mirror of
https://mirrors.bfsu.edu.cn/git/linux.git
synced 2024-12-12 21:44:06 +08:00
c95e8f6fd1
When the same key is blacklisted repeatedly logging at pr_err() level is excessive as no functionality is impaired. When these duplicates are provided by buggy firmware there is nothing the user can do to fix the situation. Instead of spamming the bootlog with errors we use a warning that can still be seen by OEMs when testing their firmware. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/c8c65713-5cda-43ad-8018-20f2e32e4432@t-8ch.de/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221104014704.3469-1-linux@weissschuh.net/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net> Tested-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
376 lines
9.5 KiB
C
376 lines
9.5 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
|
|
/* System hash blacklist.
|
|
*
|
|
* Copyright (C) 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
|
|
* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "blacklist: "fmt
|
|
#include <linux/module.h>
|
|
#include <linux/slab.h>
|
|
#include <linux/key.h>
|
|
#include <linux/key-type.h>
|
|
#include <linux/sched.h>
|
|
#include <linux/ctype.h>
|
|
#include <linux/err.h>
|
|
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
|
|
#include <linux/uidgid.h>
|
|
#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
|
|
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
|
|
#include "blacklist.h"
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* According to crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:x509_note_pkey_algo(),
|
|
* the size of the currently longest supported hash algorithm is 512 bits,
|
|
* which translates into 128 hex characters.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define MAX_HASH_LEN 128
|
|
|
|
#define BLACKLIST_KEY_PERM (KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_VIEW | \
|
|
KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_VIEW)
|
|
|
|
static const char tbs_prefix[] = "tbs";
|
|
static const char bin_prefix[] = "bin";
|
|
|
|
static struct key *blacklist_keyring;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST
|
|
extern __initconst const u8 revocation_certificate_list[];
|
|
extern __initconst const unsigned long revocation_certificate_list_size;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The description must be a type prefix, a colon and then an even number of
|
|
* hex digits. The hash is kept in the description.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int blacklist_vet_description(const char *desc)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, prefix_len, tbs_step = 0, bin_step = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* The following algorithm only works if prefix lengths match. */
|
|
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(tbs_prefix) != sizeof(bin_prefix));
|
|
prefix_len = sizeof(tbs_prefix) - 1;
|
|
for (i = 0; *desc; desc++, i++) {
|
|
if (*desc == ':') {
|
|
if (tbs_step == prefix_len)
|
|
goto found_colon;
|
|
if (bin_step == prefix_len)
|
|
goto found_colon;
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (i >= prefix_len)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
if (*desc == tbs_prefix[i])
|
|
tbs_step++;
|
|
if (*desc == bin_prefix[i])
|
|
bin_step++;
|
|
}
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
found_colon:
|
|
desc++;
|
|
for (i = 0; *desc && i < MAX_HASH_LEN; desc++, i++) {
|
|
if (!isxdigit(*desc) || isupper(*desc))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (*desc)
|
|
/* The hash is greater than MAX_HASH_LEN. */
|
|
return -ENOPKG;
|
|
|
|
/* Checks for an even number of hexadecimal characters. */
|
|
if (i == 0 || i & 1)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int blacklist_key_instantiate(struct key *key,
|
|
struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE
|
|
int err;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Sets safe default permissions for keys loaded by user space. */
|
|
key->perm = BLACKLIST_KEY_PERM;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Skips the authentication step for builtin hashes, they are not
|
|
* signed but still trusted.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (key->flags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE
|
|
/*
|
|
* Verifies the description's PKCS#7 signature against the builtin
|
|
* trusted keyring.
|
|
*/
|
|
err = verify_pkcs7_signature(key->description,
|
|
strlen(key->description), prep->data, prep->datalen,
|
|
NULL, VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
return err;
|
|
#else
|
|
/*
|
|
* It should not be possible to come here because the keyring doesn't
|
|
* have KEY_USR_WRITE and the only other way to call this function is
|
|
* for builtin hashes.
