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:mod:`ssl` --- TLS/SSL wrapper for socket objects
=================================================
.. module:: ssl
:synopsis: TLS/SSL wrapper for socket objects
.. moduleauthor:: Bill Janssen <bill.janssen@gmail.com>
.. sectionauthor:: Bill Janssen <bill.janssen@gmail.com>
.. index:: single: OpenSSL; (use in module ssl)
.. index:: TLS, SSL, Transport Layer Security, Secure Sockets Layer
**Source code:** :source:`Lib/ssl.py`
--------------
This module provides access to Transport Layer Security (often known as "Secure
Sockets Layer") encryption and peer authentication facilities for network
sockets, both client-side and server-side. This module uses the OpenSSL
library. It is available on all modern Unix systems, Windows, Mac OS X, and
probably additional platforms, as long as OpenSSL is installed on that platform.
.. note::
Some behavior may be platform dependent, since calls are made to the
operating system socket APIs. The installed version of OpenSSL may also
cause variations in behavior.
.. warning::
Don't use this module without reading the :ref:`ssl-security`. Doing so
may lead to a false sense of security, as the default settings of the
ssl module are not necessarily appropriate for your application.
This section documents the objects and functions in the ``ssl`` module; for more
general information about TLS, SSL, and certificates, the reader is referred to
the documents in the "See Also" section at the bottom.
This module provides a class, :class:`ssl.SSLSocket`, which is derived from the
:class:`socket.socket` type, and provides a socket-like wrapper that also
encrypts and decrypts the data going over the socket with SSL. It supports
additional methods such as :meth:`getpeercert`, which retrieves the
certificate of the other side of the connection, and :meth:`cipher`,which
retrieves the cipher being used for the secure connection.
For more sophisticated applications, the :class:`ssl.SSLContext` class
helps manage settings and certificates, which can then be inherited
by SSL sockets created through the :meth:`SSLContext.wrap_socket` method.
Functions, Constants, and Exceptions
------------------------------------
.. exception:: SSLError
Raised to signal an error from the underlying SSL implementation
(currently provided by the OpenSSL library). This signifies some
problem in the higher-level encryption and authentication layer that's
superimposed on the underlying network connection. This error
is a subtype of :exc:`OSError`. The error code and message of
:exc:`SSLError` instances are provided by the OpenSSL library.
.. versionchanged:: 3.3
:exc:`SSLError` used to be a subtype of :exc:`socket.error`.
.. attribute:: library
A string mnemonic designating the OpenSSL submodule in which the error
occurred, such as ``SSL``, ``PEM`` or ``X509``. The range of possible
values depends on the OpenSSL version.
.. versionadded:: 3.3
.. attribute:: reason
A string mnemonic designating the reason this error occurred, for
example ``CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED``. The range of possible
values depends on the OpenSSL version.
.. versionadded:: 3.3
.. exception:: SSLZeroReturnError
A subclass of :exc:`SSLError` raised when trying to read or write and
the SSL connection has been closed cleanly. Note that this doesn't
mean that the underlying transport (read TCP) has been closed.
.. versionadded:: 3.3
.. exception:: SSLWantReadError
A subclass of :exc:`SSLError` raised by a :ref:`non-blocking SSL socket
<ssl-nonblocking>` when trying to read or write data, but more data needs
to be received on the underlying TCP transport before the request can be
fulfilled.
.. versionadded:: 3.3
.. exception:: SSLWantWriteError
A subclass of :exc:`SSLError` raised by a :ref:`non-blocking SSL socket
<ssl-nonblocking>` when trying to read or write data, but more data needs
to be sent on the underlying TCP transport before the request can be
fulfilled.
.. versionadded:: 3.3
.. exception:: SSLSyscallError
A subclass of :exc:`SSLError` raised when a system error was encountered
while trying to fulfill an operation on a SSL socket. Unfortunately,
there is no easy way to inspect the original errno number.
.. versionadded:: 3.3
.. exception:: SSLEOFError
A subclass of :exc:`SSLError` raised when the SSL connection has been
terminated abruptly. Generally, you shouldn't try to reuse the underlying
transport when this error is encountered.
.. versionadded:: 3.3
.. exception:: CertificateError
Raised to signal an error with a certificate (such as mismatching
hostname). Certificate errors detected by OpenSSL, though, raise
an :exc:`SSLError`.
Socket creation
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
The following function allows for standalone socket creation. Starting from
Python 3.2, it can be more flexible to use :meth:`SSLContext.wrap_socket`
instead.
.. function:: wrap_socket(sock, keyfile=None, certfile=None, server_side=False, cert_reqs=CERT_NONE, ssl_version={see docs}, ca_certs=None, do_handshake_on_connect=True, suppress_ragged_eofs=True, ciphers=None)
Takes an instance ``sock`` of :class:`socket.socket`, and returns an instance
of :class:`ssl.SSLSocket`, a subtype of :class:`socket.socket`, which wraps
the underlying socket in an SSL context. For client-side sockets, the
context construction is lazy; if the underlying socket isn't connected yet,
the context construction will be performed after :meth:`connect` is called on
the socket. For server-side sockets, if the socket has no remote peer, it is
assumed to be a listening socket, and the server-side SSL wrapping is
automatically performed on client connections accepted via the :meth:`accept`
method. :func:`wrap_socket` may raise :exc:`SSLError`.
The ``keyfile`` and ``certfile`` parameters specify optional files which
contain a certificate to be used to identify the local side of the
connection. See the discussion of :ref:`ssl-certificates` for more
information on how the certificate is stored in the ``certfile``.
The parameter ``server_side`` is a boolean which identifies whether
server-side or client-side behavior is desired from this socket.
The parameter ``cert_reqs`` specifies whether a certificate is required from
the other side of the connection, and whether it will be validated if
provided. It must be one of the three values :const:`CERT_NONE`
(certificates ignored), :const:`CERT_OPTIONAL` (not required, but validated
if provided), or :const:`CERT_REQUIRED` (required and validated). If the
value of this parameter is not :const:`CERT_NONE`, then the ``ca_certs``
parameter must point to a file of CA certificates.
