mirrors/openssh
0
0
Fork 0
mirror of git://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git synced 2024-11-27 05:46:36 +08:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

upstream: when writing an attestation blob for a FIDO key, record all

Browse Source 
the data needed to verify the attestation. Previously we were missing the
"authenticator data" that is included in the signature.

spotted by Ian Haken
feedback Pedro Martelletto and Ian Haken; ok markus@

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8439896e63792b2db99c6065dd9a45eabbdb7e0a
This commit is contained in:
djm@openbsd.org 2020-09-09 03:08:01 +00:00 committed by Damien Miller
parent c1c44eeecd
commit c767735241
6 changed files with 96 additions and 118 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

98
PROTOCOL.u2f
View File

@ -154,6 +154,16 @@ by trusted hardware before it will issue a certificate. To support this
case, OpenSSH optionally allows retaining the attestation information
at the time of key generation. It will take the following format:
string "ssh-sk-attest-v01"
string attestation certificate
string enrollment signature
string authenticator data (CBOR encoded)
uint32 reserved flags
string reserved string
A previous version of this format, emitted prior to OpenSSH 8.4 omitted
the authenticator data.
string "ssh-sk-attest-v00"
string attestation certificate
string enrollment signature
@ -267,87 +277,15 @@ regress testing. For this reason, OpenSSH shall support a dynamically-
loaded middleware libraries to communicate with security keys, but offer
support for the common case of USB HID security keys internally.
The middleware library need only expose a handful of functions:
#define SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR 0x00050000 /* API version */
#define SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR_MASK 0xffff0000
/* Flags */
#define SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD 0x01
#define SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD 0x04
#define SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY 0x20
/* Algs */
#define SSH_SK_ECDSA 0x00
#define SSH_SK_ED25519 0x01
/* Error codes */
#define SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL -1
#define SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED -2
#define SSH_SK_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED -3
#define SSH_SK_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND -4
struct sk_enroll_response {
uint8_t *public_key;
size_t public_key_len;
uint8_t *key_handle;
size_t key_handle_len;
uint8_t *signature;
size_t signature_len;
uint8_t *attestation_cert;
size_t attestation_cert_len;
};
struct sk_sign_response {
uint8_t flags;
uint32_t counter;
uint8_t *sig_r;
size_t sig_r_len;
uint8_t *sig_s;
size_t sig_s_len;
};
struct sk_resident_key {
uint32_t alg;
size_t slot;
char *application;
struct sk_enroll_response key;
};
struct sk_option {
char *name;
char *value;
uint8_t important;
};
/* Return the version of the middleware API */
uint32_t sk_api_version(void);
/* Enroll a U2F key (private key generation) */
int sk_enroll(uint32_t alg,
const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
struct sk_option **options,
struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response);
/* Sign a challenge */
int sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
const char *application,
const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
struct sk_sign_response **sign_response);
/* Enumerate all resident keys */
int sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks);
The SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR should be incremented for each incompatible
The middleware library need only expose a handful of functions and
numbers listed in sk-api.h. Included in the defined numbers is a
SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR that should be incremented for each incompatible
API change.
The options may be used to pass miscellaneous options to the middleware
as a NULL-terminated array of pointers to struct sk_option. The middleware
may ignore unsupported or unknown options unless the "important" flag is
set, in which case it should return failure if an unsupported option is
miscellaneous options may be passed to the middleware as a NULL-
terminated array of pointers to struct sk_option. The middleware may
ignore unsupported or unknown options unless the "required" flag is set,
in which case it should return failure if an unsupported option is
requested.
At present the following options names are supported:
@ -368,4 +306,4 @@ In OpenSSH, the middleware will be invoked by using a similar mechanism to
ssh-pkcs11-helper to provide address-space containment of the
middleware from ssh-agent.
$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.u2f,v 1.25 2020/08/31 00:17:41 djm Exp $
$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.u2f,v 1.26 2020/09/09 03:08:01 djm Exp $

6
sk-api.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: sk-api.h,v 1.10 2020/08/27 01:08:19 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: sk-api.h,v 1.11 2020/09/09 03:08:01 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
*
@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ struct sk_enroll_response {
size_t signature_len;
uint8_t *attestation_cert;
size_t attestation_cert_len;
uint8_t *authdata;
size_t authdata_len;
};
struct sk_sign_response {
@ -72,7 +74,7 @@ struct sk_option {
uint8_t required;
};
#define SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR 0x00060000 /* current API version */
#define SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR 0x00070000 /* current API version */
#define SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR_MASK 0xffff0000
/* Return the version of the middleware API */

13
sk-usbhid.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: sk-usbhid.c,v 1.25 2020/08/31 00:17:41 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: sk-usbhid.c,v 1.26 2020/09/09 03:08:01 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl
* Copyright (c) 2020 Pedro Martelletto
@ -822,6 +822,16 @@ sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
memcpy(response->attestation_cert, ptr, len);
response->attestation_cert_len = len;
}
if ((ptr = fido_cred_authdata_ptr(cred)) != NULL) {
len = fido_cred_authdata_len(cred);
debug3("%s: authdata len=%zu", __func__, len);
if ((response->authdata = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "calloc authdata failed");
goto out;
}
memcpy(response->authdata, ptr, len);
response->authdata_len = len;
}
*enroll_response = response;
response = NULL;
ret = 0;
@ -832,6 +842,7 @@ sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
free(response->key_handle);
free(response->signature);
free(response->attestation_cert);
free(response->authdata);
free(response);
}
sk_close(sk);

