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openssh/myproposal.h

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upstream: add security key types to list of keys allowed to act as CAs; spotted by Ron Frederick OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9bb0dfff927b4f7aa70679f983f84c69d45656c3
2019-12-11 06:43:19 +08:00
/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.62 2019/12/10 22:43:19 djm Exp $ */
- niklas@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/2001 [atomicio.h canohost.h clientloop.h deattack.h dh.h dispatch.h groupaccess.c groupaccess.h hmac.h hostfile.h includes.h kex.h key.h log.h login.h match.h misc.h myproposal.h nchan.ms pathnames.h radix.h readpass.h rijndael.h serverloop.h session.h sftp.h ssh-add.1 ssh-dss.h ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-rsa.h ssh1.h ssh_config sshconnect.h sshd_config tildexpand.h uidswap.h uuencode.h] $OpenBSD$
2001-01-29 15:39:26 +08:00
- (djm) Merge OpenBSD changes: - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 02:59:57 [session.c] print hostname (not hushlogin) - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 13:18:48 [authfile.c ssh-add.c] enable ssh-add -d for DSA keys - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 13:20:49 [sftp-server.c] cleanup - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/06 03:46:41 [authfile.h] prototype - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:27:56 [ALL] cleanup copyright notices on all files. I have attempted to be accurate with the details. everything is now under Tatu's licence (which I copied from his readme), and/or the core-sdi bsd-ish thing for deattack, or various openbsd developers under a 2-term bsd licence. We're not changing any rules, just being accurate. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:40:30 [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c serverloop.c ssh.c] cleanup window and packet sizes for ssh2 flow control; ok niels - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:53:00 [scp.c] typo - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 15:13:37 [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rsa.c auth.c] [authfile.h canohost.c channels.h compat.c hostfile.h log.c match.h] [pty.c readconf.c] some more Copyright fixes - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/08 03:02:51 [README.openssh2] bye bye - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/11 18:38:33 [LICENCE cipher.c] a few more comments about it being ARC4 not RC4 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/12 14:53:11 [log-client.c log-server.c log.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c] multiple debug levels - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/14 14:25:15 [clientloop.c] typo - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/15 01:13:51 [ssh-agent.c] check return value for setenv(3) for failure, and deal appropriately
2000-09-16 10:29:08 +08:00
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
- (tim) [kex.c myproposal.h md-sha256.c openbsd-compat/sha2.c,h] Disable sha256 when openssl < 0.9.7. Patch from djm@. Corrections/testing by me.
2006-03-16 12:17:05 +08:00
Wrap OpenSSL bits in WITH_OPENSSL.
2019-10-28 12:57:22 +08:00
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- (tim) [kex.c myproposal.h md-sha256.c openbsd-compat/sha2.c,h] Disable sha256 when openssl < 0.9.7. Patch from djm@. Corrections/testing by me.
2006-03-16 12:17:05 +08:00
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
Wrap OpenSSL bits in WITH_OPENSSL.
2019-10-28 12:57:22 +08:00
#endif
- (tim) [kex.c myproposal.h md-sha256.c openbsd-compat/sha2.c,h] Disable sha256 when openssl < 0.9.7. Patch from djm@. Corrections/testing by me.
2006-03-16 12:17:05 +08:00
- (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Make the conditional algorithm support consistent and add some comments so it's clear what goes where.
2013-06-11 10:10:02 +08:00
/* conditional algorithm support */
- (djm) [authfd.c authfile.c bufec.c buffer.h configure.ac kex.h kexecdh.c] [kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
2010-09-10 09:39:26 +08:00
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
filter PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG for ECC algorithms Remove ECC algorithms from the PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG list when compiling without ECC support in libcrypto.
2019-11-18 19:22:04 +08:00
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
# define KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
- (djm) [authfd.c authfile.c bufec.c buffer.h configure.ac kex.h kexecdh.c] [kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
2010-09-10 09:39:26 +08:00
"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
"ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
"ecdh-sha2-nistp521,"
filter PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG for ECC algorithms Remove ECC algorithms from the PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG list when compiling without ECC support in libcrypto.
2019-11-18 19:22:04 +08:00
# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
- (djm) [authfd.c authfile.c bufec.c buffer.h configure.ac kex.h kexecdh.c] [kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
2010-09-10 09:39:26 +08:00
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
filter PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG for ECC algorithms Remove ECC algorithms from the PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG list when compiling without ECC support in libcrypto.
2019-11-18 19:22:04 +08:00
# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
- (djm) [authfd.c authfile.c bufec.c buffer.h configure.ac kex.h kexecdh.c] [kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
2010-09-10 09:39:26 +08:00
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,"
filter PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG for ECC algorithms Remove ECC algorithms from the PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG list when compiling without ECC support in libcrypto.
