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b9bc7b8b1e
lkdtm/bugs.c:94:2: error: format '%d' expects argument of type 'int', but argument 2 has type 'long unsigned int' [-Werror=format=]
pr_info("Calling function with %d frame size to depth %d ...\n",
^
THREAD_SIZE is defined as a unsigned long, cast CONFIG_FRAME_WARN to
unsigned long as well.
Fixes: 24cccab42c
("lkdtm/bugs: Adjust recursion test to avoid elision")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Raul E Rangel <rrangel@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190827173619.170065-1-rrangel@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
335 lines
7.8 KiB
C
335 lines
7.8 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* This is for all the tests related to logic bugs (e.g. bad dereferences,
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* bad alignment, bad loops, bad locking, bad scheduling, deep stacks, and
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* lockups) along with other things that don't fit well into existing LKDTM
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* test source files.
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*/
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#include "lkdtm.h"
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#include <linux/list.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
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#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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struct lkdtm_list {
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struct list_head node;
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};
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/*
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* Make sure our attempts to over run the kernel stack doesn't trigger
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* a compiler warning when CONFIG_FRAME_WARN is set. Then make sure we
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* recurse past the end of THREAD_SIZE by default.
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*/
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#if defined(CONFIG_FRAME_WARN) && (CONFIG_FRAME_WARN > 0)
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#define REC_STACK_SIZE (_AC(CONFIG_FRAME_WARN, UL) / 2)
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#else
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#define REC_STACK_SIZE (THREAD_SIZE / 8)
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#endif
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#define REC_NUM_DEFAULT ((THREAD_SIZE / REC_STACK_SIZE) * 2)
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static int recur_count = REC_NUM_DEFAULT;
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static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock_me_up);
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/*
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* Make sure compiler does not optimize this function or stack frame away:
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* - function marked noinline
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* - stack variables are marked volatile
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* - stack variables are written (memset()) and read (pr_info())
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* - function has external effects (pr_info())
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* */
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static int noinline recursive_loop(int remaining)
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{
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volatile char buf[REC_STACK_SIZE];
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memset((void *)buf, remaining & 0xFF, sizeof(buf));
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pr_info("loop %d/%d ...\n", (int)buf[remaining % sizeof(buf)],
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recur_count);
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if (!remaining)
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return 0;
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else
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return recursive_loop(remaining - 1);
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}
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/* If the depth is negative, use the default, otherwise keep parameter. */
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void __init lkdtm_bugs_init(int *recur_param)
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{
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if (*recur_param < 0)
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*recur_param = recur_count;
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else
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recur_count = *recur_param;
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}
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void lkdtm_PANIC(void)
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{
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panic("dumptest");
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}
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void lkdtm_BUG(void)
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{
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BUG();
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}
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static int warn_counter;
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void lkdtm_WARNING(void)
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{
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WARN(1, "Warning message trigger count: %d\n", warn_counter++);
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}
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void lkdtm_EXCEPTION(void)
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{
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*((volatile int *) 0) = 0;
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}
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void lkdtm_LOOP(void)
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{
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for (;;)
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;
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}
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void lkdtm_EXHAUST_STACK(void)
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{
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pr_info("Calling function with %lu frame size to depth %d ...\n",
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REC_STACK_SIZE, recur_count);
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recursive_loop(recur_count);
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pr_info("FAIL: survived without exhausting stack?!\n");
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}
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static noinline void __lkdtm_CORRUPT_STACK(void *stack)
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{
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memset(stack, '\xff', 64);
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}
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/* This should trip the stack canary, not corrupt the return address. */
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noinline void lkdtm_CORRUPT_STACK(void)
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{
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/* Use default char array length that triggers stack protection. */
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char data[8] __aligned(sizeof(void *));
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__lkdtm_CORRUPT_STACK(&data);
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pr_info("Corrupted stack containing char array ...\n");
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}
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/* Same as above but will only get a canary with -fstack-protector-strong */
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noinline void lkdtm_CORRUPT_STACK_STRONG(void)
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{
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union {
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unsigned short shorts[4];
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unsigned long *ptr;
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} data __aligned(sizeof(void *));
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__lkdtm_CORRUPT_STACK(&data);
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pr_info("Corrupted stack containing union ...\n");
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}
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void lkdtm_UNALIGNED_LOAD_STORE_WRITE(void)
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{
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static u8 data[5] __attribute__((aligned(4))) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5};
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u32 *p;
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u32 val = 0