openssh/packet.c

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1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* This file contains code implementing the packet protocol and communication
* with the other side. This same code is used both on client and server side.
*
- (djm) Merge OpenBSD changes: - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 02:59:57 [session.c] print hostname (not hushlogin) - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 13:18:48 [authfile.c ssh-add.c] enable ssh-add -d for DSA keys - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 13:20:49 [sftp-server.c] cleanup - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/06 03:46:41 [authfile.h] prototype - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:27:56 [ALL] cleanup copyright notices on all files. I have attempted to be accurate with the details. everything is now under Tatu's licence (which I copied from his readme), and/or the core-sdi bsd-ish thing for deattack, or various openbsd developers under a 2-term bsd licence. We're not changing any rules, just being accurate. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:40:30 [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c serverloop.c ssh.c] cleanup window and packet sizes for ssh2 flow control; ok niels - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:53:00 [scp.c] typo - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 15:13:37 [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rsa.c auth.c] [authfile.h canohost.c channels.h compat.c hostfile.h log.c match.h] [pty.c readconf.c] some more Copyright fixes - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/08 03:02:51 [README.openssh2] bye bye - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/11 18:38:33 [LICENCE cipher.c] a few more comments about it being ARC4 not RC4 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/12 14:53:11 [log-client.c log-server.c log.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c] multiple debug levels - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/14 14:25:15 [clientloop.c] typo - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/15 01:13:51 [ssh-agent.c] check return value for setenv(3) for failure, and deal appropriately
2000-09-16 10:29:08 +08:00
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
*
* SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl.
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- (djm) Merge OpenBSD changes: - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 02:59:57 [session.c] print hostname (not hushlogin) - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 13:18:48 [authfile.c ssh-add.c] enable ssh-add -d for DSA keys - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 13:20:49 [sftp-server.c] cleanup - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/06 03:46:41 [authfile.h] prototype - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:27:56 [ALL] cleanup copyright notices on all files. I have attempted to be accurate with the details. everything is now under Tatu's licence (which I copied from his readme), and/or the core-sdi bsd-ish thing for deattack, or various openbsd developers under a 2-term bsd licence. We're not changing any rules, just being accurate. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:40:30 [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c serverloop.c ssh.c] cleanup window and packet sizes for ssh2 flow control; ok niels - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:53:00 [scp.c] typo - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 15:13:37 [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rsa.c auth.c] [authfile.h canohost.c channels.h compat.c hostfile.h log.c match.h] [pty.c readconf.c] some more Copyright fixes - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/08 03:02:51 [README.openssh2] bye bye - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/11 18:38:33 [LICENCE cipher.c] a few more comments about it being ARC4 not RC4 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/12 14:53:11 [log-client.c log-server.c log.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c] multiple debug levels - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/14 14:25:15 [clientloop.c] typo - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/15 01:13:51 [ssh-agent.c] check return value for setenv(3) for failure, and deal appropriately
2000-09-16 10:29:08 +08:00
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
- (djm) Merge OpenBSD changes: - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 02:59:57 [session.c] print hostname (not hushlogin) - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 13:18:48 [authfile.c ssh-add.c] enable ssh-add -d for DSA keys - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 13:20:49 [sftp-server.c] cleanup - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/06 03:46:41 [authfile.h] prototype - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:27:56 [ALL] cleanup copyright notices on all files. I have attempted to be accurate with the details. everything is now under Tatu's licence (which I copied from his readme), and/or the core-sdi bsd-ish thing for deattack, or various openbsd developers under a 2-term bsd licence. We're not changing any rules, just being accurate. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:40:30 [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c serverloop.c ssh.c] cleanup window and packet sizes for ssh2 flow control; ok niels - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:53:00 [scp.c] typo - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 15:13:37 [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rsa.c auth.c] [authfile.h canohost.c channels.h compat.c hostfile.h log.c match.h] [pty.c readconf.c] some more Copyright fixes - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/08 03:02:51 [README.openssh2] bye bye - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/11 18:38:33 [LICENCE cipher.c] a few more comments about it being ARC4 not RC4 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/12 14:53:11 [log-client.c log-server.c log.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c] multiple debug levels - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/14 14:25:15 [clientloop.c] typo - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/15 01:13:51 [ssh-agent.c] check return value for setenv(3) for failure, and deal appropriately
2000-09-16 10:29:08 +08:00
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
#include "includes.h"
RCSID("$OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.104 2003/04/01 10:22:21 markus Exp $");
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "bufaux.h"
#include "crc32.h"
#include "getput.h"
#include "compress.h"
#include "deattack.h"
#include "channels.h"
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
#include "compat.h"
Hopefully things did not get mixed around too much. It compiles under Linux and works. So that is at least a good sign. =) 20010122 - (bal) OpenBSD Resync - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 12:45:26 GMT 2001 by markus [servconf.c ssh.h sshd.c] only auth-chall.c needs #ifdef SKEY - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 15:55:10 GMT 2001 by markus [auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c auth2.c channels.c clientloop.c dh.c dispatch.c nchan.c packet.c pathname.h readconf.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c session.c ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c ssh.h ssh1.h sshconnect1.c sshd.c ttymodes.c] move ssh1 definitions to ssh1.h, pathnames to pathnames.h - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:48:14 [sshd.8] fix typo; from stevesk@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:50:58 [ssh-dss.c] clear and free digest, make consistent with other code (use dlen); from stevesk@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 15:55:20 GMT 2001 by markus [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c auth2.c] pass the filename to auth_parse_options() - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 17:59:40 GMT 2001 [readconf.c] fix SIGSEGV from -o ""; problem noted by jehsom@togetherweb.com - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 18:20:29 [sshconnect2.c] dh_new_group() does not return NULL. ok markus@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 21:33:42 [ssh-add.c] do not loop forever if askpass does not exist; from andrew@pimlott.ne.mediaone.net - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:00:56 [servconf.c] Check for NULL return from strdelim; ok markus - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:02:07 [readconf.c] KNF; ok markus - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 9:00:33 [ssh-keygen.1] remove -R flag; ok markus@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 19:05:40 [atomicio.c automicio.h auth-chall.c auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufaux.h buffer.c canahost.c canahost.h channels.c cipher.c cli.c clientloop.c clientloop.h compat.c compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c groupaccess.c hmac.c hostfile.c kex.c key.c key.h log-client.c log-server.c log.c log.h login.c login.h match.c misc.c misc.h nchan.c packet.c pty.c radix.h readconf.c readpass.c readpass.h rsa.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c serverloop.h session.c sftp-server.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c tildexpand.c tildexpand.h ttysmodes.c uidswap.c xmalloc.c] split ssh.h and try to cleanup the #include mess. remove unnecessary #includes. rename util.[ch] -> misc.[ch] - (bal) renamed 'PIDDIR' to '_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR' to match OpenBSD tree - (bal) Moved #ifdef KRB4 in auth-krb4.c above the #include to resolve conflict when compiling for non-kerb install - (bal) removed the #ifdef SKEY in auth1.c to match Markus' changes on 1/19.
2001-01-22 13:34:40 +08:00
#include "ssh1.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
- (djm) Big OpenBSD sync: - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/30 10:27:44 [log.c] allow loglevel debug - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 11:59:57 [packet.c] hmac->mac - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:03:03 [auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c] move fake-auth from auth1.c to individual auth methods, disables s/key in debug-msg - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:16:48 ssh.c do not resolve canonname, i have no idea why this was added oin ossh - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:30:44 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c -X now reads private ssh.com DSA keys, too. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:32:34 auth-options.c clear options on every call. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:51:00 authfd.c authfd.h interop with ssh-agent2, from <res@shore.net> - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 14:20:45 compat.c use rexexp for version string matching - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 22:02:18 [kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c dh.c dh.h] First rough implementation of the diffie-hellman group exchange. The client can ask the server for bigger groups to perform the diffie-hellman in, thus increasing the attack complexity when using ciphers with longer keys. University of Windsor provided network, T the company. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 13:59:52 [auth-rsa.c auth2.c] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:00:27 [auth-options.h] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:03:27 [scp.1 scp.c] support 'scp -o' with help from mouring@pconline.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:11:35 [dh.c] Wall - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:14:40 [auth.h auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h readpass.c servconf.c servconf.h] [ssh.h sshconnect2.c sshd_config auth2-skey.c cli.c cli.h] add support for s/key (kbd-interactive) to ssh2, based on work by mkiernan@avantgo.com and me - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:27:24 [auth.c auth1.c auth2.c authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h] [myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c session.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.c] new cipher framework - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:45:21 [cipher.c] remove DES - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 03:59:20 [cipher.c cipher.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] enable DES in SSH-1 clients only - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 08:21:13 [kex.h packet.c] remove unused - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:34:46 [sshd.c] Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2; appro@fy.chalmers.se - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:59:15 [cipher.c cipher.h myproposal.h rijndael.c rijndael.h] rijndael/aes support - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:10:54 [sshd.8] more info about -V - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:12:02 [myproposal.h] prefer no compression
2000-10-14 13:23:11 +08:00
#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "mac.h"
Hopefully things did not get mixed around too much. It compiles under Linux and works. So that is at least a good sign. =) 20010122 - (bal) OpenBSD Resync - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 12:45:26 GMT 2001 by markus [servconf.c ssh.h sshd.c] only auth-chall.c needs #ifdef SKEY - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 15:55:10 GMT 2001 by markus [auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c auth2.c channels.c clientloop.c dh.c dispatch.c nchan.c packet.c pathname.h readconf.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c session.c ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c ssh.h ssh1.h sshconnect1.c sshd.c ttymodes.c] move ssh1 definitions to ssh1.h, pathnames to pathnames.h - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:48:14 [sshd.8] fix typo; from stevesk@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:50:58 [ssh-dss.c] clear and free digest, make consistent with other code (use dlen); from stevesk@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 15:55:20 GMT 2001 by markus [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c auth2.c] pass the filename to auth_parse_options() - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 17:59:40 GMT 2001 [readconf.c] fix SIGSEGV from -o ""; problem noted by jehsom@togetherweb.com - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 18:20:29 [sshconnect2.c] dh_new_group() does not return NULL. ok markus@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 21:33:42 [ssh-add.c] do not loop forever if askpass does not exist; from andrew@pimlott.ne.mediaone.net - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:00:56 [servconf.c] Check for NULL return from strdelim; ok markus - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:02:07 [readconf.c] KNF; ok markus - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 9:00:33 [ssh-keygen.1] remove -R flag; ok markus@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 19:05:40 [atomicio.c automicio.h auth-chall.c auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufaux.h buffer.c canahost.c canahost.h channels.c cipher.c cli.c clientloop.c clientloop.h compat.c compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c groupaccess.c hmac.c hostfile.c kex.c key.c key.h log-client.c log-server.c log.c log.h login.c login.h match.c misc.c misc.h nchan.c packet.c pty.c radix.h readconf.c readpass.c readpass.h rsa.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c serverloop.h session.c sftp-server.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c tildexpand.c tildexpand.h ttysmodes.c uidswap.c xmalloc.c] split ssh.h and try to cleanup the #include mess. remove unnecessary #includes. rename util.[ch] -> misc.[ch] - (bal) renamed 'PIDDIR' to '_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR' to match OpenBSD tree - (bal) Moved #ifdef KRB4 in auth-krb4.c above the #include to resolve conflict when compiling for non-kerb install - (bal) removed the #ifdef SKEY in auth1.c to match Markus' changes on 1/19.
