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080dc5e565
While checking/updating status for tcp ses, smb ses or tcon, we take GlobalMid_Lock. This doesn't make any sense. Replaced it with cifs_tcp_ses_lock. Ideally, we should take a spin lock per struct. But since tcp ses, smb ses and tcon objects won't add up to a lot, I think there should not be too much contention. Also, in few other places, these are checked without locking. Added locking for these. Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
768 lines
20 KiB
C
768 lines
20 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1
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/*
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*
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* Encryption and hashing operations relating to NTLM, NTLMv2. See MS-NLMP
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* for more detailed information
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*
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* Copyright (C) International Business Machines Corp., 2005,2013
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* Author(s): Steve French (sfrench@us.ibm.com)
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*
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*/
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include "cifspdu.h"
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#include "cifsglob.h"
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#include "cifs_debug.h"
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#include "cifs_unicode.h"
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#include "cifsproto.h"
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#include "ntlmssp.h"
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#include <linux/ctype.h>
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#include <linux/random.h>
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#include <linux/highmem.h>
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#include <linux/fips.h>
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#include "../smbfs_common/arc4.h"
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#include <crypto/aead.h>
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int __cifs_calc_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst,
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struct TCP_Server_Info *server, char *signature,
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struct shash_desc *shash)
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{
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int i;
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int rc;
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struct kvec *iov = rqst->rq_iov;
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int n_vec = rqst->rq_nvec;
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int is_smb2 = server->vals->header_preamble_size == 0;
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/* iov[0] is actual data and not the rfc1002 length for SMB2+ */
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if (is_smb2) {
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if (iov[0].iov_len <= 4)
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return -EIO;
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i = 0;
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} else {
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if (n_vec < 2 || iov[0].iov_len != 4)
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return -EIO;
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i = 1; /* skip rfc1002 length */
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}
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for (; i < n_vec; i++) {
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if (iov[i].iov_len == 0)
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continue;
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if (iov[i].iov_base == NULL) {
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cifs_dbg(VFS, "null iovec entry\n");
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return -EIO;
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}
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rc = crypto_shash_update(shash,
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iov[i].iov_base, iov[i].iov_len);
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if (rc) {
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cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with payload\n",
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__func__);
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return rc;
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}
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}
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/* now hash over the rq_pages array */
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for (i = 0; i < rqst->rq_npages; i++) {
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void *kaddr;
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unsigned int len, offset;
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rqst_page_get_length(rqst, i, &len, &offset);
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kaddr = (char *) kmap(rqst->rq_pages[i]) + offset;
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rc = crypto_shash_update(shash, kaddr, len);
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if (rc) {
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cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with payload\n",
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__func__);
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kunmap(rqst->rq_pages[i]);
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return rc;
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}
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kunmap(rqst->rq_pages[i]);
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}
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rc = crypto_shash_final(shash, signature);
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if (rc)
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cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate hash\n", __func__);
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return rc;
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}
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/*
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* Calculate and return the CIFS signature based on the mac key and SMB PDU.
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* The 16 byte signature must be allocated by the caller. Note we only use the
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* 1st eight bytes and that the smb header signature field on input contains
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* the sequence number before this function is called. Also, this function
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* should be called with the server->srv_mutex held.
