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51e1bb9eea
Back then, commit96ae522795
("bpf: Add bpf_probe_write_user BPF helper to be called in tracers") added the bpf_probe_write_user() helper in order to allow to override user space memory. Its original goal was to have a facility to "debug, divert, and manipulate execution of semi-cooperative processes" under CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Write to kernel was explicitly disallowed since it would otherwise tamper with its integrity. One use case was shown incf9b1199de
("samples/bpf: Add test/example of using bpf_probe_write_user bpf helper") where the program DNATs traffic at the time of connect(2) syscall, meaning, it rewrites the arguments to a syscall while they're still in userspace, and before the syscall has a chance to copy the argument into kernel space. These days we have better mechanisms in BPF for achieving the same (e.g. for load-balancers), but without having to write to userspace memory. Of course the bpf_probe_write_user() helper can also be used to abuse many other things for both good or bad purpose. Outside of BPF, there is a similar mechanism for ptrace(2) such as PTRACE_PEEK{TEXT,DATA} and PTRACE_POKE{TEXT,DATA}, but would likely require some more effort. Commit96ae522795
explicitly dedicated the helper for experimentation purpose only. Thus, move the helper's availability behind a newly added LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER lockdown knob so that the helper is disabled under the "integrity" mode. More fine-grained control can be implemented also from LSM side with this change. Fixes:96ae522795
("bpf: Add bpf_probe_write_user BPF helper to be called in tracers") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
2628 lines
66 KiB
C
2628 lines
66 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
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/*
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* Security plug functions
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com>
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* Copyright (C) 2001-2002 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
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* Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc <ssmalley@nai.com>
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* Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
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*/
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#define pr_fmt(fmt) "LSM: " fmt
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#include <linux/bpf.h>
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#include <linux/capability.h>
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#include <linux/dcache.h>
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#include <linux/export.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
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#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
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#include <linux/integrity.h>
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#include <linux/ima.h>
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#include <linux/evm.h>
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#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
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#include <linux/mman.h>
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#include <linux/mount.h>
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#include <linux/personality.h>
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#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
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#include <linux/string.h>
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#include <linux/msg.h>
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#include <net/flow.h>
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#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
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/* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */
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#define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info)
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/*
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* These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the
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* security_locked_down() LSM hook. Placing this array here allows
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* all security modules to use the same descriptions for auditing
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* purposes.
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*/
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const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
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[LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none",
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[LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading",
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[LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port",
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[LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access",
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[LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images",
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[LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation",
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[LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access",
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[LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access",
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[LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access",
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[LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables",
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[LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage",
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[LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO",
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[LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters",
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[LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio",
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[LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access",
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[LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access",
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[LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER] = "use of bpf to write user RAM",
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[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
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[LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
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[LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
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[LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
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[LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf",
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[LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs",
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[LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access",
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[LOCKDOWN_XFRM_SECRET] = "xfrm SA secret",
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[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
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};
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struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init;
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static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(blocking_lsm_notifier_chain);
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static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
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static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
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char *lsm_names;
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static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
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/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
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static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
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static __initdata const char *chosen_major_lsm;
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static __initconst const char * const builtin_lsm_order = CONFIG_LSM;
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/* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */
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static __initdata struct lsm_info **ordered_lsms;
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static __initdata struct lsm_info *exclusive;
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static __initdata bool debug;
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#define init_debug(...) \
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do { \
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if (debug) \
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pr_info(__VA_ARGS__); \
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} while (0)
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static bool __init is_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm)
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{
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if (!lsm->enabled)
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return false;
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return *lsm->enabled;
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}
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/* Mark an LSM's enabled flag. */
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static int lsm_enabled_true __initdata = 1;
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static int lsm_enabled_false __initdata = 0;
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static void __init set_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled)
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{
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/*
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* When an LSM hasn't configured an enable variable, we can use
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* a hard-coded location for storing the default enabled state.
