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f1ef09fde1
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman: "There is a lot here. A lot of these changes result in subtle user visible differences in kernel behavior. I don't expect anything will care but I will revert/fix things immediately if any regressions show up. From Seth Forshee there is a continuation of the work to make the vfs ready for unpriviled mounts. We had thought the previous changes prevented the creation of files outside of s_user_ns of a filesystem, but it turns we missed the O_CREAT path. Ooops. Pavel Tikhomirov and Oleg Nesterov worked together to fix a long standing bug in the implemenation of PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER where only children that are forked after the prctl are considered and not children forked before the prctl. The only known user of this prctl systemd forks all children after the prctl. So no userspace regressions will occur. Holding earlier forked children to the same rules as later forked children creates a semantic that is sane enough to allow checkpoing of processes that use this feature. There is a long delayed change by Nikolay Borisov to limit inotify instances inside a user namespace. Michael Kerrisk extends the API for files used to maniuplate namespaces with two new trivial ioctls to allow discovery of the hierachy and properties of namespaces. Konstantin Khlebnikov with the help of Al Viro adds code that when a network namespace exits purges it's sysctl entries from the dcache. As in some circumstances this could use a lot of memory. Vivek Goyal fixed a bug with stacked filesystems where the permissions on the wrong inode were being checked. I continue previous work on ptracing across exec. Allowing a file to be setuid across exec while being ptraced if the tracer has enough credentials in the user namespace, and if the process has CAP_SETUID in it's own namespace. Proc files for setuid or otherwise undumpable executables are now owned by the root in the user namespace of their mm. Allowing debugging of setuid applications in containers to work better. A bug I introduced with permission checking and automount is now fixed. The big change is to mark the mounts that the kernel initiates as a result of an automount. This allows the permission checks in sget to be safely suppressed for this kind of mount. As the permission check happened when the original filesystem was mounted. Finally a special case in the mount namespace is removed preventing unbounded chains in the mount hash table, and making the semantics simpler which benefits CRIU. The vfs fix along with related work in ima and evm I believe makes us ready to finish developing and merge fully unprivileged mounts of the fuse filesystem. The cleanups of the mount namespace makes discussing how to fix the worst case complexity of umount. The stacked filesystem fixes pave the way for adding multiple mappings for the filesystem uids so that efficient and safer containers can be implemented" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: proc/sysctl: Don't grab i_lock under sysctl_lock. vfs: Use upper filesystem inode in bprm_fill_uid() proc/sysctl: prune stale dentries during unregistering mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating shadow/side mounts. prctl: propagate has_child_subreaper flag to every descendant introduce the walk_process_tree() helper nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return owner UID of a userns fs: Better permission checking for submounts exit: fix the setns() && PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER interaction vfs: open() with O_CREAT should not create inodes with unknown ids nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return the namespace type proc: Better ownership of files for non-dumpable tasks in user namespaces exec: Remove LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP exec: Test the ptracer's saved cred to see if the tracee can gain caps exec: Don't reset euid and egid when the tracee has CAP_SETUID inotify: Convert to using per-namespace limits
241 lines
5.7 KiB
C
241 lines
5.7 KiB
C
/*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
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* published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
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* License.
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*/
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#include <linux/stat.h>
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#include <linux/sysctl.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/hash.h>
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#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
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#define UCOUNTS_HASHTABLE_BITS 10
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static struct hlist_head ucounts_hashtable[(1 << UCOUNTS_HASHTABLE_BITS)];
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static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ucounts_lock);
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#define ucounts_hashfn(ns, uid) \
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hash_long((unsigned long)__kuid_val(uid) + (unsigned long)(ns), \
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UCOUNTS_HASHTABLE_BITS)
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#define ucounts_hashentry(ns, uid) \
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(ucounts_hashtable + ucounts_hashfn(ns, uid))
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#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
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static struct ctl_table_set *
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set_lookup(struct ctl_table_root *root)
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{
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return ¤t_user_ns()->set;
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}
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static int set_is_seen(struct ctl_table_set *set)
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{
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return ¤t_user_ns()->set == set;
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}
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static int set_permissions(struct ctl_table_header *head,
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struct ctl_table *table)
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{
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struct user_namespace *user_ns =
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container_of(head->set, struct user_namespace, set);
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int mode;
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/* Allow users with CAP_SYS_RESOURCE unrestrained access */
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if (ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
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mode = (table->mode & S_IRWXU) >> 6;
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else
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/* Allow all others at most read-only access */
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mode = table->mode & S_IROTH;
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return (mode << 6) | (mode << 3) | mode;
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}
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static struct ctl_table_root set_root = {
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.lookup = set_lookup,
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.permissions = set_permissions,
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};
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static int zero = 0;
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static int int_max = INT_MAX;
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#define UCOUNT_ENTRY(name) \
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{ \
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.procname = name, \
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.maxlen = sizeof(int), \
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.mode = 0644, \
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.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, \
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.extra1 = &zero, \
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.extra2 = &int_max, \
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}
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static struct ctl_table user_table[] = {
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UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_user_namespaces"),
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UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_pid_namespaces"),
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UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_uts_namespaces"),
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UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_ipc_namespaces"),
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UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_net_namespaces"),
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UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_mnt_namespaces"),
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UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_cgroup_namespaces"),
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#ifdef CONFIG_INOTIFY_USER
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UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_inotify_instances"),
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UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_inotify_watches"),
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#endif
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{ }
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};
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#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
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bool setup_userns_sysctls(struct user_namespace *ns)
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{
