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4d7ca40901
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b
("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.
Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a
mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to
conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces
that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers
without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for
bugs.
Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the
really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of
two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two
eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems
only operate on struct mnt_idmap.
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
1428 lines
38 KiB
C
1428 lines
38 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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/*
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2011 Novell Inc.
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*/
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/cred.h>
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#include <linux/xattr.h>
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#include <linux/posix_acl.h>
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#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
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#include <linux/fiemap.h>
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#include <linux/fileattr.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/namei.h>
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#include <linux/posix_acl.h>
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#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
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#include "overlayfs.h"
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int ovl_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
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struct iattr *attr)
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{
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int err;
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struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(dentry->d_sb);
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bool full_copy_up = false;
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struct dentry *upperdentry;
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const struct cred *old_cred;
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err = setattr_prepare(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, attr);
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if (err)
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return err;
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err = ovl_want_write(dentry);
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if (err)
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goto out;
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if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
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/* Truncate should trigger data copy up as well */
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full_copy_up = true;
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}
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if (!full_copy_up)
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err = ovl_copy_up(dentry);
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else
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err = ovl_copy_up_with_data(dentry);
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if (!err) {
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struct inode *winode = NULL;
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upperdentry = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry);
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if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
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winode = d_inode(upperdentry);
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err = get_write_access(winode);
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if (err)
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goto out_drop_write;
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}
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if (attr->ia_valid & (ATTR_KILL_SUID|ATTR_KILL_SGID))
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attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_MODE;
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/*
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* We might have to translate ovl file into real file object
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* once use cases emerge. For now, simply don't let underlying
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* filesystem rely on attr->ia_file
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*/
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attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_FILE;
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/*
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* If open(O_TRUNC) is done, VFS calls ->setattr with ATTR_OPEN
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* set. Overlayfs does not pass O_TRUNC flag to underlying
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* filesystem during open -> do not pass ATTR_OPEN. This
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* disables optimization in fuse which assumes open(O_TRUNC)
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* already set file size to 0. But we never passed O_TRUNC to
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* fuse. So by clearing ATTR_OPEN, fuse will be forced to send
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* setattr request to server.
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*/
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attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_OPEN;
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inode_lock(upperdentry->d_inode);
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old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
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err = ovl_do_notify_change(ofs, upperdentry, attr);
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revert_creds(old_cred);
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if (!err)
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ovl_copyattr(dentry->d_inode);
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inode_unlock(upperdentry->d_inode);
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if (winode)
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put_write_access(winode);
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}
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out_drop_write:
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ovl_drop_write(dentry);
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out:
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return err;
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}
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static void ovl_map_dev_ino(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat, int fsid)
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{
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bool samefs = ovl_same_fs(dentry->d_sb);
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unsigned int xinobits = ovl_xino_bits(dentry->d_sb);
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unsigned int xinoshift = 64 - xinobits;
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if (samefs) {
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/*
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* When all layers are on the same fs, all real inode
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* number are unique, so we use the overlay st_dev,
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* which is friendly to du -x.
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*/
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stat->dev = dentry->d_sb->s_dev;
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return;
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} else if (xinobits) {
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/*
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* All inode numbers of underlying fs should not be using the
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* high xinobits, so we use high xinobits to partition the
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* overlay st_ino address space. The high bits holds the fsid
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* (upper fsid is 0). The lowest xinobit is reserved for mapping
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* the non-persistent inode numbers range in case of overflow.
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* This way all overlay inode numbers are unique and use the
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* overlay st_dev.
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*/
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if (likely(!(stat->ino >> xinoshift))) {
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stat->ino |= ((u64)fsid) << (xinoshift + 1);
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stat->dev = dentry->d_sb->s_dev;
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return;
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} else if (ovl_xino_warn(dentry->d_sb)) {
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pr_warn_ratelimited("inode number too big (%pd2, ino=%llu, xinobits=%d)\n",
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dentry, stat->ino, xinobits);
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}
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}
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/* The inode could not be mapped to a unified st_ino address space */
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if (S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) {
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/*
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* Always use the overlay st_dev for directories, so 'find
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* -xdev' will scan the entire overlay mount and won't cross the
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* overlay mount boundaries.
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*
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* If not all layers are on the same fs the pair {real st_ino;
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* overlay st_dev} is not unique, so use the non persistent
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* overlay st_ino for directories.
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*/
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stat->dev = dentry->d_sb->s_dev;
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stat->ino = dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
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} else {
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/*
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* For non-samefs setup, if we cannot map all layers st_ino
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* to a unified address space, we need to make sure that st_dev
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* is unique per underlying fs, so we use the unique anonymous
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* bdev assigned to the underlying fs.
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*/
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stat->dev = OVL_FS(dentry->d_sb)->fs[fsid].pseudo_dev;
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}
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}
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int ovl_getattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, const struct path *path,
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struct kstat *stat, u32 request_mask, unsigned int flags)
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{
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struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
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enum ovl_path_type type;
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struct path realpath;
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const struct cred *old_cred;
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struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
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bool is_dir = S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode);
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int fsid = 0;
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int err;
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bool metacopy_blocks = false;
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metacopy_blocks = ovl_is_metacopy_dentry(dentry);
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type = ovl_path_real(dentry, &realpath);
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old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
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err = vfs_getattr(&realpath, stat, request_mask, flags);
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if (err)
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goto out;
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/* Report the effective immutable/append-only STATX flags */
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generic_fill_statx_attr(inode, stat);
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/*
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* For non-dir or same fs, we use st_ino of the copy up origin.
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* This guaranties constant st_dev/st_ino across copy up.
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* With xino feature and non-samefs, we use st_ino of the copy up
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* origin masked with high bits that represent the layer id.
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*
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* If lower filesystem supports NFS file handles, this also guaranties
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* persistent st_ino across mount cycle.
