linux/fs/orangefs/acl.c
Christian Brauner 138060ba92
fs: pass dentry to set acl method
The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic
xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to
interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to
userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to
understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of
making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are
building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode
operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths
easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1].

Since some filesystem rely on the dentry being available to them when
setting posix acls (e.g., 9p and cifs) they cannot rely on set acl inode
operation. But since ->set_acl() is required in order to use the generic
posix acl xattr handlers filesystems that do not implement this inode
operation cannot use the handler and need to implement their own
dedicated posix acl handlers.

Update the ->set_acl() inode method to take a dentry argument. This
allows all filesystems to rely on ->set_acl().

As far as I can tell all codepaths can be switched to rely on the dentry
instead of just the inode. Note that the original motivation for passing
the dentry separate from the inode instead of just the dentry in the
xattr handlers was because of security modules that call
security_d_instantiate(). This hook is called during
d_instantiate_new(), d_add(), __d_instantiate_anon(), and
d_splice_alias() to initialize the inode's security context and possibly
to set security.* xattrs. Since this only affects security.* xattrs this
is completely irrelevant for posix acls.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1]
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-10-19 12:55:42 +02:00

160 lines
4.0 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* (C) 2001 Clemson University and The University of Chicago
*
* See COPYING in top-level directory.
*/
#include "protocol.h"
#include "orangefs-kernel.h"
#include "orangefs-bufmap.h"
#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
struct posix_acl *orangefs_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type, bool rcu)
{
struct posix_acl *acl;
int ret;
char *key = NULL, *value = NULL;
if (rcu)
return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
key = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
key = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
gossip_err("orangefs_get_acl: bogus value of type %d\n", type);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
/*
* Rather than incurring a network call just to determine the exact
* length of the attribute, I just allocate a max length to save on
* the network call. Conceivably, we could pass NULL to
* orangefs_inode_getxattr() to probe the length of the value, but
* I don't do that for now.
*/
value = kmalloc(ORANGEFS_MAX_XATTR_VALUELEN, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!value)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
gossip_debug(GOSSIP_ACL_DEBUG,
"inode %pU, key %s, type %d\n",
get_khandle_from_ino(inode),
key,
type);
ret = orangefs_inode_getxattr(inode, key, value,
ORANGEFS_MAX_XATTR_VALUELEN);
/* if the key exists, convert it to an in-memory rep */
if (ret > 0) {
acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(&init_user_ns, value, ret);
} else if (ret == -ENODATA || ret == -ENOSYS) {
acl = NULL;
} else {
gossip_err("inode %pU retrieving acl's failed with error %d\n",
get_khandle_from_ino(inode),
ret);
acl = ERR_PTR(ret);
}
/* kfree(NULL) is safe, so don't worry if value ever got used */
kfree(value);
return acl;
}
int __orangefs_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int error = 0;
void *value = NULL;
size_t size = 0;
const char *name = NULL;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
gossip_err("%s: invalid type %d!\n", __func__, type);
return -EINVAL;
}
gossip_debug(GOSSIP_ACL_DEBUG,
"%s: inode %pU, key %s type %d\n",
__func__, get_khandle_from_ino(inode),
name,
type);
if (acl) {
size = posix_acl_xattr_size(acl->a_count);
value = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!value)
return -ENOMEM;
error = posix_acl_to_xattr(&init_user_ns, acl, value, size);
if (error < 0)
goto out;
}
gossip_debug(GOSSIP_ACL_DEBUG,
"%s: name %s, value %p, size %zd, acl %p\n",
__func__, name, value, size, acl);
/*
* Go ahead and set the extended attribute now. NOTE: Suppose acl
* was NULL, then value will be NULL and size will be 0 and that
* will xlate to a removexattr. However, we don't want removexattr
* complain if attributes does not exist.
*/
error = orangefs_inode_setxattr(inode, name, value, size, 0);
out:
kfree(value);
if (!error)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return error;
}
int orangefs_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int error;
struct iattr iattr;
int rc;
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
memset(&iattr, 0, sizeof iattr);
if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS && acl) {
/*
* posix_acl_update_mode checks to see if the permissions
* described by the ACL can be encoded into the
* object's mode. If so, it sets "acl" to NULL
* and "mode" to the new desired value. It is up to
* us to propagate the new mode back to the server...
*/
error = posix_acl_update_mode(&init_user_ns, inode,
&iattr.ia_mode, &acl);
if (error) {
gossip_err("%s: posix_acl_update_mode err: %d\n",
__func__,
error);
return error;
}
if (inode->i_mode != iattr.ia_mode)
iattr.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE;
}
rc = __orangefs_set_acl(inode, acl, type);
if (!rc && (iattr.ia_valid == ATTR_MODE))
rc = __orangefs_setattr_mode(dentry, &iattr);
return rc;
}