mirror of
https://mirrors.bfsu.edu.cn/git/linux.git
synced 2024-12-15 23:14:31 +08:00
f11274396a
uref->usage_index can be indirectly controlled by userspace, hence leading
to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This field is used as an array index by the hiddev_ioctl_usage() function,
when 'cmd' is either HIDIOCGCOLLECTIONINDEX, HIDIOCGUSAGES or
HIDIOCSUSAGES.
For cmd == HIDIOCGCOLLECTIONINDEX case, uref->usage_index is compared to
field->maxusage and then used as an index to dereference field->usage
array. The same thing happens to the cmd == HIDIOC{G,S}USAGES cases, where
uref->usage_index is checked against an array maximum value and then it is
used as an index in an array.
This is a summary of the HIDIOCGCOLLECTIONINDEX case, which matches the
traditional Spectre V1 first load:
copy_from_user(uref, user_arg, sizeof(*uref))
if (uref->usage_index >= field->maxusage)
goto inval;
i = field->usage[uref->usage_index].collection_index;
return i;
This patch fixes this by sanitizing field uref->usage_index before using it
to index field->usage (HIDIOCGCOLLECTIONINDEX) or field->value in
HIDIOC{G,S}USAGES arrays, thus, avoiding speculation in the first load.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
--
v2: Contemplate cmd == HIDIOC{G,S}USAGES case
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
|
||
|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| hid-core.c | ||
| hid-pidff.c | ||
| hiddev.c | ||
| Kconfig | ||
| Makefile | ||
| usbhid.h | ||
| usbkbd.c | ||
| usbmouse.c | ||