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705191b03d
Last cycle we extended the idmapped mounts infrastructure to support
idmapped mounts of idmapped filesystems (No such filesystem yet exist.).
Since then, the meaning of an idmapped mount is a mount whose idmapping
is different from the filesystems idmapping.
While doing that work we missed to adapt the acl translation helpers.
They still assume that checking for the identity mapping is enough. But
they need to use the no_idmapping() helper instead.
Note, POSIX ACLs are always translated right at the userspace-kernel
boundary using the caller's current idmapping and the initial idmapping.
The order depends on whether we're coming from or going to userspace.
The filesystem's idmapping doesn't matter at the border.
Consequently, if a non-idmapped mount is passed we need to make sure to
always pass the initial idmapping as the mount's idmapping and not the
filesystem idmapping. Since it's irrelevant here it would yield invalid
ids and prevent setting acls for filesystems that are mountable in a
userns and support posix acls (tmpfs and fuse).
I verified the regression reported in [1] and verified that this patch
fixes it. A regression test will be added to xfstests in parallel.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215849 [1]
Fixes: bd303368b7
("fs: support mapped mounts of mapped filesystems")
Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.17
Cc: <regressions@lists.linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
1029 lines
24 KiB
C
1029 lines
24 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2002,2003 by Andreas Gruenbacher <a.gruenbacher@computer.org>
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*
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* Fixes from William Schumacher incorporated on 15 March 2001.
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* (Reported by Charles Bertsch, <CBertsch@microtest.com>).
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*/
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/*
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* This file contains generic functions for manipulating
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* POSIX 1003.1e draft standard 17 ACLs.
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*/
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/atomic.h>
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/cred.h>
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#include <linux/posix_acl.h>
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#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
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#include <linux/xattr.h>
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#include <linux/export.h>
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#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
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#include <linux/namei.h>
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#include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h>
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static struct posix_acl **acl_by_type(struct inode *inode, int type)
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{
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switch (type) {
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case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
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return &inode->i_acl;
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case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
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return &inode->i_default_acl;
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default:
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BUG();
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}
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}
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struct posix_acl *get_cached_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
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{
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struct posix_acl **p = acl_by_type(inode, type);
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struct posix_acl *acl;
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for (;;) {
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rcu_read_lock();
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acl = rcu_dereference(*p);
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if (!acl || is_uncached_acl(acl) ||
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refcount_inc_not_zero(&acl->a_refcount))
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break;
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rcu_read_unlock();
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cpu_relax();
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}
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return acl;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_cached_acl);
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struct posix_acl *get_cached_acl_rcu(struct inode *inode, int type)
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{
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struct posix_acl *acl = rcu_dereference(*acl_by_type(inode, type));
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if (acl == ACL_DONT_CACHE) {
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struct posix_acl *ret;
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ret = inode->i_op->get_acl(inode, type, LOOKUP_RCU);
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if (!IS_ERR(ret))
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acl = ret;
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}
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return acl;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_cached_acl_rcu);
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void set_cached_acl(struct inode *inode, int type, struct posix_acl *acl)
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{
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struct posix_acl **p = acl_by_type(inode, type);
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struct posix_acl *old;
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old = xchg(p, posix_acl_dup(acl));
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if (!is_uncached_acl(old))
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posix_acl_release(old);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_cached_acl);
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static void __forget_cached_acl(struct posix_acl **p)
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{
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struct posix_acl *old;
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old = xchg(p, ACL_NOT_CACHED);
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if (!is_uncached_acl(old))
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posix_acl_release(old);
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}
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void forget_cached_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
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{
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__forget_cached_acl(acl_by_type(inode, type));
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(forget_cached_acl);
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void forget_all_cached_acls(struct inode *inode)
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{
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__forget_cached_acl(&inode->i_acl);
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__forget_cached_acl(&inode->i_default_acl);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(forget_all_cached_acls);
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struct posix_acl *get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
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{
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void *sentinel;
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struct posix_acl **p;
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struct posix_acl *acl;
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/*
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* The sentinel is used to detect when another operation like
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* set_cached_acl() or forget_cached_acl() races with get_acl().
