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37d3dd663f
Keep file reference through the entire thing, don't bother with grabbing struct path reference and while we are at it, don't confuse the hell out of readers by random mix of path.dentry->d_sb and path.mnt->mnt_sb uses - these two are equal, so just put one of those into a local variable and use that. Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
257 lines
6.2 KiB
C
257 lines
6.2 KiB
C
#include <linux/bpf.h>
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#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
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#include <linux/fdtable.h>
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#include <linux/file.h>
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/idr.h>
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#include <linux/namei.h>
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#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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static bool bpf_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
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{
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return ns_capable(ns, cap) || (cap != CAP_SYS_ADMIN && ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN));
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}
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bool bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap)
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{
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struct user_namespace *userns;
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/* BPF token allows ns_capable() level of capabilities */
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userns = token ? token->userns : &init_user_ns;
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if (!bpf_ns_capable(userns, cap))
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return false;
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if (token && security_bpf_token_capable(token, cap) < 0)
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return false;
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return true;
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}
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void bpf_token_inc(struct bpf_token *token)
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{
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atomic64_inc(&token->refcnt);
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}
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static void bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token)
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{
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security_bpf_token_free(token);
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put_user_ns(token->userns);
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kfree(token);
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}
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static void bpf_token_put_deferred(struct work_struct *work)
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{
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struct bpf_token *token = container_of(work, struct bpf_token, work);
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bpf_token_free(token);
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}
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void bpf_token_put(struct bpf_token *token)
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{
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if (!token)
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return;
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if (!atomic64_dec_and_test(&token->refcnt))
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return;
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INIT_WORK(&token->work, bpf_token_put_deferred);
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schedule_work(&token->work);
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}
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static int bpf_token_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
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{
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struct bpf_token *token = filp->private_data;
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bpf_token_put(token);
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return 0;
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}
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static void bpf_token_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *filp)
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{
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struct bpf_token *token = filp->private_data;
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u64 mask;
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BUILD_BUG_ON(__MAX_BPF_CMD >= 64);
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mask = BIT_ULL(__MAX_BPF_CMD) - 1;
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if ((token->allowed_cmds & mask) == mask)
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seq_printf(m, "allowed_cmds:\tany\n");
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else
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seq_printf(m, "allowed_cmds:\t0x%llx\n", token->allowed_cmds);
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BUILD_BUG_ON(__MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE >= 64);
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mask = BIT_ULL(__MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE) - 1;
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if ((token->allowed_maps & mask) == mask)
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seq_printf(m, "allowed_maps:\tany\n");
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else
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seq_printf(m, "allowed_maps:\t0x%llx\n", token->allowed_maps);
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BUILD_BUG_ON(__MAX_BPF_PROG_TYPE >= 64);
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mask = BIT_ULL(__MAX_BPF_PROG_TYPE) - 1;
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if ((token->allowed_progs & mask) == mask)
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seq_printf(m, "allowed_progs:\tany\n");
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else
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seq_printf(m, "allowed_progs:\t0x%llx\n", token->allowed_progs);
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BUILD_BUG_ON(__MAX_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE >= 64);
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mask = BIT_ULL(__MAX_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE) - 1;
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if ((token->allowed_attachs & mask) == mask)
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seq_printf(m, "allowed_attachs:\tany\n");
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else
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seq_printf(m, "allowed_attachs:\t0x%llx\n", token->allowed_attachs);
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}
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#define BPF_TOKEN_INODE_NAME "bpf-token"
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static const struct inode_operations bpf_token_iops = { };
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static const struct file_operations bpf_token_fops = {
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.release = bpf_token_release,
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.show_fdinfo = bpf_token_show_fdinfo,
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};
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int bpf_token_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
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{
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struct bpf_mount_opts *mnt_opts;
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struct bpf_token *token = NULL;
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struct user_namespace *userns;
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struct inode *inode;
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struct file *file;
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CLASS(fd, f)(attr->token_create.bpffs_fd);
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struct path path;
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struct super_block *sb;
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umode_t mode;
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int err, fd;
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if (fd_empty(f))
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return -EBADF;
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path = fd_file(f)->f_path;
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sb = path.dentry->d_sb;
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if (path.dentry != sb->s_root)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (sb->s_op != &bpf_super_ops)
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return -EINVAL;
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err = path_permission(&path, MAY_ACCESS);
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if (err)
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return err;
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userns = sb->s_user_ns;
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/*
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* Enforce that creators of BPF tokens are in the same user
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* namespace as the BPF FS instance. This makes reasoning about
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* permissions a lot easier and we can always relax this later.
