linux/fs/fat/file.c
Linus Torvalds 7d6beb71da idmapped-mounts-v5.12
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Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux

Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
 "This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
  time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
  directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
  with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
  filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
  maintainers.

  Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
  are just a few:

   - Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
     multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
     scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
     implementation of portable home directories in
     systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
     directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
     computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
     effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
     login time.

   - It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
     containers without having to change ownership permanently through
     chown(2).

   - It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
     mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
     user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
     Linux subsystem.

   - It is possible to share files between containers with
     non-overlapping idmappings.

   - Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
     use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
     permission checking.

   - They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
     basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
     contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
     instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
     ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
     container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
     mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
     all files.

   - Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
     idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
     to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
     take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
     simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
     especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
     files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
     directory and container and vm scenario.

   - Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
     to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
     apply as long as the mount exists.

  Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
  pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
  this:

   - systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
     in their implementation of portable home directories.

         https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/

   - container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
     host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
     containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
     containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
     a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734

   - The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
     in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
     ported.

   - ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.

  I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
  here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
  mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
  talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:

      https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf
      https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/

  This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
  xfs:

      https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts

  It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
  execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
  non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
  setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
  be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
  merge this.

  In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
  user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
  map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
  By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
  The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
  idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
  testsuite.

  Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
  and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
  the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
  introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
  the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
  to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
  whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
  currently marked with.

  The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
  passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
  argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
  MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
  of extensibility.

  The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
  mount:

   - The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
     user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.

   - The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.

   - The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
     idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.

   - The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
     been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
     and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.

  The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
  kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.

  By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
  behavioral or performance changes are observed.

  The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:

      1d7b902e28

  In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
  and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
  patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
  complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
  xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
  will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
  that port has been done correctly.

  The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
  mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
  valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
  mounts based on file descriptors only.

  Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
  RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
  we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
  path resolution.

  While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
  proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
  possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
  the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.

  With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
  restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
  covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
  crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
  tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
  syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
  projects.

  There is a simple tool available at

      https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped

  that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
  patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
  decide to pull this in the following weeks:

  Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
  directory:

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
	total 28
	drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
	drwxr-xr-x 4 root   root   4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
	-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu  220 Feb 25  2020 .bash_logout
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25  2020 .bashrc
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu  807 Feb 25  2020 .profile
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu    0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
	-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
	total 28
	drwxr-xr-x  2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
	drwxr-xr-x 29 root  root  4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
	-rw-------  1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001  220 Feb 25  2020 .bash_logout
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25  2020 .bashrc
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001  807 Feb 25  2020 .profile
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001    0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
	-rw-------  1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
	-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
	-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
	getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
	# file: mnt/my-file
	# owner: u1001
	# group: u1001
	user::rw-
	user:u1001:rwx
	group::rw-
	mask::rwx
	other::r--

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
	getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
	# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
	# owner: ubuntu
	# group: ubuntu
	user::rw-
	user:ubuntu:rwx
	group::rw-
	mask::rwx
	other::r--"

* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
  xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
  xfs: support idmapped mounts
  ext4: support idmapped mounts
  fat: handle idmapped mounts
  tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
  fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
  fs: add mount_setattr()
  fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
  fs: split out functions to hold writers
  namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
  mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
  namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
  nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
  overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
  ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
  ima: handle idmapped mounts
  apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
  fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
  exec: handle idmapped mounts
  would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
  ...
2021-02-23 13:39:45 -08:00