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*/
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if (!lsm->enabled) {
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if (enabled)
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lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
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else
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lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false;
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} else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_true) {
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if (!enabled)
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lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false;
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} else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_false) {
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if (enabled)
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lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
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} else {
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*lsm->enabled = enabled;
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}
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}
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/* Is an LSM already listed in the ordered LSMs list? */
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static bool __init exists_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
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{
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struct lsm_info **check;
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for (check = ordered_lsms; *check; check++)
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if (*check == lsm)
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return true;
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return false;
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}
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/* Append an LSM to the list of ordered LSMs to initialize. */
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static int last_lsm __initdata;
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static void __init append_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm, const char *from)
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{
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/* Ignore duplicate selections. */
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if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
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return;
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if (WARN(last_lsm == LSM_COUNT, "%s: out of LSM slots!?\n", from))
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return;
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/* Enable this LSM, if it is not already set. */
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if (!lsm->enabled)
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lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
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ordered_lsms[last_lsm++] = lsm;
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init_debug("%s ordering: %s (%sabled)\n", from, lsm->name,
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is_enabled(lsm) ? "en" : "dis");
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}
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/* Is an LSM allowed to be initialized? */
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static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm)
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{
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/* Skip if the LSM is disabled. */
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if (!is_enabled(lsm))
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return false;
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/* Not allowed if another exclusive LSM already initialized. */
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if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && exclusive) {
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init_debug("exclusive disabled: %s\n", lsm->name);
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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static void __init lsm_set_blob_size(int *need, int *lbs)
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{
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int offset;
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if (*need > 0) {
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offset = *lbs;
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*lbs += *need;
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*need = offset;
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}
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}
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static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
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{
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if (!needed)
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return;
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lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
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lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file);
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/*
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* The inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to
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* what the modules might need.
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*/
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if (needed->lbs_inode && blob_sizes.lbs_inode == 0)
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blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head);
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lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
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lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
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lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
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lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
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lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
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}
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/* Prepare LSM for initialization. */
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static void __init prepare_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
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{
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int enabled = lsm_allowed(lsm);
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/* Record enablement (to handle any following exclusive LSMs). */
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set_enabled(lsm, enabled);
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/* If enabled, do pre-initialization work. */
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if (enabled) {
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if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && !exclusive) {
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exclusive = lsm;
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init_debug("exclusive chosen: %s\n", lsm->name);
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}
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lsm_set_blob_sizes(lsm->blobs);
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}
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}
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/* Initialize a given LSM, if it is enabled. */
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static void __init initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
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{
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if (is_enabled(lsm)) {
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int ret;
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init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name);
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ret = lsm->init();
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WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret);
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}
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}
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/* Populate ordered LSMs list from comma-separated LSM name list. */
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static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
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{
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struct lsm_info *lsm;
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char *sep, *name, *next;
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/* LSM_ORDER_FIRST is always first. */
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for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
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if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_FIRST)
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append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "first");
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}
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/* Process "security=", if given. */
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if (chosen_major_lsm) {
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struct lsm_info *major;
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/*
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* To match the original "security=" behavior, this
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* explicitly does NOT fallback to another Legacy Major
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* if the selected one was separately disabled: disable
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* all non-matching Legacy Major LSMs.
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*/
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for (major = __start_lsm_info; major < __end_lsm_info;
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major++) {
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if ((major->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) &&
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strcmp(major->name, chosen_major_lsm) != 0) {
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set_enabled(major, false);
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init_debug("security=%s disabled: %s\n",
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chosen_major_lsm, major->name);
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}
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}
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}
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sep = kstrdup(order, GFP_KERNEL);
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next = sep;
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/* Walk the list, looking for matching LSMs. */
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while ((name = strsep(&next, ",")) != NULL) {
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bool found = false;
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for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
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if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE &&
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strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
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append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
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found = true;
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}
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}
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if (!found)
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init_debug("%s ignored: %s\n", origin, name);
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}
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/* Process "security=", if given. */
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if (chosen_major_lsm) {
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for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
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if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
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continue;
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if (strcmp(lsm->name, chosen_major_lsm) == 0)
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append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "security=");
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}
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}
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/* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */
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for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
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if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
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continue;
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set_enabled(lsm, false);
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init_debug("%s disabled: %s\n", origin, lsm->name);
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}
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kfree(sep);
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}
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static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred);
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static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task);
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static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result);
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static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
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{
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struct lsm_info **lsm;
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ordered_lsms = kcalloc(LSM_COUNT + 1, sizeof(*ordered_lsms),
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GFP_KERNEL);
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if (chosen_lsm_order) {
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if (chosen_major_lsm) {
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pr_info("security= is ignored because it is superseded by lsm=\n");
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chosen_major_lsm = NULL;
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}
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ordered_lsm_parse(chosen_lsm_order, "cmdline");
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} else
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ordered_lsm_parse(builtin_lsm_order, "builtin");
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for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
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prepare_lsm(*lsm);
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init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
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init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
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init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
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init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
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init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
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init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
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init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
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/*
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* Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
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*/
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if (blob_sizes.lbs_file)
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lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache",
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blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0,
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SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
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if (blob_sizes.lbs_inode)
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lsm_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_inode_cache",
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blob_sizes.lbs_inode, 0,
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SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
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lsm_early_cred((struct cred *) current->cred);
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lsm_early_task(current);
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for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
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initialize_lsm(*lsm);
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kfree(ordered_lsms);
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}
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int __init early_security_init(void)
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{
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int i;
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struct hlist_head *list = (struct hlist_head *) &security_hook_heads;
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struct lsm_info *lsm;
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for (i = 0; i < sizeof(security_hook_heads) / sizeof(struct hlist_head);
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i++)
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INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&list[i]);
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for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) {
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if (!lsm->enabled)
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lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
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prepare_lsm(lsm);
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initialize_lsm(lsm);
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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* security_init - initializes the security framework
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*
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* This should be called early in the kernel initialization sequence.
