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openssh/jpake.c
Darren Tucker a627d42e51 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 00:13:13 
[xmalloc.h cipher.c sftp-glob.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sftp-common.c
     ssh-ecdsa.c auth2-chall.c compat.c readconf.c kexgexs.c monitor.c
     gss-genr.c cipher-3des1.c kex.c monitor_wrap.c ssh-pkcs11-client.c
     auth-options.c rsa.c auth2-pubkey.c sftp.c hostfile.c auth2.c
     servconf.c auth.c authfile.c xmalloc.c uuencode.c sftp-client.c
     auth2-gss.c sftp-server.c bufaux.c mac.c session.c jpake.c kexgexc.c
     sshconnect.c auth-chall.c auth2-passwd.c sshconnect1.c buffer.c
     kexecdhs.c kexdhs.c ssh-rsa.c auth1.c ssh-pkcs11.c auth2-kbdint.c
     kexdhc.c sshd.c umac.c ssh-dss.c auth2-jpake.c bufbn.c clientloop.c
     monitor_mm.c scp.c roaming_client.c serverloop.c key.c auth-rsa.c
     ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-keygen.c match.c channels.c
     sshconnect2.c addrmatch.c mux.c canohost.c kexecdhc.c schnorr.c
     ssh-add.c misc.c auth2-hostbased.c ssh-agent.c bufec.c groupaccess.c
     dns.c packet.c readpass.c authfd.c moduli.c]
     bye, bye xfree(); ok markus@
2013-06-02 07:31:17 +10:00

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/* $OpenBSD: jpake.c,v 1.8 2013/05/17 00:13:13 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/*
* Shared components of zero-knowledge password auth using J-PAKE protocol
* as described in:
*
* F. Hao, P. Ryan, "Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling",
* 16th Workshop on Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008
*
* http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/Research/contributions/hao-ryan-2008.pdf
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "jpake.h"
#include "schnorr.h"
#ifdef JPAKE
/* RFC3526 group 5, 1536 bits */
#define JPAKE_GROUP_G "2"
#define JPAKE_GROUP_P \
"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E088A67CC74" \
"020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F1437" \
"4FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7ED" \
"EE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3DC2007CB8A163BF05" \
"98DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB" \
"9ED529077096966D670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA237327FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
struct modp_group *
jpake_default_group(void)
{
return modp_group_from_g_and_safe_p(JPAKE_GROUP_G, JPAKE_GROUP_P);
}
struct jpake_ctx *
jpake_new(void)
{
struct jpake_ctx *ret;
ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret));
ret->grp = jpake_default_group();
ret->s = ret->k = NULL;
ret->x1 = ret->x2 = ret->x3 = ret->x4 = NULL;
ret->g_x1 = ret->g_x2 = ret->g_x3 = ret->g_x4 = NULL;
ret->a = ret->b = NULL;
ret->client_id = ret->server_id = NULL;
ret->h_k_cid_sessid = ret->h_k_sid_sessid = NULL;
debug3("%s: alloc %p", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
void
jpake_free(struct jpake_ctx *pctx)
{
debug3("%s: free %p", __func__, pctx);
#define JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(v) \
do { \
if ((v) != NULL) { \
BN_clear_free(v); \
(v) = NULL; \
} \
} while (0)
#define JPAKE_BUF_CLEAR_FREE(v, l) \
do { \
if ((v) != NULL) { \
bzero((v), (l)); \
free(v); \
(v) = NULL; \
(l) = 0; \
} \
} while (0)
JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->s);
JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->k);
JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->x1);
JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->x2);
JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->x3);
JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->x4);
JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->g_x1);
JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->g_x2);
JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->g_x3);
JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->g_x4);
JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->a);
JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->b);
JPAKE_BUF_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len);
JPAKE_BUF_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
JPAKE_BUF_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->h_k_cid_sessid, pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len);
JPAKE_BUF_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
#undef JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE
#undef JPAKE_BUF_CLEAR_FREE
bzero(pctx, sizeof(*pctx));
free(pctx);
}
/* dump entire jpake_ctx. NB. includes private values! */
void
jpake_dump(struct jpake_ctx *pctx, const char *fmt, ...)
