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As requested by the Debian security team. * SECURITY.txt: Remove Debian.
205 lines
9.0 KiB
Plaintext
205 lines
9.0 KiB
Plaintext
What is a GCC security bug?
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===========================
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A security bug is one that threatens the security of a system or
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network, or might compromise the security of data stored on it.
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In the context of GCC, there are multiple ways in which this might
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happen and some common scenarios are detailed below.
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If you're reporting a security issue and feel like it does not fit
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into any of the descriptions below, you're encouraged to reach out
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through the GCC bugzilla or, if needed, privately, by following the
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instructions in the last two sections of this document.
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Compiler drivers, programs, libgccjit and support libraries
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-----------------------------------------------------------
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The compiler driver processes source code, invokes other programs
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such as the assembler and linker and generates the output result,
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which may be assembly code or machine code. Compiling untrusted
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sources can result in arbitrary code execution and unconstrained
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resource consumption in the compiler. As a result, compilation of
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such code should be done inside a sandboxed environment to ensure
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that it does not compromise the host environment.
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The libgccjit library can, despite the name, be used both for
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ahead-of-time compilation and for just-in-compilation. In both
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cases, it can be used to translate input representations (such as
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source code) in the application context; in the latter case, the
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generated code is also run in the application context.
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Limitations that apply to the compiler driver apply here too in
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terms of trusting inputs and it is recommended that both the
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compilation *and* execution context of the code are appropriately
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sandboxed to contain the effects of any bugs in libgccjit, the
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application code using it, or its generated code to the sandboxed
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environment.
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Libraries such as libiberty, libcc1 and libcpp are not distributed
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for runtime support and have similar challenges to compiler drivers.
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While they are expected to be robust against arbitrary input, they
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should only be used with trusted inputs when linked into the
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compiler.
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Libraries such as zlib that are bundled with GCC to build it will be
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treated the same as the compiler drivers and programs as far as
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security coverage is concerned. However, if you find an issue in
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these libraries independent of their use in GCC, you should reach
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out to their upstream projects to report them.
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As a result, the only case for a potential security issue in the
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compiler is when it generates vulnerable application code for
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trusted input source code that is conforming to the relevant
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programming standard or extensions documented as supported by GCC
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and the algorithm expressed in the source code does not have the
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vulnerability. The output application code could be considered
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vulnerable if it produces an actual vulnerability in the target
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application, for example:
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- The application dereferences an invalid memory location despite
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the application sources being valid.
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- The application reads from or writes to a valid but incorrect
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memory location, resulting in an information integrity issue or an
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information leak.
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- The application ends up running in an infinite loop or with
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severe degradation in performance despite the input sources having
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no such issue, resulting in a Denial of Service. Note that
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correct but non-performant code is not a security issue candidate,
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this only applies to incorrect code that may result in performance
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degradation severe enough to amount to a denial of service.
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- The application crashes due to the generated incorrect code,
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resulting in a Denial of Service.
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Language runtime libraries
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--------------------------
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GCC also builds and distributes libraries that are intended to be
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used widely to implement runtime support for various programming
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languages. These include the following:
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* libada
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* libatomic
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* libbacktrace
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* libcc1
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* libcody
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* libcpp
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* libdecnumber
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* libffi
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* libgcc
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* libgfortran
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* libgm2
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* libgo
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* libgomp
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* libitm
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* libobjc
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* libphobos
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* libquadmath
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* libssp
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* libstdc++
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These libraries are intended to be used in arbitrary contexts and, as
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a result, bugs in these libraries may be evaluated for security
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impact. However, some of these libraries, e.g. libgo, libphobos,
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etc. are not maintained in the GCC project, due to which the GCC
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project may not be the correct point of contact for them. You are
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encouraged to look at README files within those library directories
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to locate the canonical security contact point for those projects
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and include them in the report. Once the issue is fixed in the
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upstream project, the fix will be synced into GCC in a future
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release.
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Most security vulnerabilities in these runtime libraries arise when
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an application uses functionality in a specific way. As a result,
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not all bugs qualify as security relevant. The following guidelines
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can help with the decision:
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- Buffer overflows and integer overflows should be treated as
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security issues if it is conceivable that the data triggering them
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can come from an untrusted source.
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- Bugs that cause memory corruption which is likely exploitable
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should be treated as security bugs.
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- Information disclosure can be security bugs, especially if
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exposure through applications can be determined.
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- Memory leaks and races are security bugs if they cause service
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breakage.
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- Stack overflow through unbounded alloca calls or variable-length
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arrays are security bugs if it is conceivable that the data
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triggering the overflow could come from an untrusted source.
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- Stack overflow through deep recursion and other crashes are
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security bugs if they cause service breakage.
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- Bugs that cripple the whole system (so that it doesn't even boot
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or does not run most applications) are not security bugs because
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they will not be exploitable in practice, due to general system
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instability.
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Diagnostic libraries
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--------------------
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Libraries like libvtv and the sanitizers are intended to be used in
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diagnostic cases and not intended for use in sensitive environments.
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As a result, bugs in these libraries will not be considered security
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sensitive.
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GCC plugins
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-----------
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It should be noted that GCC may execute arbitrary code loaded by a
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user through the GCC plugin mechanism or through system preloading
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mechanism. Such custom code should be vetted by the user for safety,
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as bugs exposed through such code will not be considered security
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issues.
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Security features implemented in GCC
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------------------------------------
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GCC implements a number of security features that reduce the impact
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of security issues in applications, such as -fstack-protector,
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-fstack-clash-protection, _FORTIFY_SOURCE and so on. A failure of
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these features to function perfectly in all situations is not a
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vulnerability in itself since it does not affect the correctness of
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programs. Further, they're dependent on heuristics and may not
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always have full coverage for protection.
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Similarly, GCC may transform code in a way that the correctness of
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the expressed algorithm is preserved, but supplementary properties
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that are not specifically expressible in a high-level language
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are not preserved. Examples of such supplementary properties
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include absence of sensitive data in the program's address space
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after an attempt to wipe it, or data-independent timing of code.
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When the source code attempts to express such properties, failure
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to preserve them in resulting machine code is not a security issue
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in GCC.
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Reporting private security bugs
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===============================
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*All bugs reported in the GCC Bugzilla are public.*
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In order to report a private security bug that is not immediately
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public, please contact one of the downstream distributions with
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security teams. The following teams have volunteered to handle
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such bugs:
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Red Hat: secalert@redhat.com
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SUSE: security@suse.de
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AdaCore: product-security@adacore.com
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Please report the bug to just one of these teams. It will be shared
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with other teams as necessary.
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The team contacted will take care of details such as vulnerability
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rating and CVE assignment (http://cve.mitre.org/about/). It is likely
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that the team will ask to file a public bug because the issue is
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sufficiently minor and does not warrant an embargo. An embargo is not
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a requirement for being credited with the discovery of a security
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vulnerability.
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Reporting public security bugs
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==============================
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It is expected that critical security bugs will be rare, and that most
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security bugs can be reported in GCC, thus making
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them public immediately. The system can be found here:
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https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/
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