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eb39e37d5c
Add to confidential guests the necessary memory integrity protection against malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data replay, memory remapping and others, thus achieving a stronger isolation from the hypervisor. At the core of the functionality is a new structure called a reverse map table (RMP) with which the guest has a say in which pages get assigned to it and gets notified when a page which it owns, gets accessed/modified under the covers so that the guest can take an appropriate action. In addition, add support for the whole machinery needed to launch a SNP guest, details of which is properly explained in each patch. And last but not least, the series refactors and improves parts of the previous SEV support so that the new code is accomodated properly and not just bolted on. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEzv7L6UO9uDPlPSfHEsHwGGHeVUoFAmKLU2AACgkQEsHwGGHe VUpb/Q//f4LGiJf4nw1flzpe90uIsHNwAafng3NOjeXmhI/EcOlqPf23WHPCgg3Z 2umfa4sRZyj4aZubDd7tYAoq4qWrQ7pO7viWCNTh0InxBAILOoMPMuq2jSAbq0zV ASUJXeQ2bqjYxX4JV4N5f3HT2l+k68M0mpGLN0H+O+LV9pFS7dz7Jnsg+gW4ZP25 PMPLf6FNzO/1tU1aoYu80YDP1ne4eReLrNzA7Y/rx+S2NAetNwPn21AALVgoD4Nu vFdKh4MHgtVbwaQuh0csb/+4vD+tDXAhc8lbIl+Abl9ZxJaDWtAJW5D9e2CnsHk1 NOkHwnrzizzhtGK1g56YPUVRFAWhZYMOI1hR0zGPLQaVqBnN4b+iahPeRiV0XnGE PSbIHSfJdeiCkvLMCdIAmpE5mRshhRSUfl1CXTCdetMn8xV/qz/vG6bXssf8yhTV cfLGPHU7gfVmsbR9nk5a8KZ78PaytxOxfIDXvCy8JfQwlIWtieaCcjncrj+sdMJy 0fdOuwvi4jma0cyYuPolKiS1Hn4ldeibvxXT7CZQlIx6jZShMbpfpTTJs11XdtHm PdDAc1TY3AqI33mpy9DhDQmx/+EhOGxY3HNLT7evRhv4CfdQeK3cPVUWgo4bGNVv ZnFz7nvmwpyufltW9K8mhEZV267174jXGl6/idxybnlVE7ESr2Y= =Y8kW -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_sev_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull AMD SEV-SNP support from Borislav Petkov: "The third AMD confidential computing feature called Secure Nested Paging. Add to confidential guests the necessary memory integrity protection against malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data replay, memory remapping and others, thus achieving a stronger isolation from the hypervisor. At the core of the functionality is a new structure called a reverse map table (RMP) with which the guest has a say in which pages get assigned to it and gets notified when a page which it owns, gets accessed/modified under the covers so that the guest can take an appropriate action. In addition, add support for the whole machinery needed to launch a SNP guest, details of which is properly explained in each patch. And last but not least, the series refactors and improves parts of the previous SEV support so that the new code is accomodated properly and not just bolted on" * tag 'x86_sev_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (60 commits) x86/entry: Fixup objtool/ibt validation x86/sev: Mark the code returning to user space as syscall gap x86/sev: Annotate stack change in the #VC handler x86/sev: Remove duplicated assignment to variable info x86/sev: Fix address space sparse warning x86/sev: Get the AP jump table address from secrets page x86/sev: Add missing __init annotations to SEV init routines virt: sevguest: Rename the sevguest dir and files to sev-guest virt: sevguest: Change driver name to reflect generic SEV support x86/boot: Put globals that are accessed early into the .data section x86/boot: Add an efi.h header for the decompressor virt: sevguest: Fix bool function returning negative value virt: sevguest: Fix return value check in alloc_shared_pages() x86/sev-es: Replace open-coded hlt-loop with sev_es_terminate() virt: sevguest: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs ...
1458 lines
40 KiB
C
1458 lines
40 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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/*
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* Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux
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* cpuid support routines
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*
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* derived from arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
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*
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* Copyright 2011 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
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* Copyright IBM Corporation, 2008
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*/
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#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
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#include <linux/export.h>
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#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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#include <linux/sched/stat.h>
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#include <asm/processor.h>
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#include <asm/user.h>
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#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
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#include <asm/sgx.h>
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#include <asm/cpuid.h>
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#include "cpuid.h"
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#include "lapic.h"
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#include "mmu.h"
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#include "trace.h"
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#include "pmu.h"
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/*
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* Unlike "struct cpuinfo_x86.x86_capability", kvm_cpu_caps doesn't need to be
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* aligned to sizeof(unsigned long) because it's not accessed via bitops.
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*/
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u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS] __read_mostly;
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_cpu_caps);
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u32 xstate_required_size(u64 xstate_bv, bool compacted)
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{
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int feature_bit = 0;
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u32 ret = XSAVE_HDR_SIZE + XSAVE_HDR_OFFSET;
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xstate_bv &= XFEATURE_MASK_EXTEND;
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while (xstate_bv) {
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if (xstate_bv & 0x1) {
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u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx, offset;
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cpuid_count(0xD, feature_bit, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
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/* ECX[1]: 64B alignment in compacted form */
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if (compacted)
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offset = (ecx & 0x2) ? ALIGN(ret, 64) : ret;
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else
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offset = ebx;
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ret = max(ret, offset + eax);
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}
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xstate_bv >>= 1;
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feature_bit++;
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}
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* This one is tied to SSB in the user API, and not
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* visible in /proc/cpuinfo.
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*/
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#define KVM_X86_FEATURE_PSFD (13*32+28) /* Predictive Store Forwarding Disable */
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#define F feature_bit
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#define SF(name) (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_##name) ? F(name) : 0)
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static inline struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *cpuid_entry2_find(
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struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries, int nent, u32 function, u32 index)
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{
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struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e;
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < nent; i++) {
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e = &entries[i];
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if (e->function == function &&
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(!(e->flags & KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX) || e->index == index))
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return e;
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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static int kvm_check_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
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struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries,
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int nent)
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{
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struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
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u64 xfeatures;
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/*
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* The existing code assumes virtual address is 48-bit or 57-bit in the
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* canonical address checks; exit if it is ever changed.
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*/
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best = cpuid_entry2_find(entries, nent, 0x80000008, 0);
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if (best) {
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int vaddr_bits = (best->eax & 0xff00) >> 8;
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if (vaddr_bits != 48 && vaddr_bits != 57 && vaddr_bits != 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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/*
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* Exposing dynamic xfeatures to the guest requires additional
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* enabling in the FPU, e.g. to expand the guest XSAVE state size.
