mirror of
git://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git
synced 2024-11-28 07:14:31 +08:00
upstream commit
support arguments to AuthorizedKeysCommand bz#2081 loosely based on patch by Sami Hartikainen feedback and ok markus@ Upstream-ID: b080387a14aa67dddd8ece67c00f268d626541f7
This commit is contained in:
djm@openbsd.org
Damien Miller
parent
d80fbe41a5
commit
24232a3e5a
470
auth2-pubkey.c
470
auth2-pubkey.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.49 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.50 2015/05/21 06:38:35 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
@ -65,6 +65,9 @@
|
||||
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
|
||||
#include "authfile.h"
|
||||
#include "match.h"
|
||||
#include "ssherr.h"
|
||||
#include "channels.h" /* XXX for session.h */
|
||||
#include "session.h" /* XXX for child_set_env(); refactor? */
|
||||
|
||||
/* import */
|
||||
extern ServerOptions options;
|
||||
@ -248,6 +251,288 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...)
|
||||
free(extra);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Splits 's' into an argument vector. Handles quoted string and basic
|
||||
* escape characters (\\, \", \'). Caller must free the argument vector
|
||||
* and its members.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int
|
||||
split_argv(const char *s, int *argcp, char ***argvp)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
||||
int argc = 0, quote, i, j;
|
||||
char *arg, **argv = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*argv));
|
||||
|
||||
*argvp = NULL;
|
||||
*argcp = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
|
||||
/* Skip leading whitespace */
|
||||
if (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t')
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Start of a token */
|
||||
quote = 0;
|
||||
if (s[i] == '\\' &&
|
||||
(s[i + 1] == '\'' || s[i + 1] == '\"' || s[i + 1] == '\\'))
|
||||
i++;
|
||||
else if (s[i] == '\'' || s[i] == '"')
|
||||
quote = s[i++];
|
||||
|
||||
argv = xreallocarray(argv, (argc + 2), sizeof(*argv));
|
||||
arg = argv[argc++] = xcalloc(1, strlen(s + i) + 1);
|
||||
argv[argc] = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Copy the token in, removing escapes */
|
||||
for (j = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
|
||||
if (s[i] == '\\') {
|
||||
if (s[i + 1] == '\'' ||
|
||||
s[i + 1] == '\"' ||
|
||||
s[i + 1] == '\\') {
|
||||
i++; /* Skip '\' */
|
||||
arg[j++] = s[i];
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
/* Unrecognised escape */
|
||||
arg[j++] = s[i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t'))
|
||||
break; /* done */
|
||||
else if (quote != 0 && s[i] == quote)
|
||||
break; /* done */
|
||||
else
|
||||
arg[j++] = s[i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (s[i] == '\0') {
|
||||
if (quote != 0) {
|
||||
/* Ran out of string looking for close quote */
|
||||
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Success */
|
||||
*argcp = argc;
|
||||
*argvp = argv;
|
||||
argc = 0;
|
||||
argv = NULL;
|
||||
r = 0;
|
||||
out:
|
||||
if (argc != 0 && argv != NULL) {
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
|
||||
free(argv[i]);
|
||||
free(argv);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return r;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Reassemble an argument vector into a string, quoting and escaping as
|
||||
* necessary. Caller must free returned string.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static char *
|
||||
assemble_argv(int argc, char **argv)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int i, j, ws, r;
|
||||
char c, *ret;
|
||||
struct sshbuf *buf, *arg;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (arg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
|
||||
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
|
||||
ws = 0;
|
||||
sshbuf_reset(arg);
|
||||
for (j = 0; argv[i][j] != '\0'; j++) {
|
||||
r = 0;
|
||||
c = argv[i][j];
|
||||
switch (c) {
|
||||
case ' ':
|
||||
case '\t':
|
||||
ws = 1;
|
||||
r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case '\\':
|
||||
case '\'':
|
||||
case '"':
|
||||
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, '\\')) != 0)
|
||||
break;
|
||||
/* FALLTHROUGH */
|
||||
default:
|
||||
r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (r != 0)
|
||||
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8: %s",
|
||||
__func__, ssh_err(r));
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ((i != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ' ')) != 0) ||
|
||||
(ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0) ||
|
||||
(r = sshbuf_putb(buf, arg)) != 0 ||
|
||||
(ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0))
|
||||
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ((ret = malloc(sshbuf_len(buf) + 1)) == NULL)
|
||||
fatal("%s: malloc failed", __func__);
|
||||
memcpy(ret, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
|
||||
ret[sshbuf_len(buf)] = '\0';
|
||||
sshbuf_free(buf);
|
||||
sshbuf_free(arg);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Runs command in a subprocess. Returns pid on success and a FILE* to the
|
||||
* subprocess' stdout or 0 on failure.