567 lines
14 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* linux/fs/fat/file.c
*
* Written 1992,1993 by Werner Almesberger
*
* regular file handling primitives for fat-based filesystems
*/
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/blkdev.h>
#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/falloc.h>
#include "fat.h"
static long fat_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode,
loff_t offset, loff_t len);
static int fat_ioctl_get_attributes(struct inode *inode, u32 __user *user_attr)
{
u32 attr;
inode_lock_shared(inode);
attr = fat_make_attrs(inode);
inode_unlock_shared(inode);
return put_user(attr, user_attr);
}
static int fat_ioctl_set_attributes(struct file *file, u32 __user *user_attr)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct msdos_sb_info *sbi = MSDOS_SB(inode->i_sb);
int is_dir = S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode);
u32 attr, oldattr;
struct iattr ia;
int err;
err = get_user(attr, user_attr);
if (err)
goto out;
err = mnt_want_write_file(file);
if (err)
goto out;
inode_lock(inode);
/*
* ATTR_VOLUME and ATTR_DIR cannot be changed; this also
* prevents the user from turning us into a VFAT
* longname entry. Also, we obviously can't set
* any of the NTFS attributes in the high 24 bits.
*/
attr &= 0xff & ~(ATTR_VOLUME | ATTR_DIR);
/* Merge in ATTR_VOLUME and ATTR_DIR */
attr |= (MSDOS_I(inode)->i_attrs & ATTR_VOLUME) |
(is_dir ? ATTR_DIR : 0);
oldattr = fat_make_attrs(inode);
/* Equivalent to a chmod() */
ia.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
ia.ia_ctime = current_time(inode);
if (is_dir)
ia.ia_mode = fat_make_mode(sbi, attr, S_IRWXUGO);
else {
ia.ia_mode = fat_make_mode(sbi, attr,
S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO | (inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO));
}
/* The root directory has no attributes */
if (inode->i_ino == MSDOS_ROOT_INO && attr != ATTR_DIR) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock_inode;
}
if (sbi->options.sys_immutable &&
((attr | oldattr) & ATTR_SYS) &&
!capable(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE)) {
err = -EPERM;
goto out_unlock_inode;
}
/*
* The security check is questionable... We single
* out the RO attribute for checking by the security
* module, just because it maps to a file mode.
*/
err = security_inode_setattr(file->f_path.dentry, &ia);
if (err)
goto out_unlock_inode;
/* This MUST be done before doing anything irreversible... */
err = fat_setattr(file_mnt_user_ns(file), file->f_path.dentry, &ia);
if (err)
goto out_unlock_inode;
fsnotify_change(file->f_path.dentry, ia.ia_valid);
if (sbi->options.sys_immutable) {
if (attr & ATTR_SYS)
inode->i_flags |= S_IMMUTABLE;
else
inode->i_flags &= ~S_IMMUTABLE;
}
fat_save_attrs(inode, attr);
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
out_unlock_inode:
inode_unlock(inode);
mnt_drop_write_file(file);
out:
return err;
}
static int fat_ioctl_get_volume_id(struct inode *inode, u32 __user *user_attr)
{
struct msdos_sb_info *sbi = MSDOS_SB(inode->i_sb);
return put_user(sbi->vol_id, user_attr);
}
static int fat_ioctl_fitrim(struct inode *inode, unsigned long arg)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
struct fstrim_range __user *user_range;
struct fstrim_range range;
struct request_queue *q = bdev_get_queue(sb->s_bdev);
int err;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (!blk_queue_discard(q))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
user_range = (struct fstrim_range __user *)arg;
if (copy_from_user(&range, user_range, sizeof(range)))
return -EFAULT;
range.minlen = max_t(unsigned int, range.minlen,
q->limits.discard_granularity);
err = fat_trim_fs(inode, &range);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (copy_to_user(user_range, &range, sizeof(range)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
long fat_generic_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
u32 __user *user_attr = (u32 __user *)arg;
switch (cmd) {
case FAT_IOCTL_GET_ATTRIBUTES:
return fat_ioctl_get_attributes(inode, user_attr);
case FAT_IOCTL_SET_ATTRIBUTES:
return fat_ioctl_set_attributes(filp, user_attr);
case FAT_IOCTL_GET_VOLUME_ID:
return fat_ioctl_get_volume_id(inode, user_attr);
case FITRIM:
return fat_ioctl_fitrim(inode, arg);
default:
return -ENOTTY; /* Inappropriate ioctl for device */
}
}
static int fat_file_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
if ((filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) &&
MSDOS_SB(inode->i_sb)->options.flush) {
fat_flush_inodes(inode->i_sb, inode, NULL);
congestion_wait(BLK_RW_ASYNC, HZ/10);
}
return 0;
}
int fat_file_fsync(struct file *filp, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync)
{
struct inode *inode = filp->f_mapping->host;
int err;
err = __generic_file_fsync(filp, start, end, datasync);
if (err)
return err;
err = sync_mapping_buffers(MSDOS_SB(inode->i_sb)->fat_inode->i_mapping);
if (err)
return err;
return blkdev_issue_flush(inode->i_sb->s_bdev);
}
const struct file_operations fat_file_operations = {