2001-01-22 13:34:40 +08:00
#include "log.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
#define DBG(x) x
#else
#define DBG(x)
#endif
/*
* This variable contains the file descriptors used for communicating with
* the other side. connection_in is used for reading; connection_out for
* writing. These can be the same descriptor, in which case it is assumed to
* be a socket.
*/
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
static int connection_in = -1;
static int connection_out = -1;
/* Protocol flags for the remote side. */
static u_int remote_protocol_flags = 0;
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
/* Encryption context for receiving data. This is only used for decryption. */
static CipherContext receive_context;
/* Encryption context for sending data. This is only used for encryption. */
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
static CipherContext send_context;
/* Buffer for raw input data from the socket. */
Buffer input;
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
/* Buffer for raw output data going to the socket. */
Buffer output;
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
/* Buffer for the partial outgoing packet being constructed. */
static Buffer outgoing_packet;
/* Buffer for the incoming packet currently being processed. */
static Buffer incoming_packet;
/* Scratch buffer for packet compression/decompression. */
static Buffer compression_buffer;
static int compression_buffer_ready = 0;
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
/* Flag indicating whether packet compression/decompression is enabled. */
static int packet_compression = 0;
/* default maximum packet size */
int max_packet_size = 32768;
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
/* Flag indicating whether this module has been initialized. */
static int initialized = 0;
/* Set to true if the connection is interactive. */
static int interactive_mode = 0;
/* Session key information for Encryption and MAC */
Newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX];
static u_int32_t read_seqnr = 0;
static u_int32_t send_seqnr = 0;
/* Session key for protocol v1 */
static u_char ssh1_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
static u_int ssh1_keylen;
/* roundup current message to extra_pad bytes */
static u_char extra_pad = 0;
/*
* Sets the descriptors used for communication. Disables encryption until
* packet_set_encryption_key is called.
*/
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
void
packet_set_connection(int fd_in, int fd_out)
{
- (djm) Big OpenBSD sync: - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/30 10:27:44 [log.c] allow loglevel debug - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 11:59:57 [packet.c] hmac->mac - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:03:03 [auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c] move fake-auth from auth1.c to individual auth methods, disables s/key in debug-msg - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:16:48 ssh.c do not resolve canonname, i have no idea why this was added oin ossh - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:30:44 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c -X now reads private ssh.com DSA keys, too. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:32:34 auth-options.c clear options on every call. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:51:00 authfd.c authfd.h interop with ssh-agent2, from <res@shore.net> - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 14:20:45 compat.c use rexexp for version string matching - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 22:02:18 [kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c dh.c dh.h] First rough implementation of the diffie-hellman group exchange. The client can ask the server for bigger groups to perform the diffie-hellman in, thus increasing the attack complexity when using ciphers with longer keys. University of Windsor provided network, T the company. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 13:59:52 [auth-rsa.c auth2.c] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:00:27 [auth-options.h] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:03:27 [scp.1 scp.c] support 'scp -o' with help from mouring@pconline.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:11:35 [dh.c] Wall - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:14:40 [auth.h auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h readpass.c servconf.c servconf.h] [ssh.h sshconnect2.c sshd_config auth2-skey.c cli.c cli.h] add support for s/key (kbd-interactive) to ssh2, based on work by mkiernan@avantgo.com and me - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:27:24 [auth.c auth1.c auth2.c authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h] [myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c session.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.c] new cipher framework - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:45:21 [cipher.c] remove DES - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 03:59:20 [cipher.c cipher.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] enable DES in SSH-1 clients only - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 08:21:13 [kex.h packet.c] remove unused - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:34:46 [sshd.c] Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2; appro@fy.chalmers.se - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:59:15 [cipher.c cipher.h myproposal.h rijndael.c rijndael.h] rijndael/aes support - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:10:54 [sshd.8] more info about -V - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:12:02 [myproposal.h] prefer no compression
2000-10-14 13:23:11 +08:00
Cipher *none = cipher_by_name("none");
- (djm) Big OpenBSD sync: - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/30 10:27:44 [log.c] allow loglevel debug - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 11:59:57 [packet.c] hmac->mac - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:03:03 [auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c] move fake-auth from auth1.c to individual auth methods, disables s/key in debug-msg - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:16:48 ssh.c do not resolve canonname, i have no idea why this was added oin ossh - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:30:44 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c -X now reads private ssh.com DSA keys, too. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:32:34 auth-options.c clear options on every call. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:51:00 authfd.c authfd.h interop with ssh-agent2, from <res@shore.net> - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 14:20:45 compat.c use rexexp for version string matching - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 22:02:18 [kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c dh.c dh.h] First rough implementation of the diffie-hellman group exchange. The client can ask the server for bigger groups to perform the diffie-hellman in, thus increasing the attack complexity when using ciphers with longer keys. University of Windsor provided network, T the company. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 13:59:52 [auth-rsa.c auth2.c] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:00:27 [auth-options.h] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:03:27 [scp.1 scp.c] support 'scp -o' with help from mouring@pconline.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:11:35 [dh.c] Wall - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:14:40 [auth.h auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h readpass.c servconf.c servconf.h] [ssh.h sshconnect2.c sshd_config auth2-skey.c cli.c cli.h] add support for s/key (kbd-interactive) to ssh2, based on work by mkiernan@avantgo.com and me - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:27:24 [auth.c auth1.c auth2.c authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h] [myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c session.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.c] new cipher framework - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:45:21 [cipher.c] remove DES - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 03:59:20 [cipher.c cipher.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] enable DES in SSH-1 clients only - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 08:21:13 [kex.h packet.c] remove unused - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:34:46 [sshd.c] Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2; appro@fy.chalmers.se - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:59:15 [cipher.c cipher.h myproposal.h rijndael.c rijndael.h] rijndael/aes support - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:10:54 [sshd.8] more info about -V - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:12:02 [myproposal.h] prefer no compression
2000-10-14 13:23:11 +08:00
if (none == NULL)
fatal("packet_set_connection: cannot load cipher 'none'");
connection_in = fd_in;
connection_out = fd_out;
cipher_init(&send_context, none, "", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT);
cipher_init(&receive_context, none, "", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT);
newkeys[MODE_IN] = newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
if (!initialized) {
initialized = 1;
buffer_init(&input);
buffer_init(&output);
buffer_init(&outgoing_packet);
buffer_init(&incoming_packet);
}
/* Kludge: arrange the close function to be called from fatal(). */
fatal_add_cleanup((void (*) (void *)) packet_close, NULL);
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
}
/* Returns 1 if remote host is connected via socket, 0 if not. */
int
packet_connection_is_on_socket(void)
{
struct sockaddr_storage from, to;
socklen_t fromlen, tolen;
/* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */
if (connection_in == connection_out)
return 1;
fromlen = sizeof(from);
memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
if (getpeername(connection_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0)
return 0;
tolen = sizeof(to);
memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
if (getpeername(connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to, &tolen) < 0)
return 0;
if (fromlen != tolen || memcmp(&from, &to, fromlen) != 0)
return 0;
if (from.ss_family != AF_INET && from.ss_family != AF_INET6)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Exports an IV from the CipherContext required to export the key
* state back from the unprivileged child to the privileged parent
* process.
