openssh/auth2-pubkeyfile.c
dtucker@openbsd.org fc7f8f2188
upstream: Remove unused compat.h includes.
We've previously removed a lot of the really old compatibility code,
and with it went the need to include compat.h in most of the files that
have it.

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5af8baa194be00a3092d17598e88a5b29f7ea2b4
2023-03-05 19:27:31 +11:00

501 lines
14 KiB
C

/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkeyfile.c,v 1.4 2023/03/05 05:34:09 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "ssh.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
int
auth_authorise_keyopts(struct passwd *pw, struct sshauthopt *opts,
int allow_cert_authority, const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host,
const char *loc)
{
time_t now = time(NULL);
char buf[64];
/*
* Check keys/principals file expiry time.
* NB. validity interval in certificate is handled elsewhere.
*/
if (opts->valid_before && now > 0 &&
opts->valid_before < (uint64_t)now) {
format_absolute_time(opts->valid_before, buf, sizeof(buf));
debug("%s: entry expired at %s", loc, buf);
auth_debug_add("%s: entry expired at %s", loc, buf);
return -1;
}
/* Consistency checks */
if (opts->cert_principals != NULL && !opts->cert_authority) {
debug("%s: principals on non-CA key", loc);
auth_debug_add("%s: principals on non-CA key", loc);
/* deny access */
return -1;
}
/* cert-authority flag isn't valid in authorized_principals files */
if (!allow_cert_authority && opts->cert_authority) {
debug("%s: cert-authority flag invalid here", loc);
auth_debug_add("%s: cert-authority flag invalid here", loc);
/* deny access */
return -1;
}
/* Perform from= checks */
if (opts->required_from_host_keys != NULL) {
switch (match_host_and_ip(remote_host, remote_ip,
opts->required_from_host_keys )) {
case 1:
/* Host name matches. */
break;
case -1:
default:
debug("%s: invalid from criteria", loc);
auth_debug_add("%s: invalid from criteria", loc);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 0:
logit("%s: Authentication tried for %.100s with "
"correct key but not from a permitted "
"host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s, required=%.200s).",
loc, pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip,
opts->required_from_host_keys);
auth_debug_add("%s: Your host '%.200s' is not "
"permitted to use this key for login.",
loc, remote_host);
/* deny access */
return -1;
}
}
/* Check source-address restriction from certificate */
if (opts->required_from_host_cert != NULL) {
switch (addr_match_cidr_list(remote_ip,
opts->required_from_host_cert)) {
case 1:
/* accepted */
break;
case -1:
default:
/* invalid */
error("%s: Certificate source-address invalid", loc);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 0:
logit("%s: Authentication tried for %.100s with valid "
"certificate but not from a permitted source "
"address (%.200s).", loc, pw->pw_name, remote_ip);
auth_debug_add("%s: Your address '%.200s' is not "
"permitted to use this certificate for login.",
loc, remote_ip);
return -1;
}
}
/*
*
* XXX this is spammy. We should report remotely only for keys
* that are successful in actual auth attempts, and not PK_OK
* tests.
*/
auth_log_authopts(loc, opts, 1);
return 0;
}
static int
match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
{
char *result;
u_int i;
/* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */
for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i],
principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) {
debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"",
result);
free(result);
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Process a single authorized_principals format line. Returns 0 and sets
* authoptsp is principal is authorised, -1 otherwise. "loc" is used as a
* log preamble for file/line information.
*/
int
auth_check_principals_line(char *cp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert,
const char *loc, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
u_int i, found = 0;
char *ep, *line_opts;
const char *reason = NULL;
struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
/* Trim trailing whitespace. */
ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1;
while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'))
*ep-- = '\0';
/*
* If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has
* key options.
*/
line_opts = NULL;
if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL ||
(ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) {
for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++)
;
line_opts = cp;
cp = ep;
}
if ((opts = sshauthopt_parse(line_opts, &reason)) == NULL) {
debug("%s: bad principals options: %s", loc, reason);
auth_debug_add("%s: bad principals options: %s", loc, reason);
return -1;
}
/* Check principals in cert against those on line */
for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) != 0)
continue;
debug3("%s: matched principal \"%.100s\"",
loc, cert->principals[i]);
found = 1;
}
if (found && authoptsp != NULL) {
*authoptsp = opts;
opts = NULL;
}
sshauthopt_free(opts);
return found ? 0 : -1;
}
int
auth_process_principals(FILE *f, const char *file,
const struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
char loc[256], *line = NULL, *cp, *ep;
size_t linesize = 0;
u_long linenum = 0, nonblank = 0;
u_int found_principal = 0;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
linenum++;
/* Always consume entire input */
if (found_principal)
continue;
/* Skip leading whitespace. */
for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
/* Skip blank and comment lines. */
if ((ep = strchr(cp, '#')) != NULL)
*ep = '\0';
if (!*cp || *cp == '\n')
continue;
nonblank++;
snprintf(loc, sizeof(loc), "%.200s:%lu", file, linenum);
if (auth_check_principals_line(cp, cert, loc, authoptsp) == 0)
found_principal = 1;
}
debug2_f("%s: processed %lu/%lu lines", file, nonblank, linenum);
free(line);
return found_principal;
}
/*
* Check a single line of an authorized_keys-format file. Returns 0 if key
* matches, -1 otherwise. Will return key/cert options via *authoptsp
* on success. "loc" is used as file/line location in log messages.
*/
int