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
.read_iter = generic_file_read_iter,
.write_iter = generic_file_write_iter,
.mmap = generic_file_mmap,
.release = fat_file_release,
.unlocked_ioctl = fat_generic_ioctl,
.compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl,
.fsync = fat_file_fsync,
.splice_read = generic_file_splice_read,
.splice_write = iter_file_splice_write,
.fallocate = fat_fallocate,
};
static int fat_cont_expand(struct inode *inode, loff_t size)
{
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
loff_t start = inode->i_size, count = size - inode->i_size;
int err;
err = generic_cont_expand_simple(inode, size);
if (err)
goto out;
fat_truncate_time(inode, NULL, S_CTIME|S_MTIME);
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
if (IS_SYNC(inode)) {
int err2;
/*
* Opencode syncing since we don't have a file open to use
* standard fsync path.
*/
err = filemap_fdatawrite_range(mapping, start,
start + count - 1);
err2 = sync_mapping_buffers(mapping);
if (!err)
err = err2;
err2 = write_inode_now(inode, 1);
if (!err)
err = err2;
if (!err) {
err = filemap_fdatawait_range(mapping, start,
start + count - 1);
}
}
out:
return err;
}
/*
* Preallocate space for a file. This implements fat's fallocate file
* operation, which gets called from sys_fallocate system call. User
* space requests len bytes at offset. If FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE is set
* we just allocate clusters without zeroing them out. Otherwise we
* allocate and zero out clusters via an expanding truncate.
*/
static long fat_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode,
loff_t offset, loff_t len)
{
int nr_cluster; /* Number of clusters to be allocated */
loff_t mm_bytes; /* Number of bytes to be allocated for file */
loff_t ondisksize; /* block aligned on-disk size in bytes*/
struct inode *inode = file->f_mapping->host;
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
struct msdos_sb_info *sbi = MSDOS_SB(sb);
int err = 0;
/* No support for hole punch or other fallocate flags. */
if (mode & ~FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* No support for dir */
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
inode_lock(inode);
if (mode & FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE) {
ondisksize = inode->i_blocks << 9;
if ((offset + len) <= ondisksize)
goto error;
/* First compute the number of clusters to be allocated */
mm_bytes = offset + len - ondisksize;
nr_cluster = (mm_bytes + (sbi->cluster_size - 1)) >>
sbi->cluster_bits;
/* Start the allocation.We are not zeroing out the clusters */
while (nr_cluster-- > 0) {
err = fat_add_cluster(inode);
if (err)
goto error;
}
} else {
if ((offset + len) <= i_size_read(inode))
goto error;
/* This is just an expanding truncate */
err = fat_cont_expand(inode, (offset + len));
}
error:
inode_unlock(inode);
return err;
}
/* Free all clusters after the skip'th cluster. */
static int fat_free(struct inode *inode, int skip)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
int err, wait, free_start, i_start, i_logstart;
if (MSDOS_I(inode)->i_start == 0)
return 0;
fat_cache_inval_inode(inode);
wait = IS_DIRSYNC(inode);
i_start = free_start = MSDOS_I(inode)->i_start;
i_logstart = MSDOS_I(inode)->i_logstart;
/* First, we write the new file size. */
if (!skip) {
MSDOS_I(inode)->i_start = 0;
MSDOS_I(inode)->i_logstart = 0;
}
MSDOS_I(inode)->i_attrs |= ATTR_ARCH;
fat_truncate_time(inode, NULL, S_CTIME|S_MTIME);
if (wait) {
err = fat_sync_inode(inode);
if (err) {
MSDOS_I(inode)->i_start = i_start;
MSDOS_I(inode)->i_logstart = i_logstart;
return err;
}
} else
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
/* Write a new EOF, and get the remaining cluster chain for freeing. */
if (skip) {
struct fat_entry fatent;
int ret, fclus, dclus;
ret = fat_get_cluster(inode, skip - 1, &fclus, &dclus);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
else if (ret == FAT_ENT_EOF)
return 0;
fatent_init(&fatent);
ret = fat_ent_read(inode, &fatent, dclus);
if (ret == FAT_ENT_EOF) {
fatent_brelse(&fatent);
return 0;
} else if (ret == FAT_ENT_FREE) {
fat_fs_error(sb,
"%s: invalid cluster chain (i_pos %lld)",
__func__, MSDOS_I(inode)->i_pos);
ret = -EIO;
} else if (ret > 0) {
err = fat_ent_write(inode, &fatent, FAT_ENT_EOF, wait);
if (err)
ret = err;
}
fatent_brelse(&fatent);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
free_start = ret;
}
inode->i_blocks = skip << (MSDOS_SB(sb)->cluster_bits - 9);
/* Freeing the remained cluster chain */
return fat_free_clusters(inode, free_start);
}
void fat_truncate_blocks(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset)
{
struct msdos_sb_info *sbi = MSDOS_SB(inode->i_sb);
const unsigned int cluster_size = sbi->cluster_size;
int nr_clusters;
/*
* This protects against truncating a file bigger than it was then
* trying to write into the hole.
*/
if (MSDOS_I(inode)->mmu_private > offset)
MSDOS_I(inode)->mmu_private = offset;
nr_clusters = (offset + (cluster_size - 1)) >> sbi->cluster_bits;
