openssh/sshconnect.h
Damien Miller 0faf747e2f - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/16 02:31:47
[readconf.c readconf.h roaming_client.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh_config.5]
     [sshconnect.c sshconnect.h]
     Implement client-side hostname canonicalisation to allow an explicit
     search path of domain suffixes to use to convert unqualified host names
     to fully-qualified ones for host key matching.
     This is particularly useful for host certificates, which would otherwise
     need to list unqualified names alongside fully-qualified ones (and this
     causes a number of problems).
     "looks fine" markus@
2013-10-17 11:47:23 +11:00

76 lines
2.6 KiB
C

/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.28 2013/10/16 02:31:47 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
typedef struct Sensitive Sensitive;
struct Sensitive {
Key **keys;
int nkeys;
int external_keysign;
};
struct addrinfo;
int ssh_connect(const char *, struct addrinfo *, struct sockaddr_storage *,
u_short, int, int, int *, int, int);
void ssh_kill_proxy_command(void);
void ssh_login(Sensitive *, const char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short,
struct passwd *, int);
void ssh_exchange_identification(int);
int verify_host_key(char *, struct sockaddr *, Key *);
void get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short,
char **, char **);
void ssh_kex(char *, struct sockaddr *);
void ssh_kex2(char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short);
void ssh_userauth1(const char *, const char *, char *, Sensitive *);
void ssh_userauth2(const char *, const char *, char *, Sensitive *);
void ssh_put_password(char *);
int ssh_local_cmd(const char *);
/*
* Macros to raise/lower permissions.
*/
#define PRIV_START do { \
int save_errno = errno; \
if (seteuid(original_effective_uid) != 0) \
fatal("PRIV_START: seteuid: %s", \
strerror(errno)); \
errno = save_errno; \
} while (0)
#define PRIV_END do { \
int save_errno = errno; \
if (seteuid(original_real_uid) != 0) \
fatal("PRIV_END: seteuid: %s", \
strerror(errno)); \
errno = save_errno; \
} while (0)