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* It is guaranteed that is_uncached_acl(sentinel) is true.
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*/
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acl = get_cached_acl(inode, type);
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if (!is_uncached_acl(acl))
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return acl;
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if (!IS_POSIXACL(inode))
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return NULL;
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sentinel = uncached_acl_sentinel(current);
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p = acl_by_type(inode, type);
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/*
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* If the ACL isn't being read yet, set our sentinel. Otherwise, the
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* current value of the ACL will not be ACL_NOT_CACHED and so our own
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* sentinel will not be set; another task will update the cache. We
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* could wait for that other task to complete its job, but it's easier
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* to just call ->get_acl to fetch the ACL ourself. (This is going to
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* be an unlikely race.)
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*/
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cmpxchg(p, ACL_NOT_CACHED, sentinel);
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/*
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* Normally, the ACL returned by ->get_acl will be cached.
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* A filesystem can prevent that by calling
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* forget_cached_acl(inode, type) in ->get_acl.
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*
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* If the filesystem doesn't have a get_acl() function at all, we'll
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* just create the negative cache entry.
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*/
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if (!inode->i_op->get_acl) {
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set_cached_acl(inode, type, NULL);
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return NULL;
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}
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acl = inode->i_op->get_acl(inode, type, false);
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if (IS_ERR(acl)) {
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/*
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* Remove our sentinel so that we don't block future attempts
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* to cache the ACL.
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*/
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cmpxchg(p, sentinel, ACL_NOT_CACHED);
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return acl;
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}
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/*
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* Cache the result, but only if our sentinel is still in place.
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*/
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posix_acl_dup(acl);
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if (unlikely(cmpxchg(p, sentinel, acl) != sentinel))
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posix_acl_release(acl);
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return acl;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_acl);
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/*
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* Init a fresh posix_acl
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*/
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void
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posix_acl_init(struct posix_acl *acl, int count)
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{
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refcount_set(&acl->a_refcount, 1);
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acl->a_count = count;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_init);
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/*
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* Allocate a new ACL with the specified number of entries.
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*/
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struct posix_acl *
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posix_acl_alloc(int count, gfp_t flags)
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{
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const size_t size = sizeof(struct posix_acl) +
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count * sizeof(struct posix_acl_entry);
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struct posix_acl *acl = kmalloc(size, flags);
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if (acl)
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posix_acl_init(acl, count);
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return acl;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_alloc);
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/*
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* Clone an ACL.
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*/
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static struct posix_acl *
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posix_acl_clone(const struct posix_acl *acl, gfp_t flags)
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{
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struct posix_acl *clone = NULL;
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if (acl) {
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int size = sizeof(struct posix_acl) + acl->a_count *
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sizeof(struct posix_acl_entry);
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clone = kmemdup(acl, size, flags);
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if (clone)
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refcount_set(&clone->a_refcount, 1);
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}
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return clone;
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}
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/*
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* Check if an acl is valid. Returns 0 if it is, or -E... otherwise.
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*/
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int
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posix_acl_valid(struct user_namespace *user_ns, const struct posix_acl *acl)
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{
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const struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe;
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int state = ACL_USER_OBJ;
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int needs_mask = 0;
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FOREACH_ACL_ENTRY(pa, acl, pe) {
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if (pa->e_perm & ~(ACL_READ|ACL_WRITE|ACL_EXECUTE))
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return -EINVAL;
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switch (pa->e_tag) {
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case ACL_USER_OBJ:
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if (state == ACL_USER_OBJ) {
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state = ACL_USER;
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break;
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}
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return -EINVAL;
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case ACL_USER:
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if (state != ACL_USER)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (!kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, pa->e_uid))
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return -EINVAL;
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needs_mask = 1;
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break;
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case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
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if (state == ACL_USER) {
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state = ACL_GROUP;
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break;
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}
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return -EINVAL;
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case ACL_GROUP:
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if (state != ACL_GROUP)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (!kgid_has_mapping(user_ns, pa->e_gid))
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return -EINVAL;
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needs_mask = 1;
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break;
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case ACL_MASK:
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if (state != ACL_GROUP)
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return -EINVAL;
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state = ACL_OTHER;
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break;
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case ACL_OTHER:
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if (state == ACL_OTHER ||
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(state == ACL_GROUP && !needs_mask)) {
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state = 0;
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break;
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}
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return -EINVAL;
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default:
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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}
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if (state == 0)
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return 0;
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_valid);
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/*
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* Returns 0 if the acl can be exactly represented in the traditional
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* file mode permission bits, or else 1. Returns -E... on error.
