mirror of
https://github.com/git/git.git
synced 2024-11-23 18:05:29 +08:00
75f4acc981
We use http_get_strbuf() to fetch the remote info/packs content into a strbuf, but never free it, causing a leak. There's no need to hold onto it, as we've already parsed it completely. This lets us mark t5619 as leak-free. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
72 lines
1.9 KiB
Bash
Executable File
72 lines
1.9 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/bin/sh
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test_description='test local clone with ambiguous transport'
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TEST_PASSES_SANITIZE_LEAK=true
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. ./test-lib.sh
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. "$TEST_DIRECTORY/lib-httpd.sh"
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if ! test_have_prereq SYMLINKS
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then
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skip_all='skipping test, symlink support unavailable'
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test_done
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fi
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start_httpd
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REPO="$HTTPD_DOCUMENT_ROOT_PATH/sub.git"
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URI="$HTTPD_URL/dumb/sub.git"
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test_expect_success 'setup' '
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mkdir -p sensitive &&
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echo "secret" >sensitive/secret &&
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git init --bare "$REPO" &&
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test_commit_bulk -C "$REPO" --ref=main 1 &&
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git -C "$REPO" update-ref HEAD main &&
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git -C "$REPO" update-server-info &&
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git init malicious &&
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(
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cd malicious &&
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git submodule add "$URI" &&
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mkdir -p repo/refs &&
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touch repo/refs/.gitkeep &&
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printf "ref: refs/heads/a" >repo/HEAD &&
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ln -s "$(cd .. && pwd)/sensitive" repo/objects &&
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mkdir -p "$HTTPD_URL/dumb" &&
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ln -s "../../../.git/modules/sub/../../../repo/" "$URI" &&
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git add . &&
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git commit -m "initial commit"
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) &&
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# Delete all of the references in our malicious submodule to
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# avoid the client attempting to checkout any objects (which
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# will be missing, and thus will cause the clone to fail before
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# we can trigger the exploit).
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git -C "$REPO" for-each-ref --format="delete %(refname)" >in &&
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git -C "$REPO" update-ref --stdin <in &&
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git -C "$REPO" update-server-info
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'
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test_expect_success 'ambiguous transport does not lead to arbitrary file-inclusion' '
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git clone malicious clone &&
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test_must_fail git -C clone submodule update --init 2>err &&
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test_path_is_missing clone/.git/modules/sub/objects/secret &&
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# We would actually expect "transport .file. not allowed" here,
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# but due to quirks of the URL detection in Git, we mis-parse
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# the absolute path as a bogus URL and die before that step.
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#
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# This works for now, and if we ever fix the URL detection, it
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# is OK to change this to detect the transport error.
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grep "protocol .* is not supported" err
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'
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test_done
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