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ab074ade9c
Pull audit updates from Eric Paris: "So this change across a whole bunch of arches really solves one basic problem. We want to audit when seccomp is killing a process. seccomp hooks in before the audit syscall entry code. audit_syscall_entry took as an argument the arch of the given syscall. Since the arch is part of what makes a syscall number meaningful it's an important part of the record, but it isn't available when seccomp shoots the syscall... For most arch's we have a better way to get the arch (syscall_get_arch) So the solution was two fold: Implement syscall_get_arch() everywhere there is audit which didn't have it. Use syscall_get_arch() in the seccomp audit code. Having syscall_get_arch() everywhere meant it was a useless flag on the stack and we could get rid of it for the typical syscall entry. The other changes inside the audit system aren't grand, fixed some records that had invalid spaces. Better locking around the task comm field. Removing some dead functions and structs. Make some things static. Really minor stuff" * git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit: (31 commits) audit: rename audit_log_remove_rule to disambiguate for trees audit: cull redundancy in audit_rule_change audit: WARN if audit_rule_change called illegally audit: put rule existence check in canonical order next: openrisc: Fix build audit: get comm using lock to avoid race in string printing audit: remove open_arg() function that is never used audit: correct AUDIT_GET_FEATURE return message type audit: set nlmsg_len for multicast messages. audit: use union for audit_field values since they are mutually exclusive audit: invalid op= values for rules audit: use atomic_t to simplify audit_serial() kernel/audit.c: use ARRAY_SIZE instead of sizeof/sizeof[0] audit: reduce scope of audit_log_fcaps audit: reduce scope of audit_net_id audit: arm64: Remove the audit arch argument to audit_syscall_entry arm64: audit: Add audit hook in syscall_trace_enter/exit() audit: x86: drop arch from __audit_syscall_entry() interface sparc: implement is_32bit_task sparc: properly conditionalize use of TIF_32BIT ...
306 lines
8.6 KiB
C
306 lines
8.6 KiB
C
/*
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* Kernel support for the ptrace() and syscall tracing interfaces.
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2000 Hewlett-Packard Co, Linuxcare Inc.
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* Copyright (C) 2000 Matthew Wilcox <matthew@wil.cx>
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* Copyright (C) 2000 David Huggins-Daines <dhd@debian.org>
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* Copyright (C) 2008 Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
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*/
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/smp.h>
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#include <linux/errno.h>
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#include <linux/ptrace.h>
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#include <linux/tracehook.h>
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#include <linux/user.h>
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#include <linux/personality.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/seccomp.h>
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#include <linux/compat.h>
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#include <linux/signal.h>
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#include <linux/audit.h>
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#include <asm/uaccess.h>
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#include <asm/pgtable.h>
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#include <asm/processor.h>
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#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
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/* PSW bits we allow the debugger to modify */
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#define USER_PSW_BITS (PSW_N | PSW_B | PSW_V | PSW_CB)
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/*
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* Called by kernel/ptrace.c when detaching..
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*
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* Make sure single step bits etc are not set.
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*/
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void ptrace_disable(struct task_struct *task)
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{
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clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SINGLESTEP);
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clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_BLOCKSTEP);
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/* make sure the trap bits are not set */
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pa_psw(task)->r = 0;
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pa_psw(task)->t = 0;
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pa_psw(task)->h = 0;
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pa_psw(task)->l = 0;
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}
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/*
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* The following functions are called by ptrace_resume() when
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* enabling or disabling single/block tracing.