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*/
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best = cpuid_entry2_find(entries, nent, 0xd, 0);
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if (!best)
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return 0;
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xfeatures = best->eax | ((u64)best->edx << 32);
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xfeatures &= XFEATURE_MASK_USER_DYNAMIC;
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if (!xfeatures)
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return 0;
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return fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu, xfeatures);
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}
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/* Check whether the supplied CPUID data is equal to what is already set for the vCPU. */
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static int kvm_cpuid_check_equal(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e2,
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int nent)
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{
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struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *orig;
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int i;
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if (nent != vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent)
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return -EINVAL;
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for (i = 0; i < nent; i++) {
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orig = &vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[i];
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if (e2[i].function != orig->function ||
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e2[i].index != orig->index ||
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e2[i].flags != orig->flags ||
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e2[i].eax != orig->eax || e2[i].ebx != orig->ebx ||
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e2[i].ecx != orig->ecx || e2[i].edx != orig->edx)
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static void kvm_update_kvm_cpuid_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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{
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u32 function;
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struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
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vcpu->arch.kvm_cpuid_base = 0;
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for_each_possible_hypervisor_cpuid_base(function) {
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entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, function, 0);
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if (entry) {
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u32 signature[3];
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signature[0] = entry->ebx;
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signature[1] = entry->ecx;
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signature[2] = entry->edx;
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BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(signature) > sizeof(KVM_SIGNATURE));
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if (!memcmp(signature, KVM_SIGNATURE, sizeof(signature))) {
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vcpu->arch.kvm_cpuid_base = function;
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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}
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static struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *__kvm_find_kvm_cpuid_features(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
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struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries, int nent)
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{
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u32 base = vcpu->arch.kvm_cpuid_base;
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if (!base)
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return NULL;
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return cpuid_entry2_find(entries, nent, base | KVM_CPUID_FEATURES, 0);
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}
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static struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *kvm_find_kvm_cpuid_features(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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{
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return __kvm_find_kvm_cpuid_features(vcpu, vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries,
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vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent);
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}
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void kvm_update_pv_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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{
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struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best = kvm_find_kvm_cpuid_features(vcpu);
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/*
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* save the feature bitmap to avoid cpuid lookup for every PV
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* operation
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*/
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if (best)
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vcpu->arch.pv_cpuid.features = best->eax;
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}
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/*
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* Calculate guest's supported XCR0 taking into account guest CPUID data and
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* supported_xcr0 (comprised of host configuration and KVM_SUPPORTED_XCR0).
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*/
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static u64 cpuid_get_supported_xcr0(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries, int nent)
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{
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struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
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best = cpuid_entry2_find(entries, nent, 0xd, 0);
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if (!best)
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return 0;
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return (best->eax | ((u64)best->edx << 32)) & supported_xcr0;
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}
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static void __kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries,
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int nent)
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{
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struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
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u64 guest_supported_xcr0 = cpuid_get_supported_xcr0(entries, nent);
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best = cpuid_entry2_find(entries, nent, 1, 0);
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if (best) {
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/* Update OSXSAVE bit */
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if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
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cpuid_entry_change(best, X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE,
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kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_OSXSAVE));
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cpuid_entry_change(best, X86_FEATURE_APIC,
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vcpu->arch.apic_base & MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE);
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}
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best = cpuid_entry2_find(entries, nent, 7, 0);
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if (best && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PKU) && best->function == 0x7)
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cpuid_entry_change(best, X86_FEATURE_OSPKE,
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kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE));
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best = cpuid_entry2_find(entries, nent, 0xD, 0);
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if (best)
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best->ebx = xstate_required_size(vcpu->arch.xcr0, false);
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best = cpuid_entry2_find(entries, nent, 0xD, 1);
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if (best && (cpuid_entry_has(best, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) ||
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cpuid_entry_has(best, X86_FEATURE_XSAVEC)))
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best->ebx = xstate_required_size(vcpu->arch.xcr0, true);
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best = __kvm_find_kvm_cpuid_features(vcpu, entries, nent);
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if (kvm_hlt_in_guest(vcpu->kvm) && best &&
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(best->eax & (1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT)))
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best->eax &= ~(1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT);
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if (!kvm_check_has_quirk(vcpu->kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_MISC_ENABLE_NO_MWAIT)) {
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best = cpuid_entry2_find(entries, nent, 0x1, 0);
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if (best)
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cpuid_entry_change(best, X86_FEATURE_MWAIT,
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vcpu->arch.ia32_misc_enable_msr &
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MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_MWAIT);
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}
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/*
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* Bits 127:0 of the allowed SECS.ATTRIBUTES (CPUID.0x12.0x1) enumerate
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* the supported XSAVE Feature Request Mask (XFRM), i.e. the enclave's
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* requested XCR0 value. The enclave's XFRM must be a subset of XCRO
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* at the time of EENTER, thus adjust the allowed XFRM by the guest's
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* supported XCR0. Similar to XCR0 handling, FP and SSE are forced to
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* '1' even on CPUs that don't support XSAVE.
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*/
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best = cpuid_entry2_find(entries, nent, 0x12, 0x1);
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if (best) {
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best->ecx &= guest_supported_xcr0 & 0xffffffff;
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best->edx &= guest_supported_xcr0 >> 32;
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best->ecx |= XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE;
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}
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}
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void kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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{
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__kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu, vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries, vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_update_cpuid_runtime);
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static void kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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{
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struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
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struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
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u64 guest_supported_xcr0;
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best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 1, 0);
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if (best && apic) {
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if (cpuid_entry_has(best, X86_FEATURE_TSC_DEADLINE_TIMER))
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apic->lapic_timer.timer_mode_mask = 3 << 17;
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else
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apic->lapic_timer.timer_mode_mask = 1 << 17;
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kvm_apic_set_version(vcpu);
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}
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guest_supported_xcr0 =
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cpuid_get_supported_xcr0(vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries, vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent);
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vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->user_xfeatures = guest_supported_xcr0;
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kvm_update_pv_runtime(vcpu);
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vcpu->arch.maxphyaddr = cpuid_query_maxphyaddr(vcpu);
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vcpu->arch.reserved_gpa_bits = kvm_vcpu_reserved_gpa_bits_raw(vcpu);
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kvm_pmu_refresh(vcpu);
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vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_rsvd_bits =
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__cr4_reserved_bits(guest_cpuid_has, vcpu);
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kvm_hv_set_cpuid(vcpu);
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/* Invoke the vendor callback only after the above state is updated. */
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static_call(kvm_x86_vcpu_after_set_cpuid)(vcpu);
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/*
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* Except for the MMU, which needs to do its thing any vendor specific
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* adjustments to the reserved GPA bits.
