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Currently setgid stripping in file_remove_privs()'s should_remove_suid() helper is inconsistent with other parts of the vfs. Specifically, it only raises ATTR_KILL_SGID if the inode is S_ISGID and S_IXGRP but not if the inode isn't in the caller's groups and the caller isn't privileged over the inode although we require this already in setattr_prepare() and setattr_copy() and so all filesystem implement this requirement implicitly because they have to use setattr_{prepare,copy}() anyway. But the inconsistency shows up in setgid stripping bugs for overlayfs in xfstests (e.g., generic/673, generic/683, generic/685, generic/686, generic/687). For example, we test whether suid and setgid stripping works correctly when performing various write-like operations as an unprivileged user (fallocate, reflink, write, etc.): echo "Test 1 - qa_user, non-exec file $verb" setup_testfile chmod a+rws $junk_file commit_and_check "$qa_user" "$verb" 64k 64k The test basically creates a file with 6666 permissions. While the file has the S_ISUID and S_ISGID bits set it does not have the S_IXGRP set. On a regular filesystem like xfs what will happen is: sys_fallocate() -> vfs_fallocate() -> xfs_file_fallocate() -> file_modified() -> __file_remove_privs() -> dentry_needs_remove_privs() -> should_remove_suid() -> __remove_privs() newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_FORCE | kill; -> notify_change() -> setattr_copy() In should_remove_suid() we can see that ATTR_KILL_SUID is raised unconditionally because the file in the test has S_ISUID set. But we also see that ATTR_KILL_SGID won't be set because while the file is S_ISGID it is not S_IXGRP (see above) which is a condition for ATTR_KILL_SGID being raised. So by the time we call notify_change() we have attr->ia_valid set to ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_FORCE. Now notify_change() sees that ATTR_KILL_SUID is set and does: ia_valid = attr->ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE attr->ia_mode = (inode->i_mode & ~S_ISUID); which means that when we call setattr_copy() later we will definitely update inode->i_mode. Note that attr->ia_mode still contains S_ISGID. Now we call into the filesystem's ->setattr() inode operation which will end up calling setattr_copy(). Since ATTR_MODE is set we will hit: if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) { umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode; vfsgid_t vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode); if (!vfsgid_in_group_p(vfsgid) && !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_FSETID)) mode &= ~S_ISGID; inode->i_mode = mode; } and since the caller in the test is neither capable nor in the group of the inode the S_ISGID bit is stripped. But assume the file isn't suid then ATTR_KILL_SUID won't be raised which has the consequence that neither the setgid nor the suid bits are stripped even though it should be stripped because the inode isn't in the caller's groups and the caller isn't privileged over the inode. If overlayfs is in the mix things become a bit more complicated and the bug shows up more clearly. When e.g., ovl_setattr() is hit from ovl_fallocate()'s call to file_remove_privs() then ATTR_KILL_SUID and ATTR_KILL_SGID might be raised but because the check in notify_change() is questioning the ATTR_KILL_SGID flag again by requiring S_IXGRP for it to be stripped the S_ISGID bit isn't removed even though it should be stripped: sys_fallocate() -> vfs_fallocate() -> ovl_fallocate() -> file_remove_privs() -> dentry_needs_remove_privs() -> should_remove_suid() -> __remove_privs() newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_FORCE | kill; -> notify_change() -> ovl_setattr() // TAKE ON MOUNTER'S CREDS -> ovl_do_notify_change() -> notify_change() // GIVE UP MOUNTER'S CREDS // TAKE ON MOUNTER'S CREDS -> vfs_fallocate() -> xfs_file_fallocate() -> file_modified() -> __file_remove_privs() -> dentry_needs_remove_privs() -> should_remove_suid() -> __remove_privs() newattrs.ia_valid = attr_force | kill; -> notify_change() The fix for all of this is to make file_remove_privs()'s should_remove_suid() helper to perform the same checks as we already require in setattr_prepare() and setattr_copy() and have notify_change() not pointlessly requiring S_IXGRP again. It doesn't make any sense in the first place because the caller must calculate the flags via should_remove_suid() anyway which would raise ATTR_KILL_SGID. While we're at it we move should_remove_suid() from inode.c to attr.c where it belongs with the rest of the iattr helpers. Especially since it returns ATTR_KILL_S{G,U}ID flags. We also rename it to setattr_should_drop_suidgid() to better reflect that it indicates both setuid and setgid bit removal and also that it returns attr flags. Running xfstests with this doesn't report any regressions. We should really try and use consistent checks. Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
495 lines
15 KiB
C
495 lines
15 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* linux/fs/attr.c
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*
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* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
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* changes by Thomas Schoebel-Theuer
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*/
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#include <linux/export.h>
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#include <linux/time.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/string.h>
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#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
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#include <linux/capability.h>
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#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
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#include <linux/fcntl.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/evm.h>
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#include <linux/ima.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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/**
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* setattr_should_drop_sgid - determine whether the setgid bit needs to be
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* removed
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* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount @inode was found from
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* @inode: inode to check
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*
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* This function determines whether the setgid bit needs to be removed.
