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8bbf4976b5
Alter the use of the key instantiation and negation functions' link-to-keyring arguments. Currently this specifies a keyring in the target process to link the key into, creating the keyring if it doesn't exist. This, however, can be a problem for copy-on-write credentials as it means that the instantiating process can alter the credentials of the requesting process. This patch alters the behaviour such that: (1) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given a specific keyring by ID (ringid >= 0), then that keyring will be used. (2) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given one of the special constants that refer to the requesting process's keyrings (KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING, all <= 0), then: (a) If sys_request_key() was given a keyring to use (destringid) then the key will be attached to that keyring. (b) If sys_request_key() was given a NULL keyring, then the key being instantiated will be attached to the default keyring as set by keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(). (3) No extra link will be made. Decision point (1) follows current behaviour, and allows those instantiators who've searched for a specifically named keyring in the requestor's keyring so as to partition the keys by type to still have their named keyrings. Decision point (2) allows the requestor to make sure that the key or keys that get produced by request_key() go where they want, whilst allowing the instantiator to request that the key is retained. This is mainly useful for situations where the instantiator makes a secondary request, the key for which should be retained by the initial requestor: +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ | | | | | | | Requestor |------->| Instantiator |------->| Instantiator | | | | | | | +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ request_key() request_key() This might be useful, for example, in Kerberos, where the requestor requests a ticket, and then the ticket instantiator requests the TGT, which someone else then has to go and fetch. The TGT, however, should be retained in the keyrings of the requestor, not the first instantiator. To make this explict an extra special keyring constant is also added. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
820 lines
19 KiB
C
820 lines
19 KiB
C
/* Management of a process's keyrings
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2004-2005, 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
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* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
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* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
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*/
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/keyctl.h>
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/err.h>
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#include <linux/mutex.h>
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#include <asm/uaccess.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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/* session keyring create vs join semaphore */
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static DEFINE_MUTEX(key_session_mutex);
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/* user keyring creation semaphore */
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static DEFINE_MUTEX(key_user_keyring_mutex);
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/* the root user's tracking struct */
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struct key_user root_key_user = {
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.usage = ATOMIC_INIT(3),
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.cons_lock = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(root_key_user.cons_lock),
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.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(root_key_user.lock),
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.nkeys = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
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.nikeys = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
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.uid = 0,
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};
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* install user and user session keyrings for a particular UID
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*/
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int install_user_keyrings(void)
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{
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struct user_struct *user = current->user;
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struct key *uid_keyring, *session_keyring;
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char buf[20];
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int ret;
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kenter("%p{%u}", user, user->uid);
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if (user->uid_keyring) {
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kleave(" = 0 [exist]");
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return 0;
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}
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mutex_lock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);
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ret = 0;
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if (!user->uid_keyring) {
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/* get the UID-specific keyring
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* - there may be one in existence already as it may have been
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* pinned by a session, but the user_struct pointing to it
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* may have been destroyed by setuid */
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sprintf(buf, "_uid.%u", user->uid);
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uid_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true);
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if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
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uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, (gid_t) -1,
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current, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
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NULL);
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if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(uid_keyring);
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goto error;
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}
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}
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/* get a default session keyring (which might also exist
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* already) */
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sprintf(buf, "_uid_ses.%u", user->uid);
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session_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true);
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if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
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session_keyring =
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keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, (gid_t) -1,
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current, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
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NULL);
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if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring);
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goto error_release;
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}
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/* we install a link from the user session keyring to
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* the user keyring */
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ret = key_link(session_keyring, uid_keyring);
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if (ret < 0)
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goto error_release_both;
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}
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/* install the keyrings */
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user->uid_keyring = uid_keyring;
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user->session_keyring = session_keyring;
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}
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mutex_unlock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);
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kleave(" = 0");
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return 0;
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error_release_both:
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key_put(session_keyring);
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error_release:
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key_put(uid_keyring);
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error:
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mutex_unlock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);
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kleave(" = %d", ret);
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return ret;
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}
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* deal with the UID changing
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*/
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void switch_uid_keyring(struct user_struct *new_user)
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{
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#if 0 /* do nothing for now */
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struct key *old;
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/* switch to the new user's session keyring if we were running under
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* root's default session keyring */
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if (new_user->uid != 0 &&
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current->session_keyring == &root_session_keyring
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) {
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atomic_inc(&new_user->session_keyring->usage);
