linux/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c
Marc Zyngier 814ad8f96e KVM: arm64: Drop trapping of PAuth instructions/keys
We currently insist on disabling PAuth on vcpu_load(), and get to
enable it on first guest use of an instruction or a key (ignoring
the NV case for now).

It isn't clear at all what this is trying to achieve: guests tend
to use PAuth when available, and nothing forces you to expose it
to the guest if you don't want to. This also isn't totally free:
we take a full GPR save/restore between host and guest, only to
write ten 64bit registers. The "value proposition" escapes me.

So let's forget this stuff and enable PAuth eagerly if exposed to
the guest. This results in much simpler code. Performance wise,
that's not bad either (tested on M2 Pro running a fully automated
Debian installer as the workload):

- On a non-NV guest, I can see reduction of 0.24% in the number
  of cycles (measured with perf over 10 consecutive runs)

- On a NV guest (L2), I see a 2% reduction in wall-clock time
  (measured with 'time', as M2 doesn't have a PMUv3 and NV
  doesn't support it either)

So overall, a much reduced complexity and a (small) performance
improvement.

Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240419102935.1935571-16-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2024-04-20 12:42:51 +01:00

463 lines
12 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Copyright (C) 2012,2013 - ARM Ltd
* Author: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
*
* Derived from arch/arm/kvm/handle_exit.c:
* Copyright (C) 2012 - Virtual Open Systems and Columbia University
* Author: Christoffer Dall <c.dall@virtualopensystems.com>
*/
#include <linux/kvm.h>
#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
#include <asm/esr.h>
#include <asm/exception.h>
#include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
#include <asm/kvm_emulate.h>
#include <asm/kvm_mmu.h>
#include <asm/kvm_nested.h>
#include <asm/debug-monitors.h>
#include <asm/stacktrace/nvhe.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <kvm/arm_hypercalls.h>
#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
#include "trace_handle_exit.h"
typedef int (*exit_handle_fn)(struct kvm_vcpu *);
static void kvm_handle_guest_serror(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 esr)
{
if (!arm64_is_ras_serror(esr) || arm64_is_fatal_ras_serror(NULL, esr))
kvm_inject_vabt(vcpu);
}
static int handle_hvc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
trace_kvm_hvc_arm64(*vcpu_pc(vcpu), vcpu_get_reg(vcpu, 0),
kvm_vcpu_hvc_get_imm(vcpu));
vcpu->stat.hvc_exit_stat++;
/* Forward hvc instructions to the virtual EL2 if the guest has EL2. */
if (vcpu_has_nv(vcpu)) {
if (vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, HCR_EL2) & HCR_HCD)
kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
else
kvm_inject_nested_sync(vcpu, kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu));
return 1;
}
return kvm_smccc_call_handler(vcpu);
}
static int handle_smc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
/*
* Forward this trapped smc instruction to the virtual EL2 if
* the guest has asked for it.
*/
if (forward_smc_trap(vcpu))
return 1;
/*
* "If an SMC instruction executed at Non-secure EL1 is
* trapped to EL2 because HCR_EL2.TSC is 1, the exception is a
* Trap exception, not a Secure Monitor Call exception [...]"
*
* We need to advance the PC after the trap, as it would
* otherwise return to the same address. Furthermore, pre-incrementing
* the PC before potentially exiting to userspace maintains the same
* abstraction for both SMCs and HVCs.
*/
