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867c202654
If security_filter_rule_init() doesn't return a rule, then not everything is as fine as the return code implies. This bug only occurs when the LSM (eg. SELinux) is disabled at runtime. Adding an empty LSM rule causes ima_match_rules() to always succeed, ignoring any remaining rules. default IMA TCB policy: # PROC_SUPER_MAGIC dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0 # SYSFS_MAGIC dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572 # DEBUGFS_MAGIC dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720 # TMPFS_MAGIC dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994 # SECURITYFS_MAGIC dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673 < LSM specific rule > dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t measure func=BPRM_CHECK measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0 Thus without the patch, with the boot parameters 'tcb selinux=0', adding the above 'dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t' rule to the default IMA TCB measurement policy, would result in nothing being measured. The patch prevents the default TCB policy from being replaced. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
492 lines
12 KiB
C
492 lines
12 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
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* Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
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*
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* ima_policy.c
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* - initialize default measure policy rules
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*
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*/
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/list.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/magic.h>
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#include <linux/parser.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include "ima.h"
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/* flags definitions */
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#define IMA_FUNC 0x0001
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#define IMA_MASK 0x0002
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#define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
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#define IMA_UID 0x0008
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enum ima_action { UNKNOWN = -1, DONT_MEASURE = 0, MEASURE };
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#define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
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enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
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LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
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};
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struct ima_measure_rule_entry {
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struct list_head list;
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enum ima_action action;
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unsigned int flags;
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enum ima_hooks func;
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int mask;
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unsigned long fsmagic;
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uid_t uid;
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struct {
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void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
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int type; /* audit type */
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} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
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};
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/*
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* Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
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* written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, and .uid
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*/
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/*
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* The minimum rule set to allow for full TCB coverage. Measures all files
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* opened or mmap for exec and everything read by root. Dangerous because
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* normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
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* and running executables.
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*/
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static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
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{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
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{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
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{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
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{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
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{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
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{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
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{.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_MMAP,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
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.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
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{.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
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.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
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{.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0,
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.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
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};
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static LIST_HEAD(measure_default_rules);
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static LIST_HEAD(measure_policy_rules);
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static struct list_head *ima_measure;
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static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_measure_mutex);
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static bool ima_use_tcb __initdata;
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static int __init default_policy_setup(char *str)
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{
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ima_use_tcb = 1;
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return 1;
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}
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__setup("ima_tcb", default_policy_setup);
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/**
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* ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
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* @rule: a pointer to a rule
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* @inode: a pointer to an inode
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* @func: LIM hook identifier
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* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
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*
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* Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
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*/
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static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
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struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
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{
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struct task_struct *tsk = current;
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int i;
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if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && rule->func != func)
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return false;
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if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && rule->mask != mask)
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return false;
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if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
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&& rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
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return false;
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if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && rule->uid != tsk->cred->uid)
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return false;
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for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
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int rc = 0;
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u32 osid, sid;
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if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
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continue;
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switch (i) {
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case LSM_OBJ_USER:
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case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
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case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
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security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
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rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
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rule->lsm[i].type,
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Audit_equal,
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rule->lsm[i].rule,
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NULL);
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break;
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case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
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case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
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case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
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security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
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rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid,
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rule->lsm[i].type,
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Audit_equal,
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rule->lsm[i].rule,
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NULL);
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default:
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break;
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}
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if (!rc)
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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/**
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* ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions
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* @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
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* @func: IMA hook identifier
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* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
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*
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* Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
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* conditions.
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*
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* (There is no need for locking when walking the policy list,
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* as elements in the list are never deleted, nor does the list
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* change.)
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*/
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int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
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{
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struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry;
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list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_measure, list) {
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bool rc;
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rc = ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask);
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if (rc)
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return entry->action;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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* ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
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*
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* ima_measure points to either the measure_default_rules or the
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* the new measure_policy_rules.
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*/
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void __init ima_init_policy(void)
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{
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int i, entries;
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/* if !ima_use_tcb set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
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if (ima_use_tcb)
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entries = ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules);
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else
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entries = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < entries; i++)
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list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, &measure_default_rules);
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ima_measure = &measure_default_rules;
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}
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/**
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* ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules
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*
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* Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new
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* policy. Once updated, the policy is locked, no additional rules can be
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* added to the policy.