*/
void
packet_get_keyiv(int mode, u_char *iv, u_int len)
{
CipherContext *cc;
if (mode == MODE_OUT)
cc = &send_context;
else
cc = &receive_context;
cipher_get_keyiv(cc, iv, len);
}
int
packet_get_keycontext(int mode, u_char *dat)
{
CipherContext *cc;
if (mode == MODE_OUT)
cc = &send_context;
else
cc = &receive_context;
return (cipher_get_keycontext(cc, dat));
}
void
packet_set_keycontext(int mode, u_char *dat)
{
CipherContext *cc;
if (mode == MODE_OUT)
cc = &send_context;
else
cc = &receive_context;
cipher_set_keycontext(cc, dat);
}
int
packet_get_keyiv_len(int mode)
{
CipherContext *cc;
if (mode == MODE_OUT)
cc = &send_context;
else
cc = &receive_context;
return (cipher_get_keyiv_len(cc));
}
void
packet_set_iv(int mode, u_char *dat)
{
CipherContext *cc;
if (mode == MODE_OUT)
cc = &send_context;
else
cc = &receive_context;
cipher_set_keyiv(cc, dat);
}
int
packet_get_ssh1_cipher()
{
return (cipher_get_number(receive_context.cipher));
}
u_int32_t
packet_get_seqnr(int mode)
{
return (mode == MODE_IN ? read_seqnr : send_seqnr);
}
void
packet_set_seqnr(int mode, u_int32_t seqnr)
{
if (mode == MODE_IN)
read_seqnr = seqnr;
else if (mode == MODE_OUT)
send_seqnr = seqnr;
else
fatal("packet_set_seqnr: bad mode %d", mode);
}
/* returns 1 if connection is via ipv4 */
int
packet_connection_is_ipv4(void)
{
struct sockaddr_storage to;
socklen_t tolen = sizeof(to);
memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
if (getsockname(connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to, &tolen) < 0)
return 0;
if (to.ss_family == AF_INET)
return 1;
#ifdef IPV4_IN_IPV6
if (to.ss_family == AF_INET6 &&
IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&to)->sin6_addr))
return 1;
#endif
return 0;
}
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
/* Sets the connection into non-blocking mode. */
void
packet_set_nonblocking(void)
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
{
/* Set the socket into non-blocking mode. */
if (fcntl(connection_in, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0)
error("fcntl O_NONBLOCK: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
if (connection_out != connection_in) {
if (fcntl(connection_out, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0)
error("fcntl O_NONBLOCK: %.100s", strerror(errno));
}
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
}
/* Returns the socket used for reading. */
int
packet_get_connection_in(void)
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
{
return connection_in;
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
}
/* Returns the descriptor used for writing. */
int
packet_get_connection_out(void)
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
{
return connection_out;
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
}
/* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */
void
packet_close(void)
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
{
if (!initialized)
return;
initialized = 0;
if (connection_in == connection_out) {
shutdown(connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
close(connection_out);
} else {
close(connection_in);
close(connection_out);
}
buffer_free(&input);
buffer_free(&output);
buffer_free(&outgoing_packet);
buffer_free(&incoming_packet);
if (compression_buffer_ready) {
buffer_free(&compression_buffer);
buffer_compress_uninit();
}
cipher_cleanup(&send_context);
cipher_cleanup(&receive_context);
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
}
/* Sets remote side protocol flags. */
void
packet_set_protocol_flags(u_int protocol_flags)
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
{
remote_protocol_flags = protocol_flags;
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
}
/* Returns the remote protocol flags set earlier by the above function. */
u_int
packet_get_protocol_flags(void)
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
{
return remote_protocol_flags;
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
}
/*
* Starts packet compression from the next packet on in both directions.
* Level is compression level 1 (fastest) - 9 (slow, best) as in gzip.
*/
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
static void
packet_init_compression(void)
{
if (compression_buffer_ready == 1)
return;
compression_buffer_ready = 1;
buffer_init(&compression_buffer);
}
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
void
packet_start_compression(int level)
{
if (packet_compression && !compat20)
fatal("Compression already enabled.");
packet_compression = 1;
packet_init_compression();
buffer_compress_init_send(level);
buffer_compress_init_recv();
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
}
/*
* Causes any further packets to be encrypted using the given key. The same
* key is used for both sending and reception. However, both directions are
* encrypted independently of each other.
*/
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
void
packet_set_encryption_key(const u_char *key, u_int keylen,
- (djm) Big OpenBSD sync: - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/30 10:27:44 [log.c] allow loglevel debug - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 11:59:57 [packet.c] hmac->mac - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:03:03 [auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c] move fake-auth from auth1.c to individual auth methods, disables s/key in debug-msg - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:16:48 ssh.c do not resolve canonname, i have no idea why this was added oin ossh - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:30:44 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c -X now reads private ssh.com DSA keys, too. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:32:34 auth-options.c clear options on every call. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:51:00 authfd.c authfd.h interop with ssh-agent2, from <res@shore.net> - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 14:20:45 compat.c use rexexp for version string matching - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 22:02:18 [kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c dh.c dh.h] First rough implementation of the diffie-hellman group exchange. The client can ask the server for bigger groups to perform the diffie-hellman in, thus increasing the attack complexity when using ciphers with longer keys. University of Windsor provided network, T the company. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 13:59:52 [auth-rsa.c auth2.c] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:00:27 [auth-options.h] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:03:27 [scp.1 scp.c] support 'scp -o' with help from mouring@pconline.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:11:35 [dh.c] Wall - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:14:40 [auth.h auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h readpass.c servconf.c servconf.h] [ssh.h sshconnect2.c sshd_config auth2-skey.c cli.c cli.h] add support for s/key (kbd-interactive) to ssh2, based on work by mkiernan@avantgo.com and me - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:27:24 [auth.c auth1.c auth2.c authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h] [myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c session.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.c] new cipher framework - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:45:21 [cipher.c] remove DES - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 03:59:20 [cipher.c cipher.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] enable DES in SSH-1 clients only - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 08:21:13 [kex.h packet.c] remove unused - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:34:46 [sshd.c] Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2; appro@fy.chalmers.se - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:59:15 [cipher.c cipher.h myproposal.h rijndael.c rijndael.h] rijndael/aes support - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:10:54 [sshd.8] more info about -V - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:12:02 [myproposal.h] prefer no compression
2000-10-14 13:23:11 +08:00
int number)
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
{
- (djm) Big OpenBSD sync: - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/30 10:27:44 [log.c] allow loglevel debug - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 11:59:57 [packet.c] hmac->mac - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:03:03 [auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c] move fake-auth from auth1.c to individual auth methods, disables s/key in debug-msg - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:16:48 ssh.c do not resolve canonname, i have no idea why this was added oin ossh - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:30:44 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c -X now reads private ssh.com DSA keys, too. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:32:34 auth-options.c clear options on every call. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:51:00 authfd.c authfd.h interop with ssh-agent2, from <res@shore.net> - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 14:20:45 compat.c use rexexp for version string matching - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 22:02:18 [kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c dh.c dh.h] First rough implementation of the diffie-hellman group exchange. The client can ask the server for bigger groups to perform the diffie-hellman in, thus increasing the attack complexity when using ciphers with longer keys. University of Windsor provided network, T the company. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 13:59:52 [auth-rsa.c auth2.c] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:00:27 [auth-options.h] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:03:27 [scp.1 scp.c] support 'scp -o' with help from mouring@pconline.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:11:35 [dh.c] Wall - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:14:40 [auth.h auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h readpass.c servconf.c servconf.h] [ssh.h sshconnect2.c sshd_config auth2-skey.c cli.c cli.h] add support for s/key (kbd-interactive) to ssh2, based on work by mkiernan@avantgo.com and me - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:27:24 [auth.c auth1.c auth2.c authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h] [myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c session.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.c] new cipher framework - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:45:21 [cipher.c] remove DES - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 03:59:20 [cipher.c cipher.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] enable DES in SSH-1 clients only - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 08:21:13 [kex.h packet.c] remove unused - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:34:46 [sshd.c] Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2; appro@fy.chalmers.se - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:59:15 [cipher.c cipher.h myproposal.h rijndael.c rijndael.h] rijndael/aes support - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:10:54 [sshd.8] more info about -V - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:12:02 [myproposal.h] prefer no compression
2000-10-14 13:23:11 +08:00
Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_number(number);
- (djm) Big OpenBSD sync: - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/30 10:27:44 [log.c] allow loglevel debug - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 11:59:57 [packet.c] hmac->mac - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:03:03 [auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c] move fake-auth from auth1.c to individual auth methods, disables s/key in debug-msg - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:16:48 ssh.c do not resolve canonname, i have no idea why this was added oin ossh - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:30:44 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c -X now reads private ssh.com DSA keys, too. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:32:34 auth-options.c clear options on every call. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:51:00 authfd.c authfd.h interop with ssh-agent2, from <res@shore.net> - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 14:20:45 compat.c use rexexp for version string matching - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 22:02:18 [kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c dh.c dh.h] First rough implementation of the diffie-hellman group exchange. The client can ask the server for bigger groups to perform the diffie-hellman in, thus increasing the attack complexity when using ciphers with longer keys. University of Windsor provided network, T the company. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 13:59:52 [auth-rsa.c auth2.c] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:00:27 [auth-options.h] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:03:27 [scp.1 scp.c] support 'scp -o' with help from mouring@pconline.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:11:35 [dh.c] Wall - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:14:40 [auth.h auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h readpass.c servconf.c servconf.h] [ssh.h sshconnect2.c sshd_config auth2-skey.c cli.c cli.h] add support for s/key (kbd-interactive) to ssh2, based on work by mkiernan@avantgo.com and me - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:27:24 [auth.c auth1.c auth2.c authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h] [myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c session.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.c] new cipher framework - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:45:21 [cipher.c] remove DES - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 03:59:20 [cipher.c cipher.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] enable DES in SSH-1 clients only - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 08:21:13 [kex.h packet.c] remove unused - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:34:46 [sshd.c] Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2; appro@fy.chalmers.se - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:59:15 [cipher.c cipher.h myproposal.h rijndael.c rijndael.h] rijndael/aes support - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:10:54 [sshd.8] more info about -V - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:12:02 [myproposal.h] prefer no compression
