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98c7ad60ec
[ssh.h atomicio.c] - int atomicio -> ssize_t (for alpha). ok deraadt@ [auth-rsa.c] - delay MD5 computation until client sends response, free() early, cleanup. [cipher.c] - void* -> unsigned char*, ok niels@ [hostfile.c] - remove unused variable 'len'. fix comments. - remove unused variable [log-client.c log-server.c] - rename a cpp symbol, to avoid param.h collision [packet.c] - missing xfree() - getsockname() requires initialized tolen; andy@guildsoftware.com - use getpeername() in packet_connection_is_on_socket(), fixes sshd -i; from Holger.Trapp@Informatik.TU-Chemnitz.DE [pty.c pty.h] - register cleanup for pty earlier. move code for pty-owner handling to pty.c ok provos@, dugsong@ [readconf.c] - turn off x11-fwd for the client, too. [rsa.c] - PKCS#1 padding [scp.c] - allow '.' in usernames; from jedgar@fxp.org [servconf.c] - typo: ignore_user_known_hosts int->flag; naddy@mips.rhein-neckar.de - sync with sshd_config [ssh-keygen.c] - enable ssh-keygen -l -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts, ok deraadt@ [ssh.1] - Change invalid 'CHAT' loglevel to 'VERBOSE' [ssh.c] - suppress AAAA query host when '-4' is used; from shin@nd.net.fujitsu.co.jp - turn off x11-fwd for the client, too. [sshconnect.c] - missing xfree() - retry rresvport_af(), too. from sumikawa@ebina.hitachi.co.jp. - read error vs. "Connection closed by remote host" [sshd.8] - ie. -> i.e., - do not link to a commercial page.. - sync with sshd_config [sshd.c] - no need for poll.h; from bright@wintelcom.net - log with level log() not fatal() if peer behaves badly. - don't panic if client behaves strange. ok deraadt@ - make no-port-forwarding for RSA keys deny both -L and -R style fwding - delay close() of pty until the pty has been chowned back to root - oops, fix comment, too. - missing xfree() - move XAUTHORITY to subdir. ok dugsong@. fixes debian bug #57907, too. (http://cgi.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?archive=no&bug=57907) - register cleanup for pty earlier. move code for pty-owner handling to pty.c ok provos@, dugsong@ - create x11 cookie file - fix pr 1113, fclose() -> pclose(), todo: remote popen() - version 1.2.3 - Cleaned up
327 lines
7.7 KiB
C
327 lines
7.7 KiB
C
/*
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*
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* cipher.c
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*
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* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
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*
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* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
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* All rights reserved
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*
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* Created: Wed Apr 19 17:41:39 1995 ylo
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*
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*/
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#include "includes.h"
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RCSID("$Id: cipher.c,v 1.13 2000/03/09 10:27:50 damien Exp $");
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#include "ssh.h"
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#include "cipher.h"
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#include "config.h"
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#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
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#include <openssl/md5.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef HAVE_SSL
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#include <ssl/md5.h>
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#endif
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/*
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* What kind of tripple DES are these 2 routines?
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*
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* Why is there a redundant initialization vector?
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*
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* If only iv3 was used, then, this would till effect have been
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* outer-cbc. However, there is also a private iv1 == iv2 which
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* perhaps makes differential analysis easier. On the other hand, the
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* private iv1 probably makes the CRC-32 attack ineffective. This is a
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* result of that there is no longer any known iv1 to use when
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* choosing the X block.