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*/
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if (current_user_ns() != userns)
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return -EPERM;
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if (!ns_capable(userns, CAP_BPF))
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return -EPERM;
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/* Creating BPF token in init_user_ns doesn't make much sense. */
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if (current_user_ns() == &init_user_ns)
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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mnt_opts = sb->s_fs_info;
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if (mnt_opts->delegate_cmds == 0 &&
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mnt_opts->delegate_maps == 0 &&
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mnt_opts->delegate_progs == 0 &&
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mnt_opts->delegate_attachs == 0)
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return -ENOENT; /* no BPF token delegation is set up */
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mode = S_IFREG | ((S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) & ~current_umask());
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inode = bpf_get_inode(sb, NULL, mode);
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if (IS_ERR(inode))
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return PTR_ERR(inode);
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inode->i_op = &bpf_token_iops;
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inode->i_fop = &bpf_token_fops;
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clear_nlink(inode); /* make sure it is unlinked */
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file = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, path.mnt, BPF_TOKEN_INODE_NAME, O_RDWR, &bpf_token_fops);
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if (IS_ERR(file)) {
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iput(inode);
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return PTR_ERR(file);
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}
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token = kzalloc(sizeof(*token), GFP_USER);
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if (!token) {
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err = -ENOMEM;
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goto out_file;
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}
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atomic64_set(&token->refcnt, 1);
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/* remember bpffs owning userns for future ns_capable() checks */
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token->userns = get_user_ns(userns);
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token->allowed_cmds = mnt_opts->delegate_cmds;
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token->allowed_maps = mnt_opts->delegate_maps;
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token->allowed_progs = mnt_opts->delegate_progs;
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token->allowed_attachs = mnt_opts->delegate_attachs;
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err = security_bpf_token_create(token, attr, &path);
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if (err)
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goto out_token;
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fd = get_unused_fd_flags(O_CLOEXEC);
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if (fd < 0) {
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err = fd;
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goto out_token;
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}
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file->private_data = token;
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fd_install(fd, file);
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return fd;
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out_token:
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bpf_token_free(token);
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out_file:
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fput(file);
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return err;
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}
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struct bpf_token *bpf_token_get_from_fd(u32 ufd)
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{
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CLASS(fd, f)(ufd);
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struct bpf_token *token;
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if (fd_empty(f))
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return ERR_PTR(-EBADF);
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if (fd_file(f)->f_op != &bpf_token_fops)
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return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
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token = fd_file(f)->private_data;
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bpf_token_inc(token);
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return token;
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}
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bool bpf_token_allow_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd)
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{
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if (!token)
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return false;
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if (!(token->allowed_cmds & BIT_ULL(cmd)))
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return false;
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return security_bpf_token_cmd(token, cmd) == 0;
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}
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bool bpf_token_allow_map_type(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_map_type type)
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{
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if (!token || type >= __MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE)
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return false;
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return token->allowed_maps & BIT_ULL(type);
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}
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bool bpf_token_allow_prog_type(const struct bpf_token *token,
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enum bpf_prog_type prog_type,
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enum bpf_attach_type attach_type)
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{
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if (!token || prog_type >= __MAX_BPF_PROG_TYPE || attach_type >= __MAX_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE)
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return false;
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return (token->allowed_progs & BIT_ULL(prog_type)) &&
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(token->allowed_attachs & BIT_ULL(attach_type));
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}
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