mirror of
https://github.com/git/git.git
synced 2024-11-24 02:17:02 +08:00
is_ntfs_dotgit(): only verify the leading segment
The config setting `core.protectNTFS` is specifically designed to work not only on Windows, but anywhere, to allow for repositories hosted on, say, Linux servers to be protected against NTFS-specific attack vectors. As a consequence, `is_ntfs_dotgit()` manually splits backslash-separated paths (but does not do the same for paths separated by forward slashes), under the assumption that the backslash might not be a valid directory separator on the _current_ Operating System. However, the two callers, `verify_path()` and `fsck_tree()`, are supposed to feed only individual path segments to the `is_ntfs_dotgit()` function. This causes a lot of duplicate scanning (and very inefficient scanning, too, as the inner loop of `is_ntfs_dotgit()` was optimized for readability rather than for speed. Let's simplify the design of `is_ntfs_dotgit()` by putting the burden of splitting the paths by backslashes as directory separators on the callers of said function. Consequently, the `verify_path()` function, which already splits the path by directory separators, now treats backslashes as directory separators _explicitly_ when `core.protectNTFS` is turned on, even on platforms where the backslash is _not_ a directory separator. Note that we have to repeat some code in `verify_path()`: if the backslash is not a directory separator on the current Operating System, we want to allow file names like `\`, but we _do_ want to disallow paths that are clearly intended to cause harm when the repository is cloned on Windows. The `fsck_tree()` function (the other caller of `is_ntfs_dotgit()`) now needs to look for backslashes in tree entries' names specifically when `core.protectNTFS` is turned on. While it would be tempting to completely disallow backslashes in that case (much like `fsck` reports names containing forward slashes as "full paths"), this would be overzealous: when `core.protectNTFS` is turned on in a non-Windows setup, backslashes are perfectly valid characters in file names while we _still_ want to disallow tree entries that are clearly designed to exploit NTFS-specific behavior. This simplification will make subsequent changes easier to implement, such as turning `core.protectNTFS` on by default (not only on Windows) or protecting against attack vectors involving NTFS Alternate Data Streams. Incidentally, this change allows for catching malicious repositories that contain tree entries of the form `dir\.gitmodules` already on the server side rather than only on the client side (and previously only on Windows): in contrast to `is_ntfs_dotgit()`, the `is_ntfs_dotgitmodules()` function already expects the caller to split the paths by directory separators. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
This commit is contained in:
parent
a62f9d1ace
commit
288a74bcd2
11
fsck.c
11
fsck.c
@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ static int fsck_tree(struct tree *item, struct fsck_options *options)
|
||||
|
||||
while (desc.size) {
|
||||
unsigned mode;
|
||||
const char *name;
|
||||
const char *name, *backslash;
|
||||
const struct object_id *oid;
|
||||
|
||||
oid = tree_entry_extract(&desc, &name, &mode);
|
||||
@ -565,6 +565,15 @@ static int fsck_tree(struct tree *item, struct fsck_options *options)
|
||||
is_hfs_dotgit(name) ||
|
||||
is_ntfs_dotgit(name));
|
||||
has_zero_pad |= *(char *)desc.buffer == '0';
|
||||
|
||||
if ((backslash = strchr(name, '\\'))) {
|
||||
while (backslash) {
|
||||
backslash++;
|
||||
has_dotgit |= is_ntfs_dotgit(backslash);
|
||||
backslash = strchr(backslash, '\\');
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (update_tree_entry_gently(&desc)) {
|
||||
retval += report(options, &item->object, FSCK_MSG_BAD_TREE, "cannot be parsed as a tree");
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
5
path.c
5
path.c
@ -1342,10 +1342,7 @@ int is_ntfs_dotgit(const char *name)
|
||||
if (only_spaces_and_periods(name, len, 5) &&
|
||||
!strncasecmp(name, "git~1", 5))
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
if (name[len] != '\\')
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
name += len + 1;
|
||||
len = -1;
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -874,7 +874,15 @@ inside:
|
||||
if ((c == '.' && !verify_dotfile(path, mode)) ||
|
||||
is_dir_sep(c) || c == '\0')
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
} else if (c == '\\' && protect_ntfs) {
|
||||
if (is_ntfs_dotgit(path))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
if (S_ISLNK(mode)) {
|
||||
if (is_ntfs_dotgitmodules(path))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c = *path++;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user