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*/
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if (!is_dir || ovl_same_dev(dentry->d_sb)) {
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if (!OVL_TYPE_UPPER(type)) {
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fsid = ovl_layer_lower(dentry)->fsid;
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} else if (OVL_TYPE_ORIGIN(type)) {
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struct kstat lowerstat;
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u32 lowermask = STATX_INO | STATX_BLOCKS |
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(!is_dir ? STATX_NLINK : 0);
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ovl_path_lower(dentry, &realpath);
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err = vfs_getattr(&realpath, &lowerstat,
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lowermask, flags);
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if (err)
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goto out;
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/*
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* Lower hardlinks may be broken on copy up to different
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* upper files, so we cannot use the lower origin st_ino
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* for those different files, even for the same fs case.
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*
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* Similarly, several redirected dirs can point to the
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* same dir on a lower layer. With the "verify_lower"
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* feature, we do not use the lower origin st_ino, if
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* we haven't verified that this redirect is unique.
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*
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* With inodes index enabled, it is safe to use st_ino
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* of an indexed origin. The index validates that the
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* upper hardlink is not broken and that a redirected
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* dir is the only redirect to that origin.
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*/
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if (ovl_test_flag(OVL_INDEX, d_inode(dentry)) ||
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(!ovl_verify_lower(dentry->d_sb) &&
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(is_dir || lowerstat.nlink == 1))) {
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fsid = ovl_layer_lower(dentry)->fsid;
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stat->ino = lowerstat.ino;
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}
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/*
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* If we are querying a metacopy dentry and lower
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* dentry is data dentry, then use the blocks we
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* queried just now. We don't have to do additional
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* vfs_getattr(). If lower itself is metacopy, then
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* additional vfs_getattr() is unavoidable.
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*/
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if (metacopy_blocks &&
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realpath.dentry == ovl_dentry_lowerdata(dentry)) {
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stat->blocks = lowerstat.blocks;
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metacopy_blocks = false;
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}
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}
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if (metacopy_blocks) {
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/*
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* If lower is not same as lowerdata or if there was
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* no origin on upper, we can end up here.
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*/
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struct kstat lowerdatastat;
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u32 lowermask = STATX_BLOCKS;
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ovl_path_lowerdata(dentry, &realpath);
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err = vfs_getattr(&realpath, &lowerdatastat,
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lowermask, flags);
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if (err)
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goto out;
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stat->blocks = lowerdatastat.blocks;
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}
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}
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ovl_map_dev_ino(dentry, stat, fsid);
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/*
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* It's probably not worth it to count subdirs to get the
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* correct link count. nlink=1 seems to pacify 'find' and
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* other utilities.
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*/
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if (is_dir && OVL_TYPE_MERGE(type))
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stat->nlink = 1;
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/*
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* Return the overlay inode nlinks for indexed upper inodes.
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* Overlay inode nlink counts the union of the upper hardlinks
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* and non-covered lower hardlinks. It does not include the upper
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* index hardlink.
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*/
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if (!is_dir && ovl_test_flag(OVL_INDEX, d_inode(dentry)))
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stat->nlink = dentry->d_inode->i_nlink;
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out:
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revert_creds(old_cred);
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return err;
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}
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int ovl_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
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struct inode *inode, int mask)
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{
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struct inode *upperinode = ovl_inode_upper(inode);
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struct inode *realinode;
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struct path realpath;
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const struct cred *old_cred;
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int err;
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/* Careful in RCU walk mode */
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ovl_i_path_real(inode, &realpath);
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if (!realpath.dentry) {
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WARN_ON(!(mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK));
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return -ECHILD;
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}
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/*
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* Check overlay inode with the creds of task and underlying inode
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* with creds of mounter
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*/
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err = generic_permission(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode, mask);
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if (err)
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return err;
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realinode = d_inode(realpath.dentry);
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old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
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if (!upperinode &&
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!special_file(realinode->i_mode) && mask & MAY_WRITE) {
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mask &= ~(MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND);
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/* Make sure mounter can read file for copy up later */
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mask |= MAY_READ;
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}
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err = inode_permission(mnt_idmap(realpath.mnt), realinode, mask);
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revert_creds(old_cred);
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return err;
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}
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static const char *ovl_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
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struct inode *inode,
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struct delayed_call *done)
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{
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const struct cred *old_cred;
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const char *p;
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if (!dentry)
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return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
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old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
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p = vfs_get_link(ovl_dentry_real(dentry), done);
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revert_creds(old_cred);
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return p;
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}
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bool ovl_is_private_xattr(struct super_block *sb, const char *name)
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{
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struct ovl_fs *ofs = sb->s_fs_info;
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if (ofs->config.userxattr)
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return strncmp(name, OVL_XATTR_USER_PREFIX,
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sizeof(OVL_XATTR_USER_PREFIX) - 1) == 0;
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else
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return strncmp(name, OVL_XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX,
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sizeof(OVL_XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX) - 1) == 0;
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}
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int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,