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*/
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static int cifs_calc_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst,
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struct TCP_Server_Info *server, char *signature)
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{
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int rc;
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if (!rqst->rq_iov || !signature || !server)
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return -EINVAL;
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rc = cifs_alloc_hash("md5", &server->secmech.md5,
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&server->secmech.sdescmd5);
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if (rc)
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return -1;
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rc = crypto_shash_init(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash);
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if (rc) {
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cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not init md5\n", __func__);
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return rc;
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}
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rc = crypto_shash_update(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash,
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server->session_key.response, server->session_key.len);
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if (rc) {
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cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with response\n", __func__);
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return rc;
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}
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return __cifs_calc_signature(rqst, server, signature,
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&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash);
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}
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/* must be called with server->srv_mutex held */
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int cifs_sign_rqst(struct smb_rqst *rqst, struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
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__u32 *pexpected_response_sequence_number)
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{
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int rc = 0;
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char smb_signature[20];
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struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu = (struct smb_hdr *)rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base;
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if (rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_len != 4 ||
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rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base + 4 != rqst->rq_iov[1].iov_base)
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return -EIO;
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if ((cifs_pdu == NULL) || (server == NULL))
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return -EINVAL;
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spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
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if (!(cifs_pdu->Flags2 & SMBFLG2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE) ||
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server->tcpStatus == CifsNeedNegotiate) {
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spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
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return rc;
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}
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spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
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if (!server->session_estab) {
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memcpy(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, "BSRSPYL", 8);
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return rc;
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}
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cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.SequenceNumber =
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cpu_to_le32(server->sequence_number);
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cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.Reserved = 0;
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*pexpected_response_sequence_number = ++server->sequence_number;
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++server->sequence_number;
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rc = cifs_calc_signature(rqst, server, smb_signature);
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if (rc)
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memset(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, 0, 8);
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else
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memcpy(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, smb_signature, 8);
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return rc;
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}
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int cifs_sign_smbv(struct kvec *iov, int n_vec, struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
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__u32 *pexpected_response_sequence)
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{
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struct smb_rqst rqst = { .rq_iov = iov,
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.rq_nvec = n_vec };
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return cifs_sign_rqst(&rqst, server, pexpected_response_sequence);
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}
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/* must be called with server->srv_mutex held */
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int cifs_sign_smb(struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu, struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
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__u32 *pexpected_response_sequence_number)
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{
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struct kvec iov[2];
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iov[0].iov_base = cifs_pdu;
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iov[0].iov_len = 4;
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iov[1].iov_base = (char *)cifs_pdu + 4;
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iov[1].iov_len = be32_to_cpu(cifs_pdu->smb_buf_length);
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return cifs_sign_smbv(iov, 2, server,
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pexpected_response_sequence_number);
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}
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int cifs_verify_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst,
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struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
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__u32 expected_sequence_number)
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{
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unsigned int rc;
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char server_response_sig[8];
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char what_we_think_sig_should_be[20];
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struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu = (struct smb_hdr *)rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base;
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if (rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_len != 4 ||
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rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base + 4 != rqst->rq_iov[1].iov_base)
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return -EIO;
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if (cifs_pdu == NULL || server == NULL)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (!server->session_estab)
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return 0;
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if (cifs_pdu->Command == SMB_COM_LOCKING_ANDX) {
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struct smb_com_lock_req *pSMB =
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(struct smb_com_lock_req *)cifs_pdu;
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if (pSMB->LockType & LOCKING_ANDX_OPLOCK_RELEASE)
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return 0;
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}
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/* BB what if signatures are supposed to be on for session but
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server does not send one? BB */
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/* Do not need to verify session setups with signature "BSRSPYL " */
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if (memcmp(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, "BSRSPYL ", 8) == 0)
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cifs_dbg(FYI, "dummy signature received for smb command 0x%x\n",
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cifs_pdu->Command);
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/* save off the origiginal signature so we can modify the smb and check
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its signature against what the server sent */
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memcpy(server_response_sig, cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, 8);
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cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.SequenceNumber =
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cpu_to_le32(expected_sequence_number);
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cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.Reserved = 0;
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mutex_lock(&server->srv_mutex);
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rc = cifs_calc_signature(rqst, server, what_we_think_sig_should_be);
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mutex_unlock(&server->srv_mutex);
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if (rc)
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return rc;
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/* cifs_dump_mem("what we think it should be: ",
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what_we_think_sig_should_be, 16); */
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if (memcmp(server_response_sig, what_we_think_sig_should_be, 8))
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return -EACCES;
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else
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return 0;
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}
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/* Build a proper attribute value/target info pairs blob.
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* Fill in netbios and dns domain name and workstation name
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* and client time (total five av pairs and + one end of fields indicator.
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* Allocate domain name which gets freed when session struct is deallocated.
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*/
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static int
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build_avpair_blob(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
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{
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unsigned int dlen;
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unsigned int size = 2 * sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name);
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char *defdmname = "WORKGROUP";
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unsigned char *blobptr;
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struct ntlmssp2_name *attrptr;
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if (!ses->domainName) {
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ses->domainName = kstrdup(defdmname, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!ses->domainName)
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return -ENOMEM;
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}
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dlen = strlen(ses->domainName);
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/*
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* The length of this blob is two times the size of a
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* structure (av pair) which holds name/size
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* ( for NTLMSSP_AV_NB_DOMAIN_NAME followed by NTLMSSP_AV_EOL ) +
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* unicode length of a netbios domain name
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*/
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ses->auth_key.len = size + 2 * dlen;
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ses->auth_key.response = kzalloc(ses->auth_key.len, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!ses->auth_key.response) {
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ses->auth_key.len = 0;
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return -ENOMEM;
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}
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blobptr = ses->auth_key.response;
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attrptr = (struct ntlmssp2_name *) blobptr;
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/*
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* As defined in MS-NTLM 3.3.2, just this av pair field
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* is sufficient as part of the temp
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*/
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attrptr->type = cpu_to_le16(NTLMSSP_AV_NB_DOMAIN_NAME);
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attrptr->length = cpu_to_le16(2 * dlen);
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blobptr = (unsigned char *)attrptr + sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name);
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cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)blobptr, ses->domainName, dlen, nls_cp);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Server has provided av pairs/target info in the type 2 challenge
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* packet and we have plucked it and stored within smb session.
