2005-07-16 11:42:28 +08:00
|
|
|
#include <signal.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/wait.h>
|
2005-07-14 10:45:26 +08:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/socket.h>
|
2005-08-24 04:34:44 +08:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/time.h>
|
2005-09-29 08:26:44 +08:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/poll.h>
|
2005-07-23 16:24:59 +08:00
|
|
|
#include <netdb.h>
|
2005-07-14 10:45:26 +08:00
|
|
|
#include <netinet/in.h>
|
2005-09-22 17:25:28 +08:00
|
|
|
#include <arpa/inet.h>
|
2005-09-24 22:13:01 +08:00
|
|
|
#include <syslog.h>
|
2005-10-26 07:29:09 +08:00
|
|
|
#include "pkt-line.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "cache.h"
|
2006-01-11 10:12:17 +08:00
|
|
|
#include "exec_cmd.h"
|
2005-09-22 17:25:28 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-09-24 22:13:01 +08:00
|
|
|
static int log_syslog;
|
2005-09-22 17:25:28 +08:00
|
|
|
static int verbose;
|
2006-02-04 04:27:04 +08:00
|
|
|
static int reuseaddr;
|
2005-09-22 17:25:28 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-10-20 05:27:01 +08:00
|
|
|
static const char daemon_usage[] =
|
|
|
|
"git-daemon [--verbose] [--syslog] [--inetd | --port=n] [--export-all]\n"
|
2005-12-23 09:27:40 +08:00
|
|
|
" [--timeout=n] [--init-timeout=n] [--strict-paths]\n"
|
2006-02-05 14:27:29 +08:00
|
|
|
" [--base-path=path] [--user-path | --user-path=path]\n"
|
|
|
|
" [--reuseaddr] [directory...]";
|
2005-09-27 10:10:55 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* List of acceptable pathname prefixes */
|
|
|
|
static char **ok_paths = NULL;
|
2005-11-18 03:37:14 +08:00
|
|
|
static int strict_paths = 0;
|
2005-09-27 10:10:55 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If this is set, git-daemon-export-ok is not required */
|
|
|
|
static int export_all_trees = 0;
|
2005-09-22 17:25:28 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-12-23 09:27:40 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Take all paths relative to this one if non-NULL */
|
|
|
|
static char *base_path = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-02-05 14:27:29 +08:00
|
|
|
/* If defined, ~user notation is allowed and the string is inserted
|
|
|
|
* after ~user/. E.g. a request to git://host/~alice/frotz would
|
|
|
|
* go to /home/alice/pub_git/frotz with --user-path=pub_git.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static char *user_path = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-10-20 05:27:01 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Timeout, and initial timeout */
|
|
|
|
static unsigned int timeout = 0;
|
|
|
|
static unsigned int init_timeout = 0;
|
2005-09-22 17:25:28 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-09-24 22:13:01 +08:00
|
|
|
static void logreport(int priority, const char *err, va_list params)
|
2005-09-22 17:25:28 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* We should do a single write so that it is atomic and output
|
|
|
|
* of several processes do not get intermingled. */
|
|
|
|
char buf[1024];
|
|
|
|
int buflen;
|
|
|
|
int maxlen, msglen;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* sizeof(buf) should be big enough for "[pid] \n" */
|
2005-09-24 14:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
buflen = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "[%ld] ", (long) getpid());
|
2005-09-22 17:25:28 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
maxlen = sizeof(buf) - buflen - 1; /* -1 for our own LF */
|
|
|
|
msglen = vsnprintf(buf + buflen, maxlen, err, params);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-24 22:13:01 +08:00
|
|
|
if (log_syslog) {
|
|
|
|
syslog(priority, "%s", buf);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-22 17:25:28 +08:00
|
|
|
/* maxlen counted our own LF but also counts space given to
|
|
|
|
* vsnprintf for the terminating NUL. We want to make sure that
|
|
|
|
* we have space for our own LF and NUL after the "meat" of the
|
|
|
|
* message, so truncate it at maxlen - 1.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (msglen > maxlen - 1)
|
|
|
|
msglen = maxlen - 1;
|
|
|
|
else if (msglen < 0)
|
|
|
|
msglen = 0; /* Protect against weird return values. */
|
|
|
|
buflen += msglen;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
buf[buflen++] = '\n';
|
|
|
|
buf[buflen] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
write(2, buf, buflen);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-30 04:53:14 +08:00
|
|
|
static void logerror(const char *err, ...)