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*/
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int
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posix_acl_equiv_mode(const struct posix_acl *acl, umode_t *mode_p)
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{
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const struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe;
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umode_t mode = 0;
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int not_equiv = 0;
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/*
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* A null ACL can always be presented as mode bits.
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*/
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if (!acl)
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return 0;
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FOREACH_ACL_ENTRY(pa, acl, pe) {
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switch (pa->e_tag) {
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case ACL_USER_OBJ:
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mode |= (pa->e_perm & S_IRWXO) << 6;
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break;
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case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
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mode |= (pa->e_perm & S_IRWXO) << 3;
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break;
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case ACL_OTHER:
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mode |= pa->e_perm & S_IRWXO;
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break;
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case ACL_MASK:
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mode = (mode & ~S_IRWXG) |
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((pa->e_perm & S_IRWXO) << 3);
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not_equiv = 1;
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break;
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case ACL_USER:
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case ACL_GROUP:
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not_equiv = 1;
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break;
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default:
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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}
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if (mode_p)
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*mode_p = (*mode_p & ~S_IRWXUGO) | mode;
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return not_equiv;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_equiv_mode);
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/*
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* Create an ACL representing the file mode permission bits of an inode.
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*/
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struct posix_acl *
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posix_acl_from_mode(umode_t mode, gfp_t flags)
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{
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struct posix_acl *acl = posix_acl_alloc(3, flags);
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if (!acl)
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
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acl->a_entries[0].e_tag = ACL_USER_OBJ;
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acl->a_entries[0].e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXU) >> 6;
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acl->a_entries[1].e_tag = ACL_GROUP_OBJ;
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acl->a_entries[1].e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXG) >> 3;
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acl->a_entries[2].e_tag = ACL_OTHER;
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acl->a_entries[2].e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXO);
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return acl;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_from_mode);
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/*
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* Return 0 if current is granted want access to the inode
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* by the acl. Returns -E... otherwise.
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*/
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int
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posix_acl_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
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const struct posix_acl *acl, int want)
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{
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const struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe, *mask_obj;
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int found = 0;
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kuid_t uid;
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kgid_t gid;
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want &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC;
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FOREACH_ACL_ENTRY(pa, acl, pe) {
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switch(pa->e_tag) {
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case ACL_USER_OBJ:
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/* (May have been checked already) */
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uid = i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode);
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if (uid_eq(uid, current_fsuid()))
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goto check_perm;
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break;
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case ACL_USER:
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uid = mapped_kuid_fs(mnt_userns,
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i_user_ns(inode),
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pa->e_uid);
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if (uid_eq(uid, current_fsuid()))
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goto mask;
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break;
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case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
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gid = i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode);
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if (in_group_p(gid)) {
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found = 1;
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if ((pa->e_perm & want) == want)
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goto mask;
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}
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break;
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case ACL_GROUP:
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gid = mapped_kgid_fs(mnt_userns,
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i_user_ns(inode),
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pa->e_gid);
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if (in_group_p(gid)) {
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found = 1;
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if ((pa->e_perm & want) == want)
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goto mask;
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}
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break;
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case ACL_MASK:
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break;
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case ACL_OTHER:
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if (found)
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return -EACCES;
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else
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goto check_perm;
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default:
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return -EIO;
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}
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}
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return -EIO;
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mask:
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for (mask_obj = pa+1; mask_obj != pe; mask_obj++) {
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if (mask_obj->e_tag == ACL_MASK) {
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if ((pa->e_perm & mask_obj->e_perm & want) == want)
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return 0;
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return -EACCES;
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}
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}
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check_perm:
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if ((pa->e_perm & want) == want)
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return 0;
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return -EACCES;
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}
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/*
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* Modify acl when creating a new inode. The caller must ensure the acl is
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* only referenced once.