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#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
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struct ctl_table *tbl;
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setup_sysctl_set(&ns->set, &set_root, set_is_seen);
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tbl = kmemdup(user_table, sizeof(user_table), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (tbl) {
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < UCOUNT_COUNTS; i++) {
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tbl[i].data = &ns->ucount_max[i];
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}
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ns->sysctls = __register_sysctl_table(&ns->set, "user", tbl);
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}
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if (!ns->sysctls) {
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kfree(tbl);
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retire_sysctl_set(&ns->set);
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return false;
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}
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#endif
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return true;
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}
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void retire_userns_sysctls(struct user_namespace *ns)
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{
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#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
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struct ctl_table *tbl;
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tbl = ns->sysctls->ctl_table_arg;
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unregister_sysctl_table(ns->sysctls);
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retire_sysctl_set(&ns->set);
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kfree(tbl);
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#endif
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}
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static struct ucounts *find_ucounts(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid, struct hlist_head *hashent)
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{
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struct ucounts *ucounts;
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hlist_for_each_entry(ucounts, hashent, node) {
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if (uid_eq(ucounts->uid, uid) && (ucounts->ns == ns))
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return ucounts;
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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static struct ucounts *get_ucounts(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid)
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{
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struct hlist_head *hashent = ucounts_hashentry(ns, uid);
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struct ucounts *ucounts, *new;
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spin_lock_irq(&ucounts_lock);
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ucounts = find_ucounts(ns, uid, hashent);
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if (!ucounts) {
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spin_unlock_irq(&ucounts_lock);
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new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!new)
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return NULL;
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new->ns = ns;
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new->uid = uid;
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atomic_set(&new->count, 0);
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spin_lock_irq(&ucounts_lock);
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ucounts = find_ucounts(ns, uid, hashent);
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if (ucounts) {
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kfree(new);
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} else {
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hlist_add_head(&new->node, hashent);
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ucounts = new;
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}
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}
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if (!atomic_add_unless(&ucounts->count, 1, INT_MAX))
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ucounts = NULL;
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spin_unlock_irq(&ucounts_lock);
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return ucounts;
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}
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static void put_ucounts(struct ucounts *ucounts)
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{
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unsigned long flags;
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if (atomic_dec_and_test(&ucounts->count)) {
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spin_lock_irqsave(&ucounts_lock, flags);
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hlist_del_init(&ucounts->node);
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spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ucounts_lock, flags);
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kfree(ucounts);
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}
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}
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static inline bool atomic_inc_below(atomic_t *v, int u)
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{
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int c, old;
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c = atomic_read(v);
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for (;;) {
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if (unlikely(c >= u))
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return false;
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old = atomic_cmpxchg(v, c, c+1);
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if (likely(old == c))
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return true;
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c = old;
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}
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}
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struct ucounts *inc_ucount(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid,
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enum ucount_type type)
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{
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struct ucounts *ucounts, *iter, *bad;
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struct user_namespace *tns;
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ucounts = get_ucounts(ns, uid);
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for (iter = ucounts; iter; iter = tns->ucounts) {
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int max;
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tns = iter->ns;
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max = READ_ONCE(tns->ucount_max[type]);
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if (!atomic_inc_below(&iter->ucount[type], max))
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goto fail;
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}
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return ucounts;
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fail:
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bad = iter;
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for (iter = ucounts; iter != bad; iter = iter->ns->ucounts)
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atomic_dec(&iter->ucount[type]);
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put_ucounts(ucounts);
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return NULL;
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}
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void dec_ucount(struct ucounts *ucounts, enum ucount_type type)
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{
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struct ucounts *iter;
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for (iter = ucounts; iter; iter = iter->ns->ucounts) {
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int dec = atomic_dec_if_positive(&iter->ucount[type]);
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WARN_ON_ONCE(dec < 0);
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}
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put_ucounts(ucounts);
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}
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static __init int user_namespace_sysctl_init(void)
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{
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#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
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static struct ctl_table_header *user_header;
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static struct ctl_table empty[1];
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/*
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* It is necessary to register the user directory in the
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* default set so that registrations in the child sets work
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* properly.
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*/
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user_header = register_sysctl("user", empty);
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kmemleak_ignore(user_header);
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BUG_ON(!user_header);
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BUG_ON(!setup_userns_sysctls(&init_user_ns));
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#endif
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return 0;
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}
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subsys_initcall(user_namespace_sysctl_init);
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