mirror of
https://github.com/git/git.git
synced 2024-11-27 20:14:30 +08:00
d79374c7b5
The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed earier (mid October 2005). Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped. For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time /pub needs to point at a different partition for storage allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using /pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property. So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir() and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path, it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git). What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say /home if the advertised way to access user home directories are ~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid unnecessary aliasing issues. Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting /../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose. This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally, because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
253 lines
5.3 KiB
C
253 lines
5.3 KiB
C
/*
|
|
* I'm tired of doing "vsnprintf()" etc just to open a
|
|
* file, so here's a "return static buffer with printf"
|
|
* interface for paths.
|
|
*
|
|
* It's obviously not thread-safe. Sue me. But it's quite
|
|
* useful for doing things like
|
|
*
|
|
* f = open(mkpath("%s/%s.git", base, name), O_RDONLY);
|
|
*
|
|
* which is what it's designed for.
|
|
*/
|
|
#include "cache.h"
|
|
#include <pwd.h>
|
|
|
|
static char pathname[PATH_MAX];
|
|
static char bad_path[] = "/bad-path/";
|
|
|
|
static char *cleanup_path(char *path)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Clean it up */
|
|
if (!memcmp(path, "./", 2)) {
|
|
path += 2;
|
|
while (*path == '/')
|
|
path++;
|
|
}
|
|
return path;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
char *mkpath(const char *fmt, ...)
|
|
{
|
|
va_list args;
|
|
unsigned len;
|
|
|
|
va_start(args, fmt);
|
|
len = vsnprintf(pathname, PATH_MAX, fmt, args);
|
|
va_end(args);
|
|
if (len >= PATH_MAX)
|
|
return bad_path;
|
|
return cleanup_path(pathname);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
char *git_path(const char *fmt, ...)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *git_dir = get_git_dir();
|
|
va_list args;
|
|
unsigned len;
|
|
|
|
len = strlen(git_dir);
|
|
if (len > PATH_MAX-100)
|
|
return bad_path;
|
|
memcpy(pathname, git_dir, len);
|
|
if (len && git_dir[len-1] != '/')
|
|
pathname[len++] = '/';
|
|
va_start(args, fmt);
|
|
len += vsnprintf(pathname + len, PATH_MAX - len, fmt, args);
|
|
va_end(args);
|
|
if (len >= PATH_MAX)
|
|
return bad_path;
|
|
return cleanup_path(pathname);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* git_mkstemp() - create tmp file honoring TMPDIR variable */
|
|
int git_mkstemp(char *path, size_t len, const char *template)
|
|
{
|
|
char *env, *pch = path;
|
|
|
|
if ((env = getenv("TMPDIR")) == NULL) {
|
|
strcpy(pch, "/tmp/");
|
|
len -= 5;
|
|
pch += 5;
|
|
} else {
|
|
size_t n = snprintf(pch, len, "%s/", env);
|
|
|
|
len -= n;
|
|
pch += n;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
safe_strncpy(pch, template, len);
|
|
|
|
return mkstemp(path);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
char *safe_strncpy(char *dest, const char *src, size_t n)
|
|
{
|
|
strncpy(dest, src, n);
|
|
dest[n - 1] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
return dest;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int validate_symref(const char *path)
|
|
{
|
|
struct stat st;
|
|
char *buf, buffer[256];
|
|
int len, fd;
|
|
|
|
if (lstat(path, &st) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure it is a "refs/.." symlink */
|
|
if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) {
|
|
len = readlink(path, buffer, sizeof(buffer)-1);
|
|
if (len >= 5 && !memcmp("refs/", buffer, 5))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Anything else, just open it and try to see if it is a symbolic ref.
|
|
*/
|
|
fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
|
|
if (fd < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
len = read(fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer)-1);
|
|
close(fd);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Is it a symbolic ref?