|
||||
* NB. "command" is only used for logging.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static pid_t
|
||||
subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
|
||||
int ac, char **av, FILE **child)
|
||||
{
|
||||
FILE *f;
|
||||
struct stat st;
|
||||
int devnull, p[2], i;
|
||||
pid_t pid;
|
||||
char *cp, errmsg[512];
|
||||
u_int envsize;
|
||||
char **child_env;
|
||||
|
||||
*child = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
debug3("%s: %s command \"%s\" running as %s", __func__,
|
||||
tag, command, pw->pw_name);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Verify the path exists and is safe-ish to execute */
|
||||
if (*av[0] != '/') {
|
||||
error("%s path is not absolute", tag);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
|
||||
if (stat(av[0], &st) < 0) {
|
||||
error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag,
|
||||
av[0], strerror(errno));
|
||||
restore_uid();
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (auth_secure_path(av[0], &st, NULL, 0,
|
||||
errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
|
||||
error("Unsafe %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], errmsg);
|
||||
restore_uid();
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Run the command; stderr is left in place, stdout is the
|
||||
* authorized_keys output.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (pipe(p) != 0) {
|
||||
error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
|
||||
restore_uid();
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
|
||||
* run cleanup_exit() code.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
restore_uid();
|
||||
|
||||
switch ((pid = fork())) {
|
||||
case -1: /* error */
|
||||
error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
|
||||
close(p[0]);
|
||||
close(p[1]);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
case 0: /* child */
|
||||
/* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */
|
||||
envsize = 5;
|
||||
child_env = xcalloc(sizeof(*child_env), envsize);
|
||||
child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
|
||||
child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
|
||||
child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
|
||||
child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
|
||||
if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL)
|
||||
child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LANG", cp);
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
|
||||
signal(i, SIG_DFL);
|
||||
|
||||
if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
|
||||
error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL,
|
||||
strerror(errno));
|
||||
_exit(1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */
|
||||
if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
|
||||
dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
|
||||
error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
|
||||
_exit(1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
|
||||
if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
|
||||
error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
|
||||
strerror(errno));
|
||||
_exit(1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
|
||||
error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
|
||||
strerror(errno));
|
||||
_exit(1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
|
||||
if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
|
||||
error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
|
||||
_exit(1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
execve(av[0], av, child_env);
|
||||
error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno));
|
||||
_exit(127);
|
||||
default: /* parent */
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
close(p[1]);
|
||||
if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
|
||||
error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
|
||||
close(p[0]);
|
||||
/* Don't leave zombie child */
|
||||
kill(pid, SIGTERM);
|
||||
while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
|
||||
;
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Success */
|
||||
debug3("%s: %s pid %ld", __func__, tag, (long)pid);
|
||||
*child = f;
|
||||
return pid;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Returns 0 if pid exited cleanly, non-zero otherwise */
|
||||
static int
|
||||
exited_cleanly(pid_t pid, const char *tag, const char *cmd)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int status;
|
||||
|
||||
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
|
||||
if (errno != EINTR) {
|
||||
error("%s: waitpid: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
|
||||
error("%s %s exited on signal %d", tag, cmd, WTERMSIG(status));
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
} else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
|
||||
error("%s %s failed, status %d", tag, cmd, WEXITSTATUS(status));
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int
|
||||
match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@ -526,144 +811,117 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
|
||||
static int
|
||||
user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
|
||||
{
|
||||
FILE *f;
|
||||
int ok, found_key = 0;
|
||||
FILE *f = NULL;
|
||||
int r, ok, found_key = 0;
|
||||
struct passwd *pw;
|
||||
struct stat st;
|
||||
int status, devnull, p[2], i;
|
||||
int i, uid_swapped = 0, ac = 0;
|
||||
pid_t pid;
|
||||
char *username, errmsg[512];
|
||||
char *username = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *keytext = NULL;
|
||||
char *tmp, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
|
||||
void (*osigchld)(int);
|
||||
|
||||
if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL ||
|
||||
options.authorized_keys_command[0] != '/')
|
||||
if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) {
|
||||
error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping");
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
|
||||
* ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
|
||||
username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user,
|
||||
"u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
|
||||
pw = getpwnam(username);
|
||||
if (pw == NULL) {
|
||||
error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
|
||||
username, strerror(errno));
|
||||
free(username);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
free(username);
|
||||
|
||||
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
|
||||
|
||||
if (stat(options.authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) {
|
||||
error("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s",
|
||||
options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (auth_secure_path(options.authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0,
|
||||
errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
|
||||
error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (pipe(p) != 0) {
|
||||
error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
|
||||
/* Prepare AuthorizedKeysCommand */
|
||||
if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
|
||||
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
|
||||
error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) {
|
||||
error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
debug3("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s %s\" as \"%s\"",
|
||||
options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, pw->pw_name);
|
||||
/* Turn the command into an argument vector */
|
||||
if (split_argv(options.authorized_keys_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
|
||||
error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" contains invalid quotes",
|
||||
command);
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (ac == 0) {
|
||||
error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
|
||||
command);
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
|
||||
tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
|
||||
"u", user_pw->pw_name,
|
||||
"h", user_pw->pw_dir,
|
||||
"t", sshkey_ssh_name(key),
|
||||
"f", key_fp,
|
||||
"k", keytext,
|
||||
(char *)NULL);
|
||||
if (tmp == NULL)
|
||||
fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__);
|
||||
free(av[i]);
|
||||
av[i] = tmp;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
|
||||
command = assemble_argv(ac, av);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
|
||||
* run cleanup_exit() code.