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*/
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int __init security_init(void)
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{
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struct lsm_info *lsm;
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pr_info("Security Framework initializing\n");
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/*
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* Append the names of the early LSM modules now that kmalloc() is
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* available
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*/
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for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) {
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if (lsm->enabled)
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lsm_append(lsm->name, &lsm_names);
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}
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/* Load LSMs in specified order. */
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ordered_lsm_init();
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return 0;
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}
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/* Save user chosen LSM */
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static int __init choose_major_lsm(char *str)
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{
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chosen_major_lsm = str;
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return 1;
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}
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__setup("security=", choose_major_lsm);
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/* Explicitly choose LSM initialization order. */
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static int __init choose_lsm_order(char *str)
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{
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chosen_lsm_order = str;
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return 1;
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}
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__setup("lsm=", choose_lsm_order);
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/* Enable LSM order debugging. */
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static int __init enable_debug(char *str)
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{
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debug = true;
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return 1;
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}
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__setup("lsm.debug", enable_debug);
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static bool match_last_lsm(const char *list, const char *lsm)
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{
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const char *last;
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if (WARN_ON(!list || !lsm))
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return false;
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last = strrchr(list, ',');
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if (last)
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/* Pass the comma, strcmp() will check for '\0' */
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last++;
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else
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last = list;
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return !strcmp(last, lsm);
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}
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static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
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{
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char *cp;
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if (*result == NULL) {
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*result = kstrdup(new, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (*result == NULL)
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return -ENOMEM;
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} else {
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/* Check if it is the last registered name */
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|
if (match_last_lsm(*result, new))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s,%s", *result, new);
|
|
if (cp == NULL)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
kfree(*result);
|
|
*result = cp;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
|
|
* @hooks: the hooks to add
|
|
* @count: the number of hooks to add
|
|
* @lsm: the name of the security module
|
|
*
|
|
* Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure.
|
|
*/
|
|
void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
|
|
char *lsm)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
|
|
hooks[i].lsm = lsm;
|
|
hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Don't try to append during early_security_init(), we'll come back
|
|
* and fix this up afterwards.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (slab_is_available()) {
|
|
if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
|
|
panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
return blocking_notifier_call_chain(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain,
|
|
event, data);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(call_blocking_lsm_notifier);
|
|
|
|
int register_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
|
|
{
|
|
return blocking_notifier_chain_register(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain,
|
|
nb);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_blocking_lsm_notifier);
|
|
|
|
int unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
|
|
{
|
|
return blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain,
|
|
nb);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* lsm_cred_alloc - allocate a composite cred blob
|
|
* @cred: the cred that needs a blob
|
|
* @gfp: allocation type
|
|
*
|
|
* Allocate the cred blob for all the modules
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (blob_sizes.lbs_cred == 0) {
|
|
cred->security = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cred->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_cred, gfp);
|
|
if (cred->security == NULL)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* lsm_early_cred - during initialization allocate a composite cred blob
|
|
* @cred: the cred that needs a blob
|
|
*
|
|
* Allocate the cred blob for all the modules
|
|
*/
|
|
static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
panic("%s: Early cred alloc failed.\n", __func__);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* lsm_file_alloc - allocate a composite file blob
|
|
* @file: the file that needs a blob
|
|
*
|
|
* Allocate the file blob for all the modules
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int lsm_file_alloc(struct file *file)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!lsm_file_cache) {
|
|
file->f_security = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
file->f_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_file_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (file->f_security == NULL)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* lsm_inode_alloc - allocate a composite inode blob
|
|
* @inode: the inode that needs a blob
|
|
*
|
|
* Allocate the inode blob for all the modules
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
|
|
*/
|
|
int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!lsm_inode_cache) {
|
|
inode->i_security = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
inode->i_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
|
|
if (inode->i_security == NULL)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* lsm_task_alloc - allocate a composite task blob
|
|
* @task: the task that needs a blob
|
|
*
|
|
* Allocate the task blob for all the modules
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
|
|
{
|
|
if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) {
|
|
task->security = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (task->security == NULL)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* lsm_ipc_alloc - allocate a composite ipc blob
|
|
* @kip: the ipc that needs a blob
|
|
*
|
|
* Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip)
|
|
{
|
|
if (blob_sizes.lbs_ipc == 0) {
|
|
kip->security = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kip->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_ipc, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (kip->security == NULL)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob
|
|
* @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob
|
|
*
|
|
* Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg == 0) {
|
|
mp->security = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mp->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (mp->security == NULL)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob
|
|
* @task: the task that needs a blob
|
|
*
|
|
* Allocate the task blob for all the modules
|
|
*/
|
|
static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob
|
|
* @sb: the superblock that needs a blob
|
|
*
|
|
* Allocate the superblock blob for all the modules
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
|
|
{
|
|
if (blob_sizes.lbs_superblock == 0) {
|
|
sb->s_security = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sb->s_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_superblock, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (sb->s_security == NULL)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and
|
|
* can be accessed with:
|
|
*
|
|
* LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>)
|
|
*
|
|
* The macros below define static constants for the default value of each
|
|
* LSM hook.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) (NAME##_default)
|
|
#define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_void(DEFAULT, NAME)
|
|
#define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_int(DEFAULT, NAME) \
|
|
static const int LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) = (DEFAULT);
|
|
#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \
|
|
DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_##RET(DEFAULT, NAME)
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
|
|
#undef LSM_HOOK
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Hook list operation macros.