kvm_incr_pc(vcpu);
/*
* SMCs with a nonzero immediate are reserved according to DEN0028E 2.9
* "SMC and HVC immediate value".
*/
if (kvm_vcpu_hvc_get_imm(vcpu)) {
vcpu_set_reg(vcpu, 0, ~0UL);
return 1;
}
/*
* If imm is zero then it is likely an SMCCC call.
*
* Note that on ARMv8.3, even if EL3 is not implemented, SMC executed
* at Non-secure EL1 is trapped to EL2 if HCR_EL2.TSC==1, rather than
* being treated as UNDEFINED.
*/
return kvm_smccc_call_handler(vcpu);
}
/*
* Guest access to FP/ASIMD registers are routed to this handler only
* when the system doesn't support FP/ASIMD.
*/
static int handle_no_fpsimd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
return 1;
}
/**
* kvm_handle_wfx - handle a wait-for-interrupts or wait-for-event
* instruction executed by a guest
*
* @vcpu: the vcpu pointer
*
* WFE[T]: Yield the CPU and come back to this vcpu when the scheduler
* decides to.
* WFI: Simply call kvm_vcpu_halt(), which will halt execution of
* world-switches and schedule other host processes until there is an
* incoming IRQ or FIQ to the VM.
* WFIT: Same as WFI, with a timed wakeup implemented as a background timer
*
* WF{I,E}T can immediately return if the deadline has already expired.
*/
static int kvm_handle_wfx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u64 esr = kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu);
if (esr & ESR_ELx_WFx_ISS_WFE) {
trace_kvm_wfx_arm64(*vcpu_pc(vcpu), true);
vcpu->stat.wfe_exit_stat++;
} else {
trace_kvm_wfx_arm64(*vcpu_pc(vcpu), false);
vcpu->stat.wfi_exit_stat++;
}
if (esr & ESR_ELx_WFx_ISS_WFxT) {
if (esr & ESR_ELx_WFx_ISS_RV) {
u64 val, now;
now = kvm_arm_timer_get_reg(vcpu, KVM_REG_ARM_TIMER_CNT);
val = vcpu_get_reg(vcpu, kvm_vcpu_sys_get_rt(vcpu));
if (now >= val)
goto out;
} else {
/* Treat WFxT as WFx if RN is invalid */
esr &= ~ESR_ELx_WFx_ISS_WFxT;
}
}
if (esr & ESR_ELx_WFx_ISS_WFE) {
kvm_vcpu_on_spin(vcpu, vcpu_mode_priv(vcpu));
} else {
if (esr & ESR_ELx_WFx_ISS_WFxT)
vcpu_set_flag(vcpu, IN_WFIT);
kvm_vcpu_wfi(vcpu);
}
out:
kvm_incr_pc(vcpu);
return 1;
}
/**
* kvm_handle_guest_debug - handle a debug exception instruction
*
* @vcpu: the vcpu pointer
*
* We route all debug exceptions through the same handler. If both the
* guest and host are using the same debug facilities it will be up to
* userspace to re-inject the correct exception for guest delivery.
*
* @return: 0 (while setting vcpu->run->exit_reason)
*/
static int kvm_handle_guest_debug(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_run *run = vcpu->run;
u64 esr = kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu);
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
run->debug.arch.hsr = lower_32_bits(esr);
run->debug.arch.hsr_high = upper_32_bits(esr);
run->flags = KVM_DEBUG_ARCH_HSR_HIGH_VALID;
switch (ESR_ELx_EC(esr)) {
case ESR_ELx_EC_WATCHPT_LOW:
run->debug.arch.far = vcpu->arch.fault.far_el2;
break;
case ESR_ELx_EC_SOFTSTP_LOW:
vcpu_clear_flag(vcpu, DBG_SS_ACTIVE_PENDING);
break;
}
return 0;
}
static int kvm_handle_unknown_ec(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u64 esr = kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu);
kvm_pr_unimpl("Unknown exception class: esr: %#016llx -- %s\n",
esr, esr_get_class_string(esr));
kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
return 1;
}
/*
* Guest access to SVE registers should be routed to this handler only
* when the system doesn't support SVE.
*/
static int handle_sve(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
return 1;
}
/*
* Two possibilities to handle a trapping ptrauth instruction:
*
* - Guest usage of a ptrauth instruction (which the guest EL1 did not