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*
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* mode_p initially must contain the mode parameter to the open() / creat()
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* system calls. All permissions that are not granted by the acl are removed.
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* The permissions in the acl are changed to reflect the mode_p parameter.
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*/
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static int posix_acl_create_masq(struct posix_acl *acl, umode_t *mode_p)
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{
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struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe;
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struct posix_acl_entry *group_obj = NULL, *mask_obj = NULL;
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umode_t mode = *mode_p;
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int not_equiv = 0;
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/* assert(atomic_read(acl->a_refcount) == 1); */
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FOREACH_ACL_ENTRY(pa, acl, pe) {
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switch(pa->e_tag) {
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case ACL_USER_OBJ:
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pa->e_perm &= (mode >> 6) | ~S_IRWXO;
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mode &= (pa->e_perm << 6) | ~S_IRWXU;
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break;
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case ACL_USER:
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case ACL_GROUP:
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not_equiv = 1;
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break;
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case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
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group_obj = pa;
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break;
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case ACL_OTHER:
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pa->e_perm &= mode | ~S_IRWXO;
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mode &= pa->e_perm | ~S_IRWXO;
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break;
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case ACL_MASK:
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mask_obj = pa;
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not_equiv = 1;
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break;
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default:
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return -EIO;
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}
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}
|
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|
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if (mask_obj) {
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mask_obj->e_perm &= (mode >> 3) | ~S_IRWXO;
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mode &= (mask_obj->e_perm << 3) | ~S_IRWXG;
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} else {
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if (!group_obj)
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return -EIO;
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group_obj->e_perm &= (mode >> 3) | ~S_IRWXO;
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mode &= (group_obj->e_perm << 3) | ~S_IRWXG;
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}
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*mode_p = (*mode_p & ~S_IRWXUGO) | mode;
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return not_equiv;
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}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Modify the ACL for the chmod syscall.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int __posix_acl_chmod_masq(struct posix_acl *acl, umode_t mode)
|
|
{
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|
struct posix_acl_entry *group_obj = NULL, *mask_obj = NULL;
|
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struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe;
|
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|
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/* assert(atomic_read(acl->a_refcount) == 1); */
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|
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FOREACH_ACL_ENTRY(pa, acl, pe) {
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switch(pa->e_tag) {
|
|
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
|
|
pa->e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXU) >> 6;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ACL_USER:
|
|
case ACL_GROUP:
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
|
|
group_obj = pa;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ACL_MASK:
|
|
mask_obj = pa;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ACL_OTHER:
|
|
pa->e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXO);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return -EIO;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mask_obj) {
|
|