|
|
*
|
|
* call_void_hook:
|
|
* This is a hook that does not return a value.
|
|
*
|
|
* call_int_hook:
|
|
* This is a hook that returns a value.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define call_void_hook(FUNC, ...) \
|
|
do { \
|
|
struct security_hook_list *P; \
|
|
\
|
|
hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) \
|
|
P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
|
|
} while (0)
|
|
|
|
#define call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({ \
|
|
int RC = IRC; \
|
|
do { \
|
|
struct security_hook_list *P; \
|
|
\
|
|
hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \
|
|
RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
|
|
if (RC != 0) \
|
|
break; \
|
|
} \
|
|
} while (0); \
|
|
RC; \
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
/* Security operations */
|
|
|
|
int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
|
|
struct task_struct *to)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
|
|
struct task_struct *to)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, 0, from, to);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
|
|
struct task_struct *to, struct file *file)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, 0, from, to, file);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(ptrace_access_check, 0, child, mode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, 0, parent);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
|
|
kernel_cap_t *effective,
|
|
kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
|
|
kernel_cap_t *permitted)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(capget, 0, target,
|
|
effective, inheritable, permitted);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
|
|
const kernel_cap_t *effective,
|
|
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
|
|
const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(capset, 0, new, old,
|
|
effective, inheritable, permitted);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
|
|
struct user_namespace *ns,
|
|
int cap,
|
|
unsigned int opts)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, opts);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(quotactl, 0, cmds, type, id, sb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(quota_on, 0, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_syslog(int type)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(syslog, 0, type);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_settime64(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(settime, 0, ts, tz);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
|
|
{
|
|
struct security_hook_list *hp;
|
|
int cap_sys_admin = 1;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The module will respond with a positive value if
|
|
* it thinks the __vm_enough_memory() call should be
|
|
* made with the cap_sys_admin set. If all of the modules
|
|
* agree that it should be set it will. If any module
|
|
* thinks it should not be set it won't.
|
|
*/
|
|
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory, list) {
|
|
rc = hp->hook.vm_enough_memory(mm, pages);
|
|
if (rc <= 0) {
|
|
cap_sys_admin = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_for_exec, 0, bprm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_from_file, 0, bprm, file);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(fs_context_dup, 0, fc, src_fc);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(fs_context_parse_param, -ENOPARAM, fc, param);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = lsm_superblock_alloc(sb);
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
return rc;
|
|
rc = call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb);
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
security_sb_free(sb);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_sb_delete(struct super_block *sb)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(sb_delete, sb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb);
|
|
kfree(sb->s_security);
|
|
sb->s_security = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!*mnt_opts)
|
|
return;
|
|
call_void_hook(sb_free_mnt_opts, *mnt_opts);
|
|
*mnt_opts = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_free_mnt_opts);
|
|
|
|
int security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sb_eat_lsm_opts, 0, options, mnt_opts);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_eat_lsm_opts);
|
|
|
|
int security_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb,
|
|
void *mnt_opts)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sb_mnt_opts_compat, 0, sb, mnt_opts);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_mnt_opts_compat);
|
|
|
|
int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb,
|
|
void *mnt_opts)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sb_remount, 0, sb, mnt_opts);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_remount);
|
|
|
|
int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, 0, sb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, 0, m, sb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sb_statfs, 0, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
|
|
const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sb_mount, 0, dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sb_umount, 0, mnt, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, const struct path *new_path)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sb_pivotroot, 0, old_path, new_path);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
|
|
void *mnt_opts,
|
|
unsigned long kern_flags,
|
|
unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sb_set_mnt_opts,
|
|
mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0, sb,
|
|
mnt_opts, kern_flags, set_kern_flags);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts);
|
|
|
|
int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
|
|
struct super_block *newsb,
|
|
unsigned long kern_flags,
|
|
unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, 0, oldsb, newsb,
|
|
kern_flags, set_kern_flags);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts);
|
|
|
|
int security_add_mnt_opt(const char *option, const char *val, int len,
|
|
void **mnt_opts)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sb_add_mnt_opt, -EINVAL,
|
|
option, val, len, mnt_opts);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_add_mnt_opt);
|
|
|
|
int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, const struct path *to_path)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(move_mount, 0, from_path, to_path);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
|
|
unsigned int obj_type)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_notify, 0, path, mask, obj_type);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode);
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
return rc;
|
|
rc = call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode);
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
security_inode_free(inode);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* The rcu head is at the start of the inode blob
|
|
*/
|
|
kmem_cache_free(lsm_inode_cache, head);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
|
|