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*/
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kvm_mmu_after_set_cpuid(vcpu);
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}
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int cpuid_query_maxphyaddr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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{
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struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
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best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x80000000, 0);
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if (!best || best->eax < 0x80000008)
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goto not_found;
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best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x80000008, 0);
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if (best)
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return best->eax & 0xff;
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not_found:
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return 36;
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}
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/*
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* This "raw" version returns the reserved GPA bits without any adjustments for
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* encryption technologies that usurp bits. The raw mask should be used if and
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* only if hardware does _not_ strip the usurped bits, e.g. in virtual MTRRs.
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*/
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u64 kvm_vcpu_reserved_gpa_bits_raw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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{
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return rsvd_bits(cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu), 63);
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}
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static int kvm_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e2,
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int nent)
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{
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int r;
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__kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu, e2, nent);
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/*
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* KVM does not correctly handle changing guest CPUID after KVM_RUN, as
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* MAXPHYADDR, GBPAGES support, AMD reserved bit behavior, etc.. aren't
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* tracked in kvm_mmu_page_role. As a result, KVM may miss guest page
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* faults due to reusing SPs/SPTEs. In practice no sane VMM mucks with
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* the core vCPU model on the fly. It would've been better to forbid any
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* KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} calls after KVM_RUN altogether but unfortunately
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* some VMMs (e.g. QEMU) reuse vCPU fds for CPU hotplug/unplug and do
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* KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} again. To support this legacy behavior, check
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* whether the supplied CPUID data is equal to what's already set.
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*/
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if (vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu != -1) {
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r = kvm_cpuid_check_equal(vcpu, e2, nent);
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if (r)
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return r;
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kvfree(e2);
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return 0;
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}
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r = kvm_check_cpuid(vcpu, e2, nent);
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if (r)
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return r;
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|
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kvfree(vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries);
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vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries = e2;
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vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent = nent;
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|
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kvm_update_kvm_cpuid_base(vcpu);
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kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(vcpu);
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return 0;
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}
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/* when an old userspace process fills a new kernel module */
|
|
int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
|
|
struct kvm_cpuid *cpuid,
|
|
struct kvm_cpuid_entry __user *entries)
|
|
{
|
|
int r, i;
|
|
struct kvm_cpuid_entry *e = NULL;
|
|
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e2 = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (cpuid->nent > KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES)
|
|
return -E2BIG;
|
|
|
|
if (cpuid->nent) {
|
|
e = vmemdup_user(entries, array_size(sizeof(*e), cpuid->nent));
|
|
if (IS_ERR(e))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(e);
|
|
|
|
e2 = kvmalloc_array(cpuid->nent, sizeof(*e2), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
|
|
if (!e2) {
|
|
r = -ENOMEM;
|
|
goto out_free_cpuid;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for (i = 0; i < cpuid->nent; i++) {
|
|
e2[i].function = e[i].function;
|
|
e2[i].eax = e[i].eax;
|
|
e2[i].ebx = e[i].ebx;
|
|
e2[i].ecx = e[i].ecx;
|
|
e2[i].edx = e[i].edx;
|
|
e2[i].index = 0;
|
|
e2[i].flags = 0;
|
|
e2[i].padding[0] = 0;
|
|
e2[i].padding[1] = 0;
|
|
e2[i].padding[2] = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r = kvm_set_cpuid(vcpu, e2, cpuid->nent);
|
|
if (r)
|
|
kvfree(e2);
|
|
|
|
out_free_cpuid:
|
|
kvfree(e);
|
|
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_cpuid2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
|
|
struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid,
|
|
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 __user *entries)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e2 = NULL;
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
if (cpuid->nent > KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES)
|
|
return -E2BIG;
|
|
|
|
if (cpuid->nent) {
|
|
e2 = vmemdup_user(entries, array_size(sizeof(*e2), cpuid->nent));
|
|
if (IS_ERR(e2))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(e2);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r = kvm_set_cpuid(vcpu, e2, cpuid->nent);
|
|
if (r)
|
|
kvfree(e2);
|
|
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_get_cpuid2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
|
|
struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid,
|
|
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 __user *entries)
|
|
{
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
r = -E2BIG;
|
|
if (cpuid->nent < vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
r = -EFAULT;
|
|
if (copy_to_user(entries, vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries,
|
|
vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent * sizeof(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2)))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
cpuid->nent = vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent;
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Mask kvm_cpu_caps for @leaf with the raw CPUID capabilities of this CPU. */
|
|
static __always_inline void __kvm_cpu_cap_mask(unsigned int leaf)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct cpuid_reg cpuid = x86_feature_cpuid(leaf * 32);
|
|
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 entry;
|
|
|
|
reverse_cpuid_check(leaf);
|
|
|
|
cpuid_count(cpuid.function, cpuid.index,
|
|
&entry.eax, &entry.ebx, &entry.ecx, &entry.edx);
|
|
|
|
kvm_cpu_caps[leaf] &= *__cpuid_entry_get_reg(&entry, cpuid.reg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static __always_inline
|
|
void kvm_cpu_cap_init_scattered(enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs leaf, u32 mask)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Use kvm_cpu_cap_mask for non-scattered leafs. */
|
|
BUILD_BUG_ON(leaf < NCAPINTS);
|
|
|
|
kvm_cpu_caps[leaf] = mask;
|
|
|
|
__kvm_cpu_cap_mask(leaf);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_mask(enum cpuid_leafs leaf, u32 mask)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Use kvm_cpu_cap_init_scattered for scattered leafs. */
|
|
BUILD_BUG_ON(leaf >= NCAPINTS);
|
|
|
|
kvm_cpu_caps[leaf] &= mask;
|
|
|
|
__kvm_cpu_cap_mask(leaf);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
|
|
unsigned int f_gbpages = F(GBPAGES);
|
|
unsigned int f_lm = F(LM);
|
|
unsigned int f_xfd = F(XFD);
|
|
#else
|
|
unsigned int f_gbpages = 0;
|
|
unsigned int f_lm = 0;
|
|
unsigned int f_xfd = 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
memset(kvm_cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps));
|
|
|
|
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps) - (NKVMCAPINTS * sizeof(*kvm_cpu_caps)) >
|
|
sizeof(boot_cpu_data.x86_capability));
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&kvm_cpu_caps, &boot_cpu_data.x86_capability,
|
|
sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps) - (NKVMCAPINTS * sizeof(*kvm_cpu_caps)));
|
|
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_1_ECX,
|
|
/*
|
|
* NOTE: MONITOR (and MWAIT) are emulated as NOP, but *not*
|
|
* advertised to guests via CPUID!