2000-10-14 13:23:11 +08:00
if (cipher == NULL)
fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: unknown cipher number %d", number);
if (keylen < 20)
- (djm) Big OpenBSD sync: - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/30 10:27:44 [log.c] allow loglevel debug - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 11:59:57 [packet.c] hmac->mac - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:03:03 [auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c] move fake-auth from auth1.c to individual auth methods, disables s/key in debug-msg - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:16:48 ssh.c do not resolve canonname, i have no idea why this was added oin ossh - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:30:44 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c -X now reads private ssh.com DSA keys, too. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:32:34 auth-options.c clear options on every call. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:51:00 authfd.c authfd.h interop with ssh-agent2, from <res@shore.net> - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 14:20:45 compat.c use rexexp for version string matching - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 22:02:18 [kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c dh.c dh.h] First rough implementation of the diffie-hellman group exchange. The client can ask the server for bigger groups to perform the diffie-hellman in, thus increasing the attack complexity when using ciphers with longer keys. University of Windsor provided network, T the company. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 13:59:52 [auth-rsa.c auth2.c] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:00:27 [auth-options.h] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:03:27 [scp.1 scp.c] support 'scp -o' with help from mouring@pconline.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:11:35 [dh.c] Wall - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:14:40 [auth.h auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h readpass.c servconf.c servconf.h] [ssh.h sshconnect2.c sshd_config auth2-skey.c cli.c cli.h] add support for s/key (kbd-interactive) to ssh2, based on work by mkiernan@avantgo.com and me - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:27:24 [auth.c auth1.c auth2.c authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h] [myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c session.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.c] new cipher framework - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:45:21 [cipher.c] remove DES - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 03:59:20 [cipher.c cipher.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] enable DES in SSH-1 clients only - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 08:21:13 [kex.h packet.c] remove unused - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:34:46 [sshd.c] Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2; appro@fy.chalmers.se - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:59:15 [cipher.c cipher.h myproposal.h rijndael.c rijndael.h] rijndael/aes support - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:10:54 [sshd.8] more info about -V - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:12:02 [myproposal.h] prefer no compression
2000-10-14 13:23:11 +08:00
fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: keylen too small: %d", keylen);
if (keylen > SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH)
fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: keylen too big: %d", keylen);
memcpy(ssh1_key, key, keylen);
ssh1_keylen = keylen;
cipher_init(&send_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT);
cipher_init(&receive_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT);
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
}
u_int
packet_get_encryption_key(u_char *key)
{
if (key == NULL)
return (ssh1_keylen);
memcpy(key, ssh1_key, ssh1_keylen);
return (ssh1_keylen);
}
/* Start constructing a packet to send. */
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
void
packet_start(u_char type)
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
{
u_char buf[9];
int len;
DBG(debug("packet_start[%d]", type));
len = compat20 ? 6 : 9;
memset(buf, 0, len - 1);
buf[len - 1] = type;
buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet);
buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buf, len);
}
/* Append payload. */
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
void
packet_put_char(int value)
{
char ch = value;
buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, &ch, 1);
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
}
void
packet_put_int(u_int value)
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
{
buffer_put_int(&outgoing_packet, value);
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
}
void
packet_put_string(const void *buf, u_int len)
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
{
buffer_put_string(&outgoing_packet, buf, len);
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
}
void
packet_put_cstring(const char *str)
{
buffer_put_cstring(&outgoing_packet, str);
}
void
packet_put_raw(const void *buf, u_int len)
{
buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buf, len);
}
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
void
packet_put_bignum(BIGNUM * value)
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
{
buffer_put_bignum(&outgoing_packet, value);
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
}
void
packet_put_bignum2(BIGNUM * value)
{
buffer_put_bignum2(&outgoing_packet, value);
}
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
/*
* Finalizes and sends the packet. If the encryption key has been set,
* encrypts the packet before sending.
*/
static void
packet_send1(void)
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
{
u_char buf[8], *cp;
int i, padding, len;
u_int checksum;
u_int32_t rand = 0;
/*
* If using packet compression, compress the payload of the outgoing
* packet.
*/
if (packet_compression) {
buffer_clear(&compression_buffer);
/* Skip padding. */
buffer_consume(&outgoing_packet, 8);
/* padding */
buffer_append(&compression_buffer, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8);
buffer_compress(&outgoing_packet, &compression_buffer);
buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet);
buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buffer_ptr(&compression_buffer),
buffer_len(&compression_buffer));
}
/* Compute packet length without padding (add checksum, remove padding). */
len = buffer_len(&outgoing_packet) + 4 - 8;
- Remove references to SSLeay. - Big OpenBSD CVS update - markus@cvs.openbsd.org [clientloop.c] - typo [session.c] - update proctitle on pty alloc/dealloc, e.g. w/ windows client [session.c] - update proctitle for proto 1, too [channels.h nchan.c serverloop.c session.c sshd.c] - use c-style comments - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org [scp.c] - more atomicio - markus@cvs.openbsd.org [channels.c] - set O_NONBLOCK [ssh.1] - update AUTHOR [readconf.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.h] - default DSA key file ~/.ssh/id_dsa [clientloop.c] - typo, rm verbose debug - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org [ssh-keygen.1] - document DSA use of ssh-keygen [sshd.8] - a start at describing what i understand of the DSA side [ssh-keygen.1] - document -X and -x [ssh-keygen.c] - simplify usage - markus@cvs.openbsd.org [sshd.8] - there is no rhosts_dsa [ssh-keygen.1] - document -y, update -X,-x [nchan.c] - fix close for non-open ssh1 channels [servconf.c servconf.h ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c ] - s/DsaKey/HostDSAKey/, document option [sshconnect2.c] - respect number_of_password_prompts [channels.c channels.h servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd.8] - GatewayPorts for sshd, ok deraadt@ [ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh.1] - more doc on: DSA, id_dsa, known_hosts2, authorized_keys2 [ssh.1] - more info on proto 2 [sshd.8] - sync AUTHOR w/ ssh.1 [key.c key.h sshconnect.c] - print key type when talking about host keys [packet.c] - clear padding in ssh2 [dsa.c key.c radix.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c uuencode.c uuencode.h] - replace broken uuencode w/ libc b64_ntop [auth2.c] - log failure before sending the reply [key.c radix.c uuencode.c] - remote trailing comments before calling __b64_pton [auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh.1] [sshconnect2.c sshd.8] - add DSAAuthetication option to ssh/sshd, document SSH2 in sshd.8 - Bring in b64_ntop and b64_pton from OpenBSD libc (bsd-base64.[ch])
2000-05-07 10:03:14 +08:00
/* Insert padding. Initialized to zero in packet_start1() */
padding = 8 - len % 8;
if (!send_context.plaintext) {
cp = buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet);
for (i = 0; i < padding; i++) {
if (i % 4 == 0)
rand = arc4random();
cp[7 - i] = rand & 0xff;
rand >>= 8;
}
}
buffer_consume(&outgoing_packet, 8 - padding);
/* Add check bytes. */
checksum = ssh_crc32(buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet),
- (djm) Pick up LOGIN_PROGRAM from environment or PATH if not set by headers - (djm) OpenBSD CVS updates: - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:07:23 [ssh.c] accept remsh as a valid name as well; roman@buildpoint.com - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:17:13 [deattack.c crc32.c packet.c] rename crc32() to ssh_crc32() to avoid zlib name clash. do not move to libz crc32 function yet, because it has ugly "long"'s in it; oneill@cs.sfu.ca - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:26:08 [scp.1 scp.c] -S prog support; tv@debian.org - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:50:07 [scp.c] knf - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:57:33 [log-client.c] shorten - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 12:48:11 [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c ssh.c ssh.h] support for ~. in ssh2 - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:29:40 [crc32.h] proper prototype - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:34:44 [authfd.c authfd.h key.c key.h ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1] [ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c Makefile] [fingerprint.c fingerprint.h] add SSH2/DSA support to the agent and some other DSA related cleanups. (note that we cannot talk to ssh.com's ssh2 agents) - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:55:52 [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c] more ~ support for ssh2 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 16:21:19 [clientloop.c] oops - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:25:53 [session.c] We have to stash the result of get_remote_name_or_ip() before we close our socket or getpeername() will get EBADF and the process will exit. Only a problem for "UseLogin yes". - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:30:59 [session.c] Only check /etc/nologin if "UseLogin no" since login(1) may have its own policy on determining who is allowed to login when /etc/nologin is present. Also use the _PATH_NOLOGIN define. - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:42:43 [auth1.c auth2.c session.c ssh.c] Add calls to setusercontext() and login_get*(). We basically call setusercontext() in most places where previously we did a setlogin(). Add default login.conf file and put root in the "daemon" login class. - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/21 10:23:31 [session.c] Fix incorrect PATH setting; noted by Markus.
2000-08-23 08:46:23 +08:00
buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
PUT_32BIT(buf, checksum);
buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buf, 4);
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "packet_send plain: ");
buffer_dump(&outgoing_packet);
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
#endif
/* Append to output. */
PUT_32BIT(buf, len);
buffer_append(&output, buf, 4);
cp = buffer_append_space(&output, buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
cipher_crypt(&send_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet),
buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
buffer_dump(&output);
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#endif
buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet);
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
/*
* Note that the packet is now only buffered in output. It won\'t be
* actually sent until packet_write_wait or packet_write_poll is
* called.
