linux/arch/x86
Linus Torvalds 17ae69aba8 Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
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Merge tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris:
 "Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün.

  Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing.

  From Mickaël's cover letter:
    "The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g.
     global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
     is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security
     sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing
     system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to
     help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious
     behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any
     process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict
     themselves.

     Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering
     syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the
     use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the
     kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS
     sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD
     Pledge/Unveil.

     In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features.
     This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This
     series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the
     combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing,
     init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]"

  The cover letter and v34 posting is here:

      https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/

  See also:

      https://landlock.io/

  This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several
  years"

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2]

* tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features
  landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
  samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
  selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
  landlock: Add syscall implementations
  arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
  fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
  landlock: Support filesystem access-control
  LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
  landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
  landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
  landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
  landlock: Add object management
2021-05-01 18:50:44 -07:00
..
boot - turn the stack canary into a normal __percpu variable on 32-bit which 2021-04-27 17:45:09 -07:00
configs module: remove EXPORT_UNUSED_SYMBOL* 2021-02-08 12:28:07 +01:00
crypto Objtool updates in this cycle were: 2021-04-28 12:53:24 -07:00
entry Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> 2021-05-01 18:50:44 -07:00
events IOMMU Updates for Linux v5.13 2021-05-01 09:33:00 -07:00
hyperv The x86 MM changes in this cycle were: 2021-04-29 11:41:43 -07:00
ia32 x86/ia32_signal: Propagate __user annotation properly 2020-12-11 19:44:31 +01:00
include ARM: 2021-05-01 10:14:08 -07:00
kernel ARM: 2021-05-01 10:14:08 -07:00
kvm ARM: 2021-05-01 10:14:08 -07:00
lib - turn the stack canary into a normal __percpu variable on 32-bit which 2021-04-27 17:45:09 -07:00
math-emu x86/fpu/math-emu: Fix function cast warning 2021-03-23 00:08:02 +01:00
mm ARM: 2021-05-01 10:14:08 -07:00
net Networking changes for 5.13. 2021-04-29 11:57:23 -07:00
pci x86: Fix various typos in comments 2021-03-18 15:31:53 +01:00
platform - turn the stack canary into a normal __percpu variable on 32-bit which 2021-04-27 17:45:09 -07:00
power - turn the stack canary into a normal __percpu variable on 32-bit which 2021-04-27 17:45:09 -07:00
purgatory crypto: sha - split sha.h into sha1.h and sha2.h 2020-11-20 14:45:33 +11:00
ras
realmode x86: Fix various typos in comments, take #2 2021-03-21 23:50:28 +01:00
tools x86/tools/insn_sanity: Convert to insn_decode() 2021-03-15 12:21:11 +01:00
um um: remove process stub VMA 2021-02-12 21:37:38 +01:00
video
xen The x86 MM changes in this cycle were: 2021-04-29 11:41:43 -07:00
.gitignore
Kbuild
Kconfig mm/memtest: add ARCH_USE_MEMTEST 2021-04-30 11:20:36 -07:00
Kconfig.assembler
Kconfig.cpu
Kconfig.debug x86, libnvdimm/test: Remove COPY_MC_TEST 2020-10-26 18:08:35 +01:00
Makefile Kbuild updates for v5.13 2021-04-29 14:24:39 -07:00
Makefile_32.cpu
Makefile.um