2019-11-18 19:22:04 +08:00
# else /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
# define KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
- (dtucker) [configure.ac kex.c key.c myproposal.h] Test for the presence of NID_X9_62_prime256v1, NID_secp384r1 and NID_secp521r1 and test that the latter actually works before using it. Fedora (at least) has NID_secp521r1 that doesn't work (see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1021897).
2013-11-09 15:39:25 +08:00
"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
"ecdh-sha2-nistp384,"
filter PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG for ECC algorithms Remove ECC algorithms from the PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG list when compiling without ECC support in libcrypto.
2019-11-18 19:22:04 +08:00
# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
- (dtucker) [configure.ac kex.c key.c myproposal.h] Test for the presence of NID_X9_62_prime256v1, NID_secp384r1 and NID_secp521r1 and test that the latter actually works before using it. Fedora (at least) has NID_secp521r1 that doesn't work (see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1021897).
2013-11-09 15:39:25 +08:00
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
filter PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG for ECC algorithms Remove ECC algorithms from the PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG list when compiling without ECC support in libcrypto.
2019-11-18 19:22:04 +08:00
# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
- (dtucker) [configure.ac kex.c key.c myproposal.h] Test for the presence of NID_X9_62_prime256v1, NID_secp384r1 and NID_secp521r1 and test that the latter actually works before using it. Fedora (at least) has NID_secp521r1 that doesn't work (see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1021897).
2013-11-09 15:39:25 +08:00
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,"
filter PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG for ECC algorithms Remove ECC algorithms from the PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG list when compiling without ECC support in libcrypto.
2019-11-18 19:22:04 +08:00
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
# define USERKEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT_METHODS \
"sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
# define USERKEY_ECDSA_SK_METHODS \
"sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,"
#else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
- (djm) [authfd.c authfile.c bufec.c buffer.h configure.ac kex.h kexecdh.c] [kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
2010-09-10 09:39:26 +08:00
# define KEX_ECDH_METHODS
# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS
# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS
filter PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG for ECC algorithms Remove ECC algorithms from the PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG list when compiling without ECC support in libcrypto.
2019-11-18 19:22:04 +08:00
# define USERKEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT_METHODS
# define USERKEY_ECDSA_SK_METHODS
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
- (djm) [authfd.c authfile.c bufec.c buffer.h configure.ac kex.h kexecdh.c] [kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
2010-09-10 09:39:26 +08:00
- (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Do not advertise AES GSM ciphers if we don't have the required OpenSSL support. Patch from naddy at freebsd.
2013-06-11 09:47:24 +08:00
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
# define AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES \
upstream commit promote chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com to be the default cipher; ok markus
2015-03-24 17:17:21 +08:00
",aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
- (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Do not advertise AES GSM ciphers if we don't have the required OpenSSL support. Patch from naddy at freebsd.
2013-06-11 09:47:24 +08:00
#else
# define AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES
#endif
- (dtucker) Enable sha256 kex methods based on the presence of the necessary functions, not from the openssl version.
2013-06-05 13:04:00 +08:00
#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
upstream commit add support for additional fixed DH groups from draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03 diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 (2K group) diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 (4K group) diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 (8K group) based on patch from Mark D. Baushke and Darren Tucker ok markus@ Upstream-ID: ac00406ada4f0dfec41585ca0839f039545bc46f
2016-05-02 18:26:04 +08:00
# define KEX_SHA2_METHODS \
"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \
"diffie-hellman-group16-sha512," \
"diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,"
# define KEX_SHA2_GROUP14 \
"diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,"
- (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Make the conditional algorithm support consistent and add some comments so it's clear what goes where.
2013-06-11 10:10:02 +08:00
#define SHA2_HMAC_MODES \
"hmac-sha2-256," \
"hmac-sha2-512,"
- (tim) [kex.c myproposal.h md-sha256.c openbsd-compat/sha2.c,h] Disable sha256 when openssl < 0.9.7. Patch from djm@. Corrections/testing by me.
2006-03-16 12:17:05 +08:00
#else
upstream commit add support for additional fixed DH groups from draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03 diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 (2K group) diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 (4K group) diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 (8K group) based on patch from Mark D. Baushke and Darren Tucker ok markus@ Upstream-ID: ac00406ada4f0dfec41585ca0839f039545bc46f
2016-05-02 18:26:04 +08:00
# define KEX_SHA2_METHODS
# define KEX_SHA2_GROUP14
- (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Make the conditional algorithm support consistent and add some comments so it's clear what goes where.
