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- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 02:59:57 [session.c] print hostname (not hushlogin) - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 13:18:48 [authfile.c ssh-add.c] enable ssh-add -d for DSA keys - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 13:20:49 [sftp-server.c] cleanup - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/06 03:46:41 [authfile.h] prototype - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:27:56 [ALL] cleanup copyright notices on all files. I have attempted to be accurate with the details. everything is now under Tatu's licence (which I copied from his readme), and/or the core-sdi bsd-ish thing for deattack, or various openbsd developers under a 2-term bsd licence. We're not changing any rules, just being accurate. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:40:30 [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c serverloop.c ssh.c] cleanup window and packet sizes for ssh2 flow control; ok niels - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:53:00 [scp.c] typo - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 15:13:37 [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rsa.c auth.c] [authfile.h canohost.c channels.h compat.c hostfile.h log.c match.h] [pty.c readconf.c] some more Copyright fixes - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/08 03:02:51 [README.openssh2] bye bye - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/11 18:38:33 [LICENCE cipher.c] a few more comments about it being ARC4 not RC4 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/12 14:53:11 [log-client.c log-server.c log.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c] multiple debug levels - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/14 14:25:15 [clientloop.c] typo - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/15 01:13:51 [ssh-agent.c] check return value for setenv(3) for failure, and deal appropriately
140 lines
3.5 KiB
C
140 lines
3.5 KiB
C
/*
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* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
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* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
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* All rights reserved
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* Simple pattern matching, with '*' and '?' as wildcards.
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*
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* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
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* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
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* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
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* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
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* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
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*/
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#include "includes.h"
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RCSID("$OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.9 2000/09/07 20:27:52 deraadt Exp $");
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#include "ssh.h"
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/*
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* Returns true if the given string matches the pattern (which may contain ?
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* and * as wildcards), and zero if it does not match.
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*/
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int
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match_pattern(const char *s, const char *pattern)
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{
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for (;;) {
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/* If at end of pattern, accept if also at end of string. */
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if (!*pattern)
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return !*s;
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if (*pattern == '*') {
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/* Skip the asterisk. */
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pattern++;
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/* If at end of pattern, accept immediately. */
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if (!*pattern)
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return 1;
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/* If next character in pattern is known, optimize. */
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if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != '*') {
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/*
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* Look instances of the next character in
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* pattern, and try to match starting from
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* those.
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*/
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for (; *s; s++)
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if (*s == *pattern &&
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match_pattern(s + 1, pattern + 1))
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return 1;
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/* Failed. */
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Move ahead one character at a time and try to
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* match at each position.
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*/
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for (; *s; s++)
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if (match_pattern(s, pattern))
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return 1;
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/* Failed. */
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* There must be at least one more character in the string.
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* If we are at the end, fail.
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*/
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if (!*s)
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return 0;
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/* Check if the next character of the string is acceptable. */
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if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != *s)
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return 0;
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/* Move to the next character, both in string and in pattern. */
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s++;
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pattern++;
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}
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/* NOTREACHED */
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}
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/*
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* Tries to match the host name (which must be in all lowercase) against the
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* comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to
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* indicate negation). Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is
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* a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all.
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*/
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int
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match_hostname(const char *host, const char *pattern, unsigned int len)
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{
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char sub[1024];
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int negated;
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int got_positive;
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unsigned int i, subi;
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got_positive = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < len;) {
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/* Check if the subpattern is negated. */
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if (pattern[i] == '!') {
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negated = 1;
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i++;
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} else
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negated = 0;
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/*
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* Extract the subpattern up to a comma or end. Convert the
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* subpattern to lowercase.
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*/
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for (subi = 0;
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i < len && subi < sizeof(sub) - 1 && pattern[i] != ',';
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subi++, i++)
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sub[subi] = isupper(pattern[i]) ? tolower(pattern[i]) : pattern[i];
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/* If subpattern too long, return failure (no match). */
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if (subi >= sizeof(sub) - 1)
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return 0;
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/* If the subpattern was terminated by a comma, skip the comma. */
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if (i < len && pattern[i] == ',')
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i++;
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/* Null-terminate the subpattern. */
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sub[subi] = '\0';
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/* Try to match the subpattern against the host name. */
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if (match_pattern(host, sub)) {
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if (negated)
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return -1; /* Negative */
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else
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got_positive = 1; /* Positive */
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}
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}
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/*
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* Return success if got a positive match. If there was a negative
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* match, we have already returned -1 and never get here.
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*/
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return got_positive;
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}
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