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const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
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{
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int err;
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struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(dentry->d_sb);
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struct dentry *upperdentry = ovl_i_dentry_upper(inode);
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struct dentry *realdentry = upperdentry ?: ovl_dentry_lower(dentry);
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struct path realpath;
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const struct cred *old_cred;
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err = ovl_want_write(dentry);
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if (err)
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goto out;
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if (!value && !upperdentry) {
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ovl_path_lower(dentry, &realpath);
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old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
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err = vfs_getxattr(mnt_idmap(realpath.mnt), realdentry, name, NULL, 0);
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revert_creds(old_cred);
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if (err < 0)
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goto out_drop_write;
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}
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if (!upperdentry) {
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err = ovl_copy_up(dentry);
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if (err)
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goto out_drop_write;
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realdentry = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry);
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}
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old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
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if (value) {
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err = ovl_do_setxattr(ofs, realdentry, name, value, size,
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flags);
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} else {
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WARN_ON(flags != XATTR_REPLACE);
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err = ovl_do_removexattr(ofs, realdentry, name);
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}
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revert_creds(old_cred);
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/* copy c/mtime */
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ovl_copyattr(inode);
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out_drop_write:
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ovl_drop_write(dentry);
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out:
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return err;
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}
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int ovl_xattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,
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void *value, size_t size)
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{
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ssize_t res;
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const struct cred *old_cred;
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struct path realpath;
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ovl_i_path_real(inode, &realpath);
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old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
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res = vfs_getxattr(mnt_idmap(realpath.mnt), realpath.dentry, name, value, size);
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revert_creds(old_cred);
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return res;
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}
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|
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static bool ovl_can_list(struct super_block *sb, const char *s)
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{
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/* Never list private (.overlay) */
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if (ovl_is_private_xattr(sb, s))
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return false;
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|
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/* List all non-trusted xattrs */
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if (strncmp(s, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN) != 0)
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return true;
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|
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/* list other trusted for superuser only */
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return ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
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}
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|
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ssize_t ovl_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size)
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{
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struct dentry *realdentry = ovl_dentry_real(dentry);
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ssize_t res;
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size_t len;
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char *s;
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const struct cred *old_cred;
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|
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old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
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res = vfs_listxattr(realdentry, list, size);
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revert_creds(old_cred);
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if (res <= 0 || size == 0)
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return res;
|
|
|
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/* filter out private xattrs */
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for (s = list, len = res; len;) {
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size_t slen = strnlen(s, len) + 1;
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|
|
|
/* underlying fs providing us with an broken xattr list? */
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|
if (WARN_ON(slen > len))
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|
return -EIO;
|
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|
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len -= slen;
|
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if (!ovl_can_list(dentry->d_sb, s)) {
|
|
res -= slen;
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|
memmove(s, s + slen, len);
|
|
} else {
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s += slen;
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|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return res;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL
|
|
/*
|
|
* Apply the idmapping of the layer to POSIX ACLs. The caller must pass a clone
|
|
* of the POSIX ACLs retrieved from the lower layer to this function to not
|
|
* alter the POSIX ACLs for the underlying filesystem.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void ovl_idmap_posix_acl(const struct inode *realinode,
|
|
struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
|
|
struct posix_acl *acl)
|
|
{
|
|
struct user_namespace *fs_userns = i_user_ns(realinode);
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|
|
|
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < acl->a_count; i++) {
|
|
vfsuid_t vfsuid;
|
|
vfsgid_t vfsgid;
|
|
|
|
struct posix_acl_entry *e = &acl->a_entries[i];
|
|
switch (e->e_tag) {
|
|
case ACL_USER:
|
|
vfsuid = make_vfsuid(idmap, fs_userns, e->e_uid);
|
|
e->e_uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_GROUP:
|
|
vfsgid = make_vfsgid(idmap, fs_userns, e->e_gid);
|
|
e->e_gid = vfsgid_into_kgid(vfsgid);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The @noperm argument is used to skip permission checking and is a temporary
|
|
* measure. Quoting Miklos from an earlier discussion:
|
|
*
|
|
* > So there are two paths to getting an acl:
|
|
* > 1) permission checking and 2) retrieving the value via getxattr(2).
|
|
* > This is a similar situation as reading a symlink vs. following it.
|
|
* > When following a symlink overlayfs always reads the link on the
|
|
* > underlying fs just as if it was a readlink(2) call, calling
|
|
* > security_inode_readlink() instead of security_inode_follow_link().
|
|
* > This is logical: we are reading the link from the underlying storage,
|
|
* > and following it on overlayfs.
|
|
* >
|
|
* > Applying the same logic to acl: we do need to call the
|
|
* > security_inode_getxattr() on the underlying fs, even if just want to
|
|
* > check permissions on overlay. This is currently not done, which is an
|
|
* > inconsistency.
|
|
* >
|
|
* > Maybe adding the check to ovl_get_acl() is the right way to go, but
|
|
* > I'm a little afraid of a performance regression. Will look into that.
|
|
*
|
|
* Until we have made a decision allow this helper to take the @noperm
|
|
* argument. We should hopefully be able to remove it soon.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct posix_acl *ovl_get_acl_path(const struct path *path,
|
|
const char *acl_name, bool noperm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct posix_acl *real_acl, *clone;
|
|
struct mnt_idmap *idmap;
|
|
struct inode *realinode = d_inode(path->dentry);
|
|
|
|
idmap = mnt_idmap(path->mnt);
|
|
|
|
if (noperm)
|
|
real_acl = get_inode_acl(realinode, posix_acl_type(acl_name));
|
|
else
|
|
real_acl = vfs_get_acl(idmap, path->dentry, acl_name);
|
|
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(real_acl))
|
|
return real_acl;
|
|
|
|
if (!is_idmapped_mnt(path->mnt))
|
|
return real_acl;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We cannot alter the ACLs returned from the relevant layer as that
|
|
* would alter the cached values filesystem wide for the lower
|
|
* filesystem. Instead we can clone the ACLs and then apply the
|
|
* relevant idmapping of the layer.
|
|
*/
|
|
clone = posix_acl_clone(real_acl, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
posix_acl_release(real_acl); /* release original acl */
|
|
if (!clone)
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
|
|
|
|
ovl_idmap_posix_acl(realinode, idmap, clone);
|
|
return clone;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* When the relevant layer is an idmapped mount we need to take the idmapping
|
|
* of the layer into account and translate any ACL_{GROUP,USER} values
|
|
* according to the idmapped mount.
|
|
*
|
|
* We cannot alter the ACLs returned from the relevant layer as that would
|
|
* alter the cached values filesystem wide for the lower filesystem. Instead we
|
|
* can clone the ACLs and then apply the relevant idmapping of the layer.