auth_check_authkey_line(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
char *cp, const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host, const char *loc,
struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
int want_keytype = sshkey_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type;
struct sshkey *found = NULL;
struct sshauthopt *keyopts = NULL, *certopts = NULL, *finalopts = NULL;
char *key_options = NULL, *fp = NULL;
const char *reason = NULL;
int ret = -1;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
if ((found = sshkey_new(want_keytype)) == NULL) {
debug3_f("keytype %d failed", want_keytype);
goto out;
}
/* XXX djm: peek at key type in line and skip if unwanted */
if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
/* no key? check for options */
debug2("%s: check options: '%s'", loc, cp);
key_options = cp;
if (sshkey_advance_past_options(&cp) != 0) {
reason = "invalid key option string";
goto fail_reason;
}
skip_space(&cp);
if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
/* still no key? advance to next line*/
debug2("%s: advance: '%s'", loc, cp);
goto out;
}
}
/* Parse key options now; we need to know if this is a CA key */
if ((keyopts = sshauthopt_parse(key_options, &reason)) == NULL) {
debug("%s: bad key options: %s", loc, reason);
auth_debug_add("%s: bad key options: %s", loc, reason);
goto out;
}
/* Ignore keys that don't match or incorrectly marked as CAs */
if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
/* Certificate; check signature key against CA */
if (!sshkey_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key) ||
!keyopts->cert_authority)
goto out;
} else {
/* Plain key: check it against key found in file */
if (!sshkey_equal(found, key) || keyopts->cert_authority)
goto out;
}
/* We have a candidate key, perform authorisation checks */
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found,
SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
debug("%s: matching %s found: %s %s", loc,
sshkey_is_cert(key) ? "CA" : "key", sshkey_type(found), fp);
if (auth_authorise_keyopts(pw, keyopts,
sshkey_is_cert(key), remote_ip, remote_host, loc) != 0) {
reason = "Refused by key options";
goto fail_reason;
}
/* That's all we need for plain keys. */
if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
verbose("Accepted key %s %s found at %s",
sshkey_type(found), fp, loc);
finalopts = keyopts;
keyopts = NULL;
goto success;
}
/*
* Additional authorisation for certificates.
*/
/* Parse and check options present in certificate */
if ((certopts = sshauthopt_from_cert(key)) == NULL) {
reason = "Invalid certificate options";
goto fail_reason;
}
if (auth_authorise_keyopts(pw, certopts, 0,
remote_ip, remote_host, loc) != 0) {
reason = "Refused by certificate options";
goto fail_reason;
}
if ((finalopts = sshauthopt_merge(keyopts, certopts, &reason)) == NULL)
goto fail_reason;
/*
* If the user has specified a list of principals as
* a key option, then prefer that list to matching
* their username in the certificate principals list.
*/
if (keyopts->cert_principals != NULL &&
!match_principals_option(keyopts->cert_principals, key->cert)) {
reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal";
goto fail_reason;
}
if (sshkey_cert_check_authority_now(key, 0, 0, 0,
keyopts->cert_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL,
&reason) != 0)
goto fail_reason;
verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) "
"signed by CA %s %s found at %s",
key->cert->key_id,
(unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
sshkey_type(found), fp, loc);
success:
if (finalopts == NULL)
fatal_f("internal error: missing options");
if (authoptsp != NULL) {
*authoptsp = finalopts;
finalopts = NULL;
}
/* success */
ret = 0;
goto out;
fail_reason:
error("%s", reason);
auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
out:
free(fp);
sshauthopt_free(keyopts);
sshauthopt_free(certopts);
sshauthopt_free(finalopts);
sshkey_free(found);
return ret;
}
/*
* Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file,
* returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
*/
int
auth_check_authkeys_file(struct passwd *pw, FILE *f, char *file,
struct sshkey *key, const char *remote_ip,
const char *remote_host, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
char *cp, *line = NULL, loc[256];
size_t linesize = 0;
int found_key = 0;
u_long linenum = 0, nonblank = 0;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
linenum++;
/* Always consume entire file */
if (found_key)
continue;
/* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
cp = line;
skip_space(&cp);
if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
continue;
nonblank++;
snprintf(loc, sizeof(loc), "%.200s:%lu", file, linenum);
if (auth_check_authkey_line(pw, key, cp,
remote_ip, remote_host, loc, authoptsp) == 0)
found_key = 1;
}
free(line);
debug2_f("%s: processed %lu/%lu lines", file, nonblank, linenum);
return found_key;
}
static FILE *
auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes,
int log_missing, char *file_type)
{
char line[1024];
struct stat st;
int fd;
FILE *f;
if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
if (errno != ENOENT) {
logit("Could not open user '%s' %s '%s': %s",
pw->pw_name, file_type, file, strerror(errno));
} else if (log_missing) {
debug("Could not open user '%s' %s '%s': %s",
pw->pw_name, file_type, file, strerror(errno));
}
return NULL;
}
if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
logit("User '%s' %s '%s' is not a regular file",
pw->pw_name, file_type, file);
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
unset_nonblock(fd);
if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
if (strict_modes &&
safe_path_fd(fileno(f), file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
fclose(f);
logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line);
return NULL;
}
return f;
}
FILE *
auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
{
return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys");
}
FILE *
auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
{
return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0,
"authorized principals");
}