{
|
|
integrity_inode_free(inode);
|
|
call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode);
|
|
/*
|
|
* The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
|
|
* a call to security_inode_permission() can be made
|
|
* after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
|
|
* wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
|
|
* job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
|
|
* leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
|
|
* The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (inode->i_security)
|
|
call_rcu((struct rcu_head *)inode->i_security,
|
|
inode_free_by_rcu);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
|
|
const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
|
|
u32 *ctxlen)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, dentry, mode,
|
|
name, ctx, ctxlen);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security);
|
|
|
|
int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
|
|
struct qstr *name,
|
|
const struct cred *old, struct cred *new)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(dentry_create_files_as, 0, dentry, mode,
|
|
name, old, new);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_create_files_as);
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
|
|
const struct qstr *qstr,
|
|
const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data)
|
|
{
|
|
struct xattr new_xattrs[MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR + 1];
|
|
struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *evm_xattr, *xattr;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!initxattrs)
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode,
|
|
dir, qstr, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs));
|
|
lsm_xattr = new_xattrs;
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr,
|
|
&lsm_xattr->name,
|
|
&lsm_xattr->value,
|
|
&lsm_xattr->value_len);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1;
|
|
ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);
|
|
out:
|
|
for (xattr = new_xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++)
|
|
kfree(xattr->value);
|
|
return (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ? 0 : ret;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security);
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
|
|
const struct qstr *name,
|
|
const struct inode *context_inode)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_init_security_anon, 0, inode, name,
|
|
context_inode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
|
|
const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
|
|
void **value, size_t *len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir,
|
|
qstr, name, value, len);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_old_inode_init_security);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
|
|
int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,
|
|
unsigned int dev)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod);
|
|
|
|
int security_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir);
|
|
|
|
int security_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_unlink, 0, dir, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink);
|
|
|
|
int security_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
|
|
const char *old_name)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir,
|
|
struct dentry *new_dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_link, 0, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
|
|
const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
|
|
unsigned int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) ||
|
|
(d_is_positive(new_dentry) && IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry)))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
|
|
int err = call_int_hook(path_rename, 0, new_dir, new_dentry,
|
|
old_dir, old_dentry);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
|
|
new_dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename);
|
|
|
|
int security_path_truncate(const struct path *path)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_truncate, 0, path);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_chmod, 0, path, mode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_chown, 0, path, uid, gid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_path_chroot(const struct path *path)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_chroot, 0, path);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_create, 0, dir, dentry, mode);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create);
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
|
|
struct dentry *new_dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_link, 0, old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_unlink, 0, dir, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
|
|
const char *old_name)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_mkdir);
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
|
|
struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
|
|
unsigned int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) ||
|
|
(d_is_positive(new_dentry) && IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry)))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
|
|
int err = call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, new_dir, new_dentry,
|
|
old_dir, old_dentry);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry,
|
|
new_dir, new_dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_readlink, 0, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
|
|
bool rcu)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, 0, dentry, inode, rcu);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_permission, 0, inode, mask);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, dentry, attr);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return evm_inode_setattr(dentry, attr);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr);
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, 0, path);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
|
|
struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
|
|
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/*
|
|
* SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call,
|
|
* so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so.
|
|
*/
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, 1, mnt_userns, dentry, name, value,
|
|
size, flags);
|
|
|
|
if (ret == 1)
|
|
ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return evm_inode_setxattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name, value, size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
|
|
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return;
|
|
call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
|
|
evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_getxattr, 0, dentry, name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_listxattr, 0, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
|
|
struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/*
|
|
* SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call,
|
|
* so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so.