|
|
*/
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
return generic_key_instantiate(key, prep);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int blacklist_key_update(struct key *key,
|
|
struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
|
|
{
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void blacklist_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
|
|
{
|
|
seq_puts(m, key->description);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct key_type key_type_blacklist = {
|
|
.name = "blacklist",
|
|
.vet_description = blacklist_vet_description,
|
|
.instantiate = blacklist_key_instantiate,
|
|
.update = blacklist_key_update,
|
|
.describe = blacklist_describe,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static char *get_raw_hash(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
|
|
enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t type_len;
|
|
const char *type_prefix;
|
|
char *buffer, *p;
|
|
|
|
switch (hash_type) {
|
|
case BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS:
|
|
type_len = sizeof(tbs_prefix) - 1;
|
|
type_prefix = tbs_prefix;
|
|
break;
|
|
case BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY:
|
|
type_len = sizeof(bin_prefix) - 1;
|
|
type_prefix = bin_prefix;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
|
|
}
|
|
buffer = kmalloc(type_len + 1 + hash_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!buffer)
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
|
|
p = memcpy(buffer, type_prefix, type_len);
|
|
p += type_len;
|
|
*p++ = ':';
|
|
bin2hex(p, hash, hash_len);
|
|
p += hash_len * 2;
|
|
*p = '\0';
|
|
return buffer;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* mark_raw_hash_blacklisted - Add a hash to the system blacklist
|
|
* @hash: The hash as a hex string with a type prefix (eg. "tbs:23aa429783")
|
|
*/
|
|
static int mark_raw_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)
|
|
{
|
|
key_ref_t key;
|
|
|
|
key = key_create(make_key_ref(blacklist_keyring, true),
|
|
"blacklist",
|
|
hash,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
0,
|
|
BLACKLIST_KEY_PERM,
|
|
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
|
|
KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
|
|
if (PTR_ERR(key) == -EEXIST)
|
|
pr_warn("Duplicate blacklisted hash %s\n", hash);
|
|
else
|
|
pr_err("Problem blacklisting hash %s: %pe\n", hash, key);
|
|
return PTR_ERR(key);
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int mark_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
|
|
enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *buffer;
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
buffer = get_raw_hash(hash, hash_len, hash_type);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(buffer))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(buffer);
|
|
err = mark_raw_hash_blacklisted(buffer);
|
|
kfree(buffer);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* is_hash_blacklisted - Determine if a hash is blacklisted
|
|
* @hash: The hash to be checked as a binary blob
|
|
* @hash_len: The length of the binary hash
|
|
* @hash_type: Type of hash
|
|
*/
|
|
int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
|
|
enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type)
|
|
{
|
|
key_ref_t kref;
|
|
const char *buffer;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
buffer = get_raw_hash(hash, hash_len, hash_type);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(buffer))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(buffer);
|
|
kref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(blacklist_keyring, true),
|
|
&key_type_blacklist, buffer, false);
|
|
if (!IS_ERR(kref)) {
|
|
key_ref_put(kref);
|
|
ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kfree(buffer);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(is_hash_blacklisted);
|
|
|
|
int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (is_hash_blacklisted(hash, hash_len, BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY) ==
|
|
-EKEYREJECTED)
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(is_binary_blacklisted);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST
|
|
/**
|
|
* add_key_to_revocation_list - Add a revocation certificate to the blacklist
|
|
* @data: The data blob containing the certificate
|
|
* @size: The size of data blob
|
|
*/
|
|
int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size)
|
|
{
|
|
key_ref_t key;
|
|
|
|
key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(blacklist_keyring, true),
|
|
"asymmetric",
|
|
NULL,
|
|
data,
|
|
size,
|
|
KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH
|
|
| KEY_USR_VIEW,
|
|
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN
|
|
| KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
|
|
pr_err("Problem with revocation key (%ld)\n", PTR_ERR(key));
|
|
return PTR_ERR(key);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* is_key_on_revocation_list - Determine if the key for a PKCS#7 message is revoked
|
|
* @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to check
|
|
*/
|
|
int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, blacklist_keyring);
|
|
|
|
if (ret == 0)
|
|
return -EKEYREJECTED;
|
|
|
|
return -ENOKEY;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static int restrict_link_for_blacklist(struct key *dest_keyring,
|
|
const struct key_type *type, const union key_payload *payload,
|
|
struct key *restrict_key)
|
|
{
|
|
if (type == &key_type_blacklist)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialise the blacklist
|
|
*
|
|
* The blacklist_init() function is registered as an initcall via
|
|
* device_initcall(). As a result if the blacklist_init() function fails for
|
|
* any reason the kernel continues to execute. While cleanly returning -ENODEV
|
|
* could be acceptable for some non-critical kernel parts, if the blacklist
|
|
* keyring fails to load it defeats the certificate/key based deny list for
|
|
* signed modules. If a critical piece of security functionality that users
|
|
* expect to be present fails to initialize, panic()ing is likely the right
|
|
* thing to do.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int __init blacklist_init(void)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *const *bl;
|
|
struct key_restriction *restriction;
|
|
|
|
if (register_key_type(&key_type_blacklist) < 0)
|
|
panic("Can't allocate system blacklist key type\n");
|
|
|
|
restriction = kzalloc(sizeof(*restriction), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!restriction)
|
|
panic("Can't allocate blacklist keyring restriction\n");
|
|
restriction->check = restrict_link_for_blacklist;
|
|
|
|
blacklist_keyring =
|
|
keyring_alloc(".blacklist",
|
|
GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, current_cred(),
|
|
KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH |
|
|
KEY_POS_WRITE |
|
|
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE
|
|
| KEY_USR_WRITE
|
|
#endif
|
|
, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
|
|
KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP,
|
|
restriction, NULL);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(blacklist_keyring))
|
|
panic("Can't allocate system blacklist keyring\n");
|
|
|
|
for (bl = blacklist_hashes; *bl; bl++)
|
|
if (mark_raw_hash_blacklisted(*bl) < 0)
|
|
pr_err("- blacklisting failed\n");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Must be initialised before we try and load the keys into the keyring.
|
|
*/
|
|
device_initcall(blacklist_init);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST
|
|
/*
|
|
* Load the compiled-in list of revocation X.509 certificates.
|
|
*/
|
|
static __init int load_revocation_certificate_list(void)
|
|
{
|
|
if (revocation_certificate_list_size)
|
|
pr_notice("Loading compiled-in revocation X.509 certificates\n");
|
|
|
|
return x509_load_certificate_list(revocation_certificate_list,
|
|
revocation_certificate_list_size,
|
|
blacklist_keyring);
|
|
}
|
|
late_initcall(load_revocation_certificate_list);
|
|
#endif
|