2013-06-11 10:10:02 +08:00
# define SHA2_HMAC_MODES
- (djm) [authfd.c authfile.c bufec.c buffer.h configure.ac kex.h kexecdh.c] [kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
2010-09-10 09:39:26 +08:00
#endif
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 18:01:49 [auth.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c] [kex.c key.c mac.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c] [roaming_client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c] [ssh-pkcs11.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] make compiling against OpenSSL optional (make OPENSSL=no); reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519; allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm
2014-05-15 12:24:09 +08:00
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- (djm) [myproposal.h] Make curve25519 KEX dependent on HAVE_EVP_SHA256 instead of OPENSSL_HAS_ECC.
2014-08-19 09:14:36 +08:00
# ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
upstream commit support plain curve25519-sha256 KEX algorithm now that it is approaching standardisation (same algorithm is currently supported as curve25519-sha256@libssh.org) Upstream-ID: 5e2b6db2e72667048cf426da43c0ee3fc777baa2
2016-09-23 01:52:53 +08:00
# define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS \
"curve25519-sha256," \
"curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,"
- (dtucker) [myprosal.h] Don't include curve25519-sha256@libssh.org in the proposal if the version of OpenSSL we're using doesn't support ECC.
2014-06-11 05:37:25 +08:00
# else
# define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS ""
# endif
upstream: openssh-7.9 accidentally reused the server's algorithm lists in the client for KEX, ciphers and MACs. The ciphers and MACs were identical between the client and server, but the error accidentially disabled the diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 KEX method. This fixes the client code to use the correct method list, but because nobody complained, it also disables the diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 KEX method. Reported by nuxi AT vault24.org via bz#2697; ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e30c33a23c10fd536fefa120e86af1842e33fd57
2019-02-23 16:20:43 +08:00
#define KEX_SERVER_KEX \
- (dtucker) [myprosal.h] Don't include curve25519-sha256@libssh.org in the proposal if the version of OpenSSL we're using doesn't support ECC.
2014-06-11 05:37:25 +08:00
KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS \
- (djm) [authfd.c authfile.c bufec.c buffer.h configure.ac kex.h kexecdh.c] [kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
2010-09-10 09:39:26 +08:00
KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
upstream: openssh-7.9 accidentally reused the server's algorithm lists in the client for KEX, ciphers and MACs. The ciphers and MACs were identical between the client and server, but the error accidentially disabled the diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 KEX method. This fixes the client code to use the correct method list, but because nobody complained, it also disables the diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 KEX method. Reported by nuxi AT vault24.org via bz#2697; ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e30c33a23c10fd536fefa120e86af1842e33fd57
2019-02-23 16:20:43 +08:00
KEX_SHA2_METHODS \
upstream commit add support for additional fixed DH groups from draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03 diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 (2K group) diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 (4K group) diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 (8K group) based on patch from Mark D. Baushke and Darren Tucker ok markus@ Upstream-ID: ac00406ada4f0dfec41585ca0839f039545bc46f
2016-05-02 18:26:04 +08:00
KEX_SHA2_GROUP14 \
upstream commit turn off 1024 bit diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key exchange method (already off in server, this turns it off in the client by default too) ok dtucker@ Upstream-ID: f59b88f449210ab7acf7d9d88f20f1daee97a4fa
2015-07-03 11:47:00 +08:00
"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
- (tim) [kex.c myproposal.h md-sha256.c openbsd-compat/sha2.c,h] Disable sha256 when openssl < 0.9.7. Patch from djm@. Corrections/testing by me.