|
|
*
|
|
* This is obviously only relevant when idmapped layers are used.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct posix_acl *do_ovl_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
|
|
struct inode *inode, int type,
|
|
bool rcu, bool noperm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct inode *realinode = ovl_inode_real(inode);
|
|
struct posix_acl *acl;
|
|
struct path realpath;
|
|
|
|
if (!IS_POSIXACL(realinode))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Careful in RCU walk mode */
|
|
ovl_i_path_real(inode, &realpath);
|
|
if (!realpath.dentry) {
|
|
WARN_ON(!rcu);
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rcu) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the layer is idmapped drop out of RCU path walk
|
|
* so we can clone the ACLs.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (is_idmapped_mnt(realpath.mnt))
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
|
|
|
|
acl = get_cached_acl_rcu(realinode, type);
|
|
} else {
|
|
const struct cred *old_cred;
|
|
|
|
old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
|
|
acl = ovl_get_acl_path(&realpath, posix_acl_xattr_name(type), noperm);
|
|
revert_creds(old_cred);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return acl;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ovl_set_or_remove_acl(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
|
|
struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
|
|
{
|
|
int err;
|
|
struct path realpath;
|
|
const char *acl_name;
|
|
const struct cred *old_cred;
|
|
struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(dentry->d_sb);
|
|
struct dentry *upperdentry = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry);
|
|
struct dentry *realdentry = upperdentry ?: ovl_dentry_lower(dentry);
|
|
|
|
err = ovl_want_write(dentry);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If ACL is to be removed from a lower file, check if it exists in
|
|
* the first place before copying it up.
|
|
*/
|
|
acl_name = posix_acl_xattr_name(type);
|
|
if (!acl && !upperdentry) {
|
|
struct posix_acl *real_acl;
|
|
|
|
ovl_path_lower(dentry, &realpath);
|
|
old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
|
|
real_acl = vfs_get_acl(mnt_idmap(realpath.mnt), realdentry,
|
|
acl_name);
|
|
revert_creds(old_cred);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(real_acl)) {
|
|
err = PTR_ERR(real_acl);
|
|
goto out_drop_write;
|
|
}
|
|
posix_acl_release(real_acl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!upperdentry) {
|
|
err = ovl_copy_up(dentry);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
goto out_drop_write;
|
|
|
|
realdentry = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
|
|
if (acl)
|
|
err = ovl_do_set_acl(ofs, realdentry, acl_name, acl);
|
|
else
|
|
err = ovl_do_remove_acl(ofs, realdentry, acl_name);
|
|
revert_creds(old_cred);
|
|
|
|
/* copy c/mtime */
|
|
ovl_copyattr(inode);
|
|
|
|
out_drop_write:
|
|
ovl_drop_write(dentry);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ovl_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
|
|
struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
|
|
{
|
|
int err;
|
|
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
|
|
struct dentry *workdir = ovl_workdir(dentry);
|
|
struct inode *realinode = ovl_inode_real(inode);
|
|
|
|
if (!IS_POSIXACL(d_inode(workdir)))
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
if (!realinode->i_op->set_acl)
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
if (type == ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT && !S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
|
|
return acl ? -EACCES : 0;
|
|
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode))
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check if sgid bit needs to be cleared (actual setacl operation will
|
|
* be done with mounter's capabilities and so that won't do it for us).
|
|
*/
|
|
if (unlikely(inode->i_mode & S_ISGID) && type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS &&
|
|
!in_group_p(inode->i_gid) &&
|
|
!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode, CAP_FSETID)) {
|
|
struct iattr iattr = { .ia_valid = ATTR_KILL_SGID };
|
|
|
|
err = ovl_setattr(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, &iattr);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ovl_set_or_remove_acl(dentry, inode, acl, type);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int ovl_update_time(struct inode *inode, struct timespec64 *ts, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
if (flags & S_ATIME) {
|
|
struct ovl_fs *ofs = inode->i_sb->s_fs_info;
|
|
struct path upperpath = {
|
|
.mnt = ovl_upper_mnt(ofs),
|
|
.dentry = ovl_upperdentry_dereference(OVL_I(inode)),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
if (upperpath.dentry) {
|
|
touch_atime(&upperpath);
|
|
inode->i_atime = d_inode(upperpath.dentry)->i_atime;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ovl_fiemap(struct inode *inode, struct fiemap_extent_info *fieinfo,
|
|
u64 start, u64 len)
|
|
{
|
|
int err;
|
|
struct inode *realinode = ovl_inode_realdata(inode);
|
|
const struct cred *old_cred;
|
|
|
|
if (!realinode->i_op->fiemap)
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
|
|
err = realinode->i_op->fiemap(realinode, fieinfo, start, len);
|
|
revert_creds(old_cred);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Work around the fact that security_file_ioctl() takes a file argument.
|
|
* Introducing security_inode_fileattr_get/set() hooks would solve this issue
|
|
* properly.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ovl_security_fileattr(const struct path *realpath, struct fileattr *fa,
|
|
bool set)
|
|
{
|
|
struct file *file;
|
|
unsigned int cmd;
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
file = dentry_open(realpath, O_RDONLY, current_cred());
|
|
if (IS_ERR(file))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(file);
|
|
|
|
if (set)
|
|
cmd = fa->fsx_valid ? FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR : FS_IOC_SETFLAGS;
|
|
else
|
|
cmd = fa->fsx_valid ? FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR : FS_IOC_GETFLAGS;
|
|
|
|
err = security_file_ioctl(file, cmd, 0);
|
|
fput(file);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ovl_real_fileattr_set(const struct path *realpath, struct fileattr *fa)
|
|
{
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
err = ovl_security_fileattr(realpath, fa, true);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
return vfs_fileattr_set(mnt_idmap(realpath->mnt), realpath->dentry, fa);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ovl_fileattr_set(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
|
|
struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
|
|
{
|
|
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
|
|
struct path upperpath;
|
|
const struct cred *old_cred;
|
|
unsigned int flags;
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
err = ovl_want_write(dentry);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
err = ovl_copy_up(dentry);
|
|
if (!err) {
|
|
ovl_path_real(dentry, &upperpath);
|
|
|
|
old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Store immutable/append-only flags in xattr and clear them
|
|
* in upper fileattr (in case they were set by older kernel)
|
|
* so children of "ovl-immutable" directories lower aliases of
|
|
* "ovl-immutable" hardlinks could be copied up.