|
|
*/
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, mnt_userns, dentry, name);
|
|
if (ret == 1)
|
|
ret = cap_inode_removexattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return evm_inode_removexattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, 0, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_killpriv(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
|
|
struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, 0, mnt_userns, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
|
|
struct inode *inode, const char *name,
|
|
void **buffer, bool alloc)
|
|
{
|
|
struct security_hook_list *hp;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
|
|
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name.
|
|
*/
|
|
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity, list) {
|
|
rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecurity(mnt_userns, inode, name, buffer, alloc);
|
|
if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity))
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
struct security_hook_list *hp;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
|
|
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name.
|
|
*/
|
|
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity, list) {
|
|
rc = hp->hook.inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size,
|
|
flags);
|
|
if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity))
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_listsecurity, 0, inode, buffer, buffer_size);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
|
|
|
|
void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up, 0, src, new);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up);
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
|
|
{
|
|
struct security_hook_list *hp;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The implementation can return 0 (accept the xattr), 1 (discard the
|
|
* xattr), -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know anything about the xattr or
|
|
* any other error code incase of an error.
|
|
*/
|
|
hlist_for_each_entry(hp,
|
|
&security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up_xattr, list) {
|
|
rc = hp->hook.inode_copy_up_xattr(name);
|
|
if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr))
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr);
|
|
|
|
int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
|
|
struct kernfs_node *kn)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(kernfs_init_security, 0, kn_dir, kn);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(file_permission, 0, file, mask);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
return fsnotify_perm(file, mask);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = lsm_file_alloc(file);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
return rc;
|
|
rc = call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, 0, file);
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
security_file_free(file);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_file_free(struct file *file)
|
|
{
|
|
void *blob;
|
|
|
|
call_void_hook(file_free_security, file);
|
|
|
|
blob = file->f_security;
|
|
if (blob) {
|
|
file->f_security = NULL;
|
|
kmem_cache_free(lsm_file_cache, blob);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(file_ioctl, 0, file, cmd, arg);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl);
|
|
|
|
static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect
|
|
* it to imply PROT_EXEC? If not, nothing to talk about...
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ)
|
|
return prot;
|
|
if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
|
|
return prot;
|
|
/*
|
|
* if that's an anonymous mapping, let it.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!file)
|
|
return prot | PROT_EXEC;
|
|
/*
|
|
* ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need
|
|
* NOMMU_MAP_EXEC (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!path_noexec(&file->f_path)) {
|
|
#ifndef CONFIG_MMU
|
|
if (file->f_op->mmap_capabilities) {
|
|
unsigned caps = file->f_op->mmap_capabilities(file);
|
|
if (!(caps & NOMMU_MAP_EXEC))
|
|
return prot;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
return prot | PROT_EXEC;
|
|
}
|
|
/* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */
|
|
return prot;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
|
|
unsigned long flags)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot,
|
|
mmap_prot(file, prot), flags);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return ima_file_mmap(file, prot);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, 0, addr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
|
|
unsigned long prot)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return ima_file_mprotect(vma, prot);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(file_fcntl, 0, file, cmd, arg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(file_set_fowner, file);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
|
|
struct fown_struct *fown, int sig)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(file_send_sigiotask, 0, tsk, fown, sig);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_file_receive(struct file *file)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(file_receive, 0, file);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_file_open(struct file *file)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
return fsnotify_perm(file, MAY_OPEN);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
return rc;
|
|
rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
security_task_free(task);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(task_free, task);
|
|
|
|
kfree(task->security);
|
|
task->security = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, gfp);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp);
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
security_cred_free(cred);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* There is a failure case in prepare_creds() that
|
|
* may result in a call here with ->security being NULL.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (unlikely(cred->security == NULL))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
call_void_hook(cred_free, cred);
|
|
|
|
kfree(cred->security);
|
|
cred->security = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(new, gfp);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp);
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
security_cred_free(new);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
|
|
{
|
|
*secid = 0;
|
|
call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
|
|
|
|
int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, 0, new, inode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
|
|
bool contents)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return ima_read_file(file, id, contents);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
|
|
|
|
int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
|
|
enum kernel_read_file_id id)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
|
|
|
|