The ``ca_certs`` file contains a set of concatenated "certification
authority" certificates, which are used to validate certificates passed from
the other end of the connection. See the discussion of
:ref:`ssl-certificates` for more information about how to arrange the
certificates in this file.
The parameter ``ssl_version`` specifies which version of the SSL protocol to
use. Typically, the server chooses a particular protocol version, and the
client must adapt to the server's choice. Most of the versions are not
interoperable with the other versions. If not specified, the default is
:data:`PROTOCOL_SSLv23`; it provides the most compatibility with other
versions.
Here's a table showing which versions in a client (down the side) can connect
to which versions in a server (along the top):
.. table::
======================== ========= ========= ========== =========
*client* / **server** **SSLv2** **SSLv3** **SSLv23** **TLSv1**
------------------------ --------- --------- ---------- ---------
*SSLv2* yes no yes no
*SSLv3* no yes yes no
*SSLv23* yes no yes no
*TLSv1* no no yes yes
======================== ========= ========= ========== =========
.. note::
Which connections succeed will vary depending on the version of
OpenSSL. For instance, in some older versions of OpenSSL (such
as 0.9.7l on OS X 10.4), an SSLv2 client could not connect to an
SSLv23 server. Another example: beginning with OpenSSL 1.0.0,
an SSLv23 client will not actually attempt SSLv2 connections
unless you explicitly enable SSLv2 ciphers; for example, you
might specify ``"ALL"`` or ``"SSLv2"`` as the *ciphers* parameter
to enable them.
The *ciphers* parameter sets the available ciphers for this SSL object.
It should be a string in the `OpenSSL cipher list format
<http://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ciphers.html#CIPHER_LIST_FORMAT>`_.
The parameter ``do_handshake_on_connect`` specifies whether to do the SSL
handshake automatically after doing a :meth:`socket.connect`, or whether the
application program will call it explicitly, by invoking the
:meth:`SSLSocket.do_handshake` method. Calling
:meth:`SSLSocket.do_handshake` explicitly gives the program control over the
blocking behavior of the socket I/O involved in the handshake.
The parameter ``suppress_ragged_eofs`` specifies how the
:meth:`SSLSocket.recv` method should signal unexpected EOF from the other end
of the connection. If specified as :const:`True` (the default), it returns a
normal EOF (an empty bytes object) in response to unexpected EOF errors
raised from the underlying socket; if :const:`False`, it will raise the
exceptions back to the caller.
.. versionchanged:: 3.2
New optional argument *ciphers*.
Random generation
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
.. function:: RAND_bytes(num)
Returns *num* cryptographically strong pseudo-random bytes. Raises an
:class:`SSLError` if the PRNG has not been seeded with enough data or if the
operation is not supported by the current RAND method. :func:`RAND_status`
can be used to check the status of the PRNG and :func:`RAND_add` can be used
to seed the PRNG.
Read the Wikipedia article, `Cryptographically secure pseudorandom number
generator (CSPRNG)
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographically_secure_pseudorandom_number_generator>`_,
to get the requirements of a cryptographically generator.
.. versionadded:: 3.3
.. function:: RAND_pseudo_bytes(num)
Returns (bytes, is_cryptographic): bytes are *num* pseudo-random bytes,
is_cryptographic is ``True`` if the bytes generated are cryptographically
strong. Raises an :class:`SSLError` if the operation is not supported by the
current RAND method.
Generated pseudo-random byte sequences will be unique if they are of
sufficient length, but are not necessarily unpredictable. They can be used
for non-cryptographic purposes and for certain purposes in cryptographic
protocols, but usually not for key generation etc.
.. versionadded:: 3.3
.. function:: RAND_status()
Returns ``True`` if the SSL pseudo-random number generator has been seeded with
'enough' randomness, and ``False`` otherwise. You can use :func:`ssl.RAND_egd`
and :func:`ssl.RAND_add` to increase the randomness of the pseudo-random
number generator.
.. function:: RAND_egd(path)
If you are running an entropy-gathering daemon (EGD) somewhere, and *path*
is the pathname of a socket connection open to it, this will read 256 bytes
of randomness from the socket, and add it to the SSL pseudo-random number
generator to increase the security of generated secret keys. This is
typically only necessary on systems without better sources of randomness.
See http://egd.sourceforge.net/ or http://prngd.sourceforge.net/ for sources
of entropy-gathering daemons.
.. function:: RAND_add(bytes, entropy)
Mixes the given *bytes* into the SSL pseudo-random number generator. The
parameter *entropy* (a float) is a lower bound on the entropy contained in
string (so you can always use :const:`0.0`). See :rfc:`1750` for more
information on sources of entropy.
Certificate handling
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
.. function:: match_hostname(cert, hostname)
Verify that *cert* (in decoded format as returned by
:meth:`SSLSocket.getpeercert`) matches the given *hostname*. The rules
applied are those for checking the identity of HTTPS servers as outlined
in :rfc:`2818` and :rfc:`6125`, except that IP addresses are not currently
supported. In addition to HTTPS, this function should be suitable for
checking the identity of servers in various SSL-based protocols such as
FTPS, IMAPS, POPS and others.
:exc:`CertificateError` is raised on failure. On success, the function
returns nothing::
>>> cert = {'subject': ((('commonName', 'example.com'),),)}
>>> ssl.match_hostname(cert, "example.com")
>>> ssl.match_hostname(cert, "example.org")
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "<stdin>", line 1, in <module>
File "/home/py3k/Lib/ssl.py", line 130, in match_hostname
ssl.CertificateError: hostname 'example.org' doesn't match 'example.com'
.. versionadded:: 3.2
.. versionchanged:: 3.3.3
The function now follows :rfc:`6125`, section 6.4.3 and does neither
match multiple wildcards (e.g. ``*.*.com`` or ``*a*.example.org``) nor
a wildcard inside an internationalized domain names (IDN) fragment.
IDN A-labels such as ``www*.xn--pthon-kva.org`` are still supported,
but ``x*.python.org`` no longer matches ``xn--tda.python.org``.