{
char *out;
va_list args;
out = NULL;
va_start(args, fmt);
vasprintf(&out, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
if (out == NULL)
fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
debug3("%s: %s (ctx at %p)", __func__, out, pctx);
if (pctx == NULL) {
free(out);
return;
}
#define JPAKE_DUMP_BN(a) do { \
if ((a) != NULL) \
JPAKE_DEBUG_BN(((a), "%s = ", #a)); \
} while (0)
#define JPAKE_DUMP_BUF(a, b) do { \
if ((a) != NULL) \
JPAKE_DEBUG_BUF((a, b, "%s", #a)); \
} while (0)
JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->s);
JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->k);
JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->x1);
JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->x2);
JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->x3);
JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->x4);
JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->g_x1);
JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->g_x2);
JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->g_x3);
JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->g_x4);
JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->a);
JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->b);
JPAKE_DUMP_BUF(pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len);
JPAKE_DUMP_BUF(pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
JPAKE_DUMP_BUF(pctx->h_k_cid_sessid, pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len);
JPAKE_DUMP_BUF(pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
debug3("%s: %s done", __func__, out);
free(out);
}
/* Shared parts of step 1 exchange calculation */
void
jpake_step1(struct modp_group *grp,
u_char **id, u_int *id_len,
BIGNUM **priv1, BIGNUM **priv2, BIGNUM **g_priv1, BIGNUM **g_priv2,
u_char **priv1_proof, u_int *priv1_proof_len,
u_char **priv2_proof, u_int *priv2_proof_len)
{
BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new", __func__);
/* Random nonce to prevent replay */
*id = xmalloc(KZP_ID_LEN);
*id_len = KZP_ID_LEN;
arc4random_buf(*id, *id_len);
/*
* x1/x3 is a random element of Zq
* x2/x4 is a random element of Z*q
* We also exclude [1] from x1/x3 candidates and [0, 1] from
* x2/x4 candiates to avoid possible degeneracy (i.e. g^0, g^1).
*/
if ((*priv1 = bn_rand_range_gt_one(grp->q)) == NULL ||
(*priv2 = bn_rand_range_gt_one(grp->q)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: bn_rand_range_gt_one", __func__);
/*
* client: g_x1 = g^x1 mod p / server: g_x3 = g^x3 mod p
* client: g_x2 = g^x2 mod p / server: g_x4 = g^x4 mod p
*/
if ((*g_priv1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(*g_priv2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
if (BN_mod_exp(*g_priv1, grp->g, *priv1, grp->p, bn_ctx) == -1)
fatal("%s: BN_mod_exp", __func__);
if (BN_mod_exp(*g_priv2, grp->g, *priv2, grp->p, bn_ctx) == -1)
fatal("%s: BN_mod_exp", __func__);
/* Generate proofs for holding x1/x3 and x2/x4 */
if (schnorr_sign_buf(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g,
*priv1, *g_priv1, *id, *id_len,
priv1_proof, priv1_proof_len) != 0)
fatal("%s: schnorr_sign", __func__);
if (schnorr_sign_buf(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g,
*priv2, *g_priv2, *id, *id_len,
priv2_proof, priv2_proof_len) != 0)
fatal("%s: schnorr_sign", __func__);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
}
/* Shared parts of step 2 exchange calculation */
void
jpake_step2(struct modp_group *grp, BIGNUM *s,
BIGNUM *mypub1, BIGNUM *theirpub1, BIGNUM *theirpub2, BIGNUM *mypriv2,
const u_char *theirid, u_int theirid_len,
const u_char *myid, u_int myid_len,
const u_char *theirpub1_proof, u_int theirpub1_proof_len,
const u_char *theirpub2_proof, u_int theirpub2_proof_len,
BIGNUM **newpub,
u_char **newpub_exponent_proof, u_int *newpub_exponent_proof_len)
{
BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
BIGNUM *tmp, *exponent;
/* Validate peer's step 1 values */
if (BN_cmp(theirpub1, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
fatal("%s: theirpub1 <= 1", __func__);
if (BN_cmp(theirpub1, grp->p) >= 0)