|
|
*/
|
|
F(XMM3) | F(PCLMULQDQ) | 0 /* DTES64, MONITOR */ |
|
|
0 /* DS-CPL, VMX, SMX, EST */ |
|
|
0 /* TM2 */ | F(SSSE3) | 0 /* CNXT-ID */ | 0 /* Reserved */ |
|
|
F(FMA) | F(CX16) | 0 /* xTPR Update */ | F(PDCM) |
|
|
F(PCID) | 0 /* Reserved, DCA */ | F(XMM4_1) |
|
|
F(XMM4_2) | F(X2APIC) | F(MOVBE) | F(POPCNT) |
|
|
0 /* Reserved*/ | F(AES) | F(XSAVE) | 0 /* OSXSAVE */ | F(AVX) |
|
|
F(F16C) | F(RDRAND)
|
|
);
|
|
/* KVM emulates x2apic in software irrespective of host support. */
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_X2APIC);
|
|
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_1_EDX,
|
|
F(FPU) | F(VME) | F(DE) | F(PSE) |
|
|
F(TSC) | F(MSR) | F(PAE) | F(MCE) |
|
|
F(CX8) | F(APIC) | 0 /* Reserved */ | F(SEP) |
|
|
F(MTRR) | F(PGE) | F(MCA) | F(CMOV) |
|
|
F(PAT) | F(PSE36) | 0 /* PSN */ | F(CLFLUSH) |
|
|
0 /* Reserved, DS, ACPI */ | F(MMX) |
|
|
F(FXSR) | F(XMM) | F(XMM2) | F(SELFSNOOP) |
|
|
0 /* HTT, TM, Reserved, PBE */
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_7_0_EBX,
|
|
F(FSGSBASE) | F(SGX) | F(BMI1) | F(HLE) | F(AVX2) |
|
|
F(FDP_EXCPTN_ONLY) | F(SMEP) | F(BMI2) | F(ERMS) | F(INVPCID) |
|
|
F(RTM) | F(ZERO_FCS_FDS) | 0 /*MPX*/ | F(AVX512F) |
|
|
F(AVX512DQ) | F(RDSEED) | F(ADX) | F(SMAP) | F(AVX512IFMA) |
|
|
F(CLFLUSHOPT) | F(CLWB) | 0 /*INTEL_PT*/ | F(AVX512PF) |
|
|
F(AVX512ER) | F(AVX512CD) | F(SHA_NI) | F(AVX512BW) |
|
|
F(AVX512VL));
|
|
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_7_ECX,
|
|
F(AVX512VBMI) | F(LA57) | F(PKU) | 0 /*OSPKE*/ | F(RDPID) |
|
|
F(AVX512_VPOPCNTDQ) | F(UMIP) | F(AVX512_VBMI2) | F(GFNI) |
|
|
F(VAES) | F(VPCLMULQDQ) | F(AVX512_VNNI) | F(AVX512_BITALG) |
|
|
F(CLDEMOTE) | F(MOVDIRI) | F(MOVDIR64B) | 0 /*WAITPKG*/ |
|
|
F(SGX_LC) | F(BUS_LOCK_DETECT)
|
|
);
|
|
/* Set LA57 based on hardware capability. */
|
|
if (cpuid_ecx(7) & F(LA57))
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_LA57);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* PKU not yet implemented for shadow paging and requires OSPKE
|
|
* to be set on the host. Clear it if that is not the case
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!tdp_enabled || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_PKU);
|
|
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_7_EDX,
|
|
F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS) | F(SPEC_CTRL) |
|
|
F(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES) | F(INTEL_STIBP) |
|
|
F(MD_CLEAR) | F(AVX512_VP2INTERSECT) | F(FSRM) |
|
|
F(SERIALIZE) | F(TSXLDTRK) | F(AVX512_FP16) |
|
|
F(AMX_TILE) | F(AMX_INT8) | F(AMX_BF16)
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
/* TSC_ADJUST and ARCH_CAPABILITIES are emulated in software. */
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST);
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
|
|
|
|
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
|
|
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP);
|
|
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
|
|
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_7_1_EAX,
|
|
F(AVX_VNNI) | F(AVX512_BF16)
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_D_1_EAX,
|
|
F(XSAVEOPT) | F(XSAVEC) | F(XGETBV1) | F(XSAVES) | f_xfd
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_init_scattered(CPUID_12_EAX,
|
|
SF(SGX1) | SF(SGX2)
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_8000_0001_ECX,
|
|
F(LAHF_LM) | F(CMP_LEGACY) | 0 /*SVM*/ | 0 /* ExtApicSpace */ |
|
|
F(CR8_LEGACY) | F(ABM) | F(SSE4A) | F(MISALIGNSSE) |
|
|
F(3DNOWPREFETCH) | F(OSVW) | 0 /* IBS */ | F(XOP) |
|
|
0 /* SKINIT, WDT, LWP */ | F(FMA4) | F(TBM) |
|
|
F(TOPOEXT) | 0 /* PERFCTR_CORE */
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_8000_0001_EDX,
|
|
F(FPU) | F(VME) | F(DE) | F(PSE) |
|
|
F(TSC) | F(MSR) | F(PAE) | F(MCE) |
|
|
F(CX8) | F(APIC) | 0 /* Reserved */ | F(SYSCALL) |
|
|
F(MTRR) | F(PGE) | F(MCA) | F(CMOV) |
|
|
F(PAT) | F(PSE36) | 0 /* Reserved */ |
|
|
F(NX) | 0 /* Reserved */ | F(MMXEXT) | F(MMX) |
|
|
F(FXSR) | F(FXSR_OPT) | f_gbpages | F(RDTSCP) |
|
|
0 /* Reserved */ | f_lm | F(3DNOWEXT) | F(3DNOW)
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
if (!tdp_enabled && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES);
|
|
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_8000_0008_EBX,
|
|
F(CLZERO) | F(XSAVEERPTR) |
|
|
F(WBNOINVD) | F(AMD_IBPB) | F(AMD_IBRS) | F(AMD_SSBD) | F(VIRT_SSBD) |
|
|
F(AMD_SSB_NO) | F(AMD_STIBP) | F(AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON) |
|
|
__feature_bit(KVM_X86_FEATURE_PSFD)
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* AMD has separate bits for each SPEC_CTRL bit.