.. function:: cert_time_to_seconds(timestring)
Returns a floating-point value containing a normal seconds-after-the-epoch
time value, given the time-string representing the "notBefore" or "notAfter"
date from a certificate.
Here's an example::
>>> import ssl
>>> ssl.cert_time_to_seconds("May 9 00:00:00 2007 GMT")
1178694000.0
>>> import time
>>> time.ctime(ssl.cert_time_to_seconds("May 9 00:00:00 2007 GMT"))
'Wed May 9 00:00:00 2007'
.. function:: get_server_certificate(addr, ssl_version=PROTOCOL_SSLv3, ca_certs=None)
Given the address ``addr`` of an SSL-protected server, as a (*hostname*,
*port-number*) pair, fetches the server's certificate, and returns it as a
PEM-encoded string. If ``ssl_version`` is specified, uses that version of
the SSL protocol to attempt to connect to the server. If ``ca_certs`` is
specified, it should be a file containing a list of root certificates, the
same format as used for the same parameter in :func:`wrap_socket`. The call
will attempt to validate the server certificate against that set of root
certificates, and will fail if the validation attempt fails.
.. versionchanged:: 3.3
This function is now IPv6-compatible.
.. function:: DER_cert_to_PEM_cert(DER_cert_bytes)
Given a certificate as a DER-encoded blob of bytes, returns a PEM-encoded
string version of the same certificate.
.. function:: PEM_cert_to_DER_cert(PEM_cert_string)
Given a certificate as an ASCII PEM string, returns a DER-encoded sequence of
bytes for that same certificate.
Constants
^^^^^^^^^
.. data:: CERT_NONE
Possible value for :attr:`SSLContext.verify_mode`, or the ``cert_reqs``
parameter to :func:`wrap_socket`. In this mode (the default), no
certificates will be required from the other side of the socket connection.
If a certificate is received from the other end, no attempt to validate it
is made.
See the discussion of :ref:`ssl-security` below.
.. data:: CERT_OPTIONAL
Possible value for :attr:`SSLContext.verify_mode`, or the ``cert_reqs``
parameter to :func:`wrap_socket`. In this mode no certificates will be
required from the other side of the socket connection; but if they
are provided, validation will be attempted and an :class:`SSLError`
will be raised on failure.
Use of this setting requires a valid set of CA certificates to
be passed, either to :meth:`SSLContext.load_verify_locations` or as a
value of the ``ca_certs`` parameter to :func:`wrap_socket`.
.. data:: CERT_REQUIRED
Possible value for :attr:`SSLContext.verify_mode`, or the ``cert_reqs``
parameter to :func:`wrap_socket`. In this mode, certificates are
required from the other side of the socket connection; an :class:`SSLError`
will be raised if no certificate is provided, or if its validation fails.
Use of this setting requires a valid set of CA certificates to
be passed, either to :meth:`SSLContext.load_verify_locations` or as a
value of the ``ca_certs`` parameter to :func:`wrap_socket`.
.. data:: PROTOCOL_SSLv2
Selects SSL version 2 as the channel encryption protocol.
This protocol is not available if OpenSSL is compiled with OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
flag.
.. warning::
SSL version 2 is insecure. Its use is highly discouraged.
.. data:: PROTOCOL_SSLv23
Selects SSL version 2 or 3 as the channel encryption protocol. This is a
setting to use with servers for maximum compatibility with the other end of
an SSL connection, but it may cause the specific ciphers chosen for the
encryption to be of fairly low quality.
.. data:: PROTOCOL_SSLv3
Selects SSL version 3 as the channel encryption protocol. For clients, this
is the maximally compatible SSL variant.
.. data:: PROTOCOL_TLSv1
Selects TLS version 1 as the channel encryption protocol. This is the most
modern version, and probably the best choice for maximum protection, if both
sides can speak it.
.. data:: OP_ALL
Enables workarounds for various bugs present in other SSL implementations.
This option is set by default. It does not necessarily set the same
flags as OpenSSL's ``SSL_OP_ALL`` constant.
.. versionadded:: 3.2
.. data:: OP_NO_SSLv2
Prevents an SSLv2 connection. This option is only applicable in
conjunction with :const:`PROTOCOL_SSLv23`. It prevents the peers from
choosing SSLv2 as the protocol version.
.. versionadded:: 3.2
.. data:: OP_NO_SSLv3
Prevents an SSLv3 connection. This option is only applicable in
conjunction with :const:`PROTOCOL_SSLv23`. It prevents the peers from
choosing SSLv3 as the protocol version.
.. versionadded:: 3.2
.. data:: OP_NO_TLSv1
Prevents a TLSv1 connection. This option is only applicable in
conjunction with :const:`PROTOCOL_SSLv23`. It prevents the peers from
choosing TLSv1 as the protocol version.
.. versionadded:: 3.2
.. data:: OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
Use the server's cipher ordering preference, rather than the client's.
This option has no effect on client sockets and SSLv2 server sockets.
.. versionadded:: 3.3
.. data:: OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
Prevents re-use of the same DH key for distinct SSL sessions. This
improves forward secrecy but requires more computational resources.
This option only applies to server sockets.
.. versionadded:: 3.3
.. data:: OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
Prevents re-use of the same ECDH key for distinct SSL sessions. This
improves forward secrecy but requires more computational resources.
This option only applies to server sockets.
.. versionadded:: 3.3
.. data:: OP_NO_COMPRESSION
Disable compression on the SSL channel. This is useful if the application
protocol supports its own compression scheme.
This option is only available with OpenSSL 1.0.0 and later.
.. versionadded:: 3.3
.. data:: HAS_ECDH
Whether the OpenSSL library has built-in support for Elliptic Curve-based
Diffie-Hellman key exchange. This should be true unless the feature was
explicitly disabled by the distributor.
.. versionadded:: 3.3
.. data:: HAS_SNI
Whether the OpenSSL library has built-in support for the *Server Name
Indication* extension to the SSLv3 and TLSv1 protocols (as defined in
:rfc:`4366`). When true, you can use the *server_hostname* argument to
:meth:`SSLContext.wrap_socket`.