|
2005-09-22 17:25:28 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
va_list params;
|
|
|
|
va_start(params, err);
|
2005-09-24 22:13:01 +08:00
|
|
|
logreport(LOG_ERR, err, params);
|
2005-09-22 17:25:28 +08:00
|
|
|
va_end(params);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-30 04:53:14 +08:00
|
|
|
static void loginfo(const char *err, ...)
|
2005-09-22 17:25:28 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
va_list params;
|
|
|
|
if (!verbose)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
va_start(params, err);
|
2005-09-24 22:13:01 +08:00
|
|
|
logreport(LOG_INFO, err, params);
|
2005-09-22 17:25:28 +08:00
|
|
|
va_end(params);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-07-14 10:45:26 +08:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation.
The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from
enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained
from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed
earier (mid October 2005).
Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped.
For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to
its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the
administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time
/pub needs to point at a different partition for storage
allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using
/pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property.
So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir()
and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the
directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path,
it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still
reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to
do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git).
What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user
relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user
home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say
/home if the advertised way to access user home directories are
~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid
unnecessary aliasing issues.
Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to
guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor
does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting
/../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the
belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose.
This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally,
because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to
honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack
and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2005-12-03 17:45:57 +08:00
|
|
|
static int avoid_alias(char *p)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int sl, ndot;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This resurrects the belts and suspenders paranoia check by HPA
|
|
|
|
* done in <435560F7.4080006@zytor.com> thread, now enter_repo()
|
|
|
|
* does not do getcwd() based path canonicalizations.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* sl becomes true immediately after seeing '/' and continues to
|
|
|
|
* be true as long as dots continue after that without intervening
|
|
|
|
* non-dot character.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!p || (*p != '/' && *p != '~'))
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
sl = 1; ndot = 0;
|
|
|
|
p++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (1) {
|
|
|
|
char ch = *p++;
|
|
|
|
if (sl) {
|
|
|
|
if (ch == '.')
|
|
|
|
ndot++;
|
|
|
|
else if (ch == '/') {
|
|
|
|
if (ndot < 3)
|
|
|
|
/* reject //, /./ and /../ */
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
ndot = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if (ch == 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (0 < ndot && ndot < 3)
|
|
|
|
/* reject /.$ and /..$ */
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
sl = ndot = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if (ch == 0)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
else if (ch == '/') {
|
|
|
|
sl = 1;
|
|
|
|
ndot = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-11-18 03:37:14 +08:00
|
|
|
static char *path_ok(char *dir)
|
2005-09-27 10:10:55 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2006-02-05 14:27:29 +08:00
|
|
|
static char rpath[PATH_MAX];
|
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation.
The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from
enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained
from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed
earier (mid October 2005).
Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped.
For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to
its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the
administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time
/pub needs to point at a different partition for storage
allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using
/pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property.
So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir()
and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the
directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path,
it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still
reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to
do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git).
What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user
relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user
home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say
/home if the advertised way to access user home directories are
~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid
unnecessary aliasing issues.
Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to
guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor
does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting
/../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the
belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose.
This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally,
because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to
honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack
and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2005-12-03 17:45:57 +08:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (avoid_alias(dir)) {
|
|
|
|
logerror("'%s': aliased", dir);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-02-05 14:27:29 +08:00
|
|
|
if (*dir == '~') {
|
|
|
|
if (!user_path) {
|
|
|
|
logerror("'%s': User-path not allowed", dir);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (*user_path) {
|
|
|
|
/* Got either "~alice" or "~alice/foo";
|
|
|
|
* rewrite them to "~alice/%s" or
|
|
|
|
* "~alice/%s/foo".