mask_obj->e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXG) >> 3;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!group_obj)
|
|
return -EIO;
|
|
group_obj->e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXG) >> 3;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
__posix_acl_create(struct posix_acl **acl, gfp_t gfp, umode_t *mode_p)
|
|
{
|
|
struct posix_acl *clone = posix_acl_clone(*acl, gfp);
|
|
int err = -ENOMEM;
|
|
if (clone) {
|
|
err = posix_acl_create_masq(clone, mode_p);
|
|
if (err < 0) {
|
|
posix_acl_release(clone);
|
|
clone = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
posix_acl_release(*acl);
|
|
*acl = clone;
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__posix_acl_create);
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
__posix_acl_chmod(struct posix_acl **acl, gfp_t gfp, umode_t mode)
|
|
{
|
|
struct posix_acl *clone = posix_acl_clone(*acl, gfp);
|
|
int err = -ENOMEM;
|
|
if (clone) {
|
|
err = __posix_acl_chmod_masq(clone, mode);
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
posix_acl_release(clone);
|
|
clone = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
posix_acl_release(*acl);
|
|
*acl = clone;
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__posix_acl_chmod);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* posix_acl_chmod - chmod a posix acl
|
|
*
|
|
* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount @inode was found from
|
|
* @inode: inode to check permissions on
|
|
* @mode: the new mode of @inode
|
|
*
|
|
* If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
|
|
* the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then
|
|
* take care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking
|
|
* permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
|
|
* performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
posix_acl_chmod(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
|
|
umode_t mode)
|
|
{
|
|
struct posix_acl *acl;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!IS_POSIXACL(inode))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (!inode->i_op->set_acl)
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
acl = get_acl(inode, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
|
|
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acl)) {
|
|
if (acl == ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return PTR_ERR(acl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = __posix_acl_chmod(&acl, GFP_KERNEL, mode);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
ret = inode->i_op->set_acl(mnt_userns, inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
|
|
posix_acl_release(acl);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_chmod);
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
posix_acl_create(struct inode *dir, umode_t *mode,
|
|
struct posix_acl **default_acl, struct posix_acl **acl)
|
|
{
|
|
struct posix_acl *p;
|
|
struct posix_acl *clone;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
*acl = NULL;
|
|
*default_acl = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (S_ISLNK(*mode) || !IS_POSIXACL(dir))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
p = get_acl(dir, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
|
|
if (!p || p == ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP)) {
|
|
*mode &= ~current_umask();
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (IS_ERR(p))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(p);
|
|
|
|
ret = -ENOMEM;
|
|
clone = posix_acl_clone(p, GFP_NOFS);
|
|
if (!clone)
|
|
goto err_release;
|
|
|
|
ret = posix_acl_create_masq(clone, mode);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto err_release_clone;
|
|
|
|
if (ret == 0)
|
|
posix_acl_release(clone);
|
|
else
|
|
*acl = clone;
|
|
|
|
if (!S_ISDIR(*mode))
|
|
posix_acl_release(p);
|
|
else
|
|
*default_acl = p;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
err_release_clone:
|
|
posix_acl_release(clone);
|
|
err_release:
|
|
posix_acl_release(p);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(posix_acl_create);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* posix_acl_update_mode - update mode in set_acl
|
|
* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount @inode was found from
|
|
* @inode: target inode
|
|
* @mode_p: mode (pointer) for update
|
|
* @acl: acl pointer
|
|
*
|
|
* Update the file mode when setting an ACL: compute the new file permission
|
|
* bits based on the ACL. In addition, if the ACL is equivalent to the new
|
|
* file mode, set *@acl to NULL to indicate that no ACL should be set.
|
|
*
|
|
* As with chmod, clear the setgid bit if the caller is not in the owning group
|
|
* or capable of CAP_FSETID (see inode_change_ok).
|
|
*
|
|
* If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
|
|
* the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then
|
|
* take care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking
|
|
* permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
|
|
* performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
|
|
*
|
|
* Called from set_acl inode operations.
|
|
*/
|
|
int posix_acl_update_mode(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
|
|
struct inode *inode, umode_t *mode_p,
|
|
struct posix_acl **acl)
|
|
{
|
|
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(*acl, &mode);
|
|
if (error < 0)
|
|
return error;