*/
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
}
void
set_newkeys(int mode)
{
Enc *enc;
Mac *mac;
Comp *comp;
CipherContext *cc;
int encrypt;
debug2("set_newkeys: mode %d", mode);
if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
cc = &send_context;
encrypt = CIPHER_ENCRYPT;
} else {
cc = &receive_context;
encrypt = CIPHER_DECRYPT;
}
if (newkeys[mode] != NULL) {
debug("set_newkeys: rekeying");
cipher_cleanup(cc);
enc = &newkeys[mode]->enc;
mac = &newkeys[mode]->mac;
comp = &newkeys[mode]->comp;
memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len);
xfree(enc->name);
xfree(enc->iv);
xfree(enc->key);
xfree(mac->name);
xfree(mac->key);
xfree(comp->name);
xfree(newkeys[mode]);
}
newkeys[mode] = kex_get_newkeys(mode);
if (newkeys[mode] == NULL)
fatal("newkeys: no keys for mode %d", mode);
enc = &newkeys[mode]->enc;
mac = &newkeys[mode]->mac;
comp = &newkeys[mode]->comp;
if (mac->md != NULL)
mac->enabled = 1;
DBG(debug("cipher_init_context: %d", mode));
cipher_init(cc, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len,
enc->iv, enc->block_size, encrypt);
/* Deleting the keys does not gain extra security */
/* memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->block_size);
memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len); */
if (comp->type != 0 && comp->enabled == 0) {
packet_init_compression();
if (mode == MODE_OUT)
buffer_compress_init_send(6);
else
buffer_compress_init_recv();
comp->enabled = 1;
}
}
/*
* Finalize packet in SSH2 format (compress, mac, encrypt, enqueue)
*/
static void
packet_send2(void)
{
u_char type, *cp, *macbuf = NULL;
u_char padlen, pad;
u_int packet_length = 0;
u_int i, len;
u_int32_t rand = 0;
Enc *enc = NULL;
Mac *mac = NULL;
Comp *comp = NULL;
int block_size;
if (newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL) {
enc = &newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc;
mac = &newkeys[MODE_OUT]->mac;
comp = &newkeys[MODE_OUT]->comp;
}
block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
cp = buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet);
type = cp[5];
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "plain: ");
buffer_dump(&outgoing_packet);
#endif
if (comp && comp->enabled) {
len = buffer_len(&outgoing_packet);
/* skip header, compress only payload */
buffer_consume(&outgoing_packet, 5);
buffer_clear(&compression_buffer);
buffer_compress(&outgoing_packet, &compression_buffer);
buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet);
buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, "\0\0\0\0\0", 5);
buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buffer_ptr(&compression_buffer),
buffer_len(&compression_buffer));
DBG(debug("compression: raw %d compressed %d", len,
buffer_len(&outgoing_packet)));
}
/* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload) */
len = buffer_len(&outgoing_packet);
/*
* calc size of padding, alloc space, get random data,
* minimum padding is 4 bytes
*/
padlen = block_size - (len % block_size);
if (padlen < 4)
padlen += block_size;
if (extra_pad) {
/* will wrap if extra_pad+padlen > 255 */
extra_pad = roundup(extra_pad, block_size);
pad = extra_pad - ((len + padlen) % extra_pad);
debug3("packet_send2: adding %d (len %d padlen %d extra_pad %d)",
pad, len, padlen, extra_pad);
padlen += pad;
extra_pad = 0;
}
cp = buffer_append_space(&outgoing_packet, padlen);
if (enc && !send_context.plaintext) {
- Remove references to SSLeay. - Big OpenBSD CVS update - markus@cvs.openbsd.org [clientloop.c] - typo [session.c] - update proctitle on pty alloc/dealloc, e.g. w/ windows client [session.c] - update proctitle for proto 1, too [channels.h nchan.c serverloop.c session.c sshd.c] - use c-style comments - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org [scp.c] - more atomicio - markus@cvs.openbsd.org [channels.c] - set O_NONBLOCK [ssh.1] - update AUTHOR [readconf.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.h] - default DSA key file ~/.ssh/id_dsa [clientloop.c] - typo, rm verbose debug - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org [ssh-keygen.1] - document DSA use of ssh-keygen [sshd.8] - a start at describing what i understand of the DSA side [ssh-keygen.1] - document -X and -x [ssh-keygen.c] - simplify usage - markus@cvs.openbsd.org [sshd.8] - there is no rhosts_dsa [ssh-keygen.1] - document -y, update -X,-x [nchan.c] - fix close for non-open ssh1 channels [servconf.c servconf.h ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c ] - s/DsaKey/HostDSAKey/, document option [sshconnect2.c] - respect number_of_password_prompts [channels.c channels.h servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd.8] - GatewayPorts for sshd, ok deraadt@ [ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh.1] - more doc on: DSA, id_dsa, known_hosts2, authorized_keys2 [ssh.1] - more info on proto 2 [sshd.8] - sync AUTHOR w/ ssh.1 [key.c key.h sshconnect.c] - print key type when talking about host keys [packet.c] - clear padding in ssh2 [dsa.c key.c radix.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c uuencode.c uuencode.h] - replace broken uuencode w/ libc b64_ntop [auth2.c] - log failure before sending the reply [key.c radix.c uuencode.c] - remote trailing comments before calling __b64_pton [auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh.1] [sshconnect2.c sshd.8] - add DSAAuthetication option to ssh/sshd, document SSH2 in sshd.8 - Bring in b64_ntop and b64_pton from OpenBSD libc (bsd-base64.[ch])
2000-05-07 10:03:14 +08:00
/* random padding */
for (i = 0; i < padlen; i++) {
if (i % 4 == 0)
rand = arc4random();
cp[i] = rand & 0xff;
rand >>= 8;
}
- Remove references to SSLeay. - Big OpenBSD CVS update - markus@cvs.openbsd.org [clientloop.c] - typo [session.c] - update proctitle on pty alloc/dealloc, e.g. w/ windows client [session.c] - update proctitle for proto 1, too [channels.h nchan.c serverloop.c session.c sshd.c] - use c-style comments - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org [scp.c] - more atomicio - markus@cvs.openbsd.org [channels.c] - set O_NONBLOCK [ssh.1] - update AUTHOR [readconf.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.h] - default DSA key file ~/.ssh/id_dsa [clientloop.c] - typo, rm verbose debug - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org [ssh-keygen.1] - document DSA use of ssh-keygen [sshd.8] - a start at describing what i understand of the DSA side [ssh-keygen.1] - document -X and -x [ssh-keygen.c] - simplify usage - markus@cvs.openbsd.org [sshd.8] - there is no rhosts_dsa [ssh-keygen.1] - document -y, update -X,-x [nchan.c] - fix close for non-open ssh1 channels [servconf.c servconf.h ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c ] - s/DsaKey/HostDSAKey/, document option [sshconnect2.c] - respect number_of_password_prompts [channels.c channels.h servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd.8] - GatewayPorts for sshd, ok deraadt@ [ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh.1] - more doc on: DSA, id_dsa, known_hosts2, authorized_keys2 [ssh.1] - more info on proto 2 [sshd.8] - sync AUTHOR w/ ssh.1 [key.c key.h sshconnect.c] - print key type when talking about host keys [packet.c] - clear padding in ssh2 [dsa.c key.c radix.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c uuencode.c uuencode.h] - replace broken uuencode w/ libc b64_ntop [auth2.c] - log failure before sending the reply [key.c radix.c uuencode.c] - remote trailing comments before calling __b64_pton [auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh.1] [sshconnect2.c sshd.8] - add DSAAuthetication option to ssh/sshd, document SSH2 in sshd.8 - Bring in b64_ntop and b64_pton from OpenBSD libc (bsd-base64.[ch])
2000-05-07 10:03:14 +08:00
} else {
/* clear padding */
memset(cp, 0, padlen);
}
/* packet_length includes payload, padding and padding length field */
packet_length = buffer_len(&outgoing_packet) - 4;
cp = buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet);
PUT_32BIT(cp, packet_length);
cp[4] = padlen;
DBG(debug("send: len %d (includes padlen %d)", packet_length+4, padlen));
/* compute MAC over seqnr and packet(length fields, payload, padding) */
if (mac && mac->enabled) {
macbuf = mac_compute(mac, send_seqnr,
buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet),
buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
DBG(debug("done calc MAC out #%d", send_seqnr));
}
/* encrypt packet and append to output buffer. */
cp = buffer_append_space(&output, buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
cipher_crypt(&send_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet),
buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
/* append unencrypted MAC */
if (mac && mac->enabled)
buffer_append(&output, (char *)macbuf, mac->mac_len);
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
buffer_dump(&output);
#endif
/* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
if (++send_seqnr == 0)
log("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet);
if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
set_newkeys(MODE_OUT);
}
void
packet_send(void)
{
if (compat20)
packet_send2();
else
packet_send1();
DBG(debug("packet_send done"));
}
/*
* Waits until a packet has been received, and returns its type. Note that
* no other data is processed until this returns, so this function should not
* be used during the interactive session.