fatal("%s: theirpub1 >= p", __func__);
if (BN_cmp(theirpub2, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
fatal("%s: theirpub2 <= 1", __func__);
if (BN_cmp(theirpub2, grp->p) >= 0)
fatal("%s: theirpub2 >= p", __func__);
if (schnorr_verify_buf(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g, theirpub1,
theirid, theirid_len, theirpub1_proof, theirpub1_proof_len) != 1)
fatal("%s: schnorr_verify theirpub1 failed", __func__);
if (schnorr_verify_buf(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g, theirpub2,
theirid, theirid_len, theirpub2_proof, theirpub2_proof_len) != 1)
fatal("%s: schnorr_verify theirpub2 failed", __func__);
if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new", __func__);
if ((*newpub = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(tmp = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(exponent = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
/*
* client: exponent = x2 * s mod p
* server: exponent = x4 * s mod p
*/
if (BN_mod_mul(exponent, mypriv2, s, grp->q, bn_ctx) != 1)
fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (exponent = mypriv2 * s mod p)",
__func__);
/*
* client: tmp = g^(x1 + x3 + x4) mod p
* server: tmp = g^(x1 + x2 + x3) mod p
*/
if (BN_mod_mul(tmp, mypub1, theirpub1, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (tmp = mypub1 * theirpub1 mod p)",
__func__);
if (BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, theirpub2, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (tmp = tmp * theirpub2 mod p)", __func__);
/*
* client: a = tmp^exponent = g^((x1+x3+x4) * x2 * s) mod p
* server: b = tmp^exponent = g^((x1+x2+x3) * x4 * s) mod p
*/
if (BN_mod_exp(*newpub, tmp, exponent, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (newpub = tmp^exponent mod p)", __func__);
JPAKE_DEBUG_BN((tmp, "%s: tmp = ", __func__));
JPAKE_DEBUG_BN((exponent, "%s: exponent = ", __func__));
/* Note the generator here is 'tmp', not g */
if (schnorr_sign_buf(grp->p, grp->q, tmp, exponent, *newpub,
myid, myid_len,
newpub_exponent_proof, newpub_exponent_proof_len) != 0)
fatal("%s: schnorr_sign newpub", __func__);
BN_clear_free(tmp); /* XXX stash for later use? */
BN_clear_free(exponent); /* XXX stash for later use? (yes, in conf) */
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
}
/* Confirmation hash calculation */
void
jpake_confirm_hash(const BIGNUM *k,
const u_char *endpoint_id, u_int endpoint_id_len,
const u_char *sess_id, u_int sess_id_len,
u_char **confirm_hash, u_int *confirm_hash_len)
{
Buffer b;
/*
* Calculate confirmation proof:
* client: H(k || client_id || session_id)
* server: H(k || server_id || session_id)
*/
buffer_init(&b);
buffer_put_bignum2(&b, k);
buffer_put_string(&b, endpoint_id, endpoint_id_len);
buffer_put_string(&b, sess_id, sess_id_len);
if (hash_buffer(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), EVP_sha256(),
confirm_hash, confirm_hash_len) != 0)
fatal("%s: hash_buffer", __func__);
buffer_free(&b);
}
/* Shared parts of key derivation and confirmation calculation */
void
jpake_key_confirm(struct modp_group *grp, BIGNUM *s, BIGNUM *step2_val,
BIGNUM *mypriv2, BIGNUM *mypub1, BIGNUM *mypub2,
BIGNUM *theirpub1, BIGNUM *theirpub2,
const u_char *my_id, u_int my_id_len,
const u_char *their_id, u_int their_id_len,
const u_char *sess_id, u_int sess_id_len,
const u_char *theirpriv2_s_proof, u_int theirpriv2_s_proof_len,
BIGNUM **k,
u_char **confirm_hash, u_int *confirm_hash_len)
{
BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
BIGNUM *tmp;
if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new", __func__);
if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(*k = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
/* Validate step 2 values */
if (BN_cmp(step2_val, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
fatal("%s: step2_val <= 1", __func__);
if (BN_cmp(step2_val, grp->p) >= 0)
fatal("%s: step2_val >= p", __func__);
/*
* theirpriv2_s_proof is calculated with a different generator:
* tmp = g^(mypriv1+mypriv2+theirpub1) = g^mypub1*g^mypub2*g^theirpub1
* Calculate it here so we can check the signature.
