filter_ref: avoid overwriting ref->old_sha1 with garbage

If the server supports allow_tip_sha1_in_want, then
fetch-pack's filter_refs function tries to check whether a
ref is a request for a straight sha1 by running:

  if (get_sha1_hex(ref->name, ref->old_sha1))
	  ...

I.e., we are using get_sha1_hex to ask "is this ref name a
sha1?". If it is true, then the contents of ref->old_sha1
will end up unchanged. But if it is false, then get_sha1_hex
makes no guarantees about what it has written. With a ref
name like "abcdefoo", we would overwrite 3 bytes of
ref->old_sha1 before realizing that it was not a sha1.

This is likely not a problem in practice, as anything in
refs->name (besides a sha1) will start with "refs/", meaning
that we would notice on the first character that there is a
problem. Still, we are making assumptions about the state
left in the output when get_sha1_hex returns an error (e.g.,
it could start from the end of the string, or error check
the values only once they were placed in the output). It's
better to be defensive.

We could just check that we have exactly 40 characters of
sha1. But let's be even more careful and make sure that we
have a 40-char hex refname that matches what is in old_sha1.
This is perhaps overly defensive, but spells out our
assumptions clearly.

Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
This commit is contained in:
Jeff King 2015-03-19 16:34:51 -04:00 committed by Junio C Hamano
parent fdf96a20ac
commit b7916422c7

View File

@ -544,10 +544,14 @@ static void filter_refs(struct fetch_pack_args *args,
/* Append unmatched requests to the list */
if (allow_tip_sha1_in_want) {
for (i = 0; i < nr_sought; i++) {
unsigned char sha1[20];
ref = sought[i];
if (ref->matched)
continue;
if (get_sha1_hex(ref->name, ref->old_sha1))
if (get_sha1_hex(ref->name, sha1) ||
ref->name[40] != '\0' ||
hashcmp(sha1, ref->old_sha1))
continue;
ref->matched = 1;