*/
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
int
packet_read_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
1999-10-27 11:42:43 +08:00
{
int type, len;
fd_set *setp;
char buf[8192];
DBG(debug("packet_read()"));
setp = (fd_set *)xmalloc(howmany(connection_in+1, NFDBITS) *
sizeof(fd_mask));
/* Since we are blocking, ensure that all written packets have been sent. */
packet_write_wait();
/* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
for (;;) {
/* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
type = packet_read_poll_seqnr(seqnr_p);
if (!compat20 && (
- Remove references to SSLeay. - Big OpenBSD CVS update - markus@cvs.openbsd.org [clientloop.c] - typo [session.c] - update proctitle on pty alloc/dealloc, e.g. w/ windows client [session.c] - update proctitle for proto 1, too [channels.h nchan.c serverloop.c session.c sshd.c] - use c-style comments - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org [scp.c] - more atomicio - markus@cvs.openbsd.org [channels.c] - set O_NONBLOCK [ssh.1] - update AUTHOR [readconf.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.h] - default DSA key file ~/.ssh/id_dsa [clientloop.c] - typo, rm verbose debug - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org [ssh-keygen.1] - document DSA use of ssh-keygen [sshd.8] - a start at describing what i understand of the DSA side [ssh-keygen.1] - document -X and -x [ssh-keygen.c] - simplify usage - markus@cvs.openbsd.org [sshd.8] - there is no rhosts_dsa [ssh-keygen.1] - document -y, update -X,-x [nchan.c] - fix close for non-open ssh1 channels [servconf.c servconf.h ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c ] - s/DsaKey/HostDSAKey/, document option [sshconnect2.c] - respect number_of_password_prompts [channels.c channels.h servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd.8] - GatewayPorts for sshd, ok deraadt@ [ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh.1] - more doc on: DSA, id_dsa, known_hosts2, authorized_keys2 [ssh.1] - more info on proto 2 [sshd.8] - sync AUTHOR w/ ssh.1 [key.c key.h sshconnect.c] - print key type when talking about host keys [packet.c] - clear padding in ssh2 [dsa.c key.c radix.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c uuencode.c uuencode.h] - replace broken uuencode w/ libc b64_ntop [auth2.c] - log failure before sending the reply [key.c radix.c uuencode.c] - remote trailing comments before calling __b64_pton [auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh.1] [sshconnect2.c sshd.8] - add DSAAuthetication option to ssh/sshd, document SSH2 in sshd.8 - Bring in b64_ntop and b64_pton from OpenBSD libc (bsd-base64.[ch])
2000-05-07 10:03:14 +08:00
type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS
|| type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE
|| type == SSH_CMSG_EOF
- Remove references to SSLeay. - Big OpenBSD CVS update - markus@cvs.openbsd.org [clientloop.c] - typo [session.c] - update proctitle on pty alloc/dealloc, e.g. w/ windows client [session.c] - update proctitle for proto 1, too [channels.h nchan.c serverloop.c session.c sshd.c] - use c-style comments - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org [scp.c] - more atomicio - markus@cvs.openbsd.org [channels.c] - set O_NONBLOCK [ssh.1] - update AUTHOR [readconf.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.h] - default DSA key file ~/.ssh/id_dsa [clientloop.c] - typo, rm verbose debug - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org [ssh-keygen.1] - document DSA use of ssh-keygen [sshd.8] - a start at describing what i understand of the DSA side [ssh-keygen.1] - document -X and -x [ssh-keygen.c] - simplify usage - markus@cvs.openbsd.org [sshd.8] - there is no rhosts_dsa [ssh-keygen.1] - document -y, update -X,-x [nchan.c] - fix close for non-open ssh1 channels [servconf.c servconf.h ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c ] - s/DsaKey/HostDSAKey/, document option [sshconnect2.c] - respect number_of_password_prompts [channels.c channels.h servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd.8] - GatewayPorts for sshd, ok deraadt@ [ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh.1] - more doc on: DSA, id_dsa, known_hosts2, authorized_keys2 [ssh.1] - more info on proto 2 [sshd.8] - sync AUTHOR w/ ssh.1 [key.c key.h sshconnect.c] - print key type when talking about host keys [packet.c] - clear padding in ssh2 [dsa.c key.c radix.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c uuencode.c uuencode.h] - replace broken uuencode w/ libc b64_ntop [auth2.c] - log failure before sending the reply [key.c radix.c uuencode.c] - remote trailing comments before calling __b64_pton [auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh.1] [sshconnect2.c sshd.8] - add DSAAuthetication option to ssh/sshd, document SSH2 in sshd.8 - Bring in b64_ntop and b64_pton from OpenBSD libc (bsd-base64.[ch])
2000-05-07 10:03:14 +08:00
|| type == SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION))
packet_check_eom();
/* If we got a packet, return it. */
if (type != SSH_MSG_NONE) {
xfree(setp);
return type;
}
/*
* Otherwise, wait for some data to arrive, add it to the
* buffer, and try again.
*/
memset(setp, 0, howmany(connection_in + 1, NFDBITS) *
sizeof(fd_mask));
FD_SET(connection_in, setp);
/* Wait for some data to arrive. */
while (select(connection_in + 1, setp, NULL, NULL, NULL) == -1 &&
(errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
;
/* Read data from the socket. */
len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (len == 0) {
log("Connection closed by %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
fatal_cleanup();
}
if (len < 0)
fatal("Read from socket failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
/* Append it to the buffer. */
packet_process_incoming(buf, len);
}
/* NOTREACHED */
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}
int
packet_read(void)
{
return packet_read_seqnr(NULL);
}
/*
* Waits until a packet has been received, verifies that its type matches
* that given, and gives a fatal error and exits if there is a mismatch.
*/
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void
packet_read_expect(int expected_type)
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{
int type;
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type = packet_read();
if (type != expected_type)
packet_disconnect("Protocol error: expected packet type %d, got %d",
expected_type, type);
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}
/* Checks if a full packet is available in the data received so far via
* packet_process_incoming. If so, reads the packet; otherwise returns
* SSH_MSG_NONE. This does not wait for data from the connection.
*
* SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT is handled specially here. Also,
* SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages are skipped by this function and are never returned
* to higher levels.
*/
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static int
packet_read_poll1(void)
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{
u_int len, padded_len;
u_char *cp, type;
u_int checksum, stored_checksum;
/* Check if input size is less than minimum packet size. */
if (buffer_len(&input) < 4 + 8)
return SSH_MSG_NONE;
/* Get length of incoming packet. */
cp = buffer_ptr(&input);
len = GET_32BIT(cp);
if (len < 1 + 2 + 2 || len > 256 * 1024)
packet_disconnect("Bad packet length %u.", len);
padded_len = (len + 8) & ~7;
/* Check if the packet has been entirely received. */
if (buffer_len(&input) < 4 + padded_len)
return SSH_MSG_NONE;
/* The entire packet is in buffer. */
/* Consume packet length. */
buffer_consume(&input, 4);
/*
* Cryptographic attack detector for ssh
* (C)1998 CORE-SDI, Buenos Aires Argentina
* Ariel Futoransky(futo@core-sdi.com)
*/
if (!receive_context.plaintext &&
detect_attack(buffer_ptr(&input), padded_len, NULL) == DEATTACK_DETECTED)
packet_disconnect("crc32 compensation attack: network attack detected");
/* Decrypt data to incoming_packet. */
buffer_clear(&incoming_packet);
cp = buffer_append_space(&incoming_packet, padded_len);
cipher_crypt(&receive_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&input), padded_len);
buffer_consume(&input, padded_len);
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#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "read_poll plain: ");
buffer_dump(&incoming_packet);
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#endif
/* Compute packet checksum. */
checksum = ssh_crc32(buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet),
buffer_len(&incoming_packet) - 4);
/* Skip padding. */
buffer_consume(&incoming_packet, 8 - len % 8);
/* Test check bytes. */
if (len != buffer_len(&incoming_packet))
packet_disconnect("packet_read_poll1: len %d != buffer_len %d.",
len, buffer_len(&incoming_packet));
cp = (u_char *)buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet) + len - 4;
stored_checksum = GET_32BIT(cp);
if (checksum != stored_checksum)
packet_disconnect("Corrupted check bytes on input.");
buffer_consume_end(&incoming_packet, 4);
if (packet_compression) {
buffer_clear(&compression_buffer);
buffer_uncompress(&incoming_packet, &compression_buffer);
buffer_clear(&incoming_packet);
buffer_append(&incoming_packet, buffer_ptr(&compression_buffer),
buffer_len(&compression_buffer));
}
type = buffer_get_char(&incoming_packet);
return type;
}
static int
packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
{
static u_int packet_length = 0;
u_int padlen, need;
u_char *macbuf, *cp, type;
int maclen, block_size;
Enc *enc = NULL;
Mac *mac = NULL;
Comp *comp = NULL;
if (newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL) {
enc = &newkeys[MODE_IN]->enc;
mac = &newkeys[MODE_IN]->mac;
comp = &newkeys[MODE_IN]->comp;
}
maclen = mac && mac->enabled ? mac->mac_len : 0;
block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
if (packet_length == 0) {
/*
* check if input size is less than the cipher block size,
* decrypt first block and extract length of incoming packet
*/
if (buffer_len(&input) < block_size)
return SSH_MSG_NONE;
buffer_clear(&incoming_packet);
cp = buffer_append_space(&incoming_packet, block_size);
cipher_crypt(&receive_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&input),
block_size);
cp = buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet);
packet_length = GET_32BIT(cp);
if (packet_length < 1 + 4 || packet_length > 256 * 1024) {
buffer_dump(&incoming_packet);
packet_disconnect("Bad packet length %u.", packet_length);
}
DBG(debug("input: packet len %u", packet_length+4));
buffer_consume(&input, block_size);
}
/* we have a partial packet of block_size bytes */
need = 4 + packet_length - block_size;
DBG(debug("partial packet %d, need %d, maclen %d", block_size,
need, maclen));
if (need % block_size != 0)
fatal("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d",
need, block_size, need % block_size);
/*
* check if the entire packet has been received and
* decrypt into incoming_packet
*/
if (buffer_len(&input) < need + maclen)
return SSH_MSG_NONE;
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "read_poll enc/full: ");
buffer_dump(&input);
#endif
cp = buffer_append_space(&incoming_packet, need);
cipher_crypt(&receive_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&input), need);
buffer_consume(&input, need);
/*
* compute MAC over seqnr and packet,
* increment sequence number for incoming packet
*/
if (mac && mac->enabled) {
macbuf = mac_compute(mac, read_seqnr,
buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet),