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* We retain backwards compatibility and require setgid bit to be removed
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* unconditionally if S_IXGRP is set. Otherwise we have the exact same
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* requirements as setattr_prepare() and setattr_copy().
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*
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* Return: ATTR_KILL_SGID if setgid bit needs to be removed, 0 otherwise.
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*/
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int setattr_should_drop_sgid(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
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const struct inode *inode)
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{
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umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
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if (!(mode & S_ISGID))
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return 0;
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if (mode & S_IXGRP)
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return ATTR_KILL_SGID;
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if (!in_group_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode,
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i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode)))
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return ATTR_KILL_SGID;
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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* setattr_should_drop_suidgid - determine whether the set{g,u}id bit needs to
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* be dropped
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* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount @inode was found from
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* @inode: inode to check
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*
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* This function determines whether the set{g,u}id bits need to be removed.
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* If the setuid bit needs to be removed ATTR_KILL_SUID is returned. If the
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* setgid bit needs to be removed ATTR_KILL_SGID is returned. If both
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* set{g,u}id bits need to be removed the corresponding mask of both flags is
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* returned.
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*
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* Return: A mask of ATTR_KILL_S{G,U}ID indicating which - if any - setid bits
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* to remove, 0 otherwise.
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*/
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int setattr_should_drop_suidgid(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
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struct inode *inode)
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{
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umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
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int kill = 0;
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/* suid always must be killed */
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if (unlikely(mode & S_ISUID))
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kill = ATTR_KILL_SUID;
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kill |= setattr_should_drop_sgid(mnt_userns, inode);
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if (unlikely(kill && !capable(CAP_FSETID) && S_ISREG(mode)))
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return kill;
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return 0;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(setattr_should_drop_suidgid);
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/**
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* chown_ok - verify permissions to chown inode
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* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount @inode was found from
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* @inode: inode to check permissions on
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* @ia_vfsuid: uid to chown @inode to
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*
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* If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
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* the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then
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* take care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking
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* permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
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* performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
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*/
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static bool chown_ok(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
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const struct inode *inode, vfsuid_t ia_vfsuid)
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{
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vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode);
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if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(vfsuid, current_fsuid()) &&
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vfsuid_eq(ia_vfsuid, vfsuid))
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return true;
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if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_CHOWN))
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return true;
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if (!vfsuid_valid(vfsuid) &&
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ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_CHOWN))
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return true;
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return false;
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}
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/**
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* chgrp_ok - verify permissions to chgrp inode
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* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount @inode was found from
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* @inode: inode to check permissions on
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* @ia_vfsgid: gid to chown @inode to
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*
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* If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
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* the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then
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* take care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking
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* permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
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* performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
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*/
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static bool chgrp_ok(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
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const struct inode *inode, vfsgid_t ia_vfsgid)
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{
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vfsgid_t vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode);
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vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode);
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if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(vfsuid, current_fsuid())) {
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if (vfsgid_eq(ia_vfsgid, vfsgid))
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return true;
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if (vfsgid_in_group_p(ia_vfsgid))
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return true;
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}
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if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_CHOWN))
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return true;
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if (!vfsgid_valid(vfsgid) &&
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ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_CHOWN))
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return true;
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return false;
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}
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/**
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* setattr_prepare - check if attribute changes to a dentry are allowed
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* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
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* @dentry: dentry to check
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* @attr: attributes to change
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*
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* Check if we are allowed to change the attributes contained in @attr
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* in the given dentry. This includes the normal unix access permission
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* checks, as well as checks for rlimits and others. The function also clears
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* SGID bit from mode if user is not allowed to set it. Also file capabilities
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* and IMA extended attributes are cleared if ATTR_KILL_PRIV is set.
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*
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* If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
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* the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then
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* take care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking
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* permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
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* performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
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*
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* Should be called as the first thing in ->setattr implementations,
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* possibly after taking additional locks.
