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transport: make protocol.file.allow
be "user" by default
An earlier patch discussed and fixed a scenario where Git could be used as a vector to exfiltrate sensitive data through a Docker container when a potential victim clones a suspicious repository with local submodules that contain symlinks. That security hole has since been plugged, but a similar one still exists. Instead of convincing a would-be victim to clone an embedded submodule via the "file" protocol, an attacker could convince an individual to clone a repository that has a submodule pointing to a valid path on the victim's filesystem. For example, if an individual (with username "foo") has their home directory ("/home/foo") stored as a Git repository, then an attacker could exfiltrate data by convincing a victim to clone a malicious repository containing a submodule pointing at "/home/foo/.git" with `--recurse-submodules`. Doing so would expose any sensitive contents in stored in "/home/foo" tracked in Git. For systems (such as Docker) that consider everything outside of the immediate top-level working directory containing a Dockerfile as inaccessible to the container (with the exception of volume mounts, and so on), this is a violation of trust by exposing unexpected contents in the working copy. To mitigate the likelihood of this kind of attack, adjust the "file://" protocol's default policy to be "user" to prevent commands that execute without user input (including recursive submodule initialization) from taking place by default. Suggested-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
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@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
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protocol.allow::
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If set, provide a user defined default policy for all protocols which
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don't explicitly have a policy (`protocol.<name>.allow`). By default,
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if unset, known-safe protocols (http, https, git, ssh, file) have a
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if unset, known-safe protocols (http, https, git, ssh) have a
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default policy of `always`, known-dangerous protocols (ext) have a
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default policy of `never`, and all other protocols have a default
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policy of `user`. Supported policies:
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default policy of `never`, and all other protocols (including file)
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have a default policy of `user`. Supported policies:
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+
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--
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@ -964,8 +964,7 @@ static enum protocol_allow_config get_protocol_config(const char *type)
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if (!strcmp(type, "http") ||
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!strcmp(type, "https") ||
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!strcmp(type, "git") ||
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!strcmp(type, "ssh") ||
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!strcmp(type, "file"))
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!strcmp(type, "ssh"))
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return PROTOCOL_ALLOW_ALWAYS;
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/* known scary; err on the side of caution */
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