|
|
* arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c is kind enough to
|
|
* record that in cpufeatures so use them.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB);
|
|
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS);
|
|
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP);
|
|
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD);
|
|
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS))
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO);
|
|
/*
|
|
* The preference is to use SPEC CTRL MSR instead of the
|
|
* VIRT_SPEC MSR.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD) &&
|
|
!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Hide all SVM features by default, SVM will set the cap bits for
|
|
* features it emulates and/or exposes for L1.
|
|
*/
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_8000_000A_EDX, 0);
|
|
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_8000_001F_EAX,
|
|
0 /* SME */ | F(SEV) | 0 /* VM_PAGE_FLUSH */ | F(SEV_ES) |
|
|
F(SME_COHERENT));
|
|
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_C000_0001_EDX,
|
|
F(XSTORE) | F(XSTORE_EN) | F(XCRYPT) | F(XCRYPT_EN) |
|
|
F(ACE2) | F(ACE2_EN) | F(PHE) | F(PHE_EN) |
|
|
F(PMM) | F(PMM_EN)
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Hide RDTSCP and RDPID if either feature is reported as supported but
|
|
* probing MSR_TSC_AUX failed. This is purely a sanity check and
|
|
* should never happen, but the guest will likely crash if RDTSCP or
|
|
* RDPID is misreported, and KVM has botched MSR_TSC_AUX emulation in
|
|
* the past. For example, the sanity check may fire if this instance of
|
|
* KVM is running as L1 on top of an older, broken KVM.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (WARN_ON((kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) ||
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_RDPID)) &&
|
|
!kvm_is_supported_user_return_msr(MSR_TSC_AUX))) {
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP);
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_RDPID);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_cpu_caps);
|
|
|
|
struct kvm_cpuid_array {
|
|
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries;
|
|
int maxnent;
|
|
int nent;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *do_host_cpuid(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array,
|
|
u32 function, u32 index)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
|
|
|
|
if (array->nent >= array->maxnent)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
entry = &array->entries[array->nent++];
|
|
|
|
memset(entry, 0, sizeof(*entry));
|
|
entry->function = function;
|
|
entry->index = index;
|
|
switch (function & 0xC0000000) {
|
|
case 0x40000000:
|
|
/* Hypervisor leaves are always synthesized by __do_cpuid_func. */
|
|
return entry;
|
|
|
|
case 0x80000000:
|
|
/*
|
|
* 0x80000021 is sometimes synthesized by __do_cpuid_func, which
|
|
* would result in out-of-bounds calls to do_host_cpuid.
|
|
*/
|
|
{
|
|
static int max_cpuid_80000000;
|
|
if (!READ_ONCE(max_cpuid_80000000))
|
|
WRITE_ONCE(max_cpuid_80000000, cpuid_eax(0x80000000));
|
|
if (function > READ_ONCE(max_cpuid_80000000))
|
|
return entry;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cpuid_count(entry->function, entry->index,
|
|
&entry->eax, &entry->ebx, &entry->ecx, &entry->edx);
|
|
|
|
if (cpuid_function_is_indexed(function))
|
|
entry->flags |= KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX;
|
|
|
|
return entry;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int __do_cpuid_func_emulated(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 func)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
|
|
|
|
if (array->nent >= array->maxnent)
|
|
return -E2BIG;
|
|
|
|
entry = &array->entries[array->nent];
|
|
entry->function = func;
|
|
entry->index = 0;
|
|
entry->flags = 0;
|
|
|
|
switch (func) {
|
|
case 0:
|
|
entry->eax = 7;
|
|
++array->nent;
|
|
break;
|
|
case 1:
|
|
entry->ecx = F(MOVBE);
|
|
++array->nent;
|
|
break;
|
|
case 7:
|
|
entry->flags |= KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX;
|
|
entry->eax = 0;
|
|
if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
|
|
entry->ecx = F(RDPID);
|
|
++array->nent;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
|
|
int r, i, max_idx;
|
|
|
|
/* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */
|
|
get_cpu();
|
|
|
|
r = -E2BIG;
|
|
|
|
entry = do_host_cpuid(array, function, 0);
|
|
if (!entry)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
switch (function) {
|
|
case 0:
|
|
/* Limited to the highest leaf implemented in KVM. */
|
|
entry->eax = min(entry->eax, 0x1fU);
|
|
break;
|
|
case 1:
|
|
cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_1_EDX);
|
|
cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_1_ECX);
|
|
break;
|
|
case 2:
|
|
/*
|
|
* On ancient CPUs, function 2 entries are STATEFUL. That is,
|
|
* CPUID(function=2, index=0) may return different results each
|
|
* time, with the least-significant byte in EAX enumerating the
|
|
* number of times software should do CPUID(2, 0).
|
|
*
|
|
* Modern CPUs, i.e. every CPU KVM has *ever* run on are less
|
|
* idiotic. Intel's SDM states that EAX & 0xff "will always
|
|
* return 01H. Software should ignore this value and not
|
|
* interpret it as an informational descriptor", while AMD's
|
|
* APM states that CPUID(2) is reserved.
|
|
*
|
|
* WARN if a frankenstein CPU that supports virtualization and
|
|
* a stateful CPUID.0x2 is encountered.