9
ssh-keygen.1
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.208 2020/08/27 06:15:22 jmc Exp $
.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.209 2020/09/09 03:08:01 djm Exp $
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
.Dd $Mdocdate: August 27 2020 $
.Dd $Mdocdate: September 9 2020 $
.Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
@ -520,9 +520,10 @@ Not all FIDO tokens support this option.
Currently PIN authentication is the only supported verification method,
but other methods may be supported in the future.
.It Cm write-attestation Ns = Ns Ar path
May be used at key generation time to record the attestation certificate
May be used at key generation time to record the attestation data
returned from FIDO tokens during key generation.
By default this information is discarded.
Please note that this information is potentially sensitive.
By default, this information is discarded.
.El
.Pp
The

44
ssh-keygen.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.419 2020/08/27 09:46:04 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.420 2020/09/09 03:08:01 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -3071,6 +3071,27 @@ do_download_sk(const char *skprovider, const char *device)
return ret;
}
static void
save_attestation(struct sshbuf *attest, const char *path)
{
mode_t omask;
int r;
if (path == NULL)
return; /* nothing to do */
if (attest == NULL || sshbuf_len(attest) == 0)
fatal("Enrollment did not return attestation data");
omask = umask(077);
r = sshbuf_write_file(path, attest);
umask(omask);
if (r != 0)
fatal("Unable to write attestation data \"%s\": %s", path,
ssh_err(r));
if (!quiet)
printf("Your FIDO attestation certificate has been saved in "
"%s\n", path);
}
static void
usage(void)
{
@ -3137,7 +3158,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
unsigned long long cert_serial = 0;
char *identity_comment = NULL, *ca_key_path = NULL, **opts = NULL;
char *sk_application = NULL, *sk_device = NULL, *sk_user = NULL;
char *sk_attestaion_path = NULL;
char *sk_attestation_path = NULL;
struct sshbuf *challenge = NULL, *attest = NULL;
size_t i, nopts = 0;
u_int32_t bits = 0;
@ -3593,7 +3614,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
}
} else if (strncasecmp(opts[i],
"write-attestation=", 18) == 0) {
sk_attestaion_path = opts[i] + 18;
sk_attestation_path = opts[i] + 18;
} else if (strncasecmp(opts[i],
"application=", 12) == 0) {
sk_application = xstrdup(opts[i] + 12);
@ -3715,20 +3736,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
free(fp);
}
if (sk_attestaion_path != NULL) {
if (attest == NULL || sshbuf_len(attest) == 0) {
fatal("Enrollment did not return attestation "
"certificate");
}
if ((r = sshbuf_write_file(sk_attestaion_path, attest)) != 0) {
fatal("Unable to write attestation certificate "
"\"%s\": %s", sk_attestaion_path, ssh_err(r));
}
if (!quiet) {
printf("Your FIDO attestation certificate has been "
"saved in %s\n", sk_attestaion_path);
}
}
if (sk_attestation_path != NULL)
save_attestation(attest, sk_attestation_path);
sshbuf_free(attest);
sshkey_free(public);

44
ssh-sk.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sk.c,v 1.31 2020/08/27 01:08:19 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sk.c,v 1.32 2020/09/09 03:08:02 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
*
@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ sshsk_free_enroll_response(struct sk_enroll_response *r)
freezero(r->public_key, r->public_key_len);
freezero(r->signature, r->signature_len);
freezero(r->attestation_cert, r->attestation_cert_len);
freezero(r->authdata, r->authdata_len);
freezero(r, sizeof(*r));
}
@ -419,6 +420,31 @@ make_options(const char *device, const char *user_id,
return ret;
}
static int
fill_attestation_blob(const struct sk_enroll_response *resp,
struct sshbuf *attest)
{
int r;
if (attest == NULL)
return 0; /* nothing to do */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(attest, "ssh-sk-attest-v01")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(attest,
resp->attestation_cert, resp->attestation_cert_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(attest,
resp->signature, resp->signature_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(attest,
resp->authdata, resp->authdata_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(attest, 0)) != 0 || /* resvd flags */
(r = sshbuf_put_string(attest, NULL, 0)) != 0 /* resvd */) {
error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return r;
}
/* success */
return 0;
}
int
sshsk_enroll(int type, const char *provider_path, const char *device,
const char *application, const char *userid, uint8_t flags,
@ -506,19 +532,9 @@ sshsk_enroll(int type, const char *provider_path, const char *device,
goto out;
/* Optionally fill in the attestation information */
if (attest != NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(attest,
"ssh-sk-attest-v00")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(attest,
resp->attestation_cert, resp->attestation_cert_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(attest,
resp->signature, resp->signature_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(attest, 0)) != 0 || /* resvd flags */
(r = sshbuf_put_string(attest, NULL, 0)) != 0 /* resvd */) {
error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
}
if ((r = fill_attestation_blob(resp, attest)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
*keyp = key;
key = NULL; /* transferred */