|
|
*/
|
|
if (len < 4 || memcmp("ref:", buffer, 4))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
buf = buffer + 4;
|
|
len -= 4;
|
|
while (len && isspace(*buf))
|
|
buf++, len--;
|
|
if (len >= 5 && !memcmp("refs/", buf, 5))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static char *user_path(char *buf, char *path, int sz)
|
|
{
|
|
struct passwd *pw;
|
|
char *slash;
|
|
int len, baselen;
|
|
|
|
if (!path || path[0] != '~')
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
path++;
|
|
slash = strchr(path, '/');
|
|
if (path[0] == '/' || !path[0]) {
|
|
pw = getpwuid(getuid());
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
if (slash) {
|
|
*slash = 0;
|
|
pw = getpwnam(path);
|
|
*slash = '/';
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
pw = getpwnam(path);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!pw || !pw->pw_dir || sz <= strlen(pw->pw_dir))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
baselen = strlen(pw->pw_dir);
|
|
memcpy(buf, pw->pw_dir, baselen);
|
|
while ((1 < baselen) && (buf[baselen-1] == '/')) {
|
|
buf[baselen-1] = 0;
|
|
baselen--;
|
|
}
|
|
if (slash && slash[1]) {
|
|
len = strlen(slash);
|
|
if (sz <= baselen + len)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
memcpy(buf + baselen, slash, len + 1);
|
|
}
|
|
return buf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* First, one directory to try is determined by the following algorithm.
|
|
*
|
|
* (0) If "strict" is given, the path is used as given and no DWIM is
|
|
* done. Otherwise:
|
|
* (1) "~/path" to mean path under the running user's home directory;
|
|
* (2) "~user/path" to mean path under named user's home directory;
|
|
* (3) "relative/path" to mean cwd relative directory; or
|
|
* (4) "/absolute/path" to mean absolute directory.
|
|
*
|
|
* Unless "strict" is given, we try access() for existence of "%s.git/.git",
|
|
* "%s/.git", "%s.git", "%s" in this order. The first one that exists is
|
|
* what we try.
|
|
*
|
|
* Second, we try chdir() to that. Upon failure, we return NULL.
|
|
*
|
|
* Then, we try if the current directory is a valid git repository.
|
|
* Upon failure, we return NULL.
|
|
*
|
|
* If all goes well, we return the directory we used to chdir() (but
|
|
* before ~user is expanded), avoiding getcwd() resolving symbolic
|
|
* links. User relative paths are also returned as they are given,
|
|
* except DWIM suffixing.
|
|
*/
|
|
char *enter_repo(char *path, int strict)
|
|
{
|
|
static char used_path[PATH_MAX];
|
|
static char validated_path[PATH_MAX];
|
|
|
|
if (!path)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!strict) {
|
|
static const char *suffix[] = {
|
|
".git/.git", "/.git", ".git", "", NULL,
|
|
};
|
|
int len = strlen(path);
|
|
int i;
|
|
while ((1 < len) && (path[len-1] == '/')) {
|
|
path[len-1] = 0;
|
|
len--;
|
|
}
|
|
if (PATH_MAX <= len)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
if (path[0] == '~') {
|
|
if (!user_path(used_path, path, PATH_MAX))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
strcpy(validated_path, path);
|
|
path = used_path;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (PATH_MAX - 10 < len)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
else {
|
|
path = strcpy(used_path, path);
|
|
strcpy(validated_path, path);
|
|
}
|
|
len = strlen(path);
|
|
for (i = 0; suffix[i]; i++) {
|
|
strcpy(path + len, suffix[i]);
|
|
if (!access(path, F_OK)) {
|
|
strcat(validated_path, suffix[i]);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!suffix[i] || chdir(path))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
path = validated_path;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (chdir(path))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (access("objects", X_OK) == 0 && access("refs", X_OK) == 0 &&
|
|
validate_symref("HEAD") == 0) {
|
|
putenv("GIT_DIR=.");
|
|
check_repository_format();
|
|
return path;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|