|
|
* Clear xattr when flags are cleared.
|
|
*/
|
|
err = ovl_set_protattr(inode, upperpath.dentry, fa);
|
|
if (!err)
|
|
err = ovl_real_fileattr_set(&upperpath, fa);
|
|
revert_creds(old_cred);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Merge real inode flags with inode flags read from
|
|
* overlay.protattr xattr
|
|
*/
|
|
flags = ovl_inode_real(inode)->i_flags & OVL_COPY_I_FLAGS_MASK;
|
|
|
|
BUILD_BUG_ON(OVL_PROT_I_FLAGS_MASK & ~OVL_COPY_I_FLAGS_MASK);
|
|
flags |= inode->i_flags & OVL_PROT_I_FLAGS_MASK;
|
|
inode_set_flags(inode, flags, OVL_COPY_I_FLAGS_MASK);
|
|
|
|
/* Update ctime */
|
|
ovl_copyattr(inode);
|
|
}
|
|
ovl_drop_write(dentry);
|
|
out:
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Convert inode protection flags to fileattr flags */
|
|
static void ovl_fileattr_prot_flags(struct inode *inode, struct fileattr *fa)
|
|
{
|
|
BUILD_BUG_ON(OVL_PROT_FS_FLAGS_MASK & ~FS_COMMON_FL);
|
|
BUILD_BUG_ON(OVL_PROT_FSX_FLAGS_MASK & ~FS_XFLAG_COMMON);
|
|
|
|
if (inode->i_flags & S_APPEND) {
|
|
fa->flags |= FS_APPEND_FL;
|
|
fa->fsx_xflags |= FS_XFLAG_APPEND;
|
|
}
|
|
if (inode->i_flags & S_IMMUTABLE) {
|
|
fa->flags |= FS_IMMUTABLE_FL;
|
|
fa->fsx_xflags |= FS_XFLAG_IMMUTABLE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ovl_real_fileattr_get(const struct path *realpath, struct fileattr *fa)
|
|
{
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
err = ovl_security_fileattr(realpath, fa, false);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
err = vfs_fileattr_get(realpath->dentry, fa);
|
|
if (err == -ENOIOCTLCMD)
|
|
err = -ENOTTY;
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ovl_fileattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
|
|
{
|
|
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
|
|
struct path realpath;
|
|
const struct cred *old_cred;
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
ovl_path_real(dentry, &realpath);
|
|
|
|
old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
|
|
err = ovl_real_fileattr_get(&realpath, fa);
|
|
ovl_fileattr_prot_flags(inode, fa);
|
|
revert_creds(old_cred);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const struct inode_operations ovl_file_inode_operations = {
|
|
.setattr = ovl_setattr,
|
|
.permission = ovl_permission,
|
|
.getattr = ovl_getattr,
|
|
.listxattr = ovl_listxattr,
|
|
.get_inode_acl = ovl_get_inode_acl,
|
|
.get_acl = ovl_get_acl,
|
|
.set_acl = ovl_set_acl,
|
|
.update_time = ovl_update_time,
|
|
.fiemap = ovl_fiemap,
|
|
.fileattr_get = ovl_fileattr_get,
|
|
.fileattr_set = ovl_fileattr_set,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const struct inode_operations ovl_symlink_inode_operations = {
|
|
.setattr = ovl_setattr,
|
|
.get_link = ovl_get_link,
|
|
.getattr = ovl_getattr,
|
|
.listxattr = ovl_listxattr,
|
|
.update_time = ovl_update_time,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const struct inode_operations ovl_special_inode_operations = {
|
|
.setattr = ovl_setattr,
|
|
.permission = ovl_permission,
|
|
.getattr = ovl_getattr,
|
|
.listxattr = ovl_listxattr,
|
|
.get_inode_acl = ovl_get_inode_acl,
|
|
.get_acl = ovl_get_acl,
|
|
.set_acl = ovl_set_acl,
|
|
.update_time = ovl_update_time,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const struct address_space_operations ovl_aops = {
|
|
/* For O_DIRECT dentry_open() checks f_mapping->a_ops->direct_IO */
|
|
.direct_IO = noop_direct_IO,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* It is possible to stack overlayfs instance on top of another
|
|
* overlayfs instance as lower layer. We need to annotate the
|
|
* stackable i_mutex locks according to stack level of the super
|
|
* block instance. An overlayfs instance can never be in stack
|
|
* depth 0 (there is always a real fs below it). An overlayfs
|
|
* inode lock will use the lockdep annotation ovl_i_mutex_key[depth].
|
|
*
|
|
* For example, here is a snip from /proc/lockdep_chains after
|
|
* dir_iterate of nested overlayfs:
|
|
*
|
|
* [...] &ovl_i_mutex_dir_key[depth] (stack_depth=2)
|
|
* [...] &ovl_i_mutex_dir_key[depth]#2 (stack_depth=1)
|
|
* [...] &type->i_mutex_dir_key (stack_depth=0)
|
|
*
|
|
* Locking order w.r.t ovl_want_write() is important for nested overlayfs.