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*/
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void
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SSH_3CBC_ENCRYPT(des_key_schedule ks1,
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des_key_schedule ks2, des_cblock * iv2,
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des_key_schedule ks3, des_cblock * iv3,
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unsigned char *dest, unsigned char *src,
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unsigned int len)
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{
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des_cblock iv1;
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memcpy(&iv1, iv2, 8);
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des_cbc_encrypt(src, dest, len, ks1, &iv1, DES_ENCRYPT);
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memcpy(&iv1, dest + len - 8, 8);
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des_cbc_encrypt(dest, dest, len, ks2, iv2, DES_DECRYPT);
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memcpy(iv2, &iv1, 8); /* Note how iv1 == iv2 on entry and exit. */
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des_cbc_encrypt(dest, dest, len, ks3, iv3, DES_ENCRYPT);
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memcpy(iv3, dest + len - 8, 8);
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}
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void
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SSH_3CBC_DECRYPT(des_key_schedule ks1,
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des_key_schedule ks2, des_cblock * iv2,
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des_key_schedule ks3, des_cblock * iv3,
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unsigned char *dest, unsigned char *src,
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unsigned int len)
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{
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des_cblock iv1;
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memcpy(&iv1, iv2, 8);
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des_cbc_encrypt(src, dest, len, ks3, iv3, DES_DECRYPT);
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memcpy(iv3, src + len - 8, 8);
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des_cbc_encrypt(dest, dest, len, ks2, iv2, DES_ENCRYPT);
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memcpy(iv2, dest + len - 8, 8);
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des_cbc_encrypt(dest, dest, len, ks1, &iv1, DES_DECRYPT);
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/* memcpy(&iv1, iv2, 8); */
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/* Note how iv1 == iv2 on entry and exit. */
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}
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/*
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* SSH uses a variation on Blowfish, all bytes must be swapped before
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* and after encryption/decryption. Thus the swap_bytes stuff (yuk).
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*/
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static void
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swap_bytes(const unsigned char *src, unsigned char *dst_, int n)
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{
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/* dst must be properly aligned. */
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u_int32_t *dst = (u_int32_t *) dst_;
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union {
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u_int32_t i;
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char c[4];
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} t;
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/* Process 8 bytes every lap. */
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for (n = n / 8; n > 0; n--) {
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t.c[3] = *src++;
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t.c[2] = *src++;
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t.c[1] = *src++;
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t.c[0] = *src++;
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*dst++ = t.i;
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t.c[3] = *src++;
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t.c[2] = *src++;
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t.c[1] = *src++;
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t.c[0] = *src++;
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*dst++ = t.i;
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}
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}
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void (*cipher_attack_detected) (const char *fmt,...) = fatal;
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static inline void
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detect_cbc_attack(const unsigned char *src,
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unsigned int len)
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{
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return;
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log("CRC-32 CBC insertion attack detected");
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cipher_attack_detected("CRC-32 CBC insertion attack detected");
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}
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/*
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* Names of all encryption algorithms.
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* These must match the numbers defined in cipher.h.
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*/
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static char *cipher_names[] =
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{
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"none",
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"idea",
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"des",
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"3des",
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"tss",
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"rc4",
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"blowfish"
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};
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/*
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* Returns a bit mask indicating which ciphers are supported by this
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* implementation. The bit mask has the corresponding bit set of each
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* supported cipher.
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*/
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unsigned int
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cipher_mask()
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{
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unsigned int mask = 0;
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mask |= 1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES; /* Mandatory */
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mask |= 1 << SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH;
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return mask;
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}
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/* Returns the name of the cipher. */
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const char *
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cipher_name(int cipher)
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{
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if (cipher < 0 || cipher >= sizeof(cipher_names) / sizeof(cipher_names[0]) ||
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cipher_names[cipher] == NULL)
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fatal("cipher_name: bad cipher number: %d", cipher);
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return cipher_names[cipher];
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}
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/*
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* Parses the name of the cipher. Returns the number of the corresponding
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* cipher, or -1 on error.
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*/
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int
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cipher_number(const char *name)
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{
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < sizeof(cipher_names) / sizeof(cipher_names[0]); i++)
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if (strcmp(cipher_names[i], name) == 0 &&
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(cipher_mask() & (1 << i)))
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return i;
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return -1;
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}
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/*
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* Selects the cipher, and keys if by computing the MD5 checksum of the
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* passphrase and using the resulting 16 bytes as the key.