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int namlen, restlen = strlen(dir);
|
|
|
|
char *slash = strchr(dir, '/');
|
|
|
|
if (!slash)
|
|
|
|
slash = dir + restlen;
|
|
|
|
namlen = slash - dir;
|
|
|
|
restlen -= namlen;
|
|
|
|
loginfo("userpath <%s>, request <%s>, namlen %d, restlen %d, slash <%s>", user_path, dir, namlen, restlen, slash);
|
|
|
|
snprintf(rpath, PATH_MAX, "%.*s/%s%.*s",
|
|
|
|
namlen, dir, user_path, restlen, slash);
|
|
|
|
dir = rpath;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if (base_path) {
|
|
|
|
if (*dir != '/') {
|
|
|
|
/* Allow only absolute */
|
2006-02-04 04:27:02 +08:00
|
|
|
logerror("'%s': Non-absolute path denied (base-path active)", dir);
|
2005-12-23 09:27:40 +08:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-02-04 15:50:55 +08:00
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
snprintf(rpath, PATH_MAX, "%s%s", base_path, dir);
|
|
|
|
dir = rpath;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-12-23 09:27:40 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation.
The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from
enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained
from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed
earier (mid October 2005).
Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped.
For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to
its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the
administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time
/pub needs to point at a different partition for storage
allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using
/pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property.
So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir()
and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the
directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path,
it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still
reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to
do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git).
What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user
relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user
home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say
/home if the advertised way to access user home directories are
~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid
unnecessary aliasing issues.
Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to
guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor
does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting
/../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the
belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose.
This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally,
because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to
honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack
and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2005-12-03 17:45:57 +08:00
|
|
|
path = enter_repo(dir, strict_paths);
|
2005-10-19 09:26:52 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-11-18 03:37:14 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!path) {
|
|
|
|
logerror("'%s': unable to chdir or not a git archive", dir);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2005-09-27 10:10:55 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ( ok_paths && *ok_paths ) {
|
2005-11-21 17:21:18 +08:00
|
|
|
char **pp;
|
2005-11-18 03:37:14 +08:00
|
|
|
int pathlen = strlen(path);
|
2005-09-27 10:10:55 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-11-21 17:21:18 +08:00
|
|
|
/* The validation is done on the paths after enter_repo
|
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation.
The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from
enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained
from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed
earier (mid October 2005).
Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped.
For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to
its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the
administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time
/pub needs to point at a different partition for storage
allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using
/pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property.
So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir()
and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the
directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path,
it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still
reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to
do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git).
What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user
relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user
home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say
/home if the advertised way to access user home directories are
~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid
unnecessary aliasing issues.
Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to
guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor
does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting
/../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the
belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose.
This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally,
because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to
honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack
and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2005-12-03 17:45:57 +08:00
|
|
|
* appends optional {.git,.git/.git} and friends, but
|
|
|
|
* it does not use getcwd(). So if your /pub is
|
|
|
|
* a symlink to /mnt/pub, you can whitelist /pub and
|
|
|
|
* do not have to say /mnt/pub.
|
|
|
|
* Do not say /pub/.
|
2005-11-21 17:21:18 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-09-27 10:10:55 +08:00
|
|
|
for ( pp = ok_paths ; *pp ; pp++ ) {
|
|
|
|
int len = strlen(*pp);
|
2005-11-21 17:21:18 +08:00
|
|
|
if (len <= pathlen &&
|
|
|
|
!memcmp(*pp, path, len) &&
|
|
|
|
(path[len] == '\0' ||
|
|
|
|
(!strict_paths && path[len] == '/')))
|
|
|
|
return path;
|
2005-09-27 10:10:55 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-11-18 03:37:14 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
/* be backwards compatible */
|
|
|
|
if (!strict_paths)
|
|
|
|
return path;
|
2005-09-27 10:10:55 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-11-18 03:37:14 +08:00
|
|
|
logerror("'%s': not in whitelist", path);
|
|
|
|
return NULL; /* Fallthrough. Deny by default */
|
2005-09-27 10:10:55 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-07-14 10:45:26 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-11-18 03:37:14 +08:00
|
|
|
static int upload(char *dir)
|
2005-07-14 10:45:26 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-11-18 03:37:14 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Timeout as string */
|
|
|
|
char timeout_buf[64];
|
|
|
|
const char *path;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
loginfo("Request for '%s'", dir);
|
2005-09-27 10:10:55 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-11-18 03:37:14 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!(path = path_ok(dir)))
|
2005-07-14 10:45:26 +08:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2005-09-27 23:49:40 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-07-14 10:45:26 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Security on the cheap.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2005-10-21 14:19:36 +08:00
|
|
|
* We want a readable HEAD, usable "objects" directory, and
|
2005-07-14 10:45:26 +08:00
|
|
|
* a "git-daemon-export-ok" flag that says that the other side
|
|
|
|
* is ok with us doing this.
