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MPTCP can create subflows in kernel context, and later indirectly expose them to user-space, via the owning MPTCP socket. As discussed in the reported link, the above causes unexpected failures for server, MPTCP-enabled applications. Let's introduce a new LSM hook to allow the security module to relabel the subflow according to the owning user-space process, via the MPTCP socket owning the subflow. Note that the new hook requires both the MPTCP socket and the new subflow. This could allow future extensions, e.g. explicitly validating the MPTCP <-> subflow linkage. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/mptcp/CAHC9VhTNh-YwiyTds=P1e3rixEDqbRTFj22bpya=+qJqfcaMfg@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Acked-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
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| .. | ||
| apparmor | ||
| bpf | ||
| integrity | ||
| keys | ||
| landlock | ||
| loadpin | ||
| lockdown | ||
| safesetid | ||
| selinux | ||
| smack | ||
| tomoyo | ||
| yama | ||
| commoncap.c | ||
| device_cgroup.c | ||
| inode.c | ||
| Kconfig | ||
| Kconfig.hardening | ||
| lsm_audit.c | ||
| Makefile | ||
| min_addr.c | ||
| security.c | ||