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*/
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void ima_update_policy(void)
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{
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const char *op = "policy_update";
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const char *cause = "already exists";
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int result = 1;
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int audit_info = 0;
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if (ima_measure == &measure_default_rules) {
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ima_measure = &measure_policy_rules;
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cause = "complete";
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result = 0;
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}
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integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
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NULL, op, cause, result, audit_info);
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}
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enum {
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Opt_err = -1,
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Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure,
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Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
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Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
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Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid
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};
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static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
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{Opt_measure, "measure"},
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{Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"},
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{Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"},
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{Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"},
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{Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"},
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{Opt_subj_user, "subj_user=%s"},
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{Opt_subj_role, "subj_role=%s"},
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{Opt_subj_type, "subj_type=%s"},
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{Opt_func, "func=%s"},
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{Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
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{Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
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{Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
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{Opt_err, NULL}
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};
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static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry,
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char *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type)
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{
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int result;
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if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule)
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return -EINVAL;
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entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
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result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
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Audit_equal, args,
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&entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
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if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule)
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return -EINVAL;
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return result;
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}
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static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
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{
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audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key);
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audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, value);
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audit_log_format(ab, " ");
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}
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static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
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{
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struct audit_buffer *ab;
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char *p;
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int result = 0;
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ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
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entry->uid = -1;
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entry->action = UNKNOWN;
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while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) {
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substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
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int token;
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unsigned long lnum;
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if (result < 0)
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break;
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if ((*p == '\0') || (*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t'))
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continue;
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token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args);
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switch (token) {
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case Opt_measure:
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ima_log_string(ab, "action", "measure");
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if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
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result = -EINVAL;
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entry->action = MEASURE;
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break;
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case Opt_dont_measure:
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ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_measure");
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if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
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result = -EINVAL;
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entry->action = DONT_MEASURE;
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break;
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case Opt_func:
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ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from);
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if (entry->func)
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result = -EINVAL;
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if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
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entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
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/* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
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else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
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entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
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else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
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entry->func = FILE_MMAP;
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else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
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entry->func = BPRM_CHECK;
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else
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result = -EINVAL;
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if (!result)
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entry->flags |= IMA_FUNC;
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break;
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case Opt_mask:
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ima_log_string(ab, "mask", args[0].from);
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if (entry->mask)
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result = -EINVAL;
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if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
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entry->mask = MAY_EXEC;
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else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
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entry->mask = MAY_WRITE;
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else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_READ") == 0)
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entry->mask = MAY_READ;
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else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
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entry->mask = MAY_APPEND;
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else
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result = -EINVAL;
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if (!result)
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entry->flags |= IMA_MASK;
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break;
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case Opt_fsmagic:
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ima_log_string(ab, "fsmagic", args[0].from);
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if (entry->fsmagic) {
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result = -EINVAL;
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break;
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}
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result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16,
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&entry->fsmagic);
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if (!result)
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entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
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break;
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case Opt_uid:
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ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from);
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if (entry->uid != -1) {
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result = -EINVAL;
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break;
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}
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result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
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if (!result) {
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entry->uid = (uid_t) lnum;
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if (entry->uid != lnum)
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result = -EINVAL;
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else
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entry->flags |= IMA_UID;
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}
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break;
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case Opt_obj_user:
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ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from);
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result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
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LSM_OBJ_USER,
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AUDIT_OBJ_USER);
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break;
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case Opt_obj_role:
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ima_log_string(ab, "obj_role", args[0].from);
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result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
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LSM_OBJ_ROLE,
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AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE);
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break;
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case Opt_obj_type:
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ima_log_string(ab, "obj_type", args[0].from);
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result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
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LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
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AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE);
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break;
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case Opt_subj_user:
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ima_log_string(ab, "subj_user", args[0].from);
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result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
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LSM_SUBJ_USER,
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AUDIT_SUBJ_USER);
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break;
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case Opt_subj_role:
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ima_log_string(ab, "subj_role", args[0].from);
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result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
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LSM_SUBJ_ROLE,
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AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE);
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break;
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case Opt_subj_type:
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ima_log_string(ab, "subj_type", args[0].from);
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result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
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LSM_SUBJ_TYPE,
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AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE);
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break;
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case Opt_err:
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ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
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result = -EINVAL;
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break;
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}
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}
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if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN))
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result = -EINVAL;
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audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !!result);
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audit_log_end(ab);
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return result;
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}
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/**
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* ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to measure_policy_rules
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* @rule - ima measurement policy rule
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*
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* Uses a mutex to protect the policy list from multiple concurrent writers.
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* Returns the length of the rule parsed, an error code on failure
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*/
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ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
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{
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const char *op = "update_policy";
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char *p;
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struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry;
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ssize_t result, len;
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int audit_info = 0;
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/* Prevent installed policy from changing */
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if (ima_measure != &measure_default_rules) {
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integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
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NULL, op, "already exists",
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-EACCES, audit_info);
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return -EACCES;
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}
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entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!entry) {
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integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
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NULL, op, "-ENOMEM", -ENOMEM, audit_info);
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return -ENOMEM;
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}
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INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
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p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
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len = strlen(p) + 1;
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if (*p == '#') {
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kfree(entry);
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return len;
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}
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result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
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if (result) {
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kfree(entry);
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integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
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NULL, op, "invalid policy", result,
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audit_info);
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return result;
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}
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mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
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list_add_tail(&entry->list, &measure_policy_rules);
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mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
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return len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ima_delete_rules called to cleanup invalid policy */
|
|
void ima_delete_rules(void)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
|
|
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &measure_policy_rules, list) {
|
|
list_del(&entry->list);
|
|
kfree(entry);
|
|
}
|
|
mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
|
|
}
|