fat_free(inode, nr_clusters);
fat_flush_inodes(inode->i_sb, inode, NULL);
}
int fat_getattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, const struct path *path,
struct kstat *stat, u32 request_mask, unsigned int flags)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(path->dentry);
generic_fillattr(mnt_userns, inode, stat);
stat->blksize = MSDOS_SB(inode->i_sb)->cluster_size;
if (MSDOS_SB(inode->i_sb)->options.nfs == FAT_NFS_NOSTALE_RO) {
/* Use i_pos for ino. This is used as fileid of nfs. */
stat->ino = fat_i_pos_read(MSDOS_SB(inode->i_sb), inode);
}
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fat_getattr);
static int fat_sanitize_mode(const struct msdos_sb_info *sbi,
struct inode *inode, umode_t *mode_ptr)
{
umode_t mask, perm;
/*
* Note, the basic check is already done by a caller of
* (attr->ia_mode & ~FAT_VALID_MODE)
*/
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
mask = sbi->options.fs_fmask;
else
mask = sbi->options.fs_dmask;
perm = *mode_ptr & ~(S_IFMT | mask);
/*
* Of the r and x bits, all (subject to umask) must be present. Of the
* w bits, either all (subject to umask) or none must be present.
*
* If fat_mode_can_hold_ro(inode) is false, can't change w bits.
*/
if ((perm & (S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO)) != (inode->i_mode & (S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO)))
return -EPERM;
if (fat_mode_can_hold_ro(inode)) {
if ((perm & S_IWUGO) && ((perm & S_IWUGO) != (S_IWUGO & ~mask)))
return -EPERM;
} else {
if ((perm & S_IWUGO) != (S_IWUGO & ~mask))
return -EPERM;
}
*mode_ptr &= S_IFMT | perm;
return 0;
}
static int fat_allow_set_time(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct msdos_sb_info *sbi, struct inode *inode)
{
umode_t allow_utime = sbi->options.allow_utime;
if (!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode))) {
if (in_group_p(i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)))
allow_utime >>= 3;
if (allow_utime & MAY_WRITE)
return 1;
}
/* use a default check */
return 0;
}
#define TIMES_SET_FLAGS (ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET)
/* valid file mode bits */
#define FAT_VALID_MODE (S_IFREG | S_IFDIR | S_IRWXUGO)
int fat_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
struct iattr *attr)
{
struct msdos_sb_info *sbi = MSDOS_SB(dentry->d_sb);
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
unsigned int ia_valid;
int error;
/* Check for setting the inode time. */
ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
if (ia_valid & TIMES_SET_FLAGS) {
if (fat_allow_set_time(mnt_userns, sbi, inode))
attr->ia_valid &= ~TIMES_SET_FLAGS;
}
error = setattr_prepare(mnt_userns, dentry, attr);
attr->ia_valid = ia_valid;
if (error) {
if (sbi->options.quiet)
error = 0;
goto out;
}
/*
* Expand the file. Since inode_setattr() updates ->i_size
* before calling the ->truncate(), but FAT needs to fill the
* hole before it. XXX: this is no longer true with new truncate
* sequence.
*/
if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
inode_dio_wait(inode);
if (attr->ia_size > inode->i_size) {
error = fat_cont_expand(inode, attr->ia_size);
if (error || attr->ia_valid == ATTR_SIZE)
goto out;
attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_SIZE;
}
}
if (((attr->ia_valid & ATTR_UID) &&
(!uid_eq(attr->ia_uid, sbi->options.fs_uid))) ||
((attr->ia_valid & ATTR_GID) &&
(!gid_eq(attr->ia_gid, sbi->options.fs_gid))) ||
((attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) &&
(attr->ia_mode & ~FAT_VALID_MODE)))
error = -EPERM;
if (error) {
if (sbi->options.quiet)
error = 0;
goto out;
}
/*
* We don't return -EPERM here. Yes, strange, but this is too
* old behavior.
*/
if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
if (fat_sanitize_mode(sbi, inode, &attr->ia_mode) < 0)
attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_MODE;
}
if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
error = fat_block_truncate_page(inode, attr->ia_size);
if (error)
goto out;
down_write(&MSDOS_I(inode)->truncate_lock);
truncate_setsize(inode, attr->ia_size);
fat_truncate_blocks(inode, attr->ia_size);
up_write(&MSDOS_I(inode)->truncate_lock);
}
/*
* setattr_copy can't truncate these appropriately, so we'll
* copy them ourselves
*/
if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_ATIME)
fat_truncate_time(inode, &attr->ia_atime, S_ATIME);
if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_CTIME)
fat_truncate_time(inode, &attr->ia_ctime, S_CTIME);
if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME)
fat_truncate_time(inode, &attr->ia_mtime, S_MTIME);
attr->ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_ATIME|ATTR_CTIME|ATTR_MTIME);
setattr_copy(mnt_userns, inode, attr);
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
out:
return error;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fat_setattr);
const struct inode_operations fat_file_inode_operations = {
.setattr = fat_setattr,
.getattr = fat_getattr,
.update_time = fat_update_time,
};