2006-03-16 12:17:05 +08:00
upstream: openssh-7.9 accidentally reused the server's algorithm lists in the client for KEX, ciphers and MACs. The ciphers and MACs were identical between the client and server, but the error accidentially disabled the diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 KEX method. This fixes the client code to use the correct method list, but because nobody complained, it also disables the diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 KEX method. Reported by nuxi AT vault24.org via bz#2697; ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e30c33a23c10fd536fefa120e86af1842e33fd57
2019-02-23 16:20:43 +08:00
#define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_SERVER_KEX
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/16 01:47:26 [PROTOCOL.certkeys auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c] [auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c key.c key.h myproposal.h ssh-add.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c] [sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] revised certificate format ssh-{dss,rsa}-cert-v01@openssh.com with the following changes: move the nonce field to the beginning of the certificate where it can better protect against chosen-prefix attacks on the signature hash Rename "constraints" field to "critical options" Add a new non-critical "extensions" field Add a serial number The older format is still support for authentication and cert generation (use "ssh-keygen -t v00 -s ca_key ..." to generate a v00 certificate) ok markus@
2010-04-16 13:56:21 +08:00
#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \
- (djm) [authfd.c authfile.c bufec.c buffer.h configure.ac kex.h kexecdh.c] [kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
2010-09-10 09:39:26 +08:00
HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 13:39:49 [authfd.c authfile.c key.c key.h myproposal.h pathnames.h readconf.c] [servconf.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c] [ssh-keysign.c ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd.c verify.c ssh-ed25519.c] [sc25519.h sc25519.c hash.c ge25519_base.data ge25519.h ge25519.c] [fe25519.h fe25519.c ed25519.c crypto_api.h blocks.c] support ed25519 keys (hostkeys and user identities) using the public domain ed25519 reference code from SUPERCOP, see http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/software.html feedback, help & ok djm@
2013-12-07 08:24:01 +08:00
"ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
upstream: Improve strictness and control over RSA-SHA2 signature In ssh, when an agent fails to return a RSA-SHA2 signature when requested and falls back to RSA-SHA1 instead, retry the signature to ensure that the public key algorithm sent in the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH matches the one in the signature itself. In sshd, strictly enforce that the public key algorithm sent in the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH message matches what appears in the signature. Make the sshd_config PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes options control accepted signature algorithms (previously they selected supported key types). This allows these options to ban RSA-SHA1 in favour of RSA-SHA2. Add new signature algorithms "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com" and "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com" to force use of RSA-SHA2 signatures with certificate keys. feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c6e9f6d45eed8962ad502d315d7eaef32c419dde
2018-07-03 19:39:54 +08:00
"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/08/31 11:54:45 [PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys auth2-jpake.c authfd.c] [authfile.c buffer.h dns.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h monitor.c] [monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c packet.h pathnames.h readconf.c] [ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c] [ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.8 ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h] [ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5] [uuencode.c uuencode.h bufec.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c ssh-ecdsa.c] Implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography modes for key exchange (ECDH) and host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric key length, as well as much shorter keys. Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented). Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported. Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be subject to change. feedback and ok markus@
2010-08-31 20:41:14 +08:00
"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
- (djm) [authfd.c authfile.c bufec.c buffer.h configure.ac kex.h kexecdh.c] [kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
2010-09-10 09:39:26 +08:00
HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 13:39:49 [authfd.c authfile.c key.c key.h myproposal.h pathnames.h readconf.c] [servconf.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c] [ssh-keysign.c ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd.c verify.c ssh-ed25519.c] [sc25519.h sc25519.c hash.c ge25519_base.data ge25519.h ge25519.c] [fe25519.h fe25519.c ed25519.c crypto_api.h blocks.c] support ed25519 keys (hostkeys and user identities) using the public domain ed25519 reference code from SUPERCOP, see http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/software.html feedback, help & ok djm@
2013-12-07 08:24:01 +08:00
"ssh-ed25519," \
upstream commit implement SHA2-{256,512} for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signatures (user and host auth) based on draft-rsa-dsa-sha2-256-03.txt and draft-ssh-ext-info-04.txt; with & ok djm@ Upstream-ID: cf82ce532b2733e5c4b34bb7b7c94835632db309
2015-12-05 00:41:28 +08:00
"rsa-sha2-512," \
upstream commit prefer rsa-sha2-512 over -256 for hostkeys, too; noticed by naddy@ Upstream-ID: 685f55f7ec566a8caca587750672723a0faf3ffe
2015-12-06 04:53:21 +08:00
"rsa-sha2-256," \
upstream commit implement SHA2-{256,512} for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signatures (user and host auth) based on draft-rsa-dsa-sha2-256-03.txt and draft-ssh-ext-info-04.txt; with & ok djm@ Upstream-ID: cf82ce532b2733e5c4b34bb7b7c94835632db309
2015-12-05 00:41:28 +08:00
"ssh-rsa"
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/01/23 07:58:11 [myproposal.h] prefer CTR modes and revised arcfour (i.e w/ discard) modes to CBC modes; ok markus@
2009-01-28 13:33:31 +08:00
- (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Make the conditional algorithm support consistent and add some comments so it's clear what goes where.