|
|
*
|
|
* This chain is valid:
|
|
* - inode->i_rwsem (inode_lock[2])
|
|
* - upper_mnt->mnt_sb->s_writers (ovl_want_write[0])
|
|
* - OVL_I(inode)->lock (ovl_inode_lock[2])
|
|
* - OVL_I(lowerinode)->lock (ovl_inode_lock[1])
|
|
*
|
|
* And this chain is valid:
|
|
* - inode->i_rwsem (inode_lock[2])
|
|
* - OVL_I(inode)->lock (ovl_inode_lock[2])
|
|
* - lowerinode->i_rwsem (inode_lock[1])
|
|
* - OVL_I(lowerinode)->lock (ovl_inode_lock[1])
|
|
*
|
|
* But lowerinode->i_rwsem SHOULD NOT be acquired while ovl_want_write() is
|
|
* held, because it is in reverse order of the non-nested case using the same
|
|
* upper fs:
|
|
* - inode->i_rwsem (inode_lock[1])
|
|
* - upper_mnt->mnt_sb->s_writers (ovl_want_write[0])
|
|
* - OVL_I(inode)->lock (ovl_inode_lock[1])
|
|
*/
|
|
#define OVL_MAX_NESTING FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH
|
|
|
|
static inline void ovl_lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key(struct inode *inode)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
|
|
static struct lock_class_key ovl_i_mutex_key[OVL_MAX_NESTING];
|
|
static struct lock_class_key ovl_i_mutex_dir_key[OVL_MAX_NESTING];
|
|
static struct lock_class_key ovl_i_lock_key[OVL_MAX_NESTING];
|
|
|
|
int depth = inode->i_sb->s_stack_depth - 1;
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(depth < 0 || depth >= OVL_MAX_NESTING))
|
|
depth = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
|
|
lockdep_set_class(&inode->i_rwsem, &ovl_i_mutex_dir_key[depth]);
|
|
else
|
|
lockdep_set_class(&inode->i_rwsem, &ovl_i_mutex_key[depth]);
|
|
|
|
lockdep_set_class(&OVL_I(inode)->lock, &ovl_i_lock_key[depth]);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void ovl_next_ino(struct inode *inode)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ovl_fs *ofs = inode->i_sb->s_fs_info;
|
|
|
|
inode->i_ino = atomic_long_inc_return(&ofs->last_ino);
|
|
if (unlikely(!inode->i_ino))
|
|
inode->i_ino = atomic_long_inc_return(&ofs->last_ino);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void ovl_map_ino(struct inode *inode, unsigned long ino, int fsid)
|
|
{
|
|
int xinobits = ovl_xino_bits(inode->i_sb);
|
|
unsigned int xinoshift = 64 - xinobits;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* When d_ino is consistent with st_ino (samefs or i_ino has enough
|
|
* bits to encode layer), set the same value used for st_ino to i_ino,
|
|
* so inode number exposed via /proc/locks and a like will be
|
|
* consistent with d_ino and st_ino values. An i_ino value inconsistent
|
|
* with d_ino also causes nfsd readdirplus to fail.
|
|
*/
|
|
inode->i_ino = ino;
|
|
if (ovl_same_fs(inode->i_sb)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
} else if (xinobits && likely(!(ino >> xinoshift))) {
|
|
inode->i_ino |= (unsigned long)fsid << (xinoshift + 1);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* For directory inodes on non-samefs with xino disabled or xino
|
|
* overflow, we allocate a non-persistent inode number, to be used for
|
|
* resolving st_ino collisions in ovl_map_dev_ino().
|
|
*
|
|
* To avoid ino collision with legitimate xino values from upper
|
|
* layer (fsid 0), use the lowest xinobit to map the non
|
|
* persistent inode numbers to the unified st_ino address space.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
|
|
ovl_next_ino(inode);
|
|
if (xinobits) {
|
|
inode->i_ino &= ~0UL >> xinobits;
|
|
inode->i_ino |= 1UL << xinoshift;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ovl_inode_init(struct inode *inode, struct ovl_inode_params *oip,
|
|
unsigned long ino, int fsid)
|
|
{
|
|
struct inode *realinode;
|
|
struct ovl_inode *oi = OVL_I(inode);
|
|
|
|
if (oip->upperdentry)
|
|
oi->__upperdentry = oip->upperdentry;
|
|
if (oip->lowerpath && oip->lowerpath->dentry) {
|
|
oi->lowerpath.dentry = dget(oip->lowerpath->dentry);
|
|
oi->lowerpath.layer = oip->lowerpath->layer;
|
|
}
|
|
if (oip->lowerdata)
|
|
oi->lowerdata = igrab(d_inode(oip->lowerdata));
|
|
|
|
realinode = ovl_inode_real(inode);
|
|
ovl_copyattr(inode);
|
|
ovl_copyflags(realinode, inode);
|
|
ovl_map_ino(inode, ino, fsid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void ovl_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode, dev_t rdev)
|
|
{
|
|
inode->i_mode = mode;
|
|
inode->i_flags |= S_NOCMTIME;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL
|
|
inode->i_acl = inode->i_default_acl = ACL_DONT_CACHE;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
ovl_lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key(inode);
|
|
|
|
switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
|
|
case S_IFREG:
|
|
inode->i_op = &ovl_file_inode_operations;
|
|
inode->i_fop = &ovl_file_operations;
|
|
inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &ovl_aops;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case S_IFDIR:
|
|
inode->i_op = &ovl_dir_inode_operations;
|
|
inode->i_fop = &ovl_dir_operations;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case S_IFLNK:
|
|
inode->i_op = &ovl_symlink_inode_operations;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
inode->i_op = &ovl_special_inode_operations;
|
|
init_special_inode(inode, mode, rdev);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* With inodes index enabled, an overlay inode nlink counts the union of upper
|
|
* hardlinks and non-covered lower hardlinks. During the lifetime of a non-pure
|
|
* upper inode, the following nlink modifying operations can happen:
|
|
*
|
|
* 1. Lower hardlink copy up
|
|
* 2. Upper hardlink created, unlinked or renamed over
|
|
* 3. Lower hardlink whiteout or renamed over
|
|
*
|
|
* For the first, copy up case, the union nlink does not change, whether the
|
|
* operation succeeds or fails, but the upper inode nlink may change.
|
|
* Therefore, before copy up, we store the union nlink value relative to the
|
|
* lower inode nlink in the index inode xattr .overlay.nlink.