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
|
*acl = NULL;
|
|
if (!in_group_p(i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)) &&
|
|
!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_FSETID))
|
|
mode &= ~S_ISGID;
|
|
*mode_p = mode;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_update_mode);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fix up the uids and gids in posix acl extended attributes in place.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void posix_acl_fix_xattr_userns(
|
|
struct user_namespace *to, struct user_namespace *from,
|
|
struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
|
|
void *value, size_t size, bool from_user)
|
|
{
|
|
struct posix_acl_xattr_header *header = value;
|
|
struct posix_acl_xattr_entry *entry = (void *)(header + 1), *end;
|
|
int count;
|
|
kuid_t uid;
|
|
kgid_t gid;
|
|
|
|
if (!value)
|
|
return;
|
|
if (size < sizeof(struct posix_acl_xattr_header))
|
|
return;
|
|
if (header->a_version != cpu_to_le32(POSIX_ACL_XATTR_VERSION))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
count = posix_acl_xattr_count(size);
|
|
if (count < 0)
|
|
return;
|
|
if (count == 0)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
for (end = entry + count; entry != end; entry++) {
|
|
switch(le16_to_cpu(entry->e_tag)) {
|
|
case ACL_USER:
|
|
uid = make_kuid(from, le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
|
|
if (from_user)
|
|
uid = mapped_kuid_user(mnt_userns, &init_user_ns, uid);
|
|
else
|
|
uid = mapped_kuid_fs(mnt_userns, &init_user_ns, uid);
|
|
entry->e_id = cpu_to_le32(from_kuid(to, uid));
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_GROUP:
|
|
gid = make_kgid(from, le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
|
|
if (from_user)
|
|
gid = mapped_kgid_user(mnt_userns, &init_user_ns, gid);
|
|
else
|
|
gid = mapped_kgid_fs(mnt_userns, &init_user_ns, gid);
|
|
entry->e_id = cpu_to_le32(from_kgid(to, gid));
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
|
|
struct inode *inode,
|
|
void *value, size_t size)
|
|
{
|
|
struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
|
|
|
|
/* Leave ids untouched on non-idmapped mounts. */
|
|
if (no_idmapping(mnt_userns, i_user_ns(inode)))
|
|
mnt_userns = &init_user_ns;
|
|
if ((user_ns == &init_user_ns) && (mnt_userns == &init_user_ns))
|
|
return;
|
|
posix_acl_fix_xattr_userns(&init_user_ns, user_ns, mnt_userns, value,
|
|
size, true);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
|
|
struct inode *inode,
|
|
void *value, size_t size)
|
|
{
|
|
struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
|
|
|
|
/* Leave ids untouched on non-idmapped mounts. */
|
|
if (no_idmapping(mnt_userns, i_user_ns(inode)))
|
|
mnt_userns = &init_user_ns;
|
|
if ((user_ns == &init_user_ns) && (mnt_userns == &init_user_ns))
|
|
return;
|
|
posix_acl_fix_xattr_userns(user_ns, &init_user_ns, mnt_userns, value,
|
|
size, false);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Convert from extended attribute to in-memory representation.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct posix_acl *
|
|
posix_acl_from_xattr(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
|
|
const void *value, size_t size)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct posix_acl_xattr_header *header = value;
|
|
const struct posix_acl_xattr_entry *entry = (const void *)(header + 1), *end;
|
|
int count;
|
|
struct posix_acl *acl;
|
|
struct posix_acl_entry *acl_e;
|
|
|
|
if (!value)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
if (size < sizeof(struct posix_acl_xattr_header))
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
|
|
if (header->a_version != cpu_to_le32(POSIX_ACL_XATTR_VERSION))
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
|
|
|
|
count = posix_acl_xattr_count(size);
|
|
if (count < 0)
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
|
|
if (count == 0)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
acl = posix_acl_alloc(count, GFP_NOFS);
|
|
if (!acl)
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
|
|
acl_e = acl->a_entries;
|
|
|
|
for (end = entry + count; entry != end; acl_e++, entry++) {
|
|
acl_e->e_tag = le16_to_cpu(entry->e_tag);
|
|
acl_e->e_perm = le16_to_cpu(entry->e_perm);
|
|
|
|
switch(acl_e->e_tag) {
|
|
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
|
|
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
|
|
case ACL_MASK:
|
|
case ACL_OTHER:
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ACL_USER:
|
|
acl_e->e_uid =
|
|
make_kuid(user_ns,
|
|
le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
|
|
if (!uid_valid(acl_e->e_uid))
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_GROUP:
|
|
acl_e->e_gid =
|
|
make_kgid(user_ns,
|
|
le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
|
|
if (!gid_valid(acl_e->e_gid))
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return acl;
|
|
|
|
fail:
|
|
posix_acl_release(acl);
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL (posix_acl_from_xattr);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Convert from in-memory to extended attribute representation.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
posix_acl_to_xattr(struct user_namespace *user_ns, const struct posix_acl *acl,
|
|
void *buffer, size_t size)
|
|
{
|
|
struct posix_acl_xattr_header *ext_acl = buffer;
|
|
