mirror of
https://mirrors.bfsu.edu.cn/git/linux.git
synced 2025-01-13 01:04:35 +08:00
7001052160
coarse grained, hardware based, forward edge Control-Flow-Integrity mechanism where any indirect CALL/JMP must target an ENDBR instruction or suffer #CP. Additionally, since Alderlake (12th gen)/Sapphire-Rapids, speculation is limited to 2 instructions (and typically fewer) on branch targets not starting with ENDBR. CET-IBT also limits speculation of the next sequential instruction after the indirect CALL/JMP [1]. CET-IBT is fundamentally incompatible with retpolines, but provides, as described above, speculation limits itself. [1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/branch-history-injection.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJJBAABCgAzFiEEv3OU3/byMaA0LqWJdkfhpEvA5LoFAmI/LI8VHHBldGVyekBp bmZyYWRlYWQub3JnAAoJEHZH4aRLwOS6ZnkP/2QCgQLTu6oRxv9O020CHwlaSEeD 1Hoy3loum5q5hAi1Ik3dR9p0H5u64c9qbrBVxaFoNKaLt5GKrtHaDSHNk2L/CFHX urpH65uvTLxbyZzcahkAahoJ71XU+m7PcrHLWMunw9sy10rExYVsUOlFyoyG6XCF BDCNZpdkC09ZM3vwlWGMZd5Pp+6HcZNPyoV9tpvWAS2l+WYFWAID7mflbpQ+tA8b y/hM6b3Ud0rT2ubuG1iUpopgNdwqQZ+HisMPGprh+wKZkYwS2l8pUTrz0MaBkFde go7fW16kFy2HQzGm6aIEBmfcg0palP/mFVaWP0zS62LwhJSWTn5G6xWBr3yxSsht 9gWCiI0oDZuTg698MedWmomdG2SK6yAuZuqmdKtLLoWfWgviPEi7TDFG/cKtZdAW ag8GM8T4iyYZzpCEcWO9GWbjo6TTGq30JBQefCBG47GjD0csv2ubXXx0Iey+jOwT x3E8wnv9dl8V9FSd/tMpTFmje8ges23yGrWtNpb5BRBuWTeuGiBPZED2BNyyIf+T dmewi2ufNMONgyNp27bDKopY81CPAQq9cVxqNm9Cg3eWPFnpOq2KGYEvisZ/rpEL EjMQeUBsy/C3AUFAleu1vwNnkwP/7JfKYpN00gnSyeQNZpqwxXBCKnHNgOMTXyJz beB/7u2KIUbKEkSN =jZfK -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_core_for_5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 CET-IBT (Control-Flow-Integrity) support from Peter Zijlstra: "Add support for Intel CET-IBT, available since Tigerlake (11th gen), which is a coarse grained, hardware based, forward edge Control-Flow-Integrity mechanism where any indirect CALL/JMP must target an ENDBR instruction or suffer #CP. Additionally, since Alderlake (12th gen)/Sapphire-Rapids, speculation is limited to 2 instructions (and typically fewer) on branch targets not starting with ENDBR. CET-IBT also limits speculation of the next sequential instruction after the indirect CALL/JMP [1]. CET-IBT is fundamentally incompatible with retpolines, but provides, as described above, speculation limits itself" [1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/branch-history-injection.html * tag 'x86_core_for_5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (53 commits) kvm/emulate: Fix SETcc emulation for ENDBR x86/Kconfig: Only allow CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT with ld.lld >= 14.0.0 x86/Kconfig: Only enable CONFIG_CC_HAS_IBT for clang >= 14.0.0 kbuild: Fixup the IBT kbuild changes x86/Kconfig: Do not allow CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI=y with llvm-objcopy x86: Remove toolchain check for X32 ABI capability x86/alternative: Use .ibt_endbr_seal to seal indirect calls