mirror of
https://mirrors.bfsu.edu.cn/git/linux.git
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Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
"This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
maintainers.
Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
are just a few:
- Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
implementation of portable home directories in
systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
login time.
- It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
containers without having to change ownership permanently through
chown(2).
- It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
Linux subsystem.
- It is possible to share files between containers with
non-overlapping idmappings.
- Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
permission checking.
- They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
all files.
- Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
directory and container and vm scenario.
- Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
apply as long as the mount exists.
Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
this:
- systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
in their implementation of portable home directories.
https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/
- container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734
- The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
ported.
- ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.
I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:
https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf
https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/
This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
xfs:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts
It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
merge this.
In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
testsuite.
Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
currently marked with.
The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
of extensibility.
The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
mount:
- The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.
- The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.
- The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.
- The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.
The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.
By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
behavioral or performance changes are observed.
The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:
1d7b902e28
In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
that port has been done correctly.
The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
mounts based on file descriptors only.
Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
path resolution.
While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.
With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
projects.
There is a simple tool available at
https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped
that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
decide to pull this in the following weeks:
Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
directory:
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 29 root root 4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: mnt/my-file
# owner: u1001
# group: u1001
user::rw-
user:u1001:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
# owner: ubuntu
# group: ubuntu
user::rw-
user:ubuntu:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--"
* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
xfs: support idmapped mounts
ext4: support idmapped mounts
fat: handle idmapped mounts
tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
fs: add mount_setattr()
fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
fs: split out functions to hold writers
namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ima: handle idmapped mounts
apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
exec: handle idmapped mounts
would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
...
454 lines
14 KiB
C
454 lines
14 KiB
C
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
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*
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* Authors:
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* Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
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* Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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*
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* File: ima.h
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* internal Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) definitions
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*/
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#ifndef __LINUX_IMA_H
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#define __LINUX_IMA_H
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#include <linux/types.h>
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#include <linux/crypto.h>
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/hash.h>
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#include <linux/tpm.h>
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#include <linux/audit.h>
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#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
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#include "../integrity.h"
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#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC
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#include <asm/ima.h>
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#endif
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enum ima_show_type { IMA_SHOW_BINARY, IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN,
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IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT, IMA_SHOW_ASCII };
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enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8, TPM_PCR10 = 10 };
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/* digest size for IMA, fits SHA1 or MD5 */
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#define IMA_DIGEST_SIZE SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE
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#define IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX 255
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#define IMA_HASH_BITS 10
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#define IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE (1 << IMA_HASH_BITS)
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#define IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN 16
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#define IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX 15
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#define IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME "ima"
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#define IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT "d|n"
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#define NR_BANKS(chip) ((chip != NULL) ? chip->nr_allocated_banks : 0)
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/* current content of the policy */
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extern int ima_policy_flag;
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/* set during initialization */
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extern int ima_hash_algo;
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extern int ima_sha1_idx __ro_after_init;
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extern int ima_hash_algo_idx __ro_after_init;
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extern int ima_extra_slots __ro_after_init;
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extern int ima_appraise;
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extern struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip;
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extern const char boot_aggregate_name[];
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/* IMA event related data */
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struct ima_event_data {
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struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
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struct file *file;
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const unsigned char *filename;
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struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value;
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int xattr_len;
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const struct modsig *modsig;
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const char *violation;
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const void *buf;
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int buf_len;
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};
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/* IMA template field data definition */
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struct ima_field_data {
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u8 *data;
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u32 len;
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};
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/* IMA template field definition */
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struct ima_template_field {
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const char field_id[IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN];
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int (*field_init)(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
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struct ima_field_data *field_data);
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void (*field_show)(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
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struct ima_field_data *field_data);
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};
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/* IMA template descriptor definition */
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struct ima_template_desc {
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struct list_head list;
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char *name;
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char *fmt;
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int num_fields;
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const struct ima_template_field **fields;
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};
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struct ima_template_entry {
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int pcr;
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struct tpm_digest *digests;
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struct ima_template_desc *template_desc; /* template descriptor */
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u32 template_data_len;
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struct ima_field_data template_data[]; /* template related data */
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};
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struct ima_queue_entry {
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struct hlist_node hnext; /* place in hash collision list */
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struct list_head later; /* place in ima_measurements list */
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struct ima_template_entry *entry;
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};
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extern struct list_head ima_measurements; /* list of all measurements */
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/* Some details preceding the binary serialized measurement list */
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struct ima_kexec_hdr {
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u16 version;
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u16 _reserved0;
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u32 _reserved1;
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u64 buffer_size;
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u64 count;
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};
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extern const int read_idmap[];
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#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC
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void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void);
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#else
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static inline void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void) {}
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#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC */
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/*
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* The default binary_runtime_measurements list format is defined as the
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* platform native format. The canonical format is defined as little-endian.