|
2005-11-18 03:37:14 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* path_ok() uses enter_repo() and does whitelist checking.
|
|
|
|
* We only need to make sure the repository is exported.
|
2005-07-14 10:45:26 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-11-18 03:37:14 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-10-19 09:26:52 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!export_all_trees && access("git-daemon-export-ok", F_OK)) {
|
2005-11-18 03:37:14 +08:00
|
|
|
logerror("'%s': repository not exported.", path);
|
2005-10-19 09:26:52 +08:00
|
|
|
errno = EACCES;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-07-16 13:53:31 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We'll ignore SIGTERM from now on, we have a
|
|
|
|
* good client.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-10-20 05:27:01 +08:00
|
|
|
snprintf(timeout_buf, sizeof timeout_buf, "--timeout=%u", timeout);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-07-14 10:45:26 +08:00
|
|
|
/* git-upload-pack only ever reads stuff, so this is safe */
|
2006-01-11 10:12:17 +08:00
|
|
|
execl_git_cmd("upload-pack", "--strict", timeout_buf, ".", NULL);
|
2005-07-14 10:45:26 +08:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-07-16 00:27:05 +08:00
|
|
|
static int execute(void)
|
2005-07-14 10:45:26 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-07-16 00:27:05 +08:00
|
|
|
static char line[1000];
|
|
|
|
int len;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-10-20 05:27:01 +08:00
|
|
|
alarm(init_timeout ? init_timeout : timeout);
|
2005-07-16 00:27:05 +08:00
|
|
|
len = packet_read_line(0, line, sizeof(line));
|
2005-10-20 05:27:01 +08:00
|
|
|
alarm(0);
|
2005-07-16 00:27:05 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (len && line[len-1] == '\n')
|
|
|
|
line[--len] = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-11-18 03:37:14 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!strncmp("git-upload-pack ", line, 16))
|
2005-10-19 09:26:52 +08:00
|
|
|
return upload(line+16);
|
2005-07-14 10:45:26 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-09-22 17:25:28 +08:00
|
|
|
logerror("Protocol error: '%s'", line);
|
2005-07-14 10:45:26 +08:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-07-16 12:51:57 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We count spawned/reaped separately, just to avoid any
|
|
|
|
* races when updating them from signals. The SIGCHLD handler
|
|
|
|
* will only update children_reaped, and the fork logic will
|
|
|
|
* only update children_spawned.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* MAX_CHILDREN should be a power-of-two to make the modulus
|
|
|
|
* operation cheap. It should also be at least twice
|
|
|
|
* the maximum number of connections we will ever allow.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define MAX_CHILDREN 128
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int max_connections = 25;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* These are updated by the signal handler */
|
|
|
|
static volatile unsigned int children_reaped = 0;
|
2005-08-02 03:11:53 +08:00
|
|
|
static pid_t dead_child[MAX_CHILDREN];
|
2005-07-16 12:51:57 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* These are updated by the main loop */
|
|
|
|
static unsigned int children_spawned = 0;
|
|
|
|
static unsigned int children_deleted = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-08-02 03:11:53 +08:00
|
|
|
static struct child {
|
2005-07-16 12:51:57 +08:00
|
|
|
pid_t pid;
|
2005-09-12 04:58:41 +08:00
|
|
|
int addrlen;
|
2005-07-23 16:24:59 +08:00
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_storage address;
|
2005-07-16 12:51:57 +08:00
|
|
|
} live_child[MAX_CHILDREN];
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-12 04:58:41 +08:00
|
|
|
static void add_child(int idx, pid_t pid, struct sockaddr *addr, int addrlen)
|
2005-07-16 12:51:57 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
live_child[idx].pid = pid;
|
|
|
|
live_child[idx].addrlen = addrlen;
|
2005-07-23 16:24:59 +08:00
|
|
|
memcpy(&live_child[idx].address, addr, addrlen);
|
2005-07-16 12:51:57 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Walk from "deleted" to "spawned", and remove child "pid".