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*/
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int setattr_prepare(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
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struct iattr *attr)
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{
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struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
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unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
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/*
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* First check size constraints. These can't be overriden using
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* ATTR_FORCE.
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*/
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
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int error = inode_newsize_ok(inode, attr->ia_size);
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if (error)
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return error;
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}
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/* If force is set do it anyway. */
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
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goto kill_priv;
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/* Make sure a caller can chown. */
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if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) &&
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!chown_ok(mnt_userns, inode, attr->ia_vfsuid))
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return -EPERM;
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/* Make sure caller can chgrp. */
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if ((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) &&
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!chgrp_ok(mnt_userns, inode, attr->ia_vfsgid))
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return -EPERM;
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/* Make sure a caller can chmod. */
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
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vfsgid_t vfsgid;
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if (!inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode))
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return -EPERM;
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_GID)
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vfsgid = attr->ia_vfsgid;
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else
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vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode);
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/* Also check the setgid bit! */
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if (!in_group_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode, vfsgid))
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attr->ia_mode &= ~S_ISGID;
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}
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/* Check for setting the inode time. */
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if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET)) {
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if (!inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode))
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return -EPERM;
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}
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kill_priv:
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/* User has permission for the change */
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_PRIV) {
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int error;
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error = security_inode_killpriv(mnt_userns, dentry);
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if (error)
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return error;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(setattr_prepare);
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/**
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* inode_newsize_ok - may this inode be truncated to a given size
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* @inode: the inode to be truncated
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* @offset: the new size to assign to the inode
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*
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* inode_newsize_ok must be called with i_mutex held.
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*
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* inode_newsize_ok will check filesystem limits and ulimits to check that the
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* new inode size is within limits. inode_newsize_ok will also send SIGXFSZ
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* when necessary. Caller must not proceed with inode size change if failure is
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* returned. @inode must be a file (not directory), with appropriate
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* permissions to allow truncate (inode_newsize_ok does NOT check these
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* conditions).
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*
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* Return: 0 on success, -ve errno on failure
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*/
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int inode_newsize_ok(const struct inode *inode, loff_t offset)
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{
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if (offset < 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (inode->i_size < offset) {
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unsigned long limit;
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limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE);
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if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY && offset > limit)
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goto out_sig;
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if (offset > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes)
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goto out_big;
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} else {
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/*
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* truncation of in-use swapfiles is disallowed - it would
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* cause subsequent swapout to scribble on the now-freed
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* blocks.
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*/
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if (IS_SWAPFILE(inode))
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return -ETXTBSY;
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}
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return 0;
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out_sig:
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send_sig(SIGXFSZ, current, 0);
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out_big:
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return -EFBIG;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_newsize_ok);
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/**
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* setattr_copy - copy simple metadata updates into the generic inode
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* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
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* @inode: the inode to be updated
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* @attr: the new attributes
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*
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* setattr_copy must be called with i_mutex held.
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*
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* setattr_copy updates the inode's metadata with that specified
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* in attr on idmapped mounts. Necessary permission checks to determine
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* whether or not the S_ISGID property needs to be removed are performed with
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* the correct idmapped mount permission helpers.
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* Noticeably missing is inode size update, which is more complex
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* as it requires pagecache updates.
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*
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* If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
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* the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then
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* take care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking
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* permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
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* performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
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*
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* The inode is not marked as dirty after this operation. The rationale is
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* that for "simple" filesystems, the struct inode is the inode storage.
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* The caller is free to mark the inode dirty afterwards if needed.
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*/
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void setattr_copy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
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const struct iattr *attr)
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{
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unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
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i_uid_update(mnt_userns, attr, inode);
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i_gid_update(mnt_userns, attr, inode);
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_ATIME)
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inode->i_atime = attr->ia_atime;
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME)
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inode->i_mtime = attr->ia_mtime;
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_CTIME)
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inode->i_ctime = attr->ia_ctime;
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
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umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode;
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if (!in_group_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode,
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i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode)))
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mode &= ~S_ISGID;
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inode->i_mode = mode;
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}
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(setattr_copy);
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int may_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
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unsigned int ia_valid)
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{
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int error;
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if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID | ATTR_TIMES_SET)) {
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if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
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return -EPERM;
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}
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/*
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* If utimes(2) and friends are called with times == NULL (or both
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* times are UTIME_NOW), then we need to check for write permission
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*/
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_TOUCH) {
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if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode))
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return -EPERM;
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if (!inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode)) {
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error = inode_permission(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_WRITE);
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if (error)
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return error;
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}
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}
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return 0;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(may_setattr);
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/**
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* notify_change - modify attributes of a filesytem object
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* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
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* @dentry: object affected
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* @attr: new attributes
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* @delegated_inode: returns inode, if the inode is delegated
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*
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* The caller must hold the i_mutex on the affected object.
