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df57721f9a
Convert IBT selftest to asm to fix objtool warning -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEV76QKkVc4xCGURexaDWVMHDJkrAFAmTv1QQACgkQaDWVMHDJ krAUwhAAn6TOwHJK8BSkHeiQhON1nrlP3c5cv0AyZ2NP8RYDrZrSZvhpYBJ6wgKC Cx5CGq5nn9twYsYS3KsktLKDfR3lRdsQ7K9qtyFtYiaeaVKo+7gEKl/K+klwai8/ gninQWHk0zmSCja8Vi77q52WOMkQKapT8+vaON9EVDO8dVEi+CvhAIfPwMafuiwO Rk4X86SzoZu9FP79LcCg9XyGC/XbM2OG9eNUTSCKT40qTTKm5y4gix687NvAlaHR ko5MTsdl0Wfp6Qk0ohT74LnoA2c1g/FluvZIM33ci/2rFpkf9Hw7ip3lUXqn6CPx rKiZ+pVRc0xikVWkraMfIGMJfUd2rhelp8OyoozD7DB7UZw40Q4RW4N5tgq9Fhe9 MQs3p1v9N8xHdRKl365UcOczUxNAmv4u0nV5gY/4FMC6VjldCl2V9fmqYXyzFS4/ Ogg4FSd7c2JyGFKPs+5uXyi+RY2qOX4+nzHOoKD7SY616IYqtgKoz5usxETLwZ6s VtJOmJL0h//z0A7tBliB0zd+SQ5UQQBDC2XouQH2fNX2isJMn0UDmWJGjaHgK6Hh 8jVp6LNqf+CEQS387UxckOyj7fu438hDky1Ggaw4YqowEOhQeqLVO4++x+HITrbp AupXfbJw9h9cMN63Yc0gVxXQ9IMZ+M7UxLtZ3Cd8/PVztNy/clA= =3UUm -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_shstk_for_6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 shadow stack support from Dave Hansen: "This is the long awaited x86 shadow stack support, part of Intel's Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET). CET consists of two related security features: shadow stacks and indirect branch tracking. This series implements just the shadow stack part of this feature, and just for userspace. The main use case for shadow stack is providing protection against return oriented programming attacks. It works by maintaining a secondary (shadow) stack using a special memory type that has protections against modification. When executing a CALL instruction, the processor pushes the return address to both the normal stack and to the special permission shadow stack. Upon RET, the processor pops the shadow stack copy and compares it to the normal stack copy. For more information, refer to the links below for the earlier versions of this patch set" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220130211838.8382-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230613001108.3040476-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/ * tag 'x86_shstk_for_6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (47 commits) x86/shstk: Change order of __user in type x86/ibt: Convert IBT selftest to asm x86/shstk: Don't retry vm_munmap() on -EINTR x86/kbuild: Fix Documentation/ reference x86/shstk: Move arch detail comment out of core mm x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall x86/shstk: Check that signal frame is shadow stack mem x86/shstk: Check that SSP is aligned on sigreturn x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support ... |
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| .. | ||
| pat | ||
| amdtopology.c | ||
| cpu_entry_area.c | ||
| debug_pagetables.c | ||
| dump_pagetables.c | ||
| extable.c | ||
| fault.c | ||
| highmem_32.c | ||
| hugetlbpage.c | ||
| ident_map.c | ||
| init_32.c | ||
| init_64.c | ||
| init.c | ||
| iomap_32.c | ||
| ioremap.c | ||
| kasan_init_64.c | ||
| kaslr.c | ||
| kmmio.c | ||
| kmsan_shadow.c | ||
| maccess.c | ||
| Makefile | ||
| mem_encrypt_amd.c | ||
| mem_encrypt_boot.S | ||
| mem_encrypt_identity.c | ||
| mem_encrypt.c | ||
| mm_internal.h | ||
| mmap.c | ||
| mmio-mod.c | ||
| numa_32.c | ||
| numa_64.c | ||
| numa_emulation.c | ||
| numa_internal.h | ||
| numa.c | ||
| pf_in.c | ||
| pf_in.h | ||
| pgprot.c | ||
| pgtable_32.c | ||
| pgtable.c | ||
| physaddr.c | ||
| physaddr.h | ||
| pkeys.c | ||
| pti.c | ||
| srat.c | ||
| testmmiotrace.c | ||
| tlb.c | ||