mirror of
https://mirrors.bfsu.edu.cn/git/linux.git
synced 2024-11-24 04:34:08 +08:00
fb3bd914b3
Add a mitigation for the speculative return address stack overflow vulnerability found on AMD processors. The mitigation works by ensuring all RET instructions speculate to a controlled location, similar to how speculation is controlled in the retpoline sequence. To accomplish this, the __x86_return_thunk forces the CPU to mispredict every function return using a 'safe return' sequence. To ensure the safety of this mitigation, the kernel must ensure that the safe return sequence is itself free from attacker interference. In Zen3 and Zen4, this is accomplished by creating a BTB alias between the untraining function srso_untrain_ret_alias() and the safe return function srso_safe_ret_alias() which results in evicting a potentially poisoned BTB entry and using that safe one for all function returns. In older Zen1 and Zen2, this is accomplished using a reinterpretation technique similar to Retbleed one: srso_untrain_ret() and srso_safe_ret(). Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> |
||
|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| arch | ||
| Documentation | ||
| include/objtool | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| Build | ||
| builtin-check.c | ||
| check.c | ||
| elf.c | ||
| Makefile | ||
| noreturns.h | ||
| objtool.c | ||
| orc_dump.c | ||
| orc_gen.c | ||
| special.c | ||
| sync-check.sh | ||
| weak.c | ||