|
|
*/
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE((entry->eax & 0xff) > 1);
|
|
break;
|
|
/* functions 4 and 0x8000001d have additional index. */
|
|
case 4:
|
|
case 0x8000001d:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Read entries until the cache type in the previous entry is
|
|
* zero, i.e. indicates an invalid entry.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = 1; entry->eax & 0x1f; ++i) {
|
|
entry = do_host_cpuid(array, function, i);
|
|
if (!entry)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case 6: /* Thermal management */
|
|
entry->eax = 0x4; /* allow ARAT */
|
|
entry->ebx = 0;
|
|
entry->ecx = 0;
|
|
entry->edx = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
/* function 7 has additional index. */
|
|
case 7:
|
|
entry->eax = min(entry->eax, 1u);
|
|
cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_7_0_EBX);
|
|
cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_7_ECX);
|
|
cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_7_EDX);
|
|
|
|
/* KVM only supports 0x7.0 and 0x7.1, capped above via min(). */
|
|
if (entry->eax == 1) {
|
|
entry = do_host_cpuid(array, function, 1);
|
|
if (!entry)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_7_1_EAX);
|
|
entry->ebx = 0;
|
|
entry->ecx = 0;
|
|
entry->edx = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case 9:
|
|
break;
|
|
case 0xa: { /* Architectural Performance Monitoring */
|
|
struct x86_pmu_capability cap;
|
|
union cpuid10_eax eax;
|
|
union cpuid10_edx edx;
|
|
|
|
if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON)) {
|
|
entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
perf_get_x86_pmu_capability(&cap);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The guest architecture pmu is only supported if the architecture
|
|
* pmu exists on the host and the module parameters allow it.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!cap.version || !enable_pmu)
|
|
memset(&cap, 0, sizeof(cap));
|
|
|
|
eax.split.version_id = min(cap.version, 2);
|
|
eax.split.num_counters = cap.num_counters_gp;
|
|
eax.split.bit_width = cap.bit_width_gp;
|
|
eax.split.mask_length = cap.events_mask_len;
|
|
|
|
edx.split.num_counters_fixed =
|
|
min(cap.num_counters_fixed, KVM_PMC_MAX_FIXED);
|
|
edx.split.bit_width_fixed = cap.bit_width_fixed;
|
|
if (cap.version)
|
|
edx.split.anythread_deprecated = 1;
|
|
edx.split.reserved1 = 0;
|
|
edx.split.reserved2 = 0;
|
|
|
|
entry->eax = eax.full;
|
|
entry->ebx = cap.events_mask;
|
|
entry->ecx = 0;
|
|
entry->edx = edx.full;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Per Intel's SDM, the 0x1f is a superset of 0xb,
|
|
* thus they can be handled by common code.
|
|
*/
|
|
case 0x1f:
|
|
case 0xb:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Populate entries until the level type (ECX[15:8]) of the
|
|
* previous entry is zero. Note, CPUID EAX.{0x1f,0xb}.0 is
|
|
* the starting entry, filled by the primary do_host_cpuid().
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = 1; entry->ecx & 0xff00; ++i) {
|
|
entry = do_host_cpuid(array, function, i);
|
|
if (!entry)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case 0xd: {
|
|
u64 permitted_xcr0 = supported_xcr0 & xstate_get_guest_group_perm();
|
|
u64 permitted_xss = supported_xss;
|
|
|
|
entry->eax &= permitted_xcr0;
|
|
entry->ebx = xstate_required_size(permitted_xcr0, false);
|
|
entry->ecx = entry->ebx;
|
|
entry->edx &= permitted_xcr0 >> 32;
|
|
if (!permitted_xcr0)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
entry = do_host_cpuid(array, function, 1);
|
|
if (!entry)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_D_1_EAX);
|
|
if (entry->eax & (F(XSAVES)|F(XSAVEC)))
|
|
entry->ebx = xstate_required_size(permitted_xcr0 | permitted_xss,
|
|
true);
|
|
else {
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(permitted_xss != 0);
|
|
entry->ebx = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
entry->ecx &= permitted_xss;
|
|
entry->edx &= permitted_xss >> 32;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 2; i < 64; ++i) {
|
|
bool s_state;
|
|
if (permitted_xcr0 & BIT_ULL(i))
|
|
s_state = false;
|
|
else if (permitted_xss & BIT_ULL(i))
|
|
s_state = true;
|
|
else
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
entry = do_host_cpuid(array, function, i);
|
|
if (!entry)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The supported check above should have filtered out
|
|
* invalid sub-leafs. Only valid sub-leafs should
|
|
* reach this point, and they should have a non-zero
|
|
* save state size. Furthermore, check whether the
|
|
* processor agrees with permitted_xcr0/permitted_xss
|
|
* on whether this is an XCR0- or IA32_XSS-managed area.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!entry->eax || (entry->ecx & 0x1) != s_state)) {
|
|
--array->nent;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_XFD))
|
|
entry->ecx &= ~BIT_ULL(2);
|
|
entry->edx = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case 0x12:
|
|
/* Intel SGX */
|
|
if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX)) {
|
|
entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Index 0: Sub-features, MISCSELECT (a.k.a extended features)
|
|
* and max enclave sizes. The SGX sub-features and MISCSELECT
|
|
* are restricted by kernel and KVM capabilities (like most
|
|
* feature flags), while enclave size is unrestricted.
|
|
*/
|
|
cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_12_EAX);
|
|
entry->ebx &= SGX_MISC_EXINFO;
|
|
|
|
entry = do_host_cpuid(array, function, 1);
|
|
if (!entry)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Index 1: SECS.ATTRIBUTES. ATTRIBUTES are restricted a la
|
|
* feature flags. Advertise all supported flags, including
|
|
* privileged attributes that require explicit opt-in from
|
|
* userspace. ATTRIBUTES.XFRM is not adjusted as userspace is
|
|
* expected to derive it from supported XCR0.
|
|
*/
|
|
entry->eax &= SGX_ATTR_DEBUG | SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT |
|
|
SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY | SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY |
|
|
SGX_ATTR_KSS;
|
|
entry->ebx &= 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
/* Intel PT */
|
|
case 0x14:
|
|
if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT)) {
|
|
entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 1, max_idx = entry->eax; i <= max_idx; ++i) {
|
|
if (!do_host_cpuid(array, function, i))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
/* Intel AMX TILE */
|
|
case 0x1d:
|
|
if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE)) {
|
|
entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 1, max_idx = entry->eax; i <= max_idx; ++i) {
|
|
if (!do_host_cpuid(array, function, i))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case 0x1e: /* TMUL information */
|
|
if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE)) {
|
|
entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case KVM_CPUID_SIGNATURE: {
|
|
const u32 *sigptr = (const u32 *)KVM_SIGNATURE;
|
|
entry->eax = KVM_CPUID_FEATURES;
|
|
entry->ebx = sigptr[0];
|
|
entry->ecx = sigptr[1];
|
|
entry->edx = sigptr[2];
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case KVM_CPUID_FEATURES:
|
|
entry->eax = (1 << KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE) |
|
|
(1 << KVM_FEATURE_NOP_IO_DELAY) |
|
|
(1 << KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE2) |
|
|
(1 << KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF) |
|
|
(1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI) |
|
|
(1 << KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT) |
|
|
(1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT) |
|
|
(1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_TLB_FLUSH) |
|
|
(1 << KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_VMEXIT) |
|
|
(1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_SEND_IPI) |
|
|
(1 << KVM_FEATURE_POLL_CONTROL) |
|
|
(1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD) |
|
|
(1 << KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT);
|
|
|
|
if (sched_info_on())
|
|
entry->eax |= (1 << KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME);
|
|
|
|
entry->ebx = 0;
|
|
entry->ecx = 0;
|
|
entry->edx = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
case 0x80000000:
|
|
entry->eax = min(entry->eax, 0x80000021);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Serializing LFENCE is reported in a multitude of ways, and
|
|
* NullSegClearsBase is not reported in CPUID on Zen2; help
|
|
* userspace by providing the CPUID leaf ourselves.