* turn into a NOP). If we get here, it is because we didn't enable
* ptrauth for the guest. This results in an UNDEF, as it isn't
* supposed to use ptrauth without being told it could.
*
* - Running an L2 NV guest while L1 has left HCR_EL2.API==0, and for
* which we reinject the exception into L1.
*
* Anything else is an emulation bug (hence the WARN_ON + UNDEF).
*/
static int kvm_handle_ptrauth(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (!vcpu_has_ptrauth(vcpu)) {
kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
return 1;
}
if (vcpu_has_nv(vcpu) && !is_hyp_ctxt(vcpu)) {
kvm_inject_nested_sync(vcpu, kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu));
return 1;
}
/* Really shouldn't be here! */
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
return 1;
}
static int kvm_handle_eret(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (esr_iss_is_eretax(kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu)) &&
!vcpu_has_ptrauth(vcpu))
return kvm_handle_ptrauth(vcpu);
/*
* If we got here, two possibilities:
*
* - the guest is in EL2, and we need to fully emulate ERET
*
* - the guest is in EL1, and we need to reinject the
* exception into the L1 hypervisor.
*
* If KVM ever traps ERET for its own use, we'll have to
* revisit this.
*/
if (is_hyp_ctxt(vcpu))
kvm_emulate_nested_eret(vcpu);
else
kvm_inject_nested_sync(vcpu, kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu));
return 1;
}
static int handle_svc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
/*
* So far, SVC traps only for NV via HFGITR_EL2. A SVC from a
* 32bit guest would be caught by vpcu_mode_is_bad_32bit(), so
* we should only have to deal with a 64 bit exception.
*/
kvm_inject_nested_sync(vcpu, kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu));
return 1;
}
static exit_handle_fn arm_exit_handlers[] = {
[0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX] = kvm_handle_unknown_ec,
[ESR_ELx_EC_WFx] = kvm_handle_wfx,
[ESR_ELx_EC_CP15_32] = kvm_handle_cp15_32,
[ESR_ELx_EC_CP15_64] = kvm_handle_cp15_64,
[ESR_ELx_EC_CP14_MR] = kvm_handle_cp14_32,
[ESR_ELx_EC_CP14_LS] = kvm_handle_cp14_load_store,
[ESR_ELx_EC_CP10_ID] = kvm_handle_cp10_id,
[ESR_ELx_EC_CP14_64] = kvm_handle_cp14_64,
[ESR_ELx_EC_HVC32] = handle_hvc,
[ESR_ELx_EC_SMC32] = handle_smc,
[ESR_ELx_EC_HVC64] = handle_hvc,
[ESR_ELx_EC_SMC64] = handle_smc,
[ESR_ELx_EC_SVC64] = handle_svc,
[ESR_ELx_EC_SYS64] = kvm_handle_sys_reg,
[ESR_ELx_EC_SVE] = handle_sve,
[ESR_ELx_EC_ERET] = kvm_handle_eret,
[ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW] = kvm_handle_guest_abort,
[ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_LOW] = kvm_handle_guest_abort,
[ESR_ELx_EC_SOFTSTP_LOW]= kvm_handle_guest_debug,
[ESR_ELx_EC_WATCHPT_LOW]= kvm_handle_guest_debug,
[ESR_ELx_EC_BREAKPT_LOW]= kvm_handle_guest_debug,
[ESR_ELx_EC_BKPT32] = kvm_handle_guest_debug,
[ESR_ELx_EC_BRK64] = kvm_handle_guest_debug,
[ESR_ELx_EC_FP_ASIMD] = handle_no_fpsimd,
[ESR_ELx_EC_PAC] = kvm_handle_ptrauth,
};
static exit_handle_fn kvm_get_exit_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u64 esr = kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu);
u8 esr_ec = ESR_ELx_EC(esr);
return arm_exit_handlers[esr_ec];
}
/*
* We may be single-stepping an emulated instruction. If the emulation
* has been completed in the kernel, we can return to userspace with a
* KVM_EXIT_DEBUG, otherwise userspace needs to complete its
* emulation first.
*/
static int handle_trap_exceptions(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int handled;
/*
* See ARM ARM B1.14.1: "Hyp traps on instructions
* that fail their condition code check"