.. versionadded:: 3.2
.. data:: HAS_NPN
Whether the OpenSSL library has built-in support for *Next Protocol
Negotiation* as described in the `NPN draft specification
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg>`_. When true,
you can use the :meth:`SSLContext.set_npn_protocols` method to advertise
which protocols you want to support.
.. versionadded:: 3.3
.. data:: CHANNEL_BINDING_TYPES
List of supported TLS channel binding types. Strings in this list
can be used as arguments to :meth:`SSLSocket.get_channel_binding`.
.. versionadded:: 3.3
.. data:: OPENSSL_VERSION
The version string of the OpenSSL library loaded by the interpreter::
>>> ssl.OPENSSL_VERSION
'OpenSSL 0.9.8k 25 Mar 2009'
.. versionadded:: 3.2
.. data:: OPENSSL_VERSION_INFO
A tuple of five integers representing version information about the
OpenSSL library::
>>> ssl.OPENSSL_VERSION_INFO
(0, 9, 8, 11, 15)
.. versionadded:: 3.2
.. data:: OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER
The raw version number of the OpenSSL library, as a single integer::
>>> ssl.OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER
9470143
>>> hex(ssl.OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
'0x9080bf'
.. versionadded:: 3.2
SSL Sockets
-----------
SSL sockets provide the following methods of :ref:`socket-objects`:
- :meth:`~socket.socket.accept()`
- :meth:`~socket.socket.bind()`
- :meth:`~socket.socket.close()`
- :meth:`~socket.socket.connect()`
- :meth:`~socket.socket.detach()`
- :meth:`~socket.socket.fileno()`
- :meth:`~socket.socket.getpeername()`, :meth:`~socket.socket.getsockname()`
- :meth:`~socket.socket.getsockopt()`, :meth:`~socket.socket.setsockopt()`
- :meth:`~socket.socket.gettimeout()`, :meth:`~socket.socket.settimeout()`,
:meth:`~socket.socket.setblocking()`
- :meth:`~socket.socket.listen()`
- :meth:`~socket.socket.makefile()`
- :meth:`~socket.socket.recv()`, :meth:`~socket.socket.recv_into()`
(but passing a non-zero ``flags`` argument is not allowed)
- :meth:`~socket.socket.send()`, :meth:`~socket.socket.sendall()` (with
the same limitation)
- :meth:`~socket.socket.shutdown()`
However, since the SSL (and TLS) protocol has its own framing atop
of TCP, the SSL sockets abstraction can, in certain respects, diverge from
the specification of normal, OS-level sockets. See especially the
:ref:`notes on non-blocking sockets <ssl-nonblocking>`.
SSL sockets also have the following additional methods and attributes:
.. method:: SSLSocket.do_handshake()
Perform the SSL setup handshake.
.. method:: SSLSocket.getpeercert(binary_form=False)
If there is no certificate for the peer on the other end of the connection,
returns ``None``.
If the ``binary_form`` parameter is :const:`False`, and a certificate was
received from the peer, this method returns a :class:`dict` instance. If the
certificate was not validated, the dict is empty. If the certificate was
validated, it returns a dict with several keys, amongst them ``subject``
(the principal for which the certificate was issued) and ``issuer``
(the principal issuing the certificate). If a certificate contains an
instance of the *Subject Alternative Name* extension (see :rfc:`3280`),
there will also be a ``subjectAltName`` key in the dictionary.
The ``subject`` and ``issuer`` fields are tuples containing the sequence
of relative distinguished names (RDNs) given in the certificate's data
structure for the respective fields, and each RDN is a sequence of
name-value pairs. Here is a real-world example::
{'issuer': ((('countryName', 'IL'),),
(('organizationName', 'StartCom Ltd.'),),
(('organizationalUnitName',
'Secure Digital Certificate Signing'),),
(('commonName',
'StartCom Class 2 Primary Intermediate Server CA'),)),
'notAfter': 'Nov 22 08:15:19 2013 GMT',
'notBefore': 'Nov 21 03:09:52 2011 GMT',
'serialNumber': '95F0',
'subject': ((('description', '571208-SLe257oHY9fVQ07Z'),),
(('countryName', 'US'),),
(('stateOrProvinceName', 'California'),),
(('localityName', 'San Francisco'),),
(('organizationName', 'Electronic Frontier Foundation, Inc.'),),
(('commonName', '*.eff.org'),),
(('emailAddress', 'hostmaster@eff.org'),)),
'subjectAltName': (('DNS', '*.eff.org'), ('DNS', 'eff.org')),
'version': 3}
.. note::
To validate a certificate for a particular service, you can use the
:func:`match_hostname` function.
If the ``binary_form`` parameter is :const:`True`, and a certificate was
provided, this method returns the DER-encoded form of the entire certificate
as a sequence of bytes, or :const:`None` if the peer did not provide a
certificate. Whether the peer provides a certificate depends on the SSL
socket's role:
* for a client SSL socket, the server will always provide a certificate,
regardless of whether validation was required;
* for a server SSL socket, the client will only provide a certificate
when requested by the server; therefore :meth:`getpeercert` will return
:const:`None` if you used :const:`CERT_NONE` (rather than
:const:`CERT_OPTIONAL` or :const:`CERT_REQUIRED`).
.. versionchanged:: 3.2
The returned dictionary includes additional items such as ``issuer``
and ``notBefore``.
.. method:: SSLSocket.cipher()
Returns a three-value tuple containing the name of the cipher being used, the
version of the SSL protocol that defines its use, and the number of secret
bits being used. If no connection has been established, returns ``None``.
.. method:: SSLSocket.compression()
Return the compression algorithm being used as a string, or ``None``
if the connection isn't compressed.
If the higher-level protocol supports its own compression mechanism,
you can use :data:`OP_NO_COMPRESSION` to disable SSL-level compression.
.. versionadded:: 3.3
.. method:: SSLSocket.get_channel_binding(cb_type="tls-unique")
Get channel binding data for current connection, as a bytes object. Returns
``None`` if not connected or the handshake has not been completed.