|
||||
* If AuthorizedKeysCommand was run without arguments
|
||||
* then fall back to the old behaviour of passing the
|
||||
* target username as a single argument.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
restore_uid();
|
||||
|
||||
switch ((pid = fork())) {
|
||||
case -1: /* error */
|
||||
error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
|
||||
close(p[0]);
|
||||
close(p[1]);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
case 0: /* child */
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
|
||||
signal(i, SIG_DFL);
|
||||
|
||||
if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
|
||||
error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
|
||||
strerror(errno));
|
||||
_exit(1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */
|
||||
if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
|
||||
dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
|
||||
error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
|
||||
_exit(1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
|
||||
if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
|
||||
error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
|
||||
strerror(errno));
|
||||
_exit(1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
|
||||
error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
|
||||
strerror(errno));
|
||||
_exit(1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
|
||||
if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
|
||||
error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
|
||||
_exit(1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
execl(options.authorized_keys_command,
|
||||
options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, NULL);
|
||||
|
||||
error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
|
||||
options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
|
||||
_exit(127);
|
||||
default: /* parent */
|
||||
break;
|
||||
if (ac == 1) {
|
||||
av = xreallocarray(av, ac + 2, sizeof(*av));
|
||||
av[1] = xstrdup(user_pw->pw_name);
|
||||
av[2] = NULL;
|
||||
/* Fix up command too, since it is used in log messages */
|
||||
free(command);
|
||||
xasprintf(&command, "%s %s", av[0], av[1]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", pw, command,
|
||||
ac, av, &f)) == 0)
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
||||
uid_swapped = 1;
|
||||
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
|
||||
|
||||
close(p[1]);
|
||||
if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
|
||||
error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
|
||||
close(p[0]);
|
||||
/* Don't leave zombie child */
|
||||
kill(pid, SIGTERM);
|
||||
while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
|
||||
;
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw);
|
||||
fclose(f);
|
||||
|
||||
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
|
||||
if (errno != EINTR) {
|
||||
error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
|
||||
error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
|
||||
options.authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status));
|
||||
if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command) != 0)
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
} else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
|
||||
error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
|
||||
options.authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status));
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Read completed successfully */
|
||||
found_key = ok;
|
||||
out:
|
||||
restore_uid();
|
||||
if (f != NULL)
|
||||
fclose(f);
|
||||
signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
|
||||
free(av[i]);
|
||||
free(av);
|
||||
if (uid_swapped)
|
||||
restore_uid();
|
||||
free(command);
|
||||
free(username);
|
||||
free(key_fp);
|
||||
free(keytext);
|
||||
return found_key;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
|
||||
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
|
||||
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
||||
.\"
|
||||
.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.200 2015/04/29 03:48:56 dtucker Exp $
|
||||
.Dd $Mdocdate: April 29 2015 $
|
||||
.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.201 2015/05/21 06:38:35 djm Exp $
|
||||
.Dd $Mdocdate: May 21 2015 $
|
||||
.Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
|
||||
.Os
|
||||
.Sh NAME
|
||||
@ -234,9 +234,21 @@ The default is not to require multiple authentication; successful completion
|
||||
of a single authentication method is sufficient.
|
||||
.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
|
||||
Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys.
|
||||
The program must be owned by root and not writable by group or others.
|
||||
It will be invoked with a single argument of the username
|
||||
being authenticated, and should produce on standard output zero or
|
||||
The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and
|
||||
specified by an absolute path.
|
||||
.Pp
|
||||
Arguments to
|
||||
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
|
||||
may be provided using the following tokens, which will be expanded
|
||||
at runtime: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %u is replaced by the
|
||||
username being authenticated, %h is replaced by the home directory
|
||||
of the user being authenticated, %t is replaced with the key type
|
||||
offered for authentication, %f is replaced with the fingerprint of
|
||||
the key, and %k is replaced with the key being offered for authentication.
|
||||
If no arguments are specified then the username of the target user
|
||||
will be supplied.
|
||||
.Pp
|
||||
The program should produce on standard output zero or
|
||||
more lines of authorized_keys output (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS in
|
||||
.Xr sshd 8 ) .
|
||||
If a key supplied by AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully authenticate
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user