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Git 2.39.4
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Documentation/RelNotes/2.39.4.txt
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Documentation/RelNotes/2.39.4.txt
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Git v2.39.4 Release Notes
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=========================
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This addresses the security issues CVE-2024-32002, CVE-2024-32004,
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CVE-2024-32020 and CVE-2024-32021.
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This release also backports fixes necessary to let the CI builds pass
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successfully.
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Fixes since v2.39.3
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-------------------
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* CVE-2024-32002:
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Recursive clones on case-insensitive filesystems that support symbolic
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links are susceptible to case confusion that can be exploited to
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execute just-cloned code during the clone operation.
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* CVE-2024-32004:
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Repositories can be configured to execute arbitrary code during local
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clones. To address this, the ownership checks introduced in v2.30.3
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are now extended to cover cloning local repositories.
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* CVE-2024-32020:
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Local clones may end up hardlinking files into the target repository's
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object database when source and target repository reside on the same
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disk. If the source repository is owned by a different user, then
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those hardlinked files may be rewritten at any point in time by the
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untrusted user.
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* CVE-2024-32021:
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When cloning a local source repository that contains symlinks via the
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filesystem, Git may create hardlinks to arbitrary user-readable files
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on the same filesystem as the target repository in the objects/
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directory.
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* CVE-2024-32465:
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It is supposed to be safe to clone untrusted repositories, even those
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unpacked from zip archives or tarballs originating from untrusted
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sources, but Git can be tricked to run arbitrary code as part of the
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clone.
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* Defense-in-depth: submodule: require the submodule path to contain
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directories only.
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* Defense-in-depth: clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep
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the latter.
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* Defense-in-depth: clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone.
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* Defense-in-depth: core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning.
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* Defense-in-depth: fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir.
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* Various fix-ups on HTTP tests.
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* Test update.
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* HTTP Header redaction code has been adjusted for a newer version of
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cURL library that shows its traces differently from earlier
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versions.
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* Fix was added to work around a regression in libcURL 8.7.0 (which has
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already been fixed in their tip of the tree).
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* Replace macos-12 used at GitHub CI with macos-13.
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* ci(linux-asan/linux-ubsan): let's save some time
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* Tests with LSan from time to time seem to emit harmless message that makes
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our tests unnecessarily flakey; we work it around by filtering the
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uninteresting output.
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* Update GitHub Actions jobs to avoid warnings against using deprecated
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version of Node.js.
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#!/bin/sh
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GVF=GIT-VERSION-FILE
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DEF_VER=v2.39.3
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DEF_VER=v2.39.4
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LF='
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'
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