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Git 2.8.6
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This commit is contained in:
commit
af0178aec7
25
Documentation/RelNotes/2.7.6.txt
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25
Documentation/RelNotes/2.7.6.txt
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@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
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Git v2.7.6 Release Notes
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========================
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Fixes since v2.7.5
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------------------
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* A "ssh://..." URL can result in a "ssh" command line with a
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hostname that begins with a dash "-", which would cause the "ssh"
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command to instead (mis)treat it as an option. This is now
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prevented by forbidding such a hostname (which will not be
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necessary in the real world).
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* Similarly, when GIT_PROXY_COMMAND is configured, the command is
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run with host and port that are parsed out from "ssh://..." URL;
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a poorly written GIT_PROXY_COMMAND could be tricked into treating
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a string that begins with a dash "-". This is now prevented by
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forbidding such a hostname and port number (again, which will not
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be necessary in the real world).
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* In the same spirit, a repository name that begins with a dash "-"
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is also forbidden now.
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Credits go to Brian Neel at GitLab, Joern Schneeweisz of Recurity
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Labs and Jeff King at GitHub.
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4
Documentation/RelNotes/2.8.6.txt
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4
Documentation/RelNotes/2.8.6.txt
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Git v2.8.6 Release Notes
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========================
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This release forward-ports the fix for "ssh://..." URL from Git v2.7.6
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8
cache.h
8
cache.h
@ -1035,6 +1035,14 @@ char *strip_path_suffix(const char *path, const char *suffix);
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int daemon_avoid_alias(const char *path);
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extern int is_ntfs_dotgit(const char *name);
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/*
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* Returns true iff "str" could be confused as a command-line option when
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* passed to a sub-program like "ssh". Note that this has nothing to do with
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* shell-quoting, which should be handled separately; we're assuming here that
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* the string makes it verbatim to the sub-program.
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*/
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int looks_like_command_line_option(const char *str);
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/**
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* Return a newly allocated string with the evaluation of
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* "$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/git/$filename" if $XDG_CONFIG_HOME is non-empty, otherwise
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11
connect.c
11
connect.c
@ -557,6 +557,11 @@ static struct child_process *git_proxy_connect(int fd[2], char *host)
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get_host_and_port(&host, &port);
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if (looks_like_command_line_option(host))
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die("strange hostname '%s' blocked", host);
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if (looks_like_command_line_option(port))
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die("strange port '%s' blocked", port);
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proxy = xmalloc(sizeof(*proxy));
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child_process_init(proxy);
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argv_array_push(&proxy->args, git_proxy_command);
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@ -726,6 +731,9 @@ struct child_process *git_connect(int fd[2], const char *url,
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conn = xmalloc(sizeof(*conn));
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child_process_init(conn);
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if (looks_like_command_line_option(path))
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die("strange pathname '%s' blocked", path);
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strbuf_addstr(&cmd, prog);
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strbuf_addch(&cmd, ' ');
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sq_quote_buf(&cmd, path);
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@ -758,6 +766,9 @@ struct child_process *git_connect(int fd[2], const char *url,
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return NULL;
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}
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if (looks_like_command_line_option(ssh_host))
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die("strange hostname '%s' blocked", ssh_host);
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ssh = getenv("GIT_SSH_COMMAND");
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if (!ssh) {
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const char *base;
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5
path.c
5
path.c
@ -1222,6 +1222,11 @@ int is_ntfs_dotgit(const char *name)
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}
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}
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int looks_like_command_line_option(const char *str)
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{
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return str && str[0] == '-';
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}
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char *xdg_config_home(const char *filename)
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{
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const char *home, *config_home;
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@ -43,4 +43,9 @@ test_expect_success 'fetch through proxy works' '
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test_cmp expect actual
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'
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test_expect_success 'funny hostnames are rejected before running proxy' '
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test_must_fail git fetch git://-remote/repo.git 2>stderr &&
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! grep "proxying for" stderr
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'
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test_done
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@ -11,4 +11,27 @@ test_expect_success 'setup repository to clone' '
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test_proto "file://" file "file://$PWD"
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test_proto "path" file .
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test_expect_success 'setup repo with dash' '
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git init --bare repo.git &&
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git push repo.git HEAD &&
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mv repo.git "$PWD/-repo.git"
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'
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# This will fail even without our rejection because upload-pack will
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# complain about the bogus option. So let's make sure that GIT_TRACE
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# doesn't show us even running upload-pack.
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#
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# We must also be sure to use "fetch" and not "clone" here, as the latter
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# actually canonicalizes our input into an absolute path (which is fine
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# to allow).
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test_expect_success 'repo names starting with dash are rejected' '
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rm -f trace.out &&
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test_must_fail env GIT_TRACE="$PWD/trace.out" git fetch -- -repo.git &&
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! grep upload-pack trace.out
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'
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test_expect_success 'full paths still work' '
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git fetch "$PWD/-repo.git"
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'
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test_done
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@ -17,4 +17,27 @@ test_proto "host:path" ssh "remote:repo.git"
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test_proto "ssh://" ssh "ssh://remote$PWD/remote/repo.git"
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test_proto "git+ssh://" ssh "git+ssh://remote$PWD/remote/repo.git"
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# Don't even bother setting up a "-remote" directory, as ssh would generally
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# complain about the bogus option rather than completing our request. Our
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# fake wrapper actually _can_ handle this case, but it's more robust to
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# simply confirm from its output that it did not run at all.
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test_expect_success 'hostnames starting with dash are rejected' '
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test_must_fail git clone ssh://-remote/repo.git dash-host 2>stderr &&
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! grep ^ssh: stderr
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'
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test_expect_success 'setup repo with dash' '
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git init --bare remote/-repo.git &&
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git push remote/-repo.git HEAD
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'
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test_expect_success 'repo names starting with dash are rejected' '
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test_must_fail git clone remote:-repo.git dash-path 2>stderr &&
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! grep ^ssh: stderr
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'
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test_expect_success 'full paths still work' '
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git clone "remote:$PWD/remote/-repo.git" dash-path
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'
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test_done
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