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* We move everything up by one, since the new "deleted" will
|
|
|
|
* be one higher.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void remove_child(pid_t pid, unsigned deleted, unsigned spawned)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct child n;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
deleted %= MAX_CHILDREN;
|
|
|
|
spawned %= MAX_CHILDREN;
|
|
|
|
if (live_child[deleted].pid == pid) {
|
|
|
|
live_child[deleted].pid = -1;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n = live_child[deleted];
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
|
|
struct child m;
|
|
|
|
deleted = (deleted + 1) % MAX_CHILDREN;
|
|
|
|
if (deleted == spawned)
|
|
|
|
die("could not find dead child %d\n", pid);
|
|
|
|
m = live_child[deleted];
|
|
|
|
live_child[deleted] = n;
|
|
|
|
if (m.pid == pid)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
n = m;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This gets called if the number of connections grows
|
|
|
|
* past "max_connections".
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* We _should_ start off by searching for connections
|
|
|
|
* from the same IP, and if there is some address wth
|
|
|
|
* multiple connections, we should kill that first.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* As it is, we just "randomly" kill 25% of the connections,
|
|
|
|
* and our pseudo-random generator sucks too. I have no
|
|
|
|
* shame.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Really, this is just a place-holder for a _real_ algorithm.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-07-16 13:53:31 +08:00
|
|
|
static void kill_some_children(int signo, unsigned start, unsigned stop)
|
2005-07-16 12:51:57 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
start %= MAX_CHILDREN;
|
|
|
|
stop %= MAX_CHILDREN;
|
|
|
|
while (start != stop) {
|
|
|
|
if (!(start & 3))
|
2005-07-16 13:53:31 +08:00
|
|
|
kill(live_child[start].pid, signo);
|
2005-07-16 12:51:57 +08:00
|
|
|
start = (start + 1) % MAX_CHILDREN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-07-16 13:53:31 +08:00
|
|
|
static void check_max_connections(void)
|
2005-07-14 10:45:26 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-07-16 13:53:31 +08:00
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
2005-07-16 11:42:28 +08:00
|
|
|
int active;
|
2005-07-16 12:51:57 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned spawned, reaped, deleted;
|
2005-07-16 11:42:28 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-07-16 12:51:57 +08:00
|
|
|
spawned = children_spawned;
|
|
|
|
reaped = children_reaped;
|
|
|
|
deleted = children_deleted;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (deleted < reaped) {
|
|
|
|
pid_t pid = dead_child[deleted % MAX_CHILDREN];
|
|
|
|
remove_child(pid, deleted, spawned);
|
|
|
|
deleted++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
children_deleted = deleted;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
active = spawned - deleted;
|
2005-07-16 13:53:31 +08:00
|
|
|
if (active <= max_connections)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2005-07-16 12:51:57 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-07-16 13:53:31 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Kill some unstarted connections with SIGTERM */
|
|
|
|
kill_some_children(SIGTERM, deleted, spawned);
|
|
|
|
if (active <= max_connections << 1)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If the SIGTERM thing isn't helping use SIGKILL */
|
|
|
|
kill_some_children(SIGKILL, deleted, spawned);
|
|
|
|
sleep(1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-12 04:58:41 +08:00
|
|
|
static void handle(int incoming, struct sockaddr *addr, int addrlen)
|
2005-07-16 13:53:31 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
pid_t pid = fork();
|
2005-09-22 17:25:28 +08:00
|
|
|
char addrbuf[256] = "";
|
|
|
|
int port = -1;
|
2005-07-16 13:53:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (pid) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned idx;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
close(incoming);
|
|
|
|
if (pid < 0)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
idx = children_spawned % MAX_CHILDREN;
|
|
|
|
children_spawned++;
|
|
|
|
add_child(idx, pid, addr, addrlen);
|
2005-07-16 12:51:57 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-07-16 13:53:31 +08:00
|
|
|
check_max_connections();
|
2005-07-14 10:45:26 +08:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dup2(incoming, 0);
|
|
|
|
dup2(incoming, 1);
|
|
|
|