|
|
*
|
|
* However, only do it if the host has CPUID leaf 0x8000001d.
|
|
* QEMU thinks that it can query the host blindly for that
|
|
* CPUID leaf if KVM reports that it supports 0x8000001d or
|
|
* above. The processor merrily returns values from the
|
|
* highest Intel leaf which QEMU tries to use as the guest's
|
|
* 0x8000001d. Even worse, this can result in an infinite
|
|
* loop if said highest leaf has no subleaves indexed by ECX.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (entry->eax >= 0x8000001d &&
|
|
(static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)
|
|
|| !static_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_NULL_SEG)))
|
|
entry->eax = max(entry->eax, 0x80000021);
|
|
break;
|
|
case 0x80000001:
|
|
cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_8000_0001_EDX);
|
|
cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_8000_0001_ECX);
|
|
break;
|
|
case 0x80000006:
|
|
/* L2 cache and TLB: pass through host info. */
|
|
break;
|
|
case 0x80000007: /* Advanced power management */
|
|
/* invariant TSC is CPUID.80000007H:EDX[8] */
|
|
entry->edx &= (1 << 8);
|
|
/* mask against host */
|
|
entry->edx &= boot_cpu_data.x86_power;
|
|
entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
case 0x80000008: {
|
|
unsigned g_phys_as = (entry->eax >> 16) & 0xff;
|
|
unsigned virt_as = max((entry->eax >> 8) & 0xff, 48U);
|
|
unsigned phys_as = entry->eax & 0xff;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If TDP (NPT) is disabled use the adjusted host MAXPHYADDR as
|
|
* the guest operates in the same PA space as the host, i.e.
|
|
* reductions in MAXPHYADDR for memory encryption affect shadow
|
|
* paging, too.
|
|
*
|
|
* If TDP is enabled but an explicit guest MAXPHYADDR is not
|
|
* provided, use the raw bare metal MAXPHYADDR as reductions to
|
|
* the HPAs do not affect GPAs.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!tdp_enabled)
|
|
g_phys_as = boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits;
|
|
else if (!g_phys_as)
|
|
g_phys_as = phys_as;
|
|
|
|
entry->eax = g_phys_as | (virt_as << 8);
|
|
entry->edx = 0;
|
|
cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_8000_0008_EBX);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case 0x8000000A:
|
|
if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SVM)) {
|
|
entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
entry->eax = 1; /* SVM revision 1 */
|
|
entry->ebx = 8; /* Lets support 8 ASIDs in case we add proper
|
|
ASID emulation to nested SVM */
|
|
entry->ecx = 0; /* Reserved */
|
|
cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_8000_000A_EDX);
|
|
break;
|
|
case 0x80000019:
|
|
entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
case 0x8000001a:
|
|
case 0x8000001e:
|
|
break;
|
|
case 0x8000001F:
|
|
if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV)) {
|
|
entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_8000_001F_EAX);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Enumerate '0' for "PA bits reduction", the adjusted
|
|
* MAXPHYADDR is enumerated directly (see 0x80000008).
|
|
*/
|
|
entry->ebx &= ~GENMASK(11, 6);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case 0x80000020:
|
|
entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
case 0x80000021:
|
|
entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Pass down these bits:
|
|
* EAX 0 NNDBP, Processor ignores nested data breakpoints
|
|
* EAX 2 LAS, LFENCE always serializing
|
|
* EAX 6 NSCB, Null selector clear base
|
|
*
|
|
* Other defined bits are for MSRs that KVM does not expose:
|
|
* EAX 3 SPCL, SMM page configuration lock
|
|
* EAX 13 PCMSR, Prefetch control MSR
|
|
*/
|
|
entry->eax &= BIT(0) | BIT(2) | BIT(6);
|
|
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC))
|
|
entry->eax |= BIT(2);
|
|
if (!static_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_NULL_SEG))
|
|
entry->eax |= BIT(6);
|
|
break;
|
|
/*Add support for Centaur's CPUID instruction*/
|
|
case 0xC0000000:
|
|
/*Just support up to 0xC0000004 now*/
|
|
entry->eax = min(entry->eax, 0xC0000004);
|
|
break;
|
|
case 0xC0000001:
|
|
cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_C000_0001_EDX);
|
|
break;
|
|
case 3: /* Processor serial number */
|
|
case 5: /* MONITOR/MWAIT */
|
|
case 0xC0000002:
|
|
case 0xC0000003:
|
|
case 0xC0000004:
|
|
default:
|
|
entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r = 0;
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
put_cpu();
|
|
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 func,
|
|
unsigned int type)
|
|
{
|
|
if (type == KVM_GET_EMULATED_CPUID)
|
|
return __do_cpuid_func_emulated(array, func);
|
|
|
|
return __do_cpuid_func(array, func);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#define CENTAUR_CPUID_SIGNATURE 0xC0000000
|
|
|
|
static int get_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 func,
|
|
unsigned int type)
|
|
{
|
|
u32 limit;
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
if (func == CENTAUR_CPUID_SIGNATURE &&
|
|
boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
r = do_cpuid_func(array, func, type);
|
|
if (r)
|
|
return r;
|
|
|
|
limit = array->entries[array->nent - 1].eax;
|
|
for (func = func + 1; func <= limit; ++func) {
|
|
r = do_cpuid_func(array, func, type);
|
|
if (r)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool sanity_check_entries(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 __user *entries,
|
|
__u32 num_entries, unsigned int ioctl_type)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
__u32 pad[3];
|
|
|
|
if (ioctl_type != KVM_GET_EMULATED_CPUID)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We want to make sure that ->padding is being passed clean from
|
|
* userspace in case we want to use it for something in the future.