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*/
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void
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cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *context, int cipher,
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const char *passphrase, int for_encryption)
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{
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MD5_CTX md;
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unsigned char digest[16];
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MD5_Init(&md);
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MD5_Update(&md, (const unsigned char *) passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
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MD5_Final(digest, &md);
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cipher_set_key(context, cipher, digest, 16, for_encryption);
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memset(digest, 0, sizeof(digest));
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memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md));
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}
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/* Selects the cipher to use and sets the key. */
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void
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cipher_set_key(CipherContext *context, int cipher,
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const unsigned char *key, int keylen, int for_encryption)
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{
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unsigned char padded[32];
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/* Set cipher type. */
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context->type = cipher;
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/* Get 32 bytes of key data. Pad if necessary. (So that code
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below does not need to worry about key size). */
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memset(padded, 0, sizeof(padded));
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memcpy(padded, key, keylen < sizeof(padded) ? keylen : sizeof(padded));
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/* Initialize the initialization vector. */
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switch (cipher) {
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case SSH_CIPHER_NONE:
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/*
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* Has to stay for authfile saving of private key with no
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* passphrase
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*/
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break;
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case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
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/*
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* Note: the least significant bit of each byte of key is
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* parity, and must be ignored by the implementation. 16
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* bytes of key are used (first and last keys are the same).
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*/
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if (keylen < 16)
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error("Key length %d is insufficient for 3DES.", keylen);
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des_set_key((void *) padded, context->u.des3.key1);
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des_set_key((void *) (padded + 8), context->u.des3.key2);
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if (keylen <= 16)
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des_set_key((void *) padded, context->u.des3.key3);
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else
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des_set_key((void *) (padded + 16), context->u.des3.key3);
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memset(context->u.des3.iv2, 0, sizeof(context->u.des3.iv2));
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memset(context->u.des3.iv3, 0, sizeof(context->u.des3.iv3));
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break;
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case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
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BF_set_key(&context->u.bf.key, keylen, padded);
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memset(context->u.bf.iv, 0, 8);
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break;
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default:
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fatal("cipher_set_key: unknown cipher: %s", cipher_name(cipher));
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}
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memset(padded, 0, sizeof(padded));
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}
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/* Encrypts data using the cipher. */
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void
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cipher_encrypt(CipherContext *context, unsigned char *dest,
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const unsigned char *src, unsigned int len)
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{
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if ((len & 7) != 0)
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fatal("cipher_encrypt: bad plaintext length %d", len);
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switch (context->type) {
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case SSH_CIPHER_NONE:
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memcpy(dest, src, len);
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break;
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case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
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SSH_3CBC_ENCRYPT(context->u.des3.key1,
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context->u.des3.key2, &context->u.des3.iv2,
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context->u.des3.key3, &context->u.des3.iv3,
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dest, (unsigned char *) src, len);
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break;
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case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
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swap_bytes(src, dest, len);
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BF_cbc_encrypt(dest, dest, len,
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&context->u.bf.key, context->u.bf.iv,
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BF_ENCRYPT);
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swap_bytes(dest, dest, len);
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break;
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default:
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fatal("cipher_encrypt: unknown cipher: %s", cipher_name(context->type));
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}
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}
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/* Decrypts data using the cipher. */
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void
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cipher_decrypt(CipherContext *context, unsigned char *dest,
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const unsigned char *src, unsigned int len)
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{
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if ((len & 7) != 0)
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fatal("cipher_decrypt: bad ciphertext length %d", len);
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switch (context->type) {
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case SSH_CIPHER_NONE:
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memcpy(dest, src, len);
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break;
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case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
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/* CRC-32 attack? */
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SSH_3CBC_DECRYPT(context->u.des3.key1,
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context->u.des3.key2, &context->u.des3.iv2,
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context->u.des3.key3, &context->u.des3.iv3,
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dest, (unsigned char *) src, len);
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break;
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case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
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detect_cbc_attack(src, len);
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swap_bytes(src, dest, len);
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BF_cbc_encrypt((void *) dest, dest, len,
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&context->u.bf.key, context->u.bf.iv,
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BF_DECRYPT);
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swap_bytes(dest, dest, len);
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break;
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default:
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fatal("cipher_decrypt: unknown cipher: %s", cipher_name(context->type));
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}
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}
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