|
|
*
|
|
* For the second, upper hardlink case, the union nlink should be incremented
|
|
* or decremented IFF the operation succeeds, aligned with nlink change of the
|
|
* upper inode. Therefore, before link/unlink/rename, we store the union nlink
|
|
* value relative to the upper inode nlink in the index inode.
|
|
*
|
|
* For the last, lower cover up case, we simplify things by preceding the
|
|
* whiteout or cover up with copy up. This makes sure that there is an index
|
|
* upper inode where the nlink xattr can be stored before the copied up upper
|
|
* entry is unlink.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define OVL_NLINK_ADD_UPPER (1 << 0)
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* On-disk format for indexed nlink:
|
|
*
|
|
* nlink relative to the upper inode - "U[+-]NUM"
|
|
* nlink relative to the lower inode - "L[+-]NUM"
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int ovl_set_nlink_common(struct dentry *dentry,
|
|
struct dentry *realdentry, const char *format)
|
|
{
|
|
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
|
|
struct inode *realinode = d_inode(realdentry);
|
|
char buf[13];
|
|
int len;
|
|
|
|
len = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format,
|
|
(int) (inode->i_nlink - realinode->i_nlink));
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(len >= sizeof(buf)))
|
|
return -EIO;
|
|
|
|
return ovl_setxattr(OVL_FS(inode->i_sb), ovl_dentry_upper(dentry),
|
|
OVL_XATTR_NLINK, buf, len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ovl_set_nlink_upper(struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
return ovl_set_nlink_common(dentry, ovl_dentry_upper(dentry), "U%+i");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ovl_set_nlink_lower(struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
return ovl_set_nlink_common(dentry, ovl_dentry_lower(dentry), "L%+i");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
unsigned int ovl_get_nlink(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *lowerdentry,
|
|
struct dentry *upperdentry,
|
|
unsigned int fallback)
|
|
{
|
|
int nlink_diff;
|
|
int nlink;
|
|
char buf[13];
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
if (!lowerdentry || !upperdentry || d_inode(lowerdentry)->i_nlink == 1)
|
|
return fallback;
|
|
|
|
err = ovl_getxattr_upper(ofs, upperdentry, OVL_XATTR_NLINK,
|
|
&buf, sizeof(buf) - 1);
|
|
if (err < 0)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
buf[err] = '\0';
|
|
if ((buf[0] != 'L' && buf[0] != 'U') ||
|
|
(buf[1] != '+' && buf[1] != '-'))
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
err = kstrtoint(buf + 1, 10, &nlink_diff);
|
|
if (err < 0)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
nlink = d_inode(buf[0] == 'L' ? lowerdentry : upperdentry)->i_nlink;
|
|
nlink += nlink_diff;
|
|
|
|
if (nlink <= 0)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
return nlink;
|
|
|
|
fail:
|
|
pr_warn_ratelimited("failed to get index nlink (%pd2, err=%i)\n",
|
|
upperdentry, err);
|
|
return fallback;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct inode *ovl_new_inode(struct super_block *sb, umode_t mode, dev_t rdev)
|
|
{
|
|
struct inode *inode;
|
|
|
|
inode = new_inode(sb);
|
|
if (inode)
|
|
ovl_fill_inode(inode, mode, rdev);
|
|
|
|
return inode;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ovl_inode_test(struct inode *inode, void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
return inode->i_private == data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ovl_inode_set(struct inode *inode, void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
inode->i_private = data;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ovl_verify_inode(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *lowerdentry,
|
|
struct dentry *upperdentry, bool strict)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* For directories, @strict verify from lookup path performs consistency
|
|
* checks, so NULL lower/upper in dentry must match NULL lower/upper in
|
|
* inode. Non @strict verify from NFS handle decode path passes NULL for
|
|
* 'unknown' lower/upper.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && strict) {
|
|
/* Real lower dir moved to upper layer under us? */
|
|
if (!lowerdentry && ovl_inode_lower(inode))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
/* Lookup of an uncovered redirect origin? */
|
|
if (!upperdentry && ovl_inode_upper(inode))
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Allow non-NULL lower inode in ovl_inode even if lowerdentry is NULL.
|
|
* This happens when finding a copied up overlay inode for a renamed
|
|
* or hardlinked overlay dentry and lower dentry cannot be followed
|
|
* by origin because lower fs does not support file handles.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (lowerdentry && ovl_inode_lower(inode) != d_inode(lowerdentry))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Allow non-NULL __upperdentry in inode even if upperdentry is NULL.
|
|
* This happens when finding a lower alias for a copied up hard link.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (upperdentry && ovl_inode_upper(inode) != d_inode(upperdentry))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct inode *ovl_lookup_inode(struct super_block *sb, struct dentry *real,
|
|
bool is_upper)
|
|
{
|
|
struct inode *inode, *key = d_inode(real);
|
|
|
|
inode = ilookup5(sb, (unsigned long) key, ovl_inode_test, key);
|
|
if (!inode)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!ovl_verify_inode(inode, is_upper ? NULL : real,
|
|
is_upper ? real : NULL, false)) {
|
|
iput(inode);
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ESTALE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return inode;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool ovl_lookup_trap_inode(struct super_block *sb, struct dentry *dir)
|
|
{
|
|
struct inode *key = d_inode(dir);
|
|
struct inode *trap;
|
|
bool res;
|
|
|
|
trap = ilookup5(sb, (unsigned long) key, ovl_inode_test, key);
|
|
if (!trap)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
res = IS_DEADDIR(trap) && !ovl_inode_upper(trap) &&
|
|
!ovl_inode_lower(trap);
|
|
|
|
iput(trap);
|
|
return res;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Create an inode cache entry for layer root dir, that will intentionally
|
|
* fail ovl_verify_inode(), so any lookup that will find some layer root
|
|
* will fail.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct inode *ovl_get_trap_inode(struct super_block *sb, struct dentry *dir)
|
|
{
|
|
struct inode *key = d_inode(dir);
|
|
struct inode *trap;
|
|
|
|
if (!d_is_dir(dir))
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
|
|
|
|
trap = iget5_locked(sb, (unsigned long) key, ovl_inode_test,
|
|
ovl_inode_set, key);
|
|
if (!trap)
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
|
|
|
|
if (!(trap->i_state & I_NEW)) {
|
|
/* Conflicting layer roots? */
|
|
iput(trap);
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ELOOP);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
trap->i_mode = S_IFDIR;
|
|
trap->i_flags = S_DEAD;
|
|
unlock_new_inode(trap);
|
|
|
|
return trap;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Does overlay inode need to be hashed by lower inode?