int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return ima_load_data(id, contents);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data);
|
|
|
|
int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
|
|
enum kernel_load_data_id id,
|
|
char *description)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id,
|
|
description);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return ima_post_load_data(buf, size, id, description);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data);
|
|
|
|
int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
|
|
int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_fix_setuid, 0, new, old, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
|
|
int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgid, 0, new, old, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_setpgid, 0, p, pgid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_getpgid, 0, p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
|
|
{
|
|
*secid = 0;
|
|
call_void_hook(task_getsecid_subj, p, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_subj);
|
|
|
|
void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
|
|
{
|
|
*secid = 0;
|
|
call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj);
|
|
|
|
int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_setnice, 0, p, nice);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_setioprio, 0, p, ioprio);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_getioprio, 0, p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
|
|
unsigned int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_prlimit, 0, cred, tcred, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
|
|
struct rlimit *new_rlim)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_setrlimit, 0, p, resource, new_rlim);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_setscheduler, 0, p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_getscheduler, 0, p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_movememory, 0, p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
|
|
int sig, const struct cred *cred)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, cred);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
|
|
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
|
|
{
|
|
int thisrc;
|
|
int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl);
|
|
struct security_hook_list *hp;
|
|
|
|
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_prctl, list) {
|
|
thisrc = hp->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
|
|
if (thisrc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl)) {
|
|
rc = thisrc;
|
|
if (thisrc != 0)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(task_to_inode, p, inode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
|
|
{
|
|
*secid = 0;
|
|
call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = lsm_msg_msg_alloc(msg);
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
return rc;
|
|
rc = call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, 0, msg);
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
security_msg_msg_free(msg);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(msg_msg_free_security, msg);
|
|
kfree(msg->security);
|
|
msg->security = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(msq);
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
return rc;
|
|
rc = call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, 0, msq);
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
security_msg_queue_free(msq);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_msg_queue_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(msg_queue_free_security, msq);
|
|
kfree(msq->security);
|
|
msq->security = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(msg_queue_associate, 0, msq, msqflg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgctl, 0, msq, cmd);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq,
|
|
struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgsnd, 0, msq, msg, msqflg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
|
|
struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgrcv, 0, msq, msg, target, type, mode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_shm_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(shp);
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
return rc;
|
|
rc = call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, 0, shp);
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
security_shm_free(shp);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_shm_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(shm_free_security, shp);
|
|
kfree(shp->security);
|
|
shp->security = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(shm_associate, 0, shp, shmflg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(shm_shmctl, 0, shp, cmd);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(shm_shmat, 0, shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sem_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(sma);
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
return rc;
|
|
rc = call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, 0, sma);
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
security_sem_free(sma);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_sem_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(sem_free_security, sma);
|
|
kfree(sma->security);
|
|
sma->security = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sem_associate, 0, sma, semflg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sem_semctl, 0, sma, cmd);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
|
|
unsigned nsops, int alter)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sem_semop, 0, sma, sops, nsops, alter);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(inode && IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
|
|
return;
|
|
call_void_hook(d_instantiate, dentry, inode);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate);
|
|
|
|
int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
|
|
char **value)
|
|
{
|
|
struct security_hook_list *hp;
|
|
|
|
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
|
|
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
|
|
continue;
|
|
return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
|
|
}
|
|
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getprocattr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
|
|
size_t size)
|
|
{
|
|
struct security_hook_list *hp;
|
|
|
|
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
|
|
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
|
|
continue;
|
|
return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
|
|
}
|
|
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setprocattr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(netlink_send, 0, sk, skb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(ismaclabel, 0, name);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
|
|
|
|
int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct security_hook_list *hp;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Currently, only one LSM can implement secid_to_secctx (i.e this
|
|
* LSM hook is not "stackable").
