linux/Documentation/virt
Linus Torvalds bc1bb2a49b - Add the necessary glue so that the kernel can run as a confidential
SEV-SNP vTOM guest on Hyper-V. A vTOM guest basically splits the
   address space in two parts: encrypted and unencrypted. The use case
   being running unmodified guests on the Hyper-V confidential computing
   hypervisor
 
 - Double-buffer messages between the guest and the hardware PSP device
   so that no partial buffers are copied back'n'forth and thus potential
   message integrity and leak attacks are possible
 
 - Name the return value the sev-guest driver returns when the hw PSP
   device hasn't been called, explicitly
 
 - Cleanups
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Merge tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.4_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 SEV updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Add the necessary glue so that the kernel can run as a confidential
   SEV-SNP vTOM guest on Hyper-V. A vTOM guest basically splits the
   address space in two parts: encrypted and unencrypted. The use case
   being running unmodified guests on the Hyper-V confidential computing
   hypervisor

 - Double-buffer messages between the guest and the hardware PSP device
   so that no partial buffers are copied back'n'forth and thus potential
   message integrity and leak attacks are possible

 - Name the return value the sev-guest driver returns when the hw PSP
   device hasn't been called, explicitly

 - Cleanups

* tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.4_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/hyperv: Change vTOM handling to use standard coco mechanisms
  init: Call mem_encrypt_init() after Hyper-V hypercall init is done
  x86/mm: Handle decryption/re-encryption of bss_decrypted consistently
  Drivers: hv: Explicitly request decrypted in vmap_pfn() calls
  x86/hyperv: Reorder code to facilitate future work
  x86/ioremap: Add hypervisor callback for private MMIO mapping in coco VM
  x86/sev: Change snp_guest_issue_request()'s fw_err argument
  virt/coco/sev-guest: Double-buffer messages
  crypto: ccp: Get rid of __sev_platform_init_locked()'s local function pointer
  crypto: ccp - Name -1 return value as SEV_RET_NO_FW_CALL
2023-04-25 10:48:08 -07:00
..
acrn docs: acrn: Introduce ACRN 2021-02-09 10:58:18 +01:00
coco x86/sev: Change snp_guest_issue_request()'s fw_err argument 2023-03-21 15:43:19 +01:00
hyperv Documentation: hyperv: Add overview of clocks and timers 2022-07-13 14:04:48 -06:00
kvm Commit volume in documentation is relatively low this time, but there is 2023-04-24 12:35:49 -07:00
uml docs: UML: fix typo 2022-06-24 13:18:21 -06:00
guest-halt-polling.rst docs: virt: guest-halt-polling.txt convert to ReST 2020-02-12 20:10:08 +01:00
index.rst Docs/subsystem-apis: Remove '[The ]Linux' prefixes from titles of listed documents 2023-01-24 15:27:08 -07:00
ne_overview.rst nitro_enclaves: Update documentation for Arm64 support 2021-09-14 11:11:20 +02:00
paravirt_ops.rst