*/
if (BN_mod_mul(tmp, mypub1, mypub2, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (tmp = mypub1 * mypub2 mod p)", __func__);
if (BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, theirpub1, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (tmp = tmp * theirpub1 mod p)", __func__);
JPAKE_DEBUG_BN((tmp, "%s: tmp = ", __func__));
if (schnorr_verify_buf(grp->p, grp->q, tmp, step2_val,
their_id, their_id_len,
theirpriv2_s_proof, theirpriv2_s_proof_len) != 1)
fatal("%s: schnorr_verify theirpriv2_s_proof failed", __func__);
/*
* Derive shared key:
* client: k = (b / g^(x2*x4*s))^x2 = g^((x1+x3)*x2*x4*s)
* server: k = (a / g^(x2*x4*s))^x4 = g^((x1+x3)*x2*x4*s)
*
* Computed as:
* client: k = (g_x4^(q - (x2 * s)) * b)^x2 mod p
* server: k = (g_x2^(q - (x4 * s)) * b)^x4 mod p
*/
if (BN_mul(tmp, mypriv2, s, bn_ctx) != 1)
fatal("%s: BN_mul (tmp = mypriv2 * s)", __func__);
if (BN_mod_sub(tmp, grp->q, tmp, grp->q, bn_ctx) != 1)
fatal("%s: BN_mod_sub (tmp = q - tmp mod q)", __func__);
if (BN_mod_exp(tmp, theirpub2, tmp, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
fatal("%s: BN_mod_exp (tmp = theirpub2^tmp) mod p", __func__);
if (BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, step2_val, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (tmp = tmp * step2_val) mod p", __func__);
if (BN_mod_exp(*k, tmp, mypriv2, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
fatal("%s: BN_mod_exp (k = tmp^mypriv2) mod p", __func__);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
BN_clear_free(tmp);
jpake_confirm_hash(*k, my_id, my_id_len, sess_id, sess_id_len,
confirm_hash, confirm_hash_len);
}
/*
* Calculate and check confirmation hash from peer. Returns 1 on success
* 0 on failure/mismatch.
*/
int
jpake_check_confirm(const BIGNUM *k,
const u_char *peer_id, u_int peer_id_len,
const u_char *sess_id, u_int sess_id_len,
const u_char *peer_confirm_hash, u_int peer_confirm_hash_len)
{
u_char *expected_confirm_hash;
u_int expected_confirm_hash_len;
int success = 0;
/* Calculate and verify expected confirmation hash */
jpake_confirm_hash(k, peer_id, peer_id_len, sess_id, sess_id_len,
&expected_confirm_hash, &expected_confirm_hash_len);
JPAKE_DEBUG_BUF((expected_confirm_hash, expected_confirm_hash_len,
"%s: expected confirm hash", __func__));
JPAKE_DEBUG_BUF((peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len,
"%s: received confirm hash", __func__));
if (peer_confirm_hash_len != expected_confirm_hash_len)
error("%s: confirmation length mismatch (my %u them %u)",
__func__, expected_confirm_hash_len, peer_confirm_hash_len);
else if (timingsafe_bcmp(peer_confirm_hash, expected_confirm_hash,
expected_confirm_hash_len) == 0)
success = 1;
bzero(expected_confirm_hash, expected_confirm_hash_len);
free(expected_confirm_hash);
debug3("%s: success = %d", __func__, success);
return success;
}
/* XXX main() function with tests */
#endif /* JPAKE */
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