|
|
*/
|
|
static bool ovl_hash_bylower(struct super_block *sb, struct dentry *upper,
|
|
struct dentry *lower, bool index)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ovl_fs *ofs = sb->s_fs_info;
|
|
|
|
/* No, if pure upper */
|
|
if (!lower)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
/* Yes, if already indexed */
|
|
if (index)
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
/* Yes, if won't be copied up */
|
|
if (!ovl_upper_mnt(ofs))
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
/* No, if lower hardlink is or will be broken on copy up */
|
|
if ((upper || !ovl_indexdir(sb)) &&
|
|
!d_is_dir(lower) && d_inode(lower)->i_nlink > 1)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
/* No, if non-indexed upper with NFS export */
|
|
if (sb->s_export_op && upper)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
/* Otherwise, hash by lower inode for fsnotify */
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct inode *ovl_iget5(struct super_block *sb, struct inode *newinode,
|
|
struct inode *key)
|
|
{
|
|
return newinode ? inode_insert5(newinode, (unsigned long) key,
|
|
ovl_inode_test, ovl_inode_set, key) :
|
|
iget5_locked(sb, (unsigned long) key,
|
|
ovl_inode_test, ovl_inode_set, key);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct inode *ovl_get_inode(struct super_block *sb,
|
|
struct ovl_inode_params *oip)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(sb);
|
|
struct dentry *upperdentry = oip->upperdentry;
|
|
struct ovl_path *lowerpath = oip->lowerpath;
|
|
struct inode *realinode = upperdentry ? d_inode(upperdentry) : NULL;
|
|
struct inode *inode;
|
|
struct dentry *lowerdentry = lowerpath ? lowerpath->dentry : NULL;
|
|
struct path realpath = {
|
|
.dentry = upperdentry ?: lowerdentry,
|
|
.mnt = upperdentry ? ovl_upper_mnt(ofs) : lowerpath->layer->mnt,
|
|
};
|
|
bool bylower = ovl_hash_bylower(sb, upperdentry, lowerdentry,
|
|
oip->index);
|
|
int fsid = bylower ? lowerpath->layer->fsid : 0;
|
|
bool is_dir;
|
|
unsigned long ino = 0;
|
|
int err = oip->newinode ? -EEXIST : -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
if (!realinode)
|
|
realinode = d_inode(lowerdentry);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Copy up origin (lower) may exist for non-indexed upper, but we must
|
|
* not use lower as hash key if this is a broken hardlink.
|
|
*/
|
|
is_dir = S_ISDIR(realinode->i_mode);
|
|
if (upperdentry || bylower) {
|
|
struct inode *key = d_inode(bylower ? lowerdentry :
|
|
upperdentry);
|
|
unsigned int nlink = is_dir ? 1 : realinode->i_nlink;
|
|
|
|
inode = ovl_iget5(sb, oip->newinode, key);
|
|
if (!inode)
|
|
goto out_err;
|
|
if (!(inode->i_state & I_NEW)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Verify that the underlying files stored in the inode
|
|
* match those in the dentry.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!ovl_verify_inode(inode, lowerdentry, upperdentry,
|
|
true)) {
|
|
iput(inode);
|
|
err = -ESTALE;
|
|
goto out_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dput(upperdentry);
|
|
kfree(oip->redirect);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Recalculate nlink for non-dir due to indexing */
|
|
if (!is_dir)
|
|
nlink = ovl_get_nlink(ofs, lowerdentry, upperdentry,
|
|
nlink);
|
|
set_nlink(inode, nlink);
|
|
ino = key->i_ino;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Lower hardlink that will be broken on copy up */
|
|
inode = new_inode(sb);
|
|
if (!inode) {
|
|
err = -ENOMEM;
|
|
goto out_err;
|
|
}
|
|
ino = realinode->i_ino;
|
|
fsid = lowerpath->layer->fsid;
|
|
}
|
|
ovl_fill_inode(inode, realinode->i_mode, realinode->i_rdev);
|
|
ovl_inode_init(inode, oip, ino, fsid);
|
|
|
|
if (upperdentry && ovl_is_impuredir(sb, upperdentry))
|
|
ovl_set_flag(OVL_IMPURE, inode);
|
|
|
|
if (oip->index)
|
|
ovl_set_flag(OVL_INDEX, inode);
|
|
|
|
OVL_I(inode)->redirect = oip->redirect;
|
|
|
|
if (bylower)
|
|
ovl_set_flag(OVL_CONST_INO, inode);
|
|
|
|
/* Check for non-merge dir that may have whiteouts */
|
|
if (is_dir) {
|
|
if (((upperdentry && lowerdentry) || oip->numlower > 1) ||
|
|
ovl_path_check_origin_xattr(ofs, &realpath)) {
|
|
ovl_set_flag(OVL_WHITEOUTS, inode);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check for immutable/append-only inode flags in xattr */
|
|
if (upperdentry)
|
|
ovl_check_protattr(inode, upperdentry);
|
|
|
|
if (inode->i_state & I_NEW)
|
|
unlock_new_inode(inode);
|
|
out:
|
|
return inode;
|
|
|
|
out_err:
|
|
pr_warn_ratelimited("failed to get inode (%i)\n", err);
|
|
inode = ERR_PTR(err);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|