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* We parse that blob here to find netbios domain name to be used
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* as part of ntlmv2 authentication (in Target String), if not already
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* specified on the command line.
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* If this function returns without any error but without fetching
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* domain name, authentication may fail against some server but
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* may not fail against other (those who are not very particular
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* about target string i.e. for some, just user name might suffice.
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*/
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static int
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find_domain_name(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
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{
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unsigned int attrsize;
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unsigned int type;
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unsigned int onesize = sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name);
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unsigned char *blobptr;
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unsigned char *blobend;
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struct ntlmssp2_name *attrptr;
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if (!ses->auth_key.len || !ses->auth_key.response)
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return 0;
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blobptr = ses->auth_key.response;
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blobend = blobptr + ses->auth_key.len;
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while (blobptr + onesize < blobend) {
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attrptr = (struct ntlmssp2_name *) blobptr;
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type = le16_to_cpu(attrptr->type);
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if (type == NTLMSSP_AV_EOL)
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break;
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blobptr += 2; /* advance attr type */
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attrsize = le16_to_cpu(attrptr->length);
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blobptr += 2; /* advance attr size */
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if (blobptr + attrsize > blobend)
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break;
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if (type == NTLMSSP_AV_NB_DOMAIN_NAME) {
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if (!attrsize || attrsize >= CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN)
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break;
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if (!ses->domainName) {
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ses->domainName =
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kmalloc(attrsize + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!ses->domainName)
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return -ENOMEM;
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cifs_from_utf16(ses->domainName,
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(__le16 *)blobptr, attrsize, attrsize,
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nls_cp, NO_MAP_UNI_RSVD);
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break;
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}
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}
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blobptr += attrsize; /* advance attr value */
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/* Server has provided av pairs/target info in the type 2 challenge
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* packet and we have plucked it and stored within smb session.
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* We parse that blob here to find the server given timestamp
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* as part of ntlmv2 authentication (or local current time as
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* default in case of failure)
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*/
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static __le64
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find_timestamp(struct cifs_ses *ses)
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{
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unsigned int attrsize;
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unsigned int type;
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unsigned int onesize = sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name);
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unsigned char *blobptr;
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unsigned char *blobend;
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struct ntlmssp2_name *attrptr;
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struct timespec64 ts;
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if (!ses->auth_key.len || !ses->auth_key.response)
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return 0;
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blobptr = ses->auth_key.response;
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blobend = blobptr + ses->auth_key.len;
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while (blobptr + onesize < blobend) {
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attrptr = (struct ntlmssp2_name *) blobptr;
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type = le16_to_cpu(attrptr->type);
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if (type == NTLMSSP_AV_EOL)
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break;
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blobptr += 2; /* advance attr type */
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attrsize = le16_to_cpu(attrptr->length);
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blobptr += 2; /* advance attr size */
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if (blobptr + attrsize > blobend)
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break;
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if (type == NTLMSSP_AV_TIMESTAMP) {
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if (attrsize == sizeof(u64))
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return *((__le64 *)blobptr);
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}
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blobptr += attrsize; /* advance attr value */
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}
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ktime_get_real_ts64(&ts);
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return cpu_to_le64(cifs_UnixTimeToNT(ts));
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}
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static int calc_ntlmv2_hash(struct cifs_ses *ses, char *ntlmv2_hash,
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const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