2013-06-11 10:10:02 +08:00
/* the actual algorithms */
Three commits in one (since they touch the same heavily-diverged file repeatedly): - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/25 09:40:03 [myproposal.h] trimm default proposals. This commit removes the weaker pre-SHA2 hashes, the broken ciphers (arcfour), and the broken modes (CBC) from the default configuration (the patch only changes the default, all the modes are still available for the config files). ok djm@, reminded by tedu@ & naddy@ and discussed with many - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 17:16:26 [myproposal.h] The current sharing of myproposal[] between both client and server code makes the previous diff highly unpallatable. We want to go in that direction for the server, but not for the client. Sigh. Brought up by naddy. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/27 23:01:27 [myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] disable weak proposals in sshd, but keep them in ssh; ok djm@
2014-04-20 11:17:20 +08:00
#define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
upstream commit promote chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com to be the default cipher; ok markus
2015-03-24 17:17:21 +08:00
"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr" \
AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES
Three commits in one (since they touch the same heavily-diverged file repeatedly): - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/25 09:40:03 [myproposal.h] trimm default proposals. This commit removes the weaker pre-SHA2 hashes, the broken ciphers (arcfour), and the broken modes (CBC) from the default configuration (the patch only changes the default, all the modes are still available for the config files). ok djm@, reminded by tedu@ & naddy@ and discussed with many - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 17:16:26 [myproposal.h] The current sharing of myproposal[] between both client and server code makes the previous diff highly unpallatable. We want to go in that direction for the server, but not for the client. Sigh. Brought up by naddy. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/27 23:01:27 [myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] disable weak proposals in sshd, but keep them in ssh; ok djm@
2014-04-20 11:17:20 +08:00
upstream commit Don't offer CBC ciphers by default in the client. ok markus@ Upstream-ID: 94c9ce8d0d1a085052e11c7f3307950fdc0901ef
2017-05-08 07:13:42 +08:00
#define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT
- (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Make the conditional algorithm support consistent and add some comments so it's clear what goes where.
2013-06-11 10:10:02 +08:00
Three commits in one (since they touch the same heavily-diverged file repeatedly): - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/25 09:40:03 [myproposal.h] trimm default proposals. This commit removes the weaker pre-SHA2 hashes, the broken ciphers (arcfour), and the broken modes (CBC) from the default configuration (the patch only changes the default, all the modes are still available for the config files). ok djm@, reminded by tedu@ & naddy@ and discussed with many - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 17:16:26 [myproposal.h] The current sharing of myproposal[] between both client and server code makes the previous diff highly unpallatable. We want to go in that direction for the server, but not for the client. Sigh. Brought up by naddy. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/27 23:01:27 [myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] disable weak proposals in sshd, but keep them in ssh; ok djm@
2014-04-20 11:17:20 +08:00
#define KEX_SERVER_MAC \
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:31:18 [PROTOCOL authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.h mac.c myproposal.h] [packet.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] add encrypt-then-mac (EtM) modes to openssh by defining new mac algorithms that change the packet format and compute the MAC over the encrypted message (including the packet size) instead of the plaintext data; these EtM modes are considered more secure and used by default. feedback and ok djm@
2012-12-12 07:46:31 +08:00
"umac-64-etm@openssh.com," \
"umac-128-etm@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com," \
- tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/11 13:54:34 [myproposal.h] by popular demand, add back hamc-sha1 to server proposal for better compat with many clients still in use. ok deraadt
2014-07-17 07:52:07 +08:00
"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
Three commits in one (since they touch the same heavily-diverged file repeatedly): - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/25 09:40:03 [myproposal.h] trimm default proposals. This commit removes the weaker pre-SHA2 hashes, the broken ciphers (arcfour), and the broken modes (CBC) from the default configuration (the patch only changes the default, all the modes are still available for the config files). ok djm@, reminded by tedu@ & naddy@ and discussed with many - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 17:16:26 [myproposal.h] The current sharing of myproposal[] between both client and server code makes the previous diff highly unpallatable. We want to go in that direction for the server, but not for the client. Sigh. Brought up by naddy. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/27 23:01:27 [myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] disable weak proposals in sshd, but keep them in ssh; ok djm@
2014-04-20 11:17:20 +08:00
"umac-64@openssh.com," \
"umac-128@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha2-256," \
- tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/11 13:54:34 [myproposal.h] by popular demand, add back hamc-sha1 to server proposal for better compat with many clients still in use. ok deraadt
2014-07-17 07:52:07 +08:00
"hmac-sha2-512," \
"hmac-sha1"
Three commits in one (since they touch the same heavily-diverged file repeatedly): - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/25 09:40:03 [myproposal.h] trimm default proposals. This commit removes the weaker pre-SHA2 hashes, the broken ciphers (arcfour), and the broken modes (CBC) from the default configuration (the patch only changes the default, all the modes are still available for the config files). ok djm@, reminded by tedu@ & naddy@ and discussed with many - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 17:16:26 [myproposal.h] The current sharing of myproposal[] between both client and server code makes the previous diff highly unpallatable. We want to go in that direction for the server, but not for the client. Sigh. Brought up by naddy. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/27 23:01:27 [myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] disable weak proposals in sshd, but keep them in ssh; ok djm@
2014-04-20 11:17:20 +08:00
upstream commit turn off more old crypto in the client: hmac-md5, ripemd, truncated HMACs, RC4, blowfish. ok markus@ dtucker@ Upstream-ID: 96aa11c2c082be45267a690c12f1d2aae6acd46e
2016-02-09 13:30:04 +08:00
#define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/08/02 01:22:11 [mac.c myproposal.h ssh.1 ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd_config.5] Add new SHA256 and SHA512 based HMAC modes from http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-dbider-sha2-mac-for-ssh-02.txt Patch from mdb AT juniper.net; feedback and ok markus@
2011-08-06 04:17:30 +08:00
upstream: add SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS - the default list of signature algorithms that are allowed for CA signatures. Notably excludes ssh-dsa. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1628e4181dc8ab71909378eafe5d06159a22deb4
2018-09-12 09:34:02 +08:00
/* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */
#define SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS \
Use the correct macro for SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS.