The *cb_type* parameter allow selection of the desired channel binding
type. Valid channel binding types are listed in the
:data:`CHANNEL_BINDING_TYPES` list. Currently only the 'tls-unique' channel
binding, defined by :rfc:`5929`, is supported. :exc:`ValueError` will be
raised if an unsupported channel binding type is requested.
.. versionadded:: 3.3
.. method:: SSLSocket.selected_npn_protocol()
Returns the protocol that was selected during the TLS/SSL handshake. If
:meth:`SSLContext.set_npn_protocols` was not called, or if the other party
does not support NPN, or if the handshake has not yet happened, this will
return ``None``.
.. versionadded:: 3.3
.. method:: SSLSocket.unwrap()
Performs the SSL shutdown handshake, which removes the TLS layer from the
underlying socket, and returns the underlying socket object. This can be
used to go from encrypted operation over a connection to unencrypted. The
returned socket should always be used for further communication with the
other side of the connection, rather than the original socket.
.. attribute:: SSLSocket.context
The :class:`SSLContext` object this SSL socket is tied to. If the SSL
socket was created using the top-level :func:`wrap_socket` function
(rather than :meth:`SSLContext.wrap_socket`), this is a custom context
object created for this SSL socket.
.. versionadded:: 3.2
SSL Contexts
------------
.. versionadded:: 3.2
An SSL context holds various data longer-lived than single SSL connections,
such as SSL configuration options, certificate(s) and private key(s).
It also manages a cache of SSL sessions for server-side sockets, in order
to speed up repeated connections from the same clients.
.. class:: SSLContext(protocol)
Create a new SSL context. You must pass *protocol* which must be one
of the ``PROTOCOL_*`` constants defined in this module.
:data:`PROTOCOL_SSLv23` is recommended for maximum interoperability.
:class:`SSLContext` objects have the following methods and attributes:
.. method:: SSLContext.load_cert_chain(certfile, keyfile=None, password=None)
Load a private key and the corresponding certificate. The *certfile*
string must be the path to a single file in PEM format containing the
certificate as well as any number of CA certificates needed to establish
the certificate's authenticity. The *keyfile* string, if present, must
point to a file containing the private key in. Otherwise the private
key will be taken from *certfile* as well. See the discussion of
:ref:`ssl-certificates` for more information on how the certificate
is stored in the *certfile*.
The *password* argument may be a function to call to get the password for
decrypting the private key. It will only be called if the private key is
encrypted and a password is necessary. It will be called with no arguments,
and it should return a string, bytes, or bytearray. If the return value is
a string it will be encoded as UTF-8 before using it to decrypt the key.
Alternatively a string, bytes, or bytearray value may be supplied directly
as the *password* argument. It will be ignored if the private key is not
encrypted and no password is needed.
If the *password* argument is not specified and a password is required,
OpenSSL's built-in password prompting mechanism will be used to
interactively prompt the user for a password.
An :class:`SSLError` is raised if the private key doesn't
match with the certificate.
.. versionchanged:: 3.3
New optional argument *password*.
.. method:: SSLContext.load_verify_locations(cafile=None, capath=None)
Load a set of "certification authority" (CA) certificates used to validate
other peers' certificates when :data:`verify_mode` is other than
:data:`CERT_NONE`. At least one of *cafile* or *capath* must be specified.
The *cafile* string, if present, is the path to a file of concatenated
CA certificates in PEM format. See the discussion of
:ref:`ssl-certificates` for more information about how to arrange the
certificates in this file.
The *capath* string, if present, is
the path to a directory containing several CA certificates in PEM format,
following an `OpenSSL specific layout
<http://www.openssl.org/docs/ssl/SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations.html>`_.
.. method:: SSLContext.set_default_verify_paths()
Load a set of default "certification authority" (CA) certificates from
a filesystem path defined when building the OpenSSL library. Unfortunately,
there's no easy way to know whether this method succeeds: no error is
returned if no certificates are to be found. When the OpenSSL library is
provided as part of the operating system, though, it is likely to be
configured properly.
.. method:: SSLContext.set_ciphers(ciphers)
Set the available ciphers for sockets created with this context.
It should be a string in the `OpenSSL cipher list format
<http://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ciphers.html#CIPHER_LIST_FORMAT>`_.
If no cipher can be selected (because compile-time options or other
configuration forbids use of all the specified ciphers), an
:class:`SSLError` will be raised.
.. note::
when connected, the :meth:`SSLSocket.cipher` method of SSL sockets will
give the currently selected cipher.
.. method:: SSLContext.set_npn_protocols(protocols)
Specify which protocols the socket should advertise during the SSL/TLS
handshake. It should be a list of strings, like ``['http/1.1', 'spdy/2']``,
ordered by preference. The selection of a protocol will happen during the
handshake, and will play out according to the `NPN draft specification
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg>`_. After a
successful handshake, the :meth:`SSLSocket.selected_npn_protocol` method will
return the agreed-upon protocol.
This method will raise :exc:`NotImplementedError` if :data:`HAS_NPN` is
False.
.. versionadded:: 3.3
.. method:: SSLContext.load_dh_params(dhfile)
Load the key generation parameters for Diffie-Helman (DH) key exchange.
Using DH key exchange improves forward secrecy at the expense of
computational resources (both on the server and on the client).
The *dhfile* parameter should be the path to a file containing DH
parameters in PEM format.
This setting doesn't apply to client sockets. You can also use the
:data:`OP_SINGLE_DH_USE` option to further improve security.
.. versionadded:: 3.3
.. method:: SSLContext.set_ecdh_curve(curve_name)
Set the curve name for Elliptic Curve-based Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key
exchange. ECDH is significantly faster than regular DH while arguably
as secure. The *curve_name* parameter should be a string describing
a well-known elliptic curve, for example ``prime256v1`` for a widely
supported curve.
This setting doesn't apply to client sockets. You can also use the
:data:`OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE` option to further improve security.
This method is not available if :data:`HAS_ECDH` is False.