|
|
*
|
|
* Sadly, this wasn't enforced for KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID and so we
|
|
* have to give ourselves satisfied only with the emulated side. /me
|
|
* sheds a tear.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_entries; i++) {
|
|
if (copy_from_user(pad, entries[i].padding, sizeof(pad)))
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
if (pad[0] || pad[1] || pad[2])
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int kvm_dev_ioctl_get_cpuid(struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid,
|
|
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 __user *entries,
|
|
unsigned int type)
|
|
{
|
|
static const u32 funcs[] = {
|
|
0, 0x80000000, CENTAUR_CPUID_SIGNATURE, KVM_CPUID_SIGNATURE,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
struct kvm_cpuid_array array = {
|
|
.nent = 0,
|
|
};
|
|
int r, i;
|
|
|
|
if (cpuid->nent < 1)
|
|
return -E2BIG;
|
|
if (cpuid->nent > KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES)
|
|
cpuid->nent = KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES;
|
|
|
|
if (sanity_check_entries(entries, cpuid->nent, type))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
array.entries = kvcalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2), cpuid->nent, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!array.entries)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
array.maxnent = cpuid->nent;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(funcs); i++) {
|
|
r = get_cpuid_func(&array, funcs[i], type);
|
|
if (r)
|
|
goto out_free;
|
|
}
|
|
cpuid->nent = array.nent;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_to_user(entries, array.entries,
|
|
array.nent * sizeof(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2)))
|
|
r = -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
out_free:
|
|
kvfree(array.entries);
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *kvm_find_cpuid_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
|
|
u32 function, u32 index)
|
|
{
|
|
return cpuid_entry2_find(vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries, vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent,
|
|
function, index);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_find_cpuid_entry);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Intel CPUID semantics treats any query for an out-of-range leaf as if the
|
|
* highest basic leaf (i.e. CPUID.0H:EAX) were requested. AMD CPUID semantics
|
|
* returns all zeroes for any undefined leaf, whether or not the leaf is in
|
|
* range. Centaur/VIA follows Intel semantics.
|
|
*
|
|
* A leaf is considered out-of-range if its function is higher than the maximum
|
|
* supported leaf of its associated class or if its associated class does not
|
|
* exist.
|
|
*
|
|
* There are three primary classes to be considered, with their respective
|
|
* ranges described as "<base> - <top>[,<base2> - <top2>] inclusive. A primary
|
|
* class exists if a guest CPUID entry for its <base> leaf exists. For a given
|
|
* class, CPUID.<base>.EAX contains the max supported leaf for the class.
|
|
*
|
|
* - Basic: 0x00000000 - 0x3fffffff, 0x50000000 - 0x7fffffff
|
|
* - Hypervisor: 0x40000000 - 0x4fffffff
|
|
* - Extended: 0x80000000 - 0xbfffffff
|
|
* - Centaur: 0xc0000000 - 0xcfffffff
|
|
*
|
|
* The Hypervisor class is further subdivided into sub-classes that each act as
|
|
* their own independent class associated with a 0x100 byte range. E.g. if Qemu
|
|
* is advertising support for both HyperV and KVM, the resulting Hypervisor
|
|
* CPUID sub-classes are:
|
|
*
|
|
* - HyperV: 0x40000000 - 0x400000ff
|
|
* - KVM: 0x40000100 - 0x400001ff
|
|
*/
|
|
static struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *
|
|
get_out_of_range_cpuid_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *fn_ptr, u32 index)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *basic, *class;
|
|
u32 function = *fn_ptr;
|
|
|
|
basic = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0, 0);
|
|
if (!basic)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (is_guest_vendor_amd(basic->ebx, basic->ecx, basic->edx) ||
|
|
is_guest_vendor_hygon(basic->ebx, basic->ecx, basic->edx))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (function >= 0x40000000 && function <= 0x4fffffff)
|
|
class = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, function & 0xffffff00, 0);
|
|
else if (function >= 0xc0000000)
|
|
class = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0xc0000000, 0);
|
|
else
|
|
class = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, function & 0x80000000, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (class && function <= class->eax)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Leaf specific adjustments are also applied when redirecting to the
|
|
* max basic entry, e.g. if the max basic leaf is 0xb but there is no
|
|
* entry for CPUID.0xb.index (see below), then the output value for EDX
|
|
* needs to be pulled from CPUID.0xb.1.
|
|
*/
|
|
*fn_ptr = basic->eax;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The class does not exist or the requested function is out of range;
|
|
* the effective CPUID entry is the max basic leaf. Note, the index of
|
|
* the original requested leaf is observed!
|
|
*/
|
|
return kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, basic->eax, index);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool kvm_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *eax, u32 *ebx,
|
|
u32 *ecx, u32 *edx, bool exact_only)
|
|
{
|
|
u32 orig_function = *eax, function = *eax, index = *ecx;
|
|
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
|
|
bool exact, used_max_basic = false;
|
|
|
|
entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, function, index);
|
|
exact = !!entry;
|
|
|
|
if (!entry && !exact_only) {
|
|
entry = get_out_of_range_cpuid_entry(vcpu, &function, index);
|
|
used_max_basic = !!entry;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (entry) {
|
|
*eax = entry->eax;
|
|
*ebx = entry->ebx;
|
|
*ecx = entry->ecx;
|
|
*edx = entry->edx;
|
|
if (function == 7 && index == 0) {
|
|
u64 data;
|
|
if (!__kvm_get_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, &data, true) &&
|
|
(data & TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR))
|
|
*ebx &= ~(F(RTM) | F(HLE));
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
*eax = *ebx = *ecx = *edx = 0;
|
|
/*
|
|
* When leaf 0BH or 1FH is defined, CL is pass-through
|
|
* and EDX is always the x2APIC ID, even for undefined
|
|
* subleaves. Index 1 will exist iff the leaf is
|
|
* implemented, so we pass through CL iff leaf 1
|
|
* exists. EDX can be copied from any existing index.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (function == 0xb || function == 0x1f) {
|
|
entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, function, 1);
|
|
if (entry) {
|
|
*ecx = index & 0xff;
|
|
*edx = entry->edx;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
trace_kvm_cpuid(orig_function, index, *eax, *ebx, *ecx, *edx, exact,
|
|
used_max_basic);
|
|
return exact;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_cpuid);
|
|
|
|
int kvm_emulate_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
|
|
{
|
|
u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
|
|
|
|
if (cpuid_fault_enabled(vcpu) && !kvm_require_cpl(vcpu, 0))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
eax = kvm_rax_read(vcpu);
|
|
ecx = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
|
|
kvm_cpuid(vcpu, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx, false);
|
|
kvm_rax_write(vcpu, eax);
|
|
kvm_rbx_write(vcpu, ebx);
|
|
kvm_rcx_write(vcpu, ecx);
|
|
kvm_rdx_write(vcpu, edx);
|
|
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_cpuid);
|