objtool: Find unused ENDBR instructions objtool: Validate IBT assumptions objtool: Add IBT/ENDBR decoding objtool: Read the NOENDBR annotation x86: Annotate idtentry_df() x86,objtool: Move the ASM_REACHABLE annotation to objtool.h x86: Annotate call_on_stack() objtool: Rework ASM_REACHABLE x86: Mark __invalid_creds() __noreturn exit: Mark do_group_exit() __noreturn x86: Mark stop_this_cpu() __noreturn objtool: Ignore extra-symbol code objtool: Rename --duplicate to --lto ... |
||
|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| 9p | ||
| adfs | ||
| affs | ||
| afs | ||
| autofs | ||
| befs | ||
| bfs | ||
| btrfs | ||
| cachefiles | ||
| ceph | ||
| cifs | ||
| coda | ||
| configfs | ||
| cramfs | ||
| crypto | ||
| debugfs | ||
| devpts | ||
| dlm | ||
| ecryptfs | ||
| efivarfs | ||
| efs | ||
| erofs | ||
| exfat | ||
| exportfs | ||
| ext2 | ||
| ext4 | ||
| f2fs | ||
| fat | ||
| freevxfs | ||
| fscache | ||
| fuse | ||
| gfs2 | ||
| hfs | ||
| hfsplus | ||
| hostfs | ||
| hpfs | ||
| hugetlbfs | ||
| iomap | ||
| isofs | ||
| jbd2 | ||
| jffs2 | ||
| jfs | ||
| kernfs | ||
| ksmbd | ||
| lockd | ||
| minix | ||
| netfs | ||
| nfs | ||
| nfs_common | ||
| nfsd | ||
| nilfs2 | ||
| nls | ||
| notify | ||
| ntfs | ||
| ntfs3 | ||
| ocfs2 | ||
| omfs | ||
| openpromfs | ||
| orangefs | ||
| overlayfs | ||
| proc | ||
| pstore | ||
| qnx4 | ||
| qnx6 | ||
| quota | ||
| ramfs | ||
| reiserfs | ||
| romfs | ||
| smbfs_common | ||
| squashfs | ||
| sysfs | ||
| sysv | ||
| tracefs | ||
| ubifs | ||
| udf | ||
| ufs | ||
| unicode | ||
| vboxsf | ||
| verity | ||
| xfs | ||
| zonefs | ||
| aio.c | ||
| anon_inodes.c | ||
| attr.c | ||
| bad_inode.c | ||
| binfmt_aout.c | ||
| binfmt_elf_fdpic.c | ||
| binfmt_elf_test.c | ||
| binfmt_elf.c | ||
| binfmt_flat.c | ||
| binfmt_misc.c | ||
| binfmt_script.c | ||
| buffer.c | ||
| char_dev.c | ||
| compat_binfmt_elf.c | ||
| coredump.c | ||
| d_path.c | ||
| dax.c | ||
| dcache.c | ||
| direct-io.c | ||
| drop_caches.c | ||
| eventfd.c | ||
| eventpoll.c | ||
| exec.c | ||
| fcntl.c | ||
| fhandle.c | ||
| file_table.c | ||
| file.c | ||
| filesystems.c | ||
| fs_context.c | ||
| fs_parser.c | ||
| fs_pin.c | ||
| fs_struct.c | ||
| fs_types.c | ||
| fs-writeback.c | ||
| fsopen.c | ||
| init.c | ||
| inode.c | ||
| internal.h | ||
| io_uring.c | ||
| io-wq.c | ||
| io-wq.h | ||
| ioctl.c | ||
| Kconfig | ||
| Kconfig.binfmt | ||
| kernel_read_file.c | ||
| libfs.c | ||
| locks.c | ||
| Makefile | ||
| mbcache.c | ||
| mount.h | ||
| mpage.c | ||
| namei.c | ||
| namespace.c | ||
| no-block.c | ||
| nsfs.c | ||
| open.c | ||
| pipe.c | ||
| pnode.c | ||
| pnode.h | ||
| posix_acl.c | ||
| proc_namespace.c | ||
| read_write.c | ||
| readdir.c | ||
| remap_range.c | ||
| select.c | ||
| seq_file.c | ||
| signalfd.c | ||
| splice.c | ||
| stack.c | ||
| stat.c | ||
| statfs.c | ||
| super.c | ||
| sync.c | ||
| sysctls.c | ||
| timerfd.c | ||
| userfaultfd.c | ||
| utimes.c | ||
| xattr.c | ||