|
|
*/
|
|
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
|
|
rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen);
|
|
if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx))
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
|
|
|
|
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
|
|
{
|
|
*secid = 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
|
|
|
|
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
|
|
|
|
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(inode_invalidate_secctx, inode);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx);
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, 0, dentry, ctx, ctxlen);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE
|
|
int security_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred,
|
|
const struct cred *cred,
|
|
struct watch_notification *n)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(post_notification, 0, w_cred, cred, n);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
|
|
int security_watch_key(struct key *key)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(watch_key, 0, key);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
|
|
|
|
int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(unix_stream_connect, 0, sock, other, newsk);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect);
|
|
|
|
int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, 0, sock, other);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send);
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_create, 0, family, type, protocol, kern);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
|
|
int type, int protocol, int kern)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_post_create, 0, sock, family, type,
|
|
protocol, kern);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_socketpair, 0, socka, sockb);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_socketpair);
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_bind, 0, sock, address, addrlen);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_connect, 0, sock, address, addrlen);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_listen, 0, sock, backlog);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_accept, 0, sock, newsock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_sendmsg, 0, sock, msg, size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
|
|
int size, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_recvmsg, 0, sock, msg, size, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_getsockname, 0, sock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_getpeername, 0, sock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_getsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_setsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_shutdown, 0, sock, how);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_sock_rcv_skb, 0, sk, skb);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
|
|
int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
|
|
optval, optlen, len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
|
|
skb, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
|
|
|
|
int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(sk_clone_security, sk, newsk);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_clone);
|
|
|
|
void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi_common *flic)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(sk_getsecid, sk, &flic->flowic_secid);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow);
|
|
|
|
void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
|
|
struct flowi_common *flic)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(req_classify_flow, req, flic);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_req_classify_flow);
|
|
|
|
void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(sock_graft, sk, parent);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_graft);
|
|
|
|
int security_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk,
|
|
struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(inet_conn_request, 0, sk, skb, req);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_request);
|
|
|
|
void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
|
|
const struct request_sock *req)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(inet_csk_clone, newsk, req);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
|
|
struct sk_buff *skb)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(inet_conn_established, sk, skb);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established);
|
|
|
|
int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet);
|
|
|
|
void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_inc);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_inc);
|
|
|
|
void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_dec);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec);
|
|
|
|
int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(tun_dev_alloc_security, 0, security);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_alloc_security);
|
|
|
|
void security_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(tun_dev_free_security, security);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_free_security);
|
|
|
|
int security_tun_dev_create(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(tun_dev_create, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create);
|
|
|
|
int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach_queue, 0, security);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach_queue);
|
|
|
|
int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach, 0, sk, security);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach);
|
|
|
|
int security_tun_dev_open(void *security)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(tun_dev_open, 0, security);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open);
|
|
|
|
int security_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_request, 0, ep, skb);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_request);
|
|
|
|
int security_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
|
|
struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sctp_bind_connect, 0, sk, optname,
|
|
address, addrlen);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_bind_connect);
|
|
|
|
void security_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
|
|
struct sock *newsk)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(sctp_sk_clone, ep, sk, newsk);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_sk_clone);
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
|
|
|
|
int security_ib_pkey_access(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(ib_pkey_access, 0, sec, subnet_prefix, pkey);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_pkey_access);
|
|
|
|
int security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *sec, const char *dev_name, u8 port_num)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(ib_endport_manage_subnet, 0, sec, dev_name, port_num);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_endport_manage_subnet);
|
|
|
|
int security_ib_alloc_security(void **sec)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(ib_alloc_security, 0, sec);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_alloc_security);
|
|
|
|
void security_ib_free_security(void *sec)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(ib_free_security, sec);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_free_security);
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
|
|
|
|
int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
|
|
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx,
|
|
gfp_t gfp)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, 0, ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc);
|
|
|
|
int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
|
|
struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_clone_security, 0, old_ctx, new_ctxp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(xfrm_policy_free_security, ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_free);
|
|
|
|
int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_delete_security, 0, ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
|
|
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc, 0, x, sec_ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc);
|
|
|
|
int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
|
|
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, 0, x, polsec, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_delete_security, 0, x);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_delete);
|
|
|
|
void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(xfrm_state_free_security, x);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, 0, ctx, fl_secid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
|
|
struct xfrm_policy *xp,
|
|
const struct flowi_common *flic)
|
|
{
|
|
struct security_hook_list *hp;
|
|
int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Since this function is expected to return 0 or 1, the judgment
|
|
* becomes difficult if multiple LSMs supply this call. Fortunately,
|
|
* we can use the first LSM's judgment because currently only SELinux
|
|
* supplies this call.
|
|
*
|
|
* For speed optimization, we explicitly break the loop rather than
|
|
* using the macro
|
|
*/
|
|
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
|
|
list) {
|
|
rc = hp->hook.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, flic);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, secid, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi_common *flic)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, &flic->flowic_secid,
|
|
0);
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(rc);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow);
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
|
|
|
|
int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
|
|
unsigned long flags)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_key_free(struct key *key)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(key_free, key);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
|
|
enum key_need_perm need_perm)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(key_permission, 0, key_ref, cred, need_perm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
|
|
{
|
|
*_buffer = NULL;
|
|
return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, 0, key, _buffer);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
|
|
|
|
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
|
|
int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(bpf, 0, cmd, attr, size);
|
|
}
|
|
int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(bpf_map, 0, map, fmode);
|
|
}
|
|
int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(bpf_prog, 0, prog);
|
|
}
|
|
int security_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(bpf_map_alloc_security, 0, map);
|
|
}
|
|
int security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_alloc_security, 0, aux);
|
|
}
|
|
void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(bpf_map_free_security, map);
|
|
}
|
|
void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
|
|
|
|
int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(locked_down, 0, what);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
|
|
int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, 0, attr, type);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(perf_event_alloc, 0, event);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(perf_event_free, event);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(perf_event_read, 0, event);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(perf_event_write, 0, event);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */
|