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task_lock(current);
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old = current->session_keyring;
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current->session_keyring = new_user->session_keyring;
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task_unlock(current);
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key_put(old);
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}
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#endif
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} /* end switch_uid_keyring() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* install a fresh thread keyring, discarding the old one
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*/
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int install_thread_keyring(void)
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{
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struct task_struct *tsk = current;
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struct key *keyring, *old;
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char buf[20];
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int ret;
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sprintf(buf, "_tid.%u", tsk->pid);
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keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->uid, tsk->gid, tsk,
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KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
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if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
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goto error;
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}
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task_lock(tsk);
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old = tsk->thread_keyring;
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tsk->thread_keyring = keyring;
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task_unlock(tsk);
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ret = 0;
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key_put(old);
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error:
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return ret;
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} /* end install_thread_keyring() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* make sure a process keyring is installed
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*/
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int install_process_keyring(void)
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{
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struct task_struct *tsk = current;
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struct key *keyring;
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char buf[20];
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int ret;
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might_sleep();
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if (!tsk->signal->process_keyring) {
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sprintf(buf, "_pid.%u", tsk->tgid);
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keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->uid, tsk->gid, tsk,
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KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
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if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
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goto error;
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}
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/* attach keyring */
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spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
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if (!tsk->signal->process_keyring) {
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tsk->signal->process_keyring = keyring;
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keyring = NULL;
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}
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spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
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key_put(keyring);
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}
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ret = 0;
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error:
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return ret;
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} /* end install_process_keyring() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* install a session keyring, discarding the old one
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* - if a keyring is not supplied, an empty one is invented
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*/
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static int install_session_keyring(struct key *keyring)
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{
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struct task_struct *tsk = current;
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unsigned long flags;
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struct key *old;
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char buf[20];
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might_sleep();
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/* create an empty session keyring */
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if (!keyring) {
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sprintf(buf, "_ses.%u", tsk->tgid);
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flags = KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN;
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if (tsk->signal->session_keyring)
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flags = KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA;
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keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->uid, tsk->gid, tsk,
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flags, NULL);
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if (IS_ERR(keyring))
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return PTR_ERR(keyring);
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}
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else {
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atomic_inc(&keyring->usage);
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}
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/* install the keyring */
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spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
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old = tsk->signal->session_keyring;
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rcu_assign_pointer(tsk->signal->session_keyring, keyring);
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spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
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/* we're using RCU on the pointer, but there's no point synchronising
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* on it if it didn't previously point to anything */
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if (old) {
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synchronize_rcu();
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key_put(old);
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}
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return 0;
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} /* end install_session_keyring() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* copy the keys in a thread group for fork without CLONE_THREAD
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*/
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int copy_thread_group_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
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{
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key_check(current->thread_group->session_keyring);
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key_check(current->thread_group->process_keyring);
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/* no process keyring yet */
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tsk->signal->process_keyring = NULL;
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/* same session keyring */
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rcu_read_lock();
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tsk->signal->session_keyring =
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key_get(rcu_dereference(current->signal->session_keyring));
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return 0;
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} /* end copy_thread_group_keys() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* copy the keys for fork
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*/
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int copy_keys(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
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{
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key_check(tsk->thread_keyring);
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key_check(tsk->request_key_auth);
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/* no thread keyring yet */
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tsk->thread_keyring = NULL;
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/* copy the request_key() authorisation for this thread */
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key_get(tsk->request_key_auth);
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return 0;
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} /* end copy_keys() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* dispose of thread group keys upon thread group destruction
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*/
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void exit_thread_group_keys(struct signal_struct *tg)
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{
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key_put(tg->session_keyring);
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key_put(tg->process_keyring);
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} /* end exit_thread_group_keys() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* dispose of per-thread keys upon thread exit
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*/