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*/
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extern bool ima_canonical_fmt;
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/* Internal IMA function definitions */
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int ima_init(void);
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int ima_fs_init(void);
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int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
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const char *op, struct inode *inode,
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const unsigned char *filename);
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int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash);
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int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, loff_t len,
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struct ima_digest_data *hash);
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int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
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struct ima_template_entry *entry);
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int ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash);
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void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
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struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
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const char *op, const char *cause);
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int ima_init_crypto(void);
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void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen);
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void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, u32 size);
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int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
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const struct ima_template_field ***fields,
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int *num_fields);
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struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void);
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struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_buf(void);
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struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name);
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bool ima_template_has_modsig(const struct ima_template_desc *ima_template);
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int ima_restore_measurement_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
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int ima_restore_measurement_list(loff_t bufsize, void *buf);
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int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
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unsigned long ima_get_binary_runtime_size(void);
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int ima_init_template(void);
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void ima_init_template_list(void);
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int __init ima_init_digests(void);
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int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event,
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void *lsm_data);
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/*
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* used to protect h_table and sha_table
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*/
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extern spinlock_t ima_queue_lock;
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struct ima_h_table {
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atomic_long_t len; /* number of stored measurements in the list */
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atomic_long_t violations;
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struct hlist_head queue[IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE];
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};
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extern struct ima_h_table ima_htable;
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static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
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{
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/* there is no point in taking a hash of part of a digest */
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return (digest[0] | digest[1] << 8) % IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE;
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}
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#define __ima_hooks(hook) \
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hook(NONE, none) \
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hook(FILE_CHECK, file) \
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hook(MMAP_CHECK, mmap) \
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hook(BPRM_CHECK, bprm) \
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hook(CREDS_CHECK, creds) \
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hook(POST_SETATTR, post_setattr) \
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hook(MODULE_CHECK, module) \
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hook(FIRMWARE_CHECK, firmware) \
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hook(KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, kexec_kernel) \
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hook(KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK, kexec_initramfs) \
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hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy) \
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hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline) \
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hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \
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hook(CRITICAL_DATA, critical_data) \
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hook(MAX_CHECK, none)
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#define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM, str) ENUM,
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#define __ima_stringify(arg) (#arg)
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#define __ima_hook_measuring_stringify(ENUM, str) \
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(__ima_stringify(measuring_ ##str)),
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enum ima_hooks {
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__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_enumify)
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};
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static const char * const ima_hooks_measure_str[] = {
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__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_measuring_stringify)
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};
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static inline const char *func_measure_str(enum ima_hooks func)
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{
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if (func >= MAX_CHECK)
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return ima_hooks_measure_str[NONE];
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return ima_hooks_measure_str[func];
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}
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extern const char *const func_tokens[];
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struct modsig;
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#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS
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/*
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* To track keys that need to be measured.