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*/
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void user_disable_single_step(struct task_struct *task)
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{
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ptrace_disable(task);
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}
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void user_enable_single_step(struct task_struct *task)
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{
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clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_BLOCKSTEP);
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set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SINGLESTEP);
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if (pa_psw(task)->n) {
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struct siginfo si;
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/* Nullified, just crank over the queue. */
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task_regs(task)->iaoq[0] = task_regs(task)->iaoq[1];
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task_regs(task)->iasq[0] = task_regs(task)->iasq[1];
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task_regs(task)->iaoq[1] = task_regs(task)->iaoq[0] + 4;
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pa_psw(task)->n = 0;
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pa_psw(task)->x = 0;
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pa_psw(task)->y = 0;
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pa_psw(task)->z = 0;
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pa_psw(task)->b = 0;
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ptrace_disable(task);
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/* Don't wake up the task, but let the
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parent know something happened. */
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si.si_code = TRAP_TRACE;
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si.si_addr = (void __user *) (task_regs(task)->iaoq[0] & ~3);
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si.si_signo = SIGTRAP;
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si.si_errno = 0;
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force_sig_info(SIGTRAP, &si, task);
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/* notify_parent(task, SIGCHLD); */
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return;
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}
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/* Enable recovery counter traps. The recovery counter
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* itself will be set to zero on a task switch. If the
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* task is suspended on a syscall then the syscall return
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* path will overwrite the recovery counter with a suitable
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* value such that it traps once back in user space. We
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* disable interrupts in the tasks PSW here also, to avoid
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* interrupts while the recovery counter is decrementing.
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*/
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pa_psw(task)->r = 1;
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pa_psw(task)->t = 0;
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pa_psw(task)->h = 0;
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pa_psw(task)->l = 0;
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}
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void user_enable_block_step(struct task_struct *task)
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{
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clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SINGLESTEP);
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set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_BLOCKSTEP);
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/* Enable taken branch trap. */
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pa_psw(task)->r = 0;
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pa_psw(task)->t = 1;
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pa_psw(task)->h = 0;
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pa_psw(task)->l = 0;
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}
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long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request,
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unsigned long addr, unsigned long data)
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{
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unsigned long tmp;
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long ret = -EIO;
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switch (request) {
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/* Read the word at location addr in the USER area. For ptraced
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processes, the kernel saves all regs on a syscall. */
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case PTRACE_PEEKUSR:
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if ((addr & (sizeof(unsigned long)-1)) ||
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addr >= sizeof(struct pt_regs))
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break;
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tmp = *(unsigned long *) ((char *) task_regs(child) + addr);
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ret = put_user(tmp, (unsigned long __user *) data);
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break;
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/* Write the word at location addr in the USER area. This will need
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to change when the kernel no longer saves all regs on a syscall.
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FIXME. There is a problem at the moment in that r3-r18 are only
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saved if the process is ptraced on syscall entry, and even then
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those values are overwritten by actual register values on syscall
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exit. */
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case PTRACE_POKEUSR:
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/* Some register values written here may be ignored in
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* entry.S:syscall_restore_rfi; e.g. iaoq is written with
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* r31/r31+4, and not with the values in pt_regs.
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*/
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if (addr == PT_PSW) {
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/* Allow writing to Nullify, Divide-step-correction,
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* and carry/borrow bits.
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* BEWARE, if you set N, and then single step, it won't
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* stop on the nullified instruction.
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*/
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data &= USER_PSW_BITS;
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task_regs(child)->gr[0] &= ~USER_PSW_BITS;
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task_regs(child)->gr[0] |= data;
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ret = 0;
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break;
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}
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if ((addr & (sizeof(unsigned long)-1)) ||
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addr >= sizeof(struct pt_regs))
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break;
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if ((addr >= PT_GR1 && addr <= PT_GR31) ||
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addr == PT_IAOQ0 || addr == PT_IAOQ1 ||
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(addr >= PT_FR0 && addr <= PT_FR31 + 4) ||
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addr == PT_SAR) {
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*(unsigned long *) ((char *) task_regs(child) + addr) = data;
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ret = 0;
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}
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break;
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default:
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ret = ptrace_request(child, request, addr, data);
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break;
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}
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return ret;
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
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/* This function is needed to translate 32 bit pt_regs offsets in to
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* 64 bit pt_regs offsets. For example, a 32 bit gdb under a 64 bit kernel
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* will request offset 12 if it wants gr3, but the lower 32 bits of
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* the 64 bit kernels view of gr3 will be at offset 28 (3*8 + 4).