*/
if (!kvm_condition_valid(vcpu)) {
kvm_incr_pc(vcpu);
handled = 1;
} else {
exit_handle_fn exit_handler;
exit_handler = kvm_get_exit_handler(vcpu);
handled = exit_handler(vcpu);
}
return handled;
}
/*
* Return > 0 to return to guest, < 0 on error, 0 (and set exit_reason) on
* proper exit to userspace.
*/
int handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int exception_index)
{
struct kvm_run *run = vcpu->run;
if (ARM_SERROR_PENDING(exception_index)) {
/*
* The SError is handled by handle_exit_early(). If the guest
* survives it will re-execute the original instruction.
*/
return 1;
}
exception_index = ARM_EXCEPTION_CODE(exception_index);
switch (exception_index) {
case ARM_EXCEPTION_IRQ:
return 1;
case ARM_EXCEPTION_EL1_SERROR:
return 1;
case ARM_EXCEPTION_TRAP:
return handle_trap_exceptions(vcpu);
case ARM_EXCEPTION_HYP_GONE:
/*
* EL2 has been reset to the hyp-stub. This happens when a guest
* is pre-emptied by kvm_reboot()'s shutdown call.
*/
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY;
return 0;
case ARM_EXCEPTION_IL:
/*
* We attempted an illegal exception return. Guest state must
* have been corrupted somehow. Give up.
*/
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY;
return -EINVAL;
default:
kvm_pr_unimpl("Unsupported exception type: %d",
exception_index);
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
/* For exit types that need handling before we can be preempted */
void handle_exit_early(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int exception_index)
{
if (ARM_SERROR_PENDING(exception_index)) {
if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_HAS_RAS_EXTN)) {
u64 disr = kvm_vcpu_get_disr(vcpu);
kvm_handle_guest_serror(vcpu, disr_to_esr(disr));
} else {
kvm_inject_vabt(vcpu);
}
return;
}
exception_index = ARM_EXCEPTION_CODE(exception_index);
if (exception_index == ARM_EXCEPTION_EL1_SERROR)
kvm_handle_guest_serror(vcpu, kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu));
}
void __noreturn __cold nvhe_hyp_panic_handler(u64 esr, u64 spsr,
u64 elr_virt, u64 elr_phys,
u64 par, uintptr_t vcpu,
u64 far, u64 hpfar) {
u64 elr_in_kimg = __phys_to_kimg(elr_phys);
u64 hyp_offset = elr_in_kimg - kaslr_offset() - elr_virt;
u64 mode = spsr & PSR_MODE_MASK;
u64 panic_addr = elr_virt + hyp_offset;
if (mode != PSR_MODE_EL2t && mode != PSR_MODE_EL2h) {
kvm_err("Invalid host exception to nVHE hyp!\n");
} else if (ESR_ELx_EC(esr) == ESR_ELx_EC_BRK64 &&
(esr & ESR_ELx_BRK64_ISS_COMMENT_MASK) == BUG_BRK_IMM) {
const char *file = NULL;
unsigned int line = 0;
/* All hyp bugs, including warnings, are treated as fatal. */
if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled() ||
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NVHE_EL2_DEBUG)) {
struct bug_entry *bug = find_bug(elr_in_kimg);
if (bug)
bug_get_file_line(bug, &file, &line);
}
if (file)
kvm_err("nVHE hyp BUG at: %s:%u!\n", file, line);
else
kvm_err("nVHE hyp BUG at: [<%016llx>] %pB!\n", panic_addr,
(void *)(panic_addr + kaslr_offset()));
} else {
kvm_err("nVHE hyp panic at: [<%016llx>] %pB!\n", panic_addr,
(void *)(panic_addr + kaslr_offset()));
}
/* Dump the nVHE hypervisor backtrace */
kvm_nvhe_dump_backtrace(hyp_offset);
/*
* Hyp has panicked and we're going to handle that by panicking the
* kernel. The kernel offset will be revealed in the panic so we're
* also safe to reveal the hyp offset as a debugging aid for translating
* hyp VAs to vmlinux addresses.
*/
kvm_err("Hyp Offset: 0x%llx\n", hyp_offset);
panic("HYP panic:\nPS:%08llx PC:%016llx ESR:%016llx\nFAR:%016llx HPFAR:%016llx PAR:%016llx\nVCPU:%016lx\n",
spsr, elr_virt, esr, far, hpfar, par, vcpu);
}