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*/
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struct ima_key_entry {
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struct list_head list;
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void *payload;
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size_t payload_len;
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char *keyring_name;
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};
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void ima_init_key_queue(void);
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bool ima_should_queue_key(void);
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bool ima_queue_key(struct key *keyring, const void *payload,
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size_t payload_len);
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void ima_process_queued_keys(void);
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#else
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static inline void ima_init_key_queue(void) {}
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static inline bool ima_should_queue_key(void) { return false; }
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static inline bool ima_queue_key(struct key *keyring,
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const void *payload,
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size_t payload_len) { return false; }
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static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {}
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#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS */
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/* LIM API function definitions */
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int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
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const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask,
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enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
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struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
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const char *func_data);
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int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
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int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
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struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
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enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig);
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void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
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const unsigned char *filename,
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struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
|
|
int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
|
|
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
|
|
void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
|
|
struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
|
|
const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
|
|
int pcr, const char *func_data,
|
|
bool buf_hash);
|
|
void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
|
|
const unsigned char *filename);
|
|
int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
|
|
struct ima_template_entry **entry,
|
|
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
|
|
int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
|
|
struct inode *inode,
|
|
const unsigned char *filename, int pcr);
|
|
void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
|
|
const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
|
|
|
|
/* IMA policy related functions */
|
|
int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
|
|
const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func,
|
|
int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
|
|
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
|
|
const char *func_data);
|
|
void ima_init_policy(void);
|
|
void ima_update_policy(void);
|
|
void ima_update_policy_flag(void);
|
|
ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *);
|
|
void ima_delete_rules(void);
|
|
int ima_check_policy(void);
|
|
void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos);
|
|
void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos);
|
|
void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
|
|
int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
|
|
|
|
/* Appraise integrity measurements */
|
|
#define IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE 0x01
|
|
#define IMA_APPRAISE_FIX 0x02
|
|
#define IMA_APPRAISE_LOG 0x04
|
|
#define IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES 0x08
|
|
#define IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE 0x10
|
|
#define IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY 0x20
|
|
#define IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC 0x40
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
|
|
int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
|
|
const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr);
|
|
int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
|
|
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
|
|
struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
|
|
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
|
|
int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig);
|
|
int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
|
|
int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
|
|
void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
|
|
enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
|
|
enum ima_hooks func);
|
|
enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
|
|
int xattr_len);
|
|
int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
|
|
struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value);
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
|
|
const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr)
|
|
{
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
|
|
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
|
|
struct file *file,
|
|
const unsigned char *filename,
|
|
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
|
|
int xattr_len,
|
|
const struct modsig *modsig)
|
|
{
|
|
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
|
|
struct inode *inode, int mask,
|
|
enum ima_hooks func)
|
|
{
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
|
|
struct file *file)
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache
|
|
*iint,
|
|
enum ima_hooks func)
|
|
{
|
|
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline enum hash_algo
|
|
ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len)
|
|
{
|
|
return ima_hash_algo;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
|
|
struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value)
|
|
{
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
|
|
int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
|
|
struct modsig **modsig);
|
|
void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf, loff_t size);
|
|
int ima_get_modsig_digest(const struct modsig *modsig, enum hash_algo *algo,
|
|
const u8 **digest, u32 *digest_size);
|
|
int ima_get_raw_modsig(const struct modsig *modsig, const void **data,
|
|
u32 *data_len);
|
|
void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig);
|
|
#else
|
|
static inline int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf,
|
|
loff_t buf_len, struct modsig **modsig)
|
|
{
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf,
|
|
loff_t size)
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int ima_get_modsig_digest(const struct modsig *modsig,
|
|
enum hash_algo *algo, const u8 **digest,
|
|
u32 *digest_size)
|
|
{
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int ima_get_raw_modsig(const struct modsig *modsig,
|
|
const void **data, u32 *data_len)
|
|
{
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */
|
|
|
|
/* LSM based policy rules require audit */
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
|
|
|
|
#define ima_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
|
|
#define ima_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free
|
|
#define ima_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
|
|
void **lsmrule)
|
|
{
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
|
|
void *lsmrule)
|
|
{
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
|
|
#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS (S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR)
|
|
#else
|
|
#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS S_IWUSR
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */
|
|
|
|
#endif /* __LINUX_IMA_H */
|