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* This code relies on a 32 bit pt_regs being comprised of 32 bit values
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* except for the fp registers which (a) are 64 bits, and (b) follow
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* the gr registers at the start of pt_regs. The 32 bit pt_regs should
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* be half the size of the 64 bit pt_regs, plus 32*4 to allow for fr[]
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* being 64 bit in both cases.
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*/
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static compat_ulong_t translate_usr_offset(compat_ulong_t offset)
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{
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if (offset < 0)
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return sizeof(struct pt_regs);
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else if (offset <= 32*4) /* gr[0..31] */
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return offset * 2 + 4;
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else if (offset <= 32*4+32*8) /* gr[0..31] + fr[0..31] */
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return offset + 32*4;
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else if (offset < sizeof(struct pt_regs)/2 + 32*4)
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return offset * 2 + 4 - 32*8;
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else
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return sizeof(struct pt_regs);
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}
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long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request,
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compat_ulong_t addr, compat_ulong_t data)
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{
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compat_uint_t tmp;
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long ret = -EIO;
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switch (request) {
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case PTRACE_PEEKUSR:
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if (addr & (sizeof(compat_uint_t)-1))
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break;
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addr = translate_usr_offset(addr);
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if (addr >= sizeof(struct pt_regs))
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break;
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tmp = *(compat_uint_t *) ((char *) task_regs(child) + addr);
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ret = put_user(tmp, (compat_uint_t *) (unsigned long) data);
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break;
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/* Write the word at location addr in the USER area. This will need
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to change when the kernel no longer saves all regs on a syscall.
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FIXME. There is a problem at the moment in that r3-r18 are only
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saved if the process is ptraced on syscall entry, and even then
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those values are overwritten by actual register values on syscall
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exit. */
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case PTRACE_POKEUSR:
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/* Some register values written here may be ignored in
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* entry.S:syscall_restore_rfi; e.g. iaoq is written with
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* r31/r31+4, and not with the values in pt_regs.
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*/
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if (addr == PT_PSW) {
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/* Since PT_PSW==0, it is valid for 32 bit processes
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* under 64 bit kernels as well.
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*/
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ret = arch_ptrace(child, request, addr, data);
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} else {
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if (addr & (sizeof(compat_uint_t)-1))
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break;
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addr = translate_usr_offset(addr);
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if (addr >= sizeof(struct pt_regs))
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break;
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if (addr >= PT_FR0 && addr <= PT_FR31 + 4) {
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/* Special case, fp regs are 64 bits anyway */
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*(__u64 *) ((char *) task_regs(child) + addr) = data;
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ret = 0;
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}
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else if ((addr >= PT_GR1+4 && addr <= PT_GR31+4) ||
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addr == PT_IAOQ0+4 || addr == PT_IAOQ1+4 ||
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addr == PT_SAR+4) {
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/* Zero the top 32 bits */
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*(__u32 *) ((char *) task_regs(child) + addr - 4) = 0;
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*(__u32 *) ((char *) task_regs(child) + addr) = data;
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ret = 0;
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}
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}
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break;
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default:
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ret = compat_ptrace_request(child, request, addr, data);
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break;
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}
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return ret;
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}
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#endif
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long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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long ret = 0;
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/* Do the secure computing check first. */
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secure_computing_strict(regs->gr[20]);
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if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
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tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
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ret = -1L;
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#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
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if (!is_compat_task())
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audit_syscall_entry(regs->gr[20], regs->gr[26], regs->gr[25],
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regs->gr[24], regs->gr[23]);
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else
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#endif
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audit_syscall_entry(regs->gr[20] & 0xffffffff,
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regs->gr[26] & 0xffffffff,
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regs->gr[25] & 0xffffffff,
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regs->gr[24] & 0xffffffff,
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regs->gr[23] & 0xffffffff);
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return ret ? : regs->gr[20];
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}
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void do_syscall_trace_exit(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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int stepping = test_thread_flag(TIF_SINGLESTEP) ||
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test_thread_flag(TIF_BLOCKSTEP);
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audit_syscall_exit(regs);
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if (stepping || test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE))
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tracehook_report_syscall_exit(regs, stepping);
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}
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