close(incoming);
|
2005-09-22 17:25:28 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (addr->sa_family == AF_INET) {
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in *sin_addr = (void *) addr;
|
|
|
|
inet_ntop(AF_INET, &sin_addr->sin_addr, addrbuf, sizeof(addrbuf));
|
|
|
|
port = sin_addr->sin_port;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-29 08:26:44 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef NO_IPV6
|
2005-09-22 17:25:28 +08:00
|
|
|
} else if (addr->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6_addr = (void *) addr;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
char *buf = addrbuf;
|
|
|
|
*buf++ = '['; *buf = '\0'; /* stpcpy() is cool */
|
|
|
|
inet_ntop(AF_INET6, &sin6_addr->sin6_addr, buf, sizeof(addrbuf) - 1);
|
|
|
|
strcat(buf, "]");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
port = sin6_addr->sin6_port;
|
2005-09-29 08:26:44 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2005-09-22 17:25:28 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-09-24 22:13:03 +08:00
|
|
|
loginfo("Connection from %s:%d", addrbuf, port);
|
2005-09-22 17:25:28 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-07-16 00:27:05 +08:00
|
|
|
exit(execute());
|
2005-07-14 10:45:26 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-07-16 11:42:28 +08:00
|
|
|
static void child_handler(int signo)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
2005-09-24 22:13:01 +08:00
|
|
|
int status;
|
|
|
|
pid_t pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG);
|
2005-07-16 12:51:57 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (pid > 0) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned reaped = children_reaped;
|
|
|
|
dead_child[reaped % MAX_CHILDREN] = pid;
|
|
|
|
children_reaped = reaped + 1;
|
2005-09-22 17:25:28 +08:00
|
|
|
/* XXX: Custom logging, since we don't wanna getpid() */
|
2005-09-24 22:13:01 +08:00
|
|
|
if (verbose) {
|
|
|
|
char *dead = "";
|
|
|
|
if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) > 0)
|
|
|
|
dead = " (with error)";
|
|
|
|
if (log_syslog)
|
|
|
|
syslog(LOG_INFO, "[%d] Disconnected%s", pid, dead);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[%d] Disconnected%s\n", pid, dead);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-07-16 11:42:28 +08:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-02-04 04:27:04 +08:00
|
|
|
static int set_reuse_addr(int sockfd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int on = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!reuseaddr)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
|
|
|
|
&on, sizeof(on));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-29 08:26:44 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef NO_IPV6
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int socksetup(int port, int **socklist_p)
|
2005-07-14 10:45:26 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-07-23 16:24:59 +08:00
|
|
|
int socknum = 0, *socklist = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int maxfd = -1;
|
|
|
|
char pbuf[NI_MAXSERV];
|
2005-07-14 10:45:26 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-09-29 08:26:44 +08:00
|
|
|
struct addrinfo hints, *ai0, *ai;
|
|
|
|
int gai;
|
2005-07-23 16:24:59 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sprintf(pbuf, "%d", port);
|
|
|
|
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
|
|
|
|
hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC;
|
|
|
|
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
|
|
|
|
hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;
|
|
|
|
hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
gai = getaddrinfo(NULL, pbuf, &hints, &ai0);
|
|
|
|
if (gai)
|
|
|
|
die("getaddrinfo() failed: %s\n", gai_strerror(gai));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (ai = ai0; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
|
|
|
|
int sockfd;
|
|
|
|
int *newlist;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sockfd = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
|
|
|
|
if (sockfd < 0)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (sockfd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
|
|
|
|
error("too large socket descriptor.");
|
|
|
|
close(sockfd);
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef IPV6_V6ONLY
|
|
|
|
if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) {
|
|
|
|
int on = 1;
|
|
|
|
setsockopt(sockfd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY,
|
|
|
|
&on, sizeof(on));
|
|
|
|
/* Note: error is not fatal */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2006-02-04 04:27:04 +08:00
|