2019-05-17 10:42:17 +08:00
HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
upstream: add security key types to list of keys allowed to act as CAs; spotted by Ron Frederick OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9bb0dfff927b4f7aa70679f983f84c69d45656c3
2019-12-11 06:43:19 +08:00
USERKEY_ECDSA_SK_METHODS \
upstream: add SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS - the default list of signature algorithms that are allowed for CA signatures. Notably excludes ssh-dsa. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1628e4181dc8ab71909378eafe5d06159a22deb4
2018-09-12 09:34:02 +08:00
"ssh-ed25519," \
upstream: add security key types to list of keys allowed to act as CAs; spotted by Ron Frederick OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9bb0dfff927b4f7aa70679f983f84c69d45656c3
2019-12-11 06:43:19 +08:00
"sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com," \
upstream: add SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS - the default list of signature algorithms that are allowed for CA signatures. Notably excludes ssh-dsa. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1628e4181dc8ab71909378eafe5d06159a22deb4
2018-09-12 09:34:02 +08:00
"rsa-sha2-512," \
"rsa-sha2-256," \
"ssh-rsa"
upstream: Separate myproposal.h userauth pubkey types U2F/FIDO keys are not supported for host authentication, so we need a separate list for user keys. feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fe2e6ab85f9f2338866e5af8ca2d312abbf0429
2019-11-01 05:17:49 +08:00
#define PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \
filter PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG for ECC algorithms Remove ECC algorithms from the PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG list when compiling without ECC support in libcrypto.
2019-11-18 19:22:04 +08:00
USERKEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT_METHODS \
remove all EC algs from proposals, no just sk ones ok dtucker@
2019-11-19 05:52:24 +08:00
HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
upstream: enable ed25519 support; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a399c5b3ef15bd8efb916110cf5a9e0b554ab7e
2019-11-13 03:33:08 +08:00
"sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
upstream: Separate myproposal.h userauth pubkey types U2F/FIDO keys are not supported for host authentication, so we need a separate list for user keys. feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fe2e6ab85f9f2338866e5af8ca2d312abbf0429
2019-11-01 05:17:49 +08:00
"ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
filter PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG for ECC algorithms Remove ECC algorithms from the PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG list when compiling without ECC support in libcrypto.
2019-11-18 19:22:04 +08:00
USERKEY_ECDSA_SK_METHODS \
remove all EC algs from proposals, no just sk ones ok dtucker@
2019-11-19 05:52:24 +08:00
HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
upstream: enable ed25519 support; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a399c5b3ef15bd8efb916110cf5a9e0b554ab7e
2019-11-13 03:33:08 +08:00
"sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com," \
upstream: Separate myproposal.h userauth pubkey types U2F/FIDO keys are not supported for host authentication, so we need a separate list for user keys. feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fe2e6ab85f9f2338866e5af8ca2d312abbf0429
2019-11-01 05:17:49 +08:00
"ssh-ed25519," \
"rsa-sha2-512," \
"rsa-sha2-256," \
"ssh-rsa"
upstream commit turn off more old crypto in the client: hmac-md5, ripemd, truncated HMACs, RC4, blowfish. ok markus@ dtucker@ Upstream-ID: 96aa11c2c082be45267a690c12f1d2aae6acd46e
2016-02-09 13:30:04 +08:00
#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 18:01:49 [auth.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c] [kex.c key.c mac.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c] [roaming_client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c] [ssh-pkcs11.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] make compiling against OpenSSL optional (make OPENSSL=no); reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519; allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm
2014-05-15 12:24:09 +08:00
#define KEX_SERVER_KEX \
upstream commit support plain curve25519-sha256 KEX algorithm now that it is approaching standardisation (same algorithm is currently supported as curve25519-sha256@libssh.org) Upstream-ID: 5e2b6db2e72667048cf426da43c0ee3fc777baa2
2016-09-23 01:52:53 +08:00
"curve25519-sha256," \
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 18:01:49 [auth.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c] [kex.c key.c mac.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c] [roaming_client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c] [ssh-pkcs11.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] make compiling against OpenSSL optional (make OPENSSL=no); reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519; allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm
2014-05-15 12:24:09 +08:00
"curve25519-sha256@libssh.org"
#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \
"ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
"ssh-ed25519"
upstream: Separate myproposal.h userauth pubkey types U2F/FIDO keys are not supported for host authentication, so we need a separate list for user keys. feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fe2e6ab85f9f2338866e5af8ca2d312abbf0429
2019-11-01 05:17:49 +08:00
#define PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 18:01:49 [auth.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c] [kex.c key.c mac.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c] [roaming_client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c] [ssh-pkcs11.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] make compiling against OpenSSL optional (make OPENSSL=no); reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519; allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm
2014-05-15 12:24:09 +08:00
#define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
upstream commit Add back a backslash removed in rev 1.42 so KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT will include aes again. ok deraadt@
2015-04-21 15:01:00 +08:00
"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
upstream commit promote chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com to be the default cipher; ok markus
2015-03-24 17:17:21 +08:00
"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr"
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 18:01:49 [auth.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c] [kex.c key.c mac.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c] [roaming_client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c] [ssh-pkcs11.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] make compiling against OpenSSL optional (make OPENSSL=no); reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519; allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm
2014-05-15 12:24:09 +08:00
#define KEX_SERVER_MAC \
- naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/30 19:07:48 [mac.c myproposal.h umac.c] UMAC can use our local fallback implementation of AES when OpenSSL isn't available. Glue code straight from Ted Krovetz's original umac.c. ok markus@
2014-05-15 12:35:03 +08:00
"umac-64-etm@openssh.com," \
"umac-128-etm@openssh.com," \
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 18:01:49 [auth.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c] [kex.c key.c mac.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c] [roaming_client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c] [ssh-pkcs11.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] make compiling against OpenSSL optional (make OPENSSL=no); reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519; allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm
2014-05-15 12:24:09 +08:00
"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com," \
- tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/11 13:54:34 [myproposal.h] by popular demand, add back hamc-sha1 to server proposal for better compat with many clients still in use. ok deraadt
2014-07-17 07:52:07 +08:00
"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
- naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/30 19:07:48 [mac.c myproposal.h umac.c] UMAC can use our local fallback implementation of AES when OpenSSL isn't available. Glue code straight from Ted Krovetz's original umac.c. ok markus@
2014-05-15 12:35:03 +08:00
"umac-64@openssh.com," \
"umac-128@openssh.com," \
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 18:01:49 [auth.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c] [kex.c key.c mac.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c] [roaming_client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c] [ssh-pkcs11.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] make compiling against OpenSSL optional (make OPENSSL=no); reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519; allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm
2014-05-15 12:24:09 +08:00
"hmac-sha2-256," \
- tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/11 13:54:34 [myproposal.h] by popular demand, add back hamc-sha1 to server proposal for better compat with many clients still in use. ok deraadt
2014-07-17 07:52:07 +08:00
"hmac-sha2-512," \
"hmac-sha1"
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 18:01:49 [auth.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c] [kex.c key.c mac.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c] [roaming_client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c] [ssh-pkcs11.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] make compiling against OpenSSL optional (make OPENSSL=no); reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519; allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm
2014-05-15 12:24:09 +08:00
#define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_SERVER_KEX
#define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT
- tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/11 13:54:34 [myproposal.h] by popular demand, add back hamc-sha1 to server proposal for better compat with many clients still in use. ok deraadt
2014-07-17 07:52:07 +08:00
#define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 18:01:49 [auth.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c] [kex.c key.c mac.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c] [roaming_client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c] [ssh-pkcs11.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] make compiling against OpenSSL optional (make OPENSSL=no); reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519; allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm
2014-05-15 12:24:09 +08:00
upstream: add security key types to list of keys allowed to act as CAs; spotted by Ron Frederick OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9bb0dfff927b4f7aa70679f983f84c69d45656c3
2019-12-11 06:43:19 +08:00
#define SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS "ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com"
upstream: add SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS - the default list of signature algorithms that are allowed for CA signatures. Notably excludes ssh-dsa. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1628e4181dc8ab71909378eafe5d06159a22deb4
2018-09-12 09:34:02 +08:00
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 18:01:49 [auth.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c] [kex.c key.c mac.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c] [roaming_client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c] [ssh-pkcs11.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] make compiling against OpenSSL optional (make OPENSSL=no); reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519; allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm
2014-05-15 12:24:09 +08:00
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
upstream commit Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf. multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface. Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the required attack surface considerably larger. Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security check in the shared memory manager found by Stack (http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@ NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd for >10 years. Upstream-ID: 32af9771788d45a0779693b41d06ec199d849caf
2016-09-29 00:33:06 +08:00
#define KEX_DEFAULT_COMP "none,zlib@openssh.com"
- OpenBSD CVS update: - [channels.c] close efd on eof - [clientloop.c compat.c ssh.c sshconnect.c myproposal.h] ssh2 client implementation, interops w/ ssh.com and lsh servers. - [sshconnect.c] missing free. - [authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h packet.c sshconnect.c sshd.c] remove unused argument, split cipher_mask() - [clientloop.c] re-order: group ssh1 vs. ssh2 - Make Redhat spec require openssl >= 0.9.5a
2000-04-06 10:32:37 +08:00
#define KEX_DEFAULT_LANG ""
Three commits in one (since they touch the same heavily-diverged file repeatedly): - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/25 09:40:03 [myproposal.h] trimm default proposals. This commit removes the weaker pre-SHA2 hashes, the broken ciphers (arcfour), and the broken modes (CBC) from the default configuration (the patch only changes the default, all the modes are still available for the config files). ok djm@, reminded by tedu@ & naddy@ and discussed with many - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 17:16:26 [myproposal.h] The current sharing of myproposal[] between both client and server code makes the previous diff highly unpallatable. We want to go in that direction for the server, but not for the client. Sigh. Brought up by naddy. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/27 23:01:27 [myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] disable weak proposals in sshd, but keep them in ssh; ok djm@
2014-04-20 11:17:20 +08:00
#define KEX_CLIENT \
KEX_CLIENT_KEX, \
KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, \
KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, \
KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, \
KEX_CLIENT_MAC, \
KEX_CLIENT_MAC, \
KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
KEX_DEFAULT_LANG, \
KEX_DEFAULT_LANG
- OpenBSD CVS update: - [channels.c] close efd on eof - [clientloop.c compat.c ssh.c sshconnect.c myproposal.h] ssh2 client implementation, interops w/ ssh.com and lsh servers. - [sshconnect.c] missing free. - [authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h packet.c sshconnect.c sshd.c] remove unused argument, split cipher_mask() - [clientloop.c] re-order: group ssh1 vs. ssh2 - Make Redhat spec require openssl >= 0.9.5a
2000-04-06 10:32:37 +08:00
Three commits in one (since they touch the same heavily-diverged file repeatedly): - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/25 09:40:03 [myproposal.h] trimm default proposals. This commit removes the weaker pre-SHA2 hashes, the broken ciphers (arcfour), and the broken modes (CBC) from the default configuration (the patch only changes the default, all the modes are still available for the config files). ok djm@, reminded by tedu@ & naddy@ and discussed with many - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 17:16:26 [myproposal.h] The current sharing of myproposal[] between both client and server code makes the previous diff highly unpallatable. We want to go in that direction for the server, but not for the client. Sigh. Brought up by naddy. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/27 23:01:27 [myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] disable weak proposals in sshd, but keep them in ssh; ok djm@
2014-04-20 11:17:20 +08:00
#define KEX_SERVER \
KEX_SERVER_KEX, \
KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, \
KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, \
KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, \
KEX_SERVER_MAC, \
KEX_SERVER_MAC, \
KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
KEX_DEFAULT_LANG, \
- OpenBSD CVS update: - [channels.c] close efd on eof - [clientloop.c compat.c ssh.c sshconnect.c myproposal.h] ssh2 client implementation, interops w/ ssh.com and lsh servers. - [sshconnect.c] missing free. - [authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h packet.c sshconnect.c sshd.c] remove unused argument, split cipher_mask() - [clientloop.c] re-order: group ssh1 vs. ssh2 - Make Redhat spec require openssl >= 0.9.5a
2000-04-06 10:32:37 +08:00
KEX_DEFAULT_LANG
Three commits in one (since they touch the same heavily-diverged file repeatedly): - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/25 09:40:03 [myproposal.h] trimm default proposals. This commit removes the weaker pre-SHA2 hashes, the broken ciphers (arcfour), and the broken modes (CBC) from the default configuration (the patch only changes the default, all the modes are still available for the config files). ok djm@, reminded by tedu@ & naddy@ and discussed with many - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 17:16:26 [myproposal.h] The current sharing of myproposal[] between both client and server code makes the previous diff highly unpallatable. We want to go in that direction for the server, but not for the client. Sigh. Brought up by naddy. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/27 23:01:27 [myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] disable weak proposals in sshd, but keep them in ssh; ok djm@
2014-04-20 11:17:20 +08:00
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