.. versionadded:: 3.3
.. seealso::
`SSL/TLS & Perfect Forward Secrecy <http://vincent.bernat.im/en/blog/2011-ssl-perfect-forward-secrecy.html>`_
Vincent Bernat.
.. method:: SSLContext.wrap_socket(sock, server_side=False, \
do_handshake_on_connect=True, suppress_ragged_eofs=True, \
server_hostname=None)
Wrap an existing Python socket *sock* and return an :class:`SSLSocket`
object. The SSL socket is tied to the context, its settings and
certificates. The parameters *server_side*, *do_handshake_on_connect*
and *suppress_ragged_eofs* have the same meaning as in the top-level
:func:`wrap_socket` function.
On client connections, the optional parameter *server_hostname* specifies
the hostname of the service which we are connecting to. This allows a
single server to host multiple SSL-based services with distinct certificates,
quite similarly to HTTP virtual hosts. Specifying *server_hostname*
will raise a :exc:`ValueError` if the OpenSSL library doesn't have support
for it (that is, if :data:`HAS_SNI` is :const:`False`). Specifying
*server_hostname* will also raise a :exc:`ValueError` if *server_side*
is true.
.. method:: SSLContext.session_stats()
Get statistics about the SSL sessions created or managed by this context.
A dictionary is returned which maps the names of each `piece of information
<http://www.openssl.org/docs/ssl/SSL_CTX_sess_number.html>`_ to their
numeric values. For example, here is the total number of hits and misses
in the session cache since the context was created::
>>> stats = context.session_stats()
>>> stats['hits'], stats['misses']
(0, 0)
.. attribute:: SSLContext.options
An integer representing the set of SSL options enabled on this context.
The default value is :data:`OP_ALL`, but you can specify other options
such as :data:`OP_NO_SSLv2` by ORing them together.
.. note::
With versions of OpenSSL older than 0.9.8m, it is only possible
to set options, not to clear them. Attempting to clear an option
(by resetting the corresponding bits) will raise a ``ValueError``.
.. attribute:: SSLContext.protocol
The protocol version chosen when constructing the context. This attribute
is read-only.
.. attribute:: SSLContext.verify_mode
Whether to try to verify other peers' certificates and how to behave
if verification fails. This attribute must be one of
:data:`CERT_NONE`, :data:`CERT_OPTIONAL` or :data:`CERT_REQUIRED`.
.. index:: single: certificates
.. index:: single: X509 certificate
.. _ssl-certificates:
Certificates
------------
Certificates in general are part of a public-key / private-key system. In this
system, each *principal*, (which may be a machine, or a person, or an
organization) is assigned a unique two-part encryption key. One part of the key
is public, and is called the *public key*; the other part is kept secret, and is
called the *private key*. The two parts are related, in that if you encrypt a
message with one of the parts, you can decrypt it with the other part, and
**only** with the other part.
A certificate contains information about two principals. It contains the name
of a *subject*, and the subject's public key. It also contains a statement by a
second principal, the *issuer*, that the subject is who he claims to be, and
that this is indeed the subject's public key. The issuer's statement is signed
with the issuer's private key, which only the issuer knows. However, anyone can
verify the issuer's statement by finding the issuer's public key, decrypting the
statement with it, and comparing it to the other information in the certificate.
The certificate also contains information about the time period over which it is
valid. This is expressed as two fields, called "notBefore" and "notAfter".
In the Python use of certificates, a client or server can use a certificate to
prove who they are. The other side of a network connection can also be required
to produce a certificate, and that certificate can be validated to the
satisfaction of the client or server that requires such validation. The
connection attempt can be set to raise an exception if the validation fails.
Validation is done automatically, by the underlying OpenSSL framework; the
application need not concern itself with its mechanics. But the application
does usually need to provide sets of certificates to allow this process to take
place.
Python uses files to contain certificates. They should be formatted as "PEM"
(see :rfc:`1422`), which is a base-64 encoded form wrapped with a header line
and a footer line::
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
... (certificate in base64 PEM encoding) ...
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
Certificate chains
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
The Python files which contain certificates can contain a sequence of
certificates, sometimes called a *certificate chain*. This chain should start
with the specific certificate for the principal who "is" the client or server,
and then the certificate for the issuer of that certificate, and then the
certificate for the issuer of *that* certificate, and so on up the chain till
you get to a certificate which is *self-signed*, that is, a certificate which
has the same subject and issuer, sometimes called a *root certificate*. The
certificates should just be concatenated together in the certificate file. For
example, suppose we had a three certificate chain, from our server certificate
to the certificate of the certification authority that signed our server
certificate, to the root certificate of the agency which issued the
certification authority's certificate::
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
... (certificate for your server)...
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
... (the certificate for the CA)...
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
... (the root certificate for the CA's issuer)...
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
CA certificates
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
If you are going to require validation of the other side of the connection's
certificate, you need to provide a "CA certs" file, filled with the certificate
chains for each issuer you are willing to trust. Again, this file just contains
these chains concatenated together. For validation, Python will use the first
chain it finds in the file which matches. Some "standard" root certificates are
available from various certification authorities: `CACert.org
<http://www.cacert.org/index.php?id=3>`_, `Thawte
<http://www.thawte.com/roots/>`_, `Verisign
<http://www.verisign.com/support/roots.html>`_, `Positive SSL
<http://www.PositiveSSL.com/ssl-certificate-support/cert_installation/UTN-USERFirst-Hardware.crt>`_
(used by python.org), `Equifax and GeoTrust
<http://www.geotrust.com/resources/root_certificates/index.asp>`_.
In general, if you are using SSL3 or TLS1, you don't need to put the full chain
in your "CA certs" file; you only need the root certificates, and the remote
peer is supposed to furnish the other certificates necessary to chain from its
certificate to a root certificate. See :rfc:`4158` for more discussion of the
way in which certification chains can be built.
Combined key and certificate
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Often the private key is stored in the same file as the certificate; in this
case, only the ``certfile`` parameter to :meth:`SSLContext.load_cert_chain`
and :func:`wrap_socket` needs to be passed. If the private key is stored
with the certificate, it should come before the first certificate in
the certificate chain::
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
... (private key in base64 encoding) ...
