buildroot/package/wpa_supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-fixes.patch
Baruch Siach 39a4a79d8a wpa_supplicant: apply upstream security patches
This commit adds patches for three different upstream security advisories. No
CVE numbers stated.

http://w1.fi/security/2015-2/wps-upnp-http-chunked-transfer-encoding.txt
http://w1.fi/security/2015-3/integer-underflow-in-ap-mode-wmm-action-frame.txt
http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/eap-pwd-missing-payload-length-validation.txt

Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2015-05-04 20:51:41 +02:00

155 lines
5.3 KiB
Diff

This patch combines the following upstream security fixes:
28a069a545b0 EAP-pwd peer: Fix asymmetric fragmentation behavior
3035cc2894e0 EAP-pwd server: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment reassembly
477c74395acd EAP-pwd peer: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment reassembly
e28a58be2618 EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit and Confirm
dd2f043c9c43 EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit and Confirm
Details at
http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/eap-pwd-missing-payload-length-validation.txt
Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
---
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
index f2b092669a42..e58b13a42f73 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
@@ -355,6 +355,23 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
u16 offset;
u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL;
+ size_t prime_len, order_len;
+
+ if (data->state != PWD_Commit_Req) {
+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
+ goto fin;
+ }
+
+ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
+ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
+
+ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
+ (unsigned int) payload_len,
+ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
+ goto fin;
+ }
if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
@@ -554,6 +571,18 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
int offset;
+ if (data->state != PWD_Confirm_Req) {
+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
+ goto fin;
+ }
+
+ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
+ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
+ goto fin;
+ }
+
/*
* first build up the ciphersuite which is group | random_function |
* prf
@@ -837,11 +866,23 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
* if it's the first fragment there'll be a length field
*/
if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
+ if (len < 2) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
+ return NULL;
+ }
tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments whose "
"total length = %d", tot_len);
if (tot_len > 15000)
return NULL;
+ if (data->inbuf) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
+ return NULL;
+ }
data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Out of memory to buffer "
@@ -927,6 +968,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
/*
* we have output! Do we need to fragment it?
*/
+ lm_exch = EAP_PWD_GET_EXCHANGE(lm_exch);
len = wpabuf_len(data->outbuf);
if ((len + EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE) > data->mtu) {
resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, data->mtu,
diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
index 66bd5d2e9179..2bfc3c27647d 100644
--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
int res = 0;
+ size_t prime_len, order_len;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response");
+ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
+ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
+
+ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
+ (unsigned int) payload_len,
+ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
+ goto fin;
+ }
+
if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
int offset;
+ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
+ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
+ goto fin;
+ }
+
/* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */
grp = htons(data->group_num);
ptr = (u8 *) &cs;
@@ -923,11 +942,21 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
* the first fragment has a total length
*/
if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
+ if (len < 2) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
+ return;
+ }
tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments, total "
"length = %d", tot_len);
if (tot_len > 15000)
return;
+ if (data->inbuf) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
+ return;
+ }
data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Out of memory to "