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{
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int rc = 0;
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int len;
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char nt_hash[CIFS_NTHASH_SIZE];
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__le16 *user;
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wchar_t *domain;
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wchar_t *server;
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if (!ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5) {
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cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: can't generate ntlmv2 hash\n", __func__);
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return -1;
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}
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/* calculate md4 hash of password */
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E_md4hash(ses->password, nt_hash, nls_cp);
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rc = crypto_shash_setkey(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5, nt_hash,
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CIFS_NTHASH_SIZE);
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if (rc) {
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cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set NT Hash as a key\n", __func__);
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return rc;
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}
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rc = crypto_shash_init(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash);
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if (rc) {
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cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not init hmacmd5\n", __func__);
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return rc;
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}
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/* convert ses->user_name to unicode */
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len = ses->user_name ? strlen(ses->user_name) : 0;
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user = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (user == NULL) {
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rc = -ENOMEM;
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return rc;
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}
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if (len) {
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len = cifs_strtoUTF16(user, ses->user_name, len, nls_cp);
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UniStrupr(user);
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} else {
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memset(user, '\0', 2);
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}
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rc = crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
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(char *)user, 2 * len);
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kfree(user);
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if (rc) {
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cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with user\n", __func__);
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return rc;
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}
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/* convert ses->domainName to unicode and uppercase */
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if (ses->domainName) {
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len = strlen(ses->domainName);
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domain = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (domain == NULL) {
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rc = -ENOMEM;
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return rc;
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}
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len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)domain, ses->domainName, len,
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nls_cp);
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rc =
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crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
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(char *)domain, 2 * len);
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kfree(domain);
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if (rc) {
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cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with domain\n",
|
|
__func__);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* We use ses->ip_addr if no domain name available */
|
|
len = strlen(ses->ip_addr);
|
|
|
|
server = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (server == NULL) {
|
|
rc = -ENOMEM;
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)server, ses->ip_addr, len,
|
|
nls_cp);
|
|
rc =
|
|
crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
|
|
(char *)server, 2 * len);
|
|
kfree(server);
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with server\n",
|
|
__func__);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rc = crypto_shash_final(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
|
|
ntlmv2_hash);
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__);
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
CalcNTLMv2_response(const struct cifs_ses *ses, char *ntlmv2_hash)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc;
|
|
struct ntlmv2_resp *ntlmv2 = (struct ntlmv2_resp *)
|
|
(ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
unsigned int hash_len;
|
|
|
|
/* The MD5 hash starts at challenge_key.key */
|
|
hash_len = ses->auth_key.len - (CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE +
|
|
offsetof(struct ntlmv2_resp, challenge.key[0]));
|
|
|
|
if (!ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5) {
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: can't generate ntlmv2 hash\n", __func__);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rc = crypto_shash_setkey(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5,
|
|
ntlmv2_hash, CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE);
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set NTLMV2 Hash as a key\n",
|
|
__func__);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rc = crypto_shash_init(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash);
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not init hmacmd5\n", __func__);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ses->server->negflavor == CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_EXTENDED)
|
|
memcpy(ntlmv2->challenge.key,
|
|
ses->ntlmssp->cryptkey, CIFS_SERVER_CHALLENGE_SIZE);
|
|
else
|
|
memcpy(ntlmv2->challenge.key,
|
|
ses->server->cryptkey, CIFS_SERVER_CHALLENGE_SIZE);
|
|
rc = crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
|
|
ntlmv2->challenge.key, hash_len);
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with response\n", __func__);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Note that the MD5 digest over writes anon.challenge_key.key */
|
|
rc = crypto_shash_final(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
|
|