buffer_len(&incoming_packet));
if (memcmp(macbuf, buffer_ptr(&input), mac->mac_len) != 0)
- (djm) Big OpenBSD sync: - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/30 10:27:44 [log.c] allow loglevel debug - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 11:59:57 [packet.c] hmac->mac - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:03:03 [auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c] move fake-auth from auth1.c to individual auth methods, disables s/key in debug-msg - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:16:48 ssh.c do not resolve canonname, i have no idea why this was added oin ossh - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:30:44 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c -X now reads private ssh.com DSA keys, too. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:32:34 auth-options.c clear options on every call. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:51:00 authfd.c authfd.h interop with ssh-agent2, from <res@shore.net> - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 14:20:45 compat.c use rexexp for version string matching - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 22:02:18 [kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c dh.c dh.h] First rough implementation of the diffie-hellman group exchange. The client can ask the server for bigger groups to perform the diffie-hellman in, thus increasing the attack complexity when using ciphers with longer keys. University of Windsor provided network, T the company. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 13:59:52 [auth-rsa.c auth2.c] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:00:27 [auth-options.h] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:03:27 [scp.1 scp.c] support 'scp -o' with help from mouring@pconline.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:11:35 [dh.c] Wall - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:14:40 [auth.h auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h readpass.c servconf.c servconf.h] [ssh.h sshconnect2.c sshd_config auth2-skey.c cli.c cli.h] add support for s/key (kbd-interactive) to ssh2, based on work by mkiernan@avantgo.com and me - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:27:24 [auth.c auth1.c auth2.c authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h] [myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c session.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.c] new cipher framework - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:45:21 [cipher.c] remove DES - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 03:59:20 [cipher.c cipher.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] enable DES in SSH-1 clients only - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 08:21:13 [kex.h packet.c] remove unused - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:34:46 [sshd.c] Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2; appro@fy.chalmers.se - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:59:15 [cipher.c cipher.h myproposal.h rijndael.c rijndael.h] rijndael/aes support - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:10:54 [sshd.8] more info about -V - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:12:02 [myproposal.h] prefer no compression
2000-10-14 13:23:11 +08:00
packet_disconnect("Corrupted MAC on input.");
DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", read_seqnr));
buffer_consume(&input, mac->mac_len);
}
if (seqnr_p != NULL)
*seqnr_p = read_seqnr;
if (++read_seqnr == 0)
log("incoming seqnr wraps around");
/* get padlen */
cp = buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet);
padlen = cp[4];
DBG(debug("input: padlen %d", padlen));
if (padlen < 4)
packet_disconnect("Corrupted padlen %d on input.", padlen);
/* skip packet size + padlen, discard padding */
buffer_consume(&incoming_packet, 4 + 1);
buffer_consume_end(&incoming_packet, padlen);
DBG(debug("input: len before de-compress %d", buffer_len(&incoming_packet)));
if (comp && comp->enabled) {
buffer_clear(&compression_buffer);
buffer_uncompress(&incoming_packet, &compression_buffer);
buffer_clear(&incoming_packet);
buffer_append(&incoming_packet, buffer_ptr(&compression_buffer),
buffer_len(&compression_buffer));
DBG(debug("input: len after de-compress %d",
buffer_len(&incoming_packet)));
}
/*
* get packet type, implies consume.
* return length of payload (without type field)
*/
type = buffer_get_char(&incoming_packet);
if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
set_newkeys(MODE_IN);
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "read/plain[%d]:\r\n", type);
buffer_dump(&incoming_packet);
#endif
/* reset for next packet */
packet_length = 0;
return type;
}
int
packet_read_poll_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
{
u_int reason, seqnr;
u_char type;
char *msg;
for (;;) {
if (compat20) {
type = packet_read_poll2(seqnr_p);
if (type)
DBG(debug("received packet type %d", type));
switch (type) {
case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE:
break;
case SSH2_MSG_DEBUG:
packet_get_char();
msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
xfree(msg);
msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
xfree(msg);
break;
case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
reason = packet_get_int();
msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
log("Received disconnect from %s: %u: %.400s",
get_remote_ipaddr(), reason, msg);
xfree(msg);
fatal_cleanup();
break;
case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED:
seqnr = packet_get_int();
debug("Received SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for %u",
seqnr);
break;
default:
return type;
break;
}
} else {
type = packet_read_poll1();
switch (type) {
case SSH_MSG_IGNORE:
break;
case SSH_MSG_DEBUG:
msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
xfree(msg);
break;
case SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT:
msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
log("Received disconnect from %s: %.400s",
get_remote_ipaddr(), msg);
fatal_cleanup();
xfree(msg);
break;
default:
if (type)
DBG(debug("received packet type %d", type));
return type;
break;
}
}
}
}
int
packet_read_poll(void)
{
return packet_read_poll_seqnr(NULL);
}
/*
* Buffers the given amount of input characters. This is intended to be used
* together with packet_read_poll.
*/
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void
packet_process_incoming(const char *buf, u_int len)
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{
buffer_append(&input, buf, len);
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}
/* Returns a character from the packet. */
u_int
packet_get_char(void)
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{
char ch;
buffer_get(&incoming_packet, &ch, 1);
return (u_char) ch;
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}
/* Returns an integer from the packet data. */
u_int
packet_get_int(void)
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{
return buffer_get_int(&incoming_packet);
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}
/*
* Returns an arbitrary precision integer from the packet data. The integer
* must have been initialized before this call.
*/
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void
packet_get_bignum(BIGNUM * value)
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{
buffer_get_bignum(&incoming_packet, value);
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}
void
packet_get_bignum2(BIGNUM * value)
{
buffer_get_bignum2(&incoming_packet, value);
}
void *
packet_get_raw(int *length_ptr)
{
int bytes = buffer_len(&incoming_packet);
if (length_ptr != NULL)
*length_ptr = bytes;
return buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet);
}
int
packet_remaining(void)
{
return buffer_len(&incoming_packet);
}
/*
* Returns a string from the packet data. The string is allocated using
* xmalloc; it is the responsibility of the calling program to free it when
* no longer needed. The length_ptr argument may be NULL, or point to an
* integer into which the length of the string is stored.
*/
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void *
packet_get_string(u_int *length_ptr)
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{
return buffer_get_string(&incoming_packet, length_ptr);
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}
/*
* Sends a diagnostic message from the server to the client. This message
* can be sent at any time (but not while constructing another message). The
* message is printed immediately, but only if the client is being executed
* in verbose mode. These messages are primarily intended to ease debugging
* authentication problems. The length of the formatted message must not
* exceed 1024 bytes. This will automatically call packet_write_wait.
*/
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void
packet_send_debug(const char *fmt,...)
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{
char buf[1024];
va_list args;
if (compat20 && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DEBUG))
return;
va_start(args, fmt);
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
va_end(args);
if (compat20) {
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_DEBUG);
packet_put_char(0); /* bool: always display */
packet_put_cstring(buf);
packet_put_cstring("");
} else {
packet_start(SSH_MSG_DEBUG);
packet_put_cstring(buf);
}
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
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}
/*
* Logs the error plus constructs and sends a disconnect packet, closes the
* connection, and exits. This function never returns. The error message
* should not contain a newline. The length of the formatted message must
* not exceed 1024 bytes.
*/
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void
packet_disconnect(const char *fmt,...)
{
char buf[1024];
va_list args;
static int disconnecting = 0;
if (disconnecting) /* Guard against recursive invocations. */
fatal("packet_disconnect called recursively.");
disconnecting = 1;
/*
* Format the message. Note that the caller must make sure the
* message is of limited size.
*/
va_start(args, fmt);
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
va_end(args);
/* Display the error locally */
log("Disconnecting: %.100s", buf);
/* Send the disconnect message to the other side, and wait for it to get sent. */
if (compat20) {
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
packet_put_int(SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR);
packet_put_cstring(buf);
packet_put_cstring("");
} else {
packet_start(SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT);
packet_put_cstring(buf);
}
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
/* Stop listening for connections. */
channel_close_all();
/* Close the connection. */
packet_close();
fatal_cleanup();
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}
/* Checks if there is any buffered output, and tries to write some of the output. */
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void
packet_write_poll(void)
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{
int len = buffer_len(&output);
if (len > 0) {
len = write(connection_out, buffer_ptr(&output), len);
if (len <= 0) {
if (errno == EAGAIN)
return;
else
fatal("Write failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
}
buffer_consume(&output, len);
}
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}
/*
* Calls packet_write_poll repeatedly until all pending output data has been
* written.