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void exit_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
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{
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key_put(tsk->thread_keyring);
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key_put(tsk->request_key_auth);
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} /* end exit_keys() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* deal with execve()
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*/
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int exec_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
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{
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struct key *old;
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/* newly exec'd tasks don't get a thread keyring */
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task_lock(tsk);
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old = tsk->thread_keyring;
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tsk->thread_keyring = NULL;
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task_unlock(tsk);
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key_put(old);
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/* discard the process keyring from a newly exec'd task */
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spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
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old = tsk->signal->process_keyring;
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tsk->signal->process_keyring = NULL;
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spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
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key_put(old);
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return 0;
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} /* end exec_keys() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* deal with SUID programs
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* - we might want to make this invent a new session keyring
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*/
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int suid_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
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{
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return 0;
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} /* end suid_keys() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* the filesystem user ID changed
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*/
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void key_fsuid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)
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{
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/* update the ownership of the thread keyring */
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if (tsk->thread_keyring) {
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down_write(&tsk->thread_keyring->sem);
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tsk->thread_keyring->uid = tsk->fsuid;
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up_write(&tsk->thread_keyring->sem);
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}
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} /* end key_fsuid_changed() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* the filesystem group ID changed
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*/
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void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)
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{
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/* update the ownership of the thread keyring */
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if (tsk->thread_keyring) {
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down_write(&tsk->thread_keyring->sem);
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tsk->thread_keyring->gid = tsk->fsgid;
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up_write(&tsk->thread_keyring->sem);
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}
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} /* end key_fsgid_changed() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* search the process keyrings for the first matching key
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* - we use the supplied match function to see if the description (or other
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* feature of interest) matches
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* - we return -EAGAIN if we didn't find any matching key
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* - we return -ENOKEY if we found only negative matching keys
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*/
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key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
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const void *description,
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key_match_func_t match,
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struct task_struct *context)
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{
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struct request_key_auth *rka;
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key_ref_t key_ref, ret, err;
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might_sleep();
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/* we want to return -EAGAIN or -ENOKEY if any of the keyrings were
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* searchable, but we failed to find a key or we found a negative key;
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* otherwise we want to return a sample error (probably -EACCES) if
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* none of the keyrings were searchable
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*
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* in terms of priority: success > -ENOKEY > -EAGAIN > other error
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*/
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key_ref = NULL;
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ret = NULL;
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err = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
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/* search the thread keyring first */
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if (context->thread_keyring) {
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key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
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make_key_ref(context->thread_keyring, 1),
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context, type, description, match);
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if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
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goto found;
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switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
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case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
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if (ret)
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break;
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case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
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ret = key_ref;
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break;
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default:
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err = key_ref;
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break;
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}
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}
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/* search the process keyring second */
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if (context->signal->process_keyring) {
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key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
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make_key_ref(context->signal->process_keyring, 1),
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context, type, description, match);
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if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
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goto found;
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switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
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case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
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if (ret)
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break;
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case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
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ret = key_ref;
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break;
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default:
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err = key_ref;
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break;
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}
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}
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/* search the session keyring */
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if (context->signal->session_keyring) {
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rcu_read_lock();
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key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
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make_key_ref(rcu_dereference(
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context->signal->session_keyring),
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1),
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context, type, description, match);
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rcu_read_unlock();
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if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
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goto found;
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switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
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case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
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if (ret)