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*
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* If notify_change discovers a delegation in need of breaking,
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* it will return -EWOULDBLOCK and return a reference to the inode in
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* delegated_inode. The caller should then break the delegation and
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* retry. Because breaking a delegation may take a long time, the
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* caller should drop the i_mutex before doing so.
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*
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* Alternatively, a caller may pass NULL for delegated_inode. This may
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* be appropriate for callers that expect the underlying filesystem not
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* to be NFS exported. Also, passing NULL is fine for callers holding
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* the file open for write, as there can be no conflicting delegation in
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* that case.
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*
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* If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
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* the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then
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* take care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking
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* permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
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* performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
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*/
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int notify_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
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struct iattr *attr, struct inode **delegated_inode)
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{
|
|
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
|
|
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
|
|
int error;
|
|
struct timespec64 now;
|
|
unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
|
|
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(!inode_is_locked(inode));
|
|
|
|
error = may_setattr(mnt_userns, inode, ia_valid);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
if ((ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)) {
|
|
umode_t amode = attr->ia_mode;
|
|
/* Flag setting protected by i_mutex */
|
|
if (is_sxid(amode))
|
|
inode->i_flags &= ~S_NOSEC;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
now = current_time(inode);
|
|
|
|
attr->ia_ctime = now;
|
|
if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_ATIME_SET))
|
|
attr->ia_atime = now;
|
|
else
|
|
attr->ia_atime = timestamp_truncate(attr->ia_atime, inode);
|
|
if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME_SET))
|
|
attr->ia_mtime = now;
|
|
else
|
|
attr->ia_mtime = timestamp_truncate(attr->ia_mtime, inode);
|
|
|
|
if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_PRIV) {
|
|
error = security_inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
|
|
if (error < 0)
|
|
return error;
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
|
ia_valid = attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We now pass ATTR_KILL_S*ID to the lower level setattr function so
|
|
* that the function has the ability to reinterpret a mode change
|
|
* that's due to these bits. This adds an implicit restriction that
|
|
* no function will ever call notify_change with both ATTR_MODE and
|
|
* ATTR_KILL_S*ID set.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((ia_valid & (ATTR_KILL_SUID|ATTR_KILL_SGID)) &&
|
|
(ia_valid & ATTR_MODE))
|
|
BUG();
|
|
|
|
if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_SUID) {
|
|
if (mode & S_ISUID) {
|
|
ia_valid = attr->ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE;
|
|
attr->ia_mode = (inode->i_mode & ~S_ISUID);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_SGID) {
|
|
if (mode & S_ISGID) {
|
|
if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)) {
|
|
ia_valid = attr->ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE;
|
|
attr->ia_mode = inode->i_mode;
|
|
}
|
|
attr->ia_mode &= ~S_ISGID;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!(attr->ia_valid & ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Verify that uid/gid changes are valid in the target
|
|
* namespace of the superblock.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ia_valid & ATTR_UID &&
|
|
!vfsuid_has_fsmapping(mnt_userns, inode->i_sb->s_user_ns,
|
|
attr->ia_vfsuid))
|
|
return -EOVERFLOW;
|
|
if (ia_valid & ATTR_GID &&
|
|
!vfsgid_has_fsmapping(mnt_userns, inode->i_sb->s_user_ns,
|
|
attr->ia_vfsgid))
|
|
return -EOVERFLOW;
|
|
|
|
/* Don't allow modifications of files with invalid uids or
|
|
* gids unless those uids & gids are being made valid.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_UID) &&
|
|
!vfsuid_valid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode)))
|
|
return -EOVERFLOW;
|
|
if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_GID) &&
|
|
!vfsgid_valid(i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode)))
|
|
return -EOVERFLOW;
|
|
|
|
error = security_inode_setattr(mnt_userns, dentry, attr);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return error;
|
|
error = try_break_deleg(inode, delegated_inode);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
if (inode->i_op->setattr)
|
|
error = inode->i_op->setattr(mnt_userns, dentry, attr);
|
|
else
|
|
error = simple_setattr(mnt_userns, dentry, attr);
|
|
|
|
if (!error) {
|
|
fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid);
|
|
ima_inode_post_setattr(mnt_userns, dentry);
|
|
evm_inode_post_setattr(dentry, ia_valid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(notify_change);
|