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
... (certificate in base64 PEM encoding) ...
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
Self-signed certificates
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
If you are going to create a server that provides SSL-encrypted connection
services, you will need to acquire a certificate for that service. There are
many ways of acquiring appropriate certificates, such as buying one from a
certification authority. Another common practice is to generate a self-signed
certificate. The simplest way to do this is with the OpenSSL package, using
something like the following::
% openssl req -new -x509 -days 365 -nodes -out cert.pem -keyout cert.pem
Generating a 1024 bit RSA private key
.......++++++
.............................++++++
writing new private key to 'cert.pem'
-----
You are about to be asked to enter information that will be incorporated
into your certificate request.
What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name or a DN.
There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank
For some fields there will be a default value,
If you enter '.', the field will be left blank.
-----
Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:US
State or Province Name (full name) [Some-State]:MyState
Locality Name (eg, city) []:Some City
Organization Name (eg, company) [Internet Widgits Pty Ltd]:My Organization, Inc.
Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []:My Group
Common Name (eg, YOUR name) []:myserver.mygroup.myorganization.com
Email Address []:ops@myserver.mygroup.myorganization.com
%
The disadvantage of a self-signed certificate is that it is its own root
certificate, and no one else will have it in their cache of known (and trusted)
root certificates.
Examples
--------
Testing for SSL support
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
To test for the presence of SSL support in a Python installation, user code
should use the following idiom::
try:
import ssl
except ImportError:
pass
else:
... # do something that requires SSL support
Client-side operation
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
This example connects to an SSL server and prints the server's certificate::
import socket, ssl, pprint
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
# require a certificate from the server
ssl_sock = ssl.wrap_socket(s,
ca_certs="/etc/ca_certs_file",
cert_reqs=ssl.CERT_REQUIRED)
ssl_sock.connect(('www.verisign.com', 443))
pprint.pprint(ssl_sock.getpeercert())
# note that closing the SSLSocket will also close the underlying socket
ssl_sock.close()
As of January 6, 2012, the certificate printed by this program looks like
this::
{'issuer': ((('countryName', 'US'),),
(('organizationName', 'VeriSign, Inc.'),),
(('organizationalUnitName', 'VeriSign Trust Network'),),
(('organizationalUnitName',
'Terms of use at https://www.verisign.com/rpa (c)06'),),
(('commonName',
'VeriSign Class 3 Extended Validation SSL SGC CA'),)),
'notAfter': 'May 25 23:59:59 2012 GMT',
'notBefore': 'May 26 00:00:00 2010 GMT',
'serialNumber': '53D2BEF924A7245E83CA01E46CAA2477',
'subject': ((('1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3', 'US'),),
(('1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.2', 'Delaware'),),
(('businessCategory', 'V1.0, Clause 5.(b)'),),
(('serialNumber', '2497886'),),
(('countryName', 'US'),),
(('postalCode', '94043'),),
(('stateOrProvinceName', 'California'),),
(('localityName', 'Mountain View'),),
(('streetAddress', '487 East Middlefield Road'),),
(('organizationName', 'VeriSign, Inc.'),),
(('organizationalUnitName', ' Production Security Services'),),
(('commonName', 'www.verisign.com'),)),
'subjectAltName': (('DNS', 'www.verisign.com'),
('DNS', 'verisign.com'),
('DNS', 'www.verisign.net'),
('DNS', 'verisign.net'),
('DNS', 'www.verisign.mobi'),
('DNS', 'verisign.mobi'),
('DNS', 'www.verisign.eu'),
('DNS', 'verisign.eu')),
'version': 3}
This other example first creates an SSL context, instructs it to verify
certificates sent by peers, and feeds it a set of recognized certificate
authorities (CA)::
>>> context = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_SSLv23)
>>> context.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED
>>> context.load_verify_locations("/etc/ssl/certs/ca-bundle.crt")
(it is assumed your operating system places a bundle of all CA certificates
in ``/etc/ssl/certs/ca-bundle.crt``; if not, you'll get an error and have
to adjust the location)
When you use the context to connect to a server, :const:`CERT_REQUIRED`
validates the server certificate: it ensures that the server certificate
was signed with one of the CA certificates, and checks the signature for
correctness::
>>> conn = context.wrap_socket(socket.socket(socket.AF_INET))
>>> conn.connect(("linuxfr.org", 443))
You should then fetch the certificate and check its fields for conformity::
>>> cert = conn.getpeercert()
>>> ssl.match_hostname(cert, "linuxfr.org")
Visual inspection shows that the certificate does identify the desired service
(that is, the HTTPS host ``linuxfr.org``)::
>>> pprint.pprint(cert)
{'issuer': ((('organizationName', 'CAcert Inc.'),),
(('organizationalUnitName', 'http://www.CAcert.org'),),
(('commonName', 'CAcert Class 3 Root'),)),
'notAfter': 'Jun 7 21:02:24 2013 GMT',
'notBefore': 'Jun 8 21:02:24 2011 GMT',
'serialNumber': 'D3E9',
'subject': ((('commonName', 'linuxfr.org'),),),
'subjectAltName': (('DNS', 'linuxfr.org'),
('othername', '<unsupported>'),
('DNS', 'linuxfr.org'),
('othername', '<unsupported>'),
('DNS', 'dev.linuxfr.org'),
('othername', '<unsupported>'),
('DNS', 'prod.linuxfr.org'),
('othername', '<unsupported>'),
('DNS', 'alpha.linuxfr.org'),
('othername', '<unsupported>'),
('DNS', '*.linuxfr.org'),
('othername', '<unsupported>')),
'version': 3}
Now that you are assured of its authenticity, you can proceed to talk with
the server::
>>> conn.sendall(b"HEAD / HTTP/1.0\r\nHost: linuxfr.org\r\n\r\n")
>>> pprint.pprint(conn.recv(1024).split(b"\r\n"))
[b'HTTP/1.1 302 Found',
b'Date: Sun, 16 May 2010 13:43:28 GMT',
b'Server: Apache/2.2',
b'Location: https://linuxfr.org/pub/',
b'Vary: Accept-Encoding',
b'Connection: close',
b'Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1',
b'',
b'']
See the discussion of :ref:`ssl-security` below.