struct posix_acl_xattr_entry *ext_entry;
|
|
int real_size, n;
|
|
|
|
real_size = posix_acl_xattr_size(acl->a_count);
|
|
if (!buffer)
|
|
return real_size;
|
|
if (real_size > size)
|
|
return -ERANGE;
|
|
|
|
ext_entry = (void *)(ext_acl + 1);
|
|
ext_acl->a_version = cpu_to_le32(POSIX_ACL_XATTR_VERSION);
|
|
|
|
for (n=0; n < acl->a_count; n++, ext_entry++) {
|
|
const struct posix_acl_entry *acl_e = &acl->a_entries[n];
|
|
ext_entry->e_tag = cpu_to_le16(acl_e->e_tag);
|
|
ext_entry->e_perm = cpu_to_le16(acl_e->e_perm);
|
|
switch(acl_e->e_tag) {
|
|
case ACL_USER:
|
|
ext_entry->e_id =
|
|
cpu_to_le32(from_kuid(user_ns, acl_e->e_uid));
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_GROUP:
|
|
ext_entry->e_id =
|
|
cpu_to_le32(from_kgid(user_ns, acl_e->e_gid));
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
ext_entry->e_id = cpu_to_le32(ACL_UNDEFINED_ID);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return real_size;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL (posix_acl_to_xattr);
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
posix_acl_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
|
|
struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode,
|
|
const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
|
|
{
|
|
struct posix_acl *acl;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
if (!IS_POSIXACL(inode))
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
acl = get_acl(inode, handler->flags);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(acl))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(acl);
|
|
if (acl == NULL)
|
|
return -ENODATA;
|
|
|
|
error = posix_acl_to_xattr(&init_user_ns, acl, value, size);
|
|
posix_acl_release(acl);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
set_posix_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
|
|
int type, struct posix_acl *acl)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!IS_POSIXACL(inode))
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
if (!inode->i_op->set_acl)
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
if (type == ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT && !S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
|
|
return acl ? -EACCES : 0;
|
|
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode))
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
if (acl) {
|
|
int ret = posix_acl_valid(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, acl);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
return inode->i_op->set_acl(mnt_userns, inode, acl, type);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_posix_acl);
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
posix_acl_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
|
|
struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
|
|
struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode,
|
|
const char *name, const void *value, size_t size,
|
|
int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
struct posix_acl *acl = NULL;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (value) {
|
|
acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(&init_user_ns, value, size);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(acl))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(acl);
|
|
}
|
|
ret = set_posix_acl(mnt_userns, inode, handler->flags, acl);
|
|
posix_acl_release(acl);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool
|
|
posix_acl_xattr_list(struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
return IS_POSIXACL(d_backing_inode(dentry));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const struct xattr_handler posix_acl_access_xattr_handler = {
|
|
.name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS,
|
|
.flags = ACL_TYPE_ACCESS,
|
|
.list = posix_acl_xattr_list,
|
|
.get = posix_acl_xattr_get,
|
|
.set = posix_acl_xattr_set,
|
|
};
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(posix_acl_access_xattr_handler);
|
|
|
|
const struct xattr_handler posix_acl_default_xattr_handler = {
|
|
.name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT,
|
|
.flags = ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT,
|
|
.list = posix_acl_xattr_list,
|
|
.get = posix_acl_xattr_get,
|
|
.set = posix_acl_xattr_set,
|
|
};
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(posix_acl_default_xattr_handler);
|
|
|
|
int simple_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
|
|
struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
|
|
{
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS) {
|
|
error = posix_acl_update_mode(mnt_userns, inode,
|
|
&inode->i_mode, &acl);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
|
|
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int simple_acl_create(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode)
|
|
{
|
|
struct posix_acl *default_acl, *acl;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
error = posix_acl_create(dir, &inode->i_mode, &default_acl, &acl);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
set_cached_acl(inode, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, default_acl);
|
|
set_cached_acl(inode, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, acl);
|
|
|
|
if (default_acl)
|
|
posix_acl_release(default_acl);
|
|
if (acl)
|
|
posix_acl_release(acl);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|