*/
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void
packet_write_wait(void)
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{
fd_set *setp;
setp = (fd_set *)xmalloc(howmany(connection_out + 1, NFDBITS) *
sizeof(fd_mask));
packet_write_poll();
while (packet_have_data_to_write()) {
memset(setp, 0, howmany(connection_out + 1, NFDBITS) *
sizeof(fd_mask));
FD_SET(connection_out, setp);
while (select(connection_out + 1, NULL, setp, NULL, NULL) == -1 &&
(errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
;
packet_write_poll();
}
xfree(setp);
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}
/* Returns true if there is buffered data to write to the connection. */
int
packet_have_data_to_write(void)
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{
return buffer_len(&output) != 0;
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}
/* Returns true if there is not too much data to write to the connection. */
int
packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(void)
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{
if (interactive_mode)
return buffer_len(&output) < 16384;
else
return buffer_len(&output) < 128 * 1024;
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}
#if defined(IP_TOS) && !defined(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN)
static void
packet_set_tos(int interactive)
{
int tos = interactive ? IPTOS_LOWDELAY : IPTOS_THROUGHPUT;
if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket() ||
!packet_connection_is_ipv4())
return;
if (setsockopt(connection_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, &tos,
sizeof(tos)) < 0)
error("setsockopt IP_TOS %d: %.100s:",
tos, strerror(errno));
}
#endif
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/* Informs that the current session is interactive. Sets IP flags for that. */
void
NOTE: This update changes the RSA key generation. *NEW RSA KEYS NEED TO BE GENERATED* =) Refer to to entry "2001/01/16 19:20:06" for more details. 20010118 - (bal) Super Sized OpenBSD Resync - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/11 22:14:20 GMT 2001 by markus [sshd.c] maxfd+1 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 17:59:18 [ssh-keygen.1] small ssh-keygen manpage cleanup; stevesk@pobox.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:03:07 [scp.c ssh-keygen.c sshd.c] getopt() returns -1 not EOF; stevesk@pobox.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:06:54 [ssh-keyscan.c] use SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; from stevesk@pobox.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:12:47 [ssh-keyscan.c] free() -> xfree(); fix memory leak; from stevesk@pobox.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:14:13 [ssh-add.c] typo, from stevesk@sweden.hp.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:32:50 [packet.c session.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshd.c] split out keepalive from packet_interactive (from dale@accentre.com) set IPTOS_LOWDELAY TCP_NODELAY IPTOS_THROUGHPUT for ssh2, too. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:36:45 [packet.c packet.h] reorder, typo - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:38:00 [auth-options.c] fix comment - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:43:31 [session.c] Wall - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 19:14:08 [clientloop.h clientloop.c ssh.c] move callback to headerfile - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:40:10 [ssh.c] use log() instead of stderr - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:43:51 [dh.c] use error() not stderr! - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:45:29 [sftp-server.c] rename must fail if newpath exists, debug off by default - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:46:38 [sftp-server.c] readable long listing for sftp-server, ok deraadt@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/16 19:20:06 [key.c ssh-rsa.c] make "ssh-rsa" key format for ssh2 confirm to the ietf-drafts; from galb@vandyke.com. note that you have to delete older ssh2-rsa keys, since they are in the wrong format, too. they must be removed from .ssh/authorized_keys2 and .ssh/known_hosts2, etc. (cd; grep -v ssh-rsa .ssh/authorized_keys2 > TMP && mv TMP .ssh/authorized_keys2) additionally, we now check that BN_num_bits(rsa->n) >= 768. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/16 20:54:27 [sftp-server.c] remove some statics. simpler handles; idea from nisse@lysator.liu.se - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/16 23:58:08 [bufaux.c radix.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c] indent - (bal) Added bsd-strmode.[ch] since some non-OpenBSD platforms may be missing such feature.
2001-01-18 10:04:35 +08:00
packet_set_interactive(int interactive)
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{
NOTE: This update changes the RSA key generation. *NEW RSA KEYS NEED TO BE GENERATED* =) Refer to to entry "2001/01/16 19:20:06" for more details. 20010118 - (bal) Super Sized OpenBSD Resync - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/11 22:14:20 GMT 2001 by markus [sshd.c] maxfd+1 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 17:59:18 [ssh-keygen.1] small ssh-keygen manpage cleanup; stevesk@pobox.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:03:07 [scp.c ssh-keygen.c sshd.c] getopt() returns -1 not EOF; stevesk@pobox.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:06:54 [ssh-keyscan.c] use SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; from stevesk@pobox.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:12:47 [ssh-keyscan.c] free() -> xfree(); fix memory leak; from stevesk@pobox.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:14:13 [ssh-add.c] typo, from stevesk@sweden.hp.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:32:50 [packet.c session.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshd.c] split out keepalive from packet_interactive (from dale@accentre.com) set IPTOS_LOWDELAY TCP_NODELAY IPTOS_THROUGHPUT for ssh2, too. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:36:45 [packet.c packet.h] reorder, typo - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:38:00 [auth-options.c] fix comment - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:43:31 [session.c] Wall - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 19:14:08 [clientloop.h clientloop.c ssh.c] move callback to headerfile - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:40:10 [ssh.c] use log() instead of stderr - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:43:51 [dh.c] use error() not stderr! - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:45:29 [sftp-server.c] rename must fail if newpath exists, debug off by default - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:46:38 [sftp-server.c] readable long listing for sftp-server, ok deraadt@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/16 19:20:06 [key.c ssh-rsa.c] make "ssh-rsa" key format for ssh2 confirm to the ietf-drafts; from galb@vandyke.com. note that you have to delete older ssh2-rsa keys, since they are in the wrong format, too. they must be removed from .ssh/authorized_keys2 and .ssh/known_hosts2, etc. (cd; grep -v ssh-rsa .ssh/authorized_keys2 > TMP && mv TMP .ssh/authorized_keys2) additionally, we now check that BN_num_bits(rsa->n) >= 768. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/16 20:54:27 [sftp-server.c] remove some statics. simpler handles; idea from nisse@lysator.liu.se - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/16 23:58:08 [bufaux.c radix.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c] indent - (bal) Added bsd-strmode.[ch] since some non-OpenBSD platforms may be missing such feature.
2001-01-18 10:04:35 +08:00
static int called = 0;
NOTE: This update changes the RSA key generation. *NEW RSA KEYS NEED TO BE GENERATED* =) Refer to to entry "2001/01/16 19:20:06" for more details. 20010118 - (bal) Super Sized OpenBSD Resync - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/11 22:14:20 GMT 2001 by markus [sshd.c] maxfd+1 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 17:59:18 [ssh-keygen.1] small ssh-keygen manpage cleanup; stevesk@pobox.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:03:07 [scp.c ssh-keygen.c sshd.c] getopt() returns -1 not EOF; stevesk@pobox.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:06:54 [ssh-keyscan.c] use SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; from stevesk@pobox.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:12:47 [ssh-keyscan.c] free() -> xfree(); fix memory leak; from stevesk@pobox.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:14:13 [ssh-add.c] typo, from stevesk@sweden.hp.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:32:50 [packet.c session.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshd.c] split out keepalive from packet_interactive (from dale@accentre.com) set IPTOS_LOWDELAY TCP_NODELAY IPTOS_THROUGHPUT for ssh2, too. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:36:45 [packet.c packet.h] reorder, typo - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:38:00 [auth-options.c] fix comment - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:43:31 [session.c] Wall - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 19:14:08 [clientloop.h clientloop.c ssh.c] move callback to headerfile - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:40:10 [ssh.c] use log() instead of stderr - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:43:51 [dh.c] use error() not stderr! - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:45:29 [sftp-server.c] rename must fail if newpath exists, debug off by default - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:46:38 [sftp-server.c] readable long listing for sftp-server, ok deraadt@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/16 19:20:06 [key.c ssh-rsa.c] make "ssh-rsa" key format for ssh2 confirm to the ietf-drafts; from galb@vandyke.com. note that you have to delete older ssh2-rsa keys, since they are in the wrong format, too. they must be removed from .ssh/authorized_keys2 and .ssh/known_hosts2, etc. (cd; grep -v ssh-rsa .ssh/authorized_keys2 > TMP && mv TMP .ssh/authorized_keys2) additionally, we now check that BN_num_bits(rsa->n) >= 768. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/16 20:54:27 [sftp-server.c] remove some statics. simpler handles; idea from nisse@lysator.liu.se - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/16 23:58:08 [bufaux.c radix.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c] indent - (bal) Added bsd-strmode.[ch] since some non-OpenBSD platforms may be missing such feature.
2001-01-18 10:04:35 +08:00
if (called)
return;
called = 1;
/* Record that we are in interactive mode. */
interactive_mode = interactive;
/* Only set socket options if using a socket. */
if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket())
if (interactive)
set_nodelay(connection_in);
#if defined(IP_TOS) && !defined(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN)
packet_set_tos(interactive);
#endif
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}
/* Returns true if the current connection is interactive. */
int
packet_is_interactive(void)
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{
return interactive_mode;
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}
int
packet_set_maxsize(int s)
{
static int called = 0;
if (called) {
log("packet_set_maxsize: called twice: old %d new %d",
max_packet_size, s);
return -1;
}
if (s < 4 * 1024 || s > 1024 * 1024) {
log("packet_set_maxsize: bad size %d", s);
return -1;
}
called = 1;
debug("packet_set_maxsize: setting to %d", s);
max_packet_size = s;
return s;
}
/* roundup current message to pad bytes */
void
packet_add_padding(u_char pad)
{
extra_pad = pad;
}
/*
* 9.2. Ignored Data Message
*
* byte SSH_MSG_IGNORE
* string data
*
* All implementations MUST understand (and ignore) this message at any
* time (after receiving the protocol version). No implementation is
* required to send them. This message can be used as an additional
* protection measure against advanced traffic analysis techniques.
*/
void
packet_send_ignore(int nbytes)
{
u_int32_t rand = 0;
int i;
packet_start(compat20 ? SSH2_MSG_IGNORE : SSH_MSG_IGNORE);
packet_put_int(nbytes);
for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) {
if (i % 4 == 0)
rand = arc4random();
packet_put_char(rand & 0xff);
rand >>= 8;
}
}