|
|
if (set_reuse_addr(sockfd)) {
|
|
|
|
close(sockfd);
|
2006-04-18 21:11:06 +08:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
2006-02-04 04:27:04 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-07-23 16:24:59 +08:00
|
|
|
if (bind(sockfd, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
close(sockfd);
|
|
|
|
continue; /* not fatal */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (listen(sockfd, 5) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
close(sockfd);
|
|
|
|
continue; /* not fatal */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
newlist = realloc(socklist, sizeof(int) * (socknum + 1));
|
|
|
|
if (!newlist)
|
|
|
|
die("memory allocation failed: %s", strerror(errno));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
socklist = newlist;
|
|
|
|
socklist[socknum++] = sockfd;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (maxfd < sockfd)
|
|
|
|
maxfd = sockfd;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
freeaddrinfo(ai0);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-29 08:26:44 +08:00
|
|
|
*socklist_p = socklist;
|
|
|
|
return socknum;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#else /* NO_IPV6 */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int socksetup(int port, int **socklist_p)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in sin;
|
|
|
|
int sockfd;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (sockfd < 0)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(&sin, 0, sizeof sin);
|
|
|
|
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
|
|
|
|
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
|
|
|
|
sin.sin_port = htons(port);
|
|
|
|
|
2006-02-04 04:27:04 +08:00
|
|
|
if (set_reuse_addr(sockfd)) {
|
|
|
|
close(sockfd);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-29 08:26:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if ( bind(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof sin) < 0 ) {
|
|
|
|
close(sockfd);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-07-14 10:45:26 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-11-22 01:07:23 +08:00
|
|
|
if (listen(sockfd, 5) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
close(sockfd);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-10-01 01:47:50 +08:00
|
|
|
*socklist_p = xmalloc(sizeof(int));
|
2005-09-29 08:26:44 +08:00
|
|
|
**socklist_p = sockfd;
|
2005-11-22 01:07:23 +08:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2005-09-29 08:26:44 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int service_loop(int socknum, int *socklist)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct pollfd *pfd;
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-10-01 01:47:50 +08:00
|
|
|
pfd = xcalloc(socknum, sizeof(struct pollfd));
|
2005-09-29 08:26:44 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < socknum; i++) {
|
|
|
|
pfd[i].fd = socklist[i];
|
|
|
|
pfd[i].events = POLLIN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-10-01 02:01:57 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
signal(SIGCHLD, child_handler);
|
2005-07-14 10:45:26 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
2005-07-23 16:24:59 +08:00
|
|
|
int i;
|
2005-09-29 08:26:44 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-10-20 15:52:32 +08:00
|
|
|
if (poll(pfd, socknum, -1) < 0) {
|
2005-07-27 04:26:52 +08:00
|
|
|
if (errno != EINTR) {
|
2005-09-29 08:26:44 +08:00
|
|
|
error("poll failed, resuming: %s",
|
2005-07-27 04:26:52 +08:00
|
|
|
strerror(errno));
|
|
|
|
sleep(1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-07-23 16:24:59 +08:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < socknum; i++) {
|
2005-09-29 08:26:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if (pfd[i].revents & POLLIN) {
|
2005-07-23 16:24:59 +08:00
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_storage ss;
|
2005-10-01 01:48:21 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned int sslen = sizeof(ss);
|
2005-09-29 08:26:44 +08:00
|
|
|
int incoming = accept(pfd[i].fd, (struct sockaddr *)&ss, &sslen);
|
2005-07-23 16:24:59 +08:00
|
|
|
if (incoming < 0) {
|
|
|
|
switch (errno) {
|
|
|
|
case EAGAIN:
|
|
|
|
case EINTR:
|
|
|
|
case ECONNABORTED:
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
die("accept returned %s", strerror(errno));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
handle(incoming, (struct sockaddr *)&ss, sslen);
|
2005-07-14 10:45:26 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-29 08:26:44 +08:00
|
|
|
static int serve(int port)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int socknum, *socklist;