ntlmv2->ntlmv2_hash);
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__);
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
setup_ntlmv2_rsp(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc;
|
|
int baselen;
|
|
unsigned int tilen;
|
|
struct ntlmv2_resp *ntlmv2;
|
|
char ntlmv2_hash[16];
|
|
unsigned char *tiblob = NULL; /* target info blob */
|
|
__le64 rsp_timestamp;
|
|
|
|
if (nls_cp == NULL) {
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s called with nls_cp==NULL\n", __func__);
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ses->server->negflavor == CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_EXTENDED) {
|
|
if (!ses->domainName) {
|
|
if (ses->domainAuto) {
|
|
rc = find_domain_name(ses, nls_cp);
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "error %d finding domain name\n",
|
|
rc);
|
|
goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
ses->domainName = kstrdup("", GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
rc = build_avpair_blob(ses, nls_cp);
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "error %d building av pair blob\n", rc);
|
|
goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Must be within 5 minutes of the server (or in range +/-2h
|
|
* in case of Mac OS X), so simply carry over server timestamp
|
|
* (as Windows 7 does)
|
|
*/
|
|
rsp_timestamp = find_timestamp(ses);
|
|
|
|
baselen = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE + sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp);
|
|
tilen = ses->auth_key.len;
|
|
tiblob = ses->auth_key.response;
|
|
|
|
ses->auth_key.response = kmalloc(baselen + tilen, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!ses->auth_key.response) {
|
|
rc = -ENOMEM;
|
|
ses->auth_key.len = 0;
|
|
goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
|
|
}
|
|
ses->auth_key.len += baselen;
|
|
|
|
ntlmv2 = (struct ntlmv2_resp *)
|
|
(ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
ntlmv2->blob_signature = cpu_to_le32(0x00000101);
|
|
ntlmv2->reserved = 0;
|
|
ntlmv2->time = rsp_timestamp;
|
|
|
|
get_random_bytes(&ntlmv2->client_chal, sizeof(ntlmv2->client_chal));
|
|
ntlmv2->reserved2 = 0;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(ses->auth_key.response + baselen, tiblob, tilen);
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&ses->server->srv_mutex);
|
|
|
|
rc = cifs_alloc_hash("hmac(md5)",
|
|
&ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5,
|
|
&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5);
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
goto unlock;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* calculate ntlmv2_hash */
|
|
rc = calc_ntlmv2_hash(ses, ntlmv2_hash, nls_cp);
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Could not get v2 hash rc %d\n", rc);
|
|
goto unlock;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* calculate first part of the client response (CR1) */
|
|
rc = CalcNTLMv2_response(ses, ntlmv2_hash);
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Could not calculate CR1 rc: %d\n", rc);
|
|
goto unlock;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* now calculate the session key for NTLMv2 */
|
|
rc = crypto_shash_setkey(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5,
|
|
ntlmv2_hash, CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE);
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set NTLMV2 Hash as a key\n",
|
|
__func__);
|
|
goto unlock;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rc = crypto_shash_init(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash);
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not init hmacmd5\n", __func__);
|
|
goto unlock;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rc = crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
|
|
ntlmv2->ntlmv2_hash,
|
|
CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE);
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with response\n", __func__);
|
|
goto unlock;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rc = crypto_shash_final(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
|
|
ses->auth_key.response);
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__);
|
|
|
|
unlock:
|
|
mutex_unlock(&ses->server->srv_mutex);
|
|
setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret:
|
|
kfree(tiblob);
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
calc_seckey(struct cifs_ses *ses)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char sec_key[CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE]; /* a nonce */
|
|
struct arc4_ctx *ctx_arc4;
|
|
|
|
if (fips_enabled)
|
|
return -ENODEV;
|
|
|
|
get_random_bytes(sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
ctx_arc4 = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx_arc4), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!ctx_arc4) {
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Could not allocate arc4 context\n");
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cifs_arc4_setkey(ctx_arc4, ses->auth_key.response, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
cifs_arc4_crypt(ctx_arc4, ses->ntlmssp->ciphertext, sec_key,
|
|
CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
/* make secondary_key/nonce as session key */
|
|
memcpy(ses->auth_key.response, sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
/* and make len as that of session key only */
|
|
ses->auth_key.len = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
memzero_explicit(sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
kfree_sensitive(ctx_arc4);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
cifs_crypto_secmech_release(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
|
|
{
|
|
if (server->secmech.cmacaes) {
|
|
crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.cmacaes);
|
|
server->secmech.cmacaes = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (server->secmech.hmacsha256) {
|
|
crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.hmacsha256);
|
|
server->secmech.hmacsha256 = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (server->secmech.md5) {
|
|
crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.md5);
|
|
server->secmech.md5 = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (server->secmech.sha512) {
|
|
crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.sha512);
|
|
server->secmech.sha512 = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (server->secmech.hmacmd5) {
|
|
crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.hmacmd5);
|
|
server->secmech.hmacmd5 = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (server->secmech.ccmaesencrypt) {
|
|
crypto_free_aead(server->secmech.ccmaesencrypt);
|
|
server->secmech.ccmaesencrypt = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (server->secmech.ccmaesdecrypt) {
|
|
crypto_free_aead(server->secmech.ccmaesdecrypt);
|
|
server->secmech.ccmaesdecrypt = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kfree(server->secmech.sdesccmacaes);
|
|
server->secmech.sdesccmacaes = NULL;
|
|
kfree(server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256);
|
|
server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256 = NULL;
|
|
kfree(server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5);
|
|
server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5 = NULL;
|
|
kfree(server->secmech.sdescmd5);
|
|
server->secmech.sdescmd5 = NULL;
|
|
kfree(server->secmech.sdescsha512);
|
|
server->secmech.sdescsha512 = NULL;
|
|
}
|