Server-side operation
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
For server operation, typically you'll need to have a server certificate, and
private key, each in a file. You'll first create a context holding the key
and the certificate, so that clients can check your authenticity. Then
you'll open a socket, bind it to a port, call :meth:`listen` on it, and start
waiting for clients to connect::
import socket, ssl
context = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1)
context.load_cert_chain(certfile="mycertfile", keyfile="mykeyfile")
bindsocket = socket.socket()
bindsocket.bind(('myaddr.mydomain.com', 10023))
bindsocket.listen(5)
When a client connects, you'll call :meth:`accept` on the socket to get the
new socket from the other end, and use the context's :meth:`SSLContext.wrap_socket`
method to create a server-side SSL socket for the connection::
while True:
newsocket, fromaddr = bindsocket.accept()
connstream = context.wrap_socket(newsocket, server_side=True)
try:
deal_with_client(connstream)
finally:
connstream.shutdown(socket.SHUT_RDWR)
connstream.close()
Then you'll read data from the ``connstream`` and do something with it till you
are finished with the client (or the client is finished with you)::
def deal_with_client(connstream):
data = connstream.recv(1024)
# empty data means the client is finished with us
while data:
if not do_something(connstream, data):
# we'll assume do_something returns False
# when we're finished with client
break
data = connstream.recv(1024)
# finished with client
And go back to listening for new client connections (of course, a real server
would probably handle each client connection in a separate thread, or put
the sockets in non-blocking mode and use an event loop).
.. _ssl-nonblocking:
Notes on non-blocking sockets
-----------------------------
When working with non-blocking sockets, there are several things you need
to be aware of:
- Calling :func:`~select.select` tells you that the OS-level socket can be
read from (or written to), but it does not imply that there is sufficient
data at the upper SSL layer. For example, only part of an SSL frame might
have arrived. Therefore, you must be ready to handle :meth:`SSLSocket.recv`
and :meth:`SSLSocket.send` failures, and retry after another call to
:func:`~select.select`.
(of course, similar provisions apply when using other primitives such as
:func:`~select.poll`)
- The SSL handshake itself will be non-blocking: the
:meth:`SSLSocket.do_handshake` method has to be retried until it returns
successfully. Here is a synopsis using :func:`~select.select` to wait for
the socket's readiness::
while True:
try:
sock.do_handshake()
break
except ssl.SSLWantReadError:
select.select([sock], [], [])
except ssl.SSLWantWriteError:
select.select([], [sock], [])
.. _ssl-security:
Security considerations
-----------------------
Verifying certificates
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
:const:`CERT_NONE` is the default. Since it does not authenticate the other
peer, it can be insecure, especially in client mode where most of time you
would like to ensure the authenticity of the server you're talking to.
Therefore, when in client mode, it is highly recommended to use
:const:`CERT_REQUIRED`. However, it is in itself not sufficient; you also
have to check that the server certificate, which can be obtained by calling
:meth:`SSLSocket.getpeercert`, matches the desired service. For many
protocols and applications, the service can be identified by the hostname;
in this case, the :func:`match_hostname` function can be used.
In server mode, if you want to authenticate your clients using the SSL layer
(rather than using a higher-level authentication mechanism), you'll also have
to specify :const:`CERT_REQUIRED` and similarly check the client certificate.
.. note::
In client mode, :const:`CERT_OPTIONAL` and :const:`CERT_REQUIRED` are
equivalent unless anonymous ciphers are enabled (they are disabled
by default).
Protocol versions
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
SSL version 2 is considered insecure and is therefore dangerous to use. If
you want maximum compatibility between clients and servers, it is recommended
to use :const:`PROTOCOL_SSLv23` as the protocol version and then disable
SSLv2 explicitly using the :data:`SSLContext.options` attribute::
context = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_SSLv23)
context.options |= ssl.OP_NO_SSLv2
The SSL context created above will allow SSLv3 and TLSv1 connections, but
not SSLv2.
Cipher selection
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
If you have advanced security requirements, fine-tuning of the ciphers
enabled when negotiating a SSL session is possible through the
:meth:`SSLContext.set_ciphers` method. Starting from Python 3.2.3, the
ssl module disables certain weak ciphers by default, but you may want
to further restrict the cipher choice. For example::
context = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1)
context.set_ciphers('HIGH:!aNULL:!eNULL')
The ``!aNULL:!eNULL`` part of the cipher spec is necessary to disable ciphers
which don't provide both encryption and authentication. Be sure to read
OpenSSL's documentation about the `cipher list
format <http://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ciphers.html#CIPHER_LIST_FORMAT>`_.
If you want to check which ciphers are enabled by a given cipher list,
use the ``openssl ciphers`` command on your system.
Multi-processing
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
If using this module as part of a multi-processed application (using,
for example the :mod:`multiprocessing` or :mod:`concurrent.futures` modules),
be aware that OpenSSL's internal random number generator does not properly
handle forked processes. Applications must change the PRNG state of the
parent process if they use any SSL feature with :func:`os.fork`. Any
successful call of :func:`~ssl.RAND_add`, :func:`~ssl.RAND_bytes` or
:func:`~ssl.RAND_pseudo_bytes` is sufficient.
.. seealso::
Class :class:`socket.socket`
Documentation of underlying :mod:`socket` class
`SSL/TLS Strong Encryption: An Introduction <http://httpd.apache.org/docs/trunk/en/ssl/ssl_intro.html>`_
Intro from the Apache webserver documentation
`RFC 1422: Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part II: Certificate-Based Key Management <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1422>`_
Steve Kent
`RFC 1750: Randomness Recommendations for Security <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1750>`_
D. Eastlake et. al.
`RFC 3280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3280>`_
Housley et. al.
`RFC 4366: Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4366>`_
Blake-Wilson et. al.
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