|
2005-10-21 14:21:50 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-09-29 08:26:44 +08:00
|
|
|
socknum = socksetup(port, &socklist);
|
|
|
|
if (socknum == 0)
|
|
|
|
die("unable to allocate any listen sockets on port %u", port);
|
2005-10-21 14:21:50 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-09-29 08:26:44 +08:00
|
|
|
return service_loop(socknum, socklist);
|
2005-10-21 14:21:50 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-09-29 08:26:44 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-07-14 10:45:26 +08:00
|
|
|
int main(int argc, char **argv)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int port = DEFAULT_GIT_PORT;
|
2005-07-16 00:32:16 +08:00
|
|
|
int inetd_mode = 0;
|
2005-07-14 10:45:26 +08:00
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
|
|
|
|
char *arg = argv[i];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(arg, "--port=", 7)) {
|
|
|
|
char *end;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long n;
|
|
|
|
n = strtoul(arg+7, &end, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (arg[7] && !*end) {
|
|
|
|
port = n;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-07-16 00:32:16 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(arg, "--inetd")) {
|
|
|
|
inetd_mode = 1;
|
2005-11-17 07:38:29 +08:00
|
|
|
log_syslog = 1;
|
2005-07-16 00:32:16 +08:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-09-22 17:25:28 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(arg, "--verbose")) {
|
|
|
|
verbose = 1;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-09-24 22:13:01 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(arg, "--syslog")) {
|
|
|
|
log_syslog = 1;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-09-27 10:10:55 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(arg, "--export-all")) {
|
|
|
|
export_all_trees = 1;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-10-20 05:27:01 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(arg, "--timeout=", 10)) {
|
|
|
|
timeout = atoi(arg+10);
|
2005-11-17 07:38:29 +08:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
2005-10-20 05:27:01 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-10-21 09:34:58 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(arg, "--init-timeout=", 15)) {
|
2005-10-20 05:27:01 +08:00
|
|
|
init_timeout = atoi(arg+15);
|
2005-11-17 07:38:29 +08:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
2005-10-20 05:27:01 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-11-18 03:37:14 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(arg, "--strict-paths")) {
|
|
|
|
strict_paths = 1;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-12-23 09:27:40 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(arg, "--base-path=", 12)) {
|
|
|
|
base_path = arg+12;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-02-04 04:27:04 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(arg, "--reuseaddr")) {
|
|
|
|
reuseaddr = 1;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-02-05 14:27:29 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(arg, "--user-path")) {
|
|
|
|
user_path = "";
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(arg, "--user-path=", 12)) {
|
|
|
|
user_path = arg + 12;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-09-27 10:10:55 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(arg, "--")) {
|
|
|
|
ok_paths = &argv[i+1];
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
} else if (arg[0] != '-') {
|
|
|
|
ok_paths = &argv[i];
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-07-16 00:32:16 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-07-14 10:45:26 +08:00
|
|
|
usage(daemon_usage);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-11-17 07:38:29 +08:00
|
|
|
if (log_syslog)
|
|
|
|
openlog("git-daemon", 0, LOG_DAEMON);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-11-18 03:37:14 +08:00
|
|
|
if (strict_paths && (!ok_paths || !*ok_paths)) {
|
|
|
|
if (!inetd_mode)
|
|
|
|
die("git-daemon: option --strict-paths requires a whitelist");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
logerror("option --strict-paths requires a whitelist");
|
|
|
|
exit (1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-08 09:50:01 +08:00
|
|
|
if (inetd_mode) {
|
|
|
|
fclose(stderr); //FIXME: workaround
|
2005-07-16 00:32:16 +08:00
|
|
|
return execute();
|
2005-09-08 09:50:01 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-11-15 00:41:01 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return serve(port);
|
2005-07-14 10:45:26 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|