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break;
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case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
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ret = key_ref;
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break;
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default:
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err = key_ref;
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break;
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}
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}
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/* or search the user-session keyring */
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else if (context->user->session_keyring) {
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key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
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make_key_ref(context->user->session_keyring, 1),
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context, type, description, match);
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if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
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goto found;
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switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
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case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
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if (ret)
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break;
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case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
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ret = key_ref;
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break;
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default:
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err = key_ref;
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break;
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}
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}
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/* if this process has an instantiation authorisation key, then we also
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* search the keyrings of the process mentioned there
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* - we don't permit access to request_key auth keys via this method
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*/
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if (context->request_key_auth &&
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context == current &&
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type != &key_type_request_key_auth
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) {
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/* defend against the auth key being revoked */
|
|
down_read(&context->request_key_auth->sem);
|
|
|
|
if (key_validate(context->request_key_auth) == 0) {
|
|
rka = context->request_key_auth->payload.data;
|
|
|
|
key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description,
|
|
match, rka->context);
|
|
|
|
up_read(&context->request_key_auth->sem);
|
|
|
|
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
|
|
goto found;
|
|
|
|
switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
|
|
case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
break;
|
|
case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
|
|
ret = key_ref;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
err = key_ref;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
up_read(&context->request_key_auth->sem);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* no key - decide on the error we're going to go for */
|
|
key_ref = ret ? ret : err;
|
|
|
|
found:
|
|
return key_ref;
|
|
|
|
} /* end search_process_keyrings() */
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
/*
|
|
* see if the key we're looking at is the target key
|
|
*/
|
|
static int lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key, const void *target)
|
|
{
|
|
return key == target;
|
|
|
|
} /* end lookup_user_key_possessed() */
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
/*
|
|
* lookup a key given a key ID from userspace with a given permissions mask
|
|
* - don't create special keyrings unless so requested
|
|
* - partially constructed keys aren't found unless requested
|
|
*/
|
|
key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
|
|
key_perm_t perm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct request_key_auth *rka;
|
|
struct task_struct *t = current;
|
|
key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
|
|
struct key *key;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
|
|
|
|
switch (id) {
|
|
case KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING:
|
|
if (!t->thread_keyring) {
|
|
if (!create)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
ret = install_thread_keyring();
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
key = ERR_PTR(ret);
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key = t->thread_keyring;
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
|
|
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING:
|
|
if (!t->signal->process_keyring) {
|
|
if (!create)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
ret = install_process_keyring();
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
key = ERR_PTR(ret);
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key = t->signal->process_keyring;
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
|
|
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING:
|
|
if (!t->signal->session_keyring) {
|
|
/* always install a session keyring upon access if one
|
|
* doesn't exist yet */
|
|
ret = install_user_keyrings();
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
ret = install_session_keyring(t->user->session_keyring);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
key = rcu_dereference(t->signal->session_keyring);
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING:
|
|
if (!t->user->uid_keyring) {
|
|
ret = install_user_keyrings();
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key = t->user->uid_keyring;
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
|
|
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
|
|
if (!t->user->session_keyring) {
|
|
ret = install_user_keyrings();
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key = t->user->session_keyring;
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
|
|
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case KEY_SPEC_GROUP_KEYRING:
|
|
/* group keyrings are not yet supported */
|
|
key = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
case KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY:
|
|
key = t->request_key_auth;
|
|
if (!key)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
|
|
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
|
|
if (!t->request_key_auth)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
down_read(&t->request_key_auth->sem);
|
|
if (t->request_key_auth->flags & KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) {
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
|
|
key = NULL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
rka = t->request_key_auth->payload.data;
|
|
key = rka->dest_keyring;
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
|
|
}
|
|
up_read(&t->request_key_auth->sem);
|
|
if (!key)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
|
|
if (id < 1)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
key = key_lookup(id);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
|
|
key_ref = ERR_CAST(key);
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);
|
|
|
|
/* check to see if we possess the key */
|
|
skey_ref = search_process_keyrings(key->type, key,
|
|
lookup_user_key_possessed,
|
|
current);
|
|
|
|
if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
|
|
key_put(key);
|
|
key_ref = skey_ref;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!partial) {
|
|
ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, true);
|
|
switch (ret) {
|
|
case -ERESTARTSYS:
|
|
goto invalid_key;
|
|
default:
|
|
if (perm)
|
|
goto invalid_key;
|
|
case 0:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (perm) {
|
|
ret = key_validate(key);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto invalid_key;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = -EIO;
|
|
if (!partial && !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
|
|
goto invalid_key;
|
|
|
|
/* check the permissions */
|
|
ret = key_task_permission(key_ref, t, perm);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto invalid_key;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
return key_ref;
|
|
|
|
invalid_key:
|
|
key_ref_put(key_ref);
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
} /* end lookup_user_key() */
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
/*
|
|
* join the named keyring as the session keyring if possible, or attempt to
|
|
* create a new one of that name if not
|
|
* - if the name is NULL, an empty anonymous keyring is installed instead
|
|
* - named session keyring joining is done with a semaphore held
|
|
*/
|
|
long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
|
|
{
|
|
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
|
|
struct key *keyring;
|
|
long ret;
|
|
|
|
/* if no name is provided, install an anonymous keyring */
|
|
if (!name) {
|
|
ret = install_session_keyring(NULL);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
ret = rcu_dereference(tsk->signal->session_keyring)->serial;
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* allow the user to join or create a named keyring */
|
|
mutex_lock(&key_session_mutex);
|
|
|
|
/* look for an existing keyring of this name */
|
|
keyring = find_keyring_by_name(name, false);
|
|
if (PTR_ERR(keyring) == -ENOKEY) {
|
|
/* not found - try and create a new one */
|
|
keyring = keyring_alloc(name, tsk->uid, tsk->gid, tsk,
|
|
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
|
|
goto error2;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
|
|
goto error2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* we've got a keyring - now to install it */
|
|
ret = install_session_keyring(keyring);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto error2;
|
|
|
|
ret = keyring->serial;
|
|
key_put(keyring);
|
|
|
|
error2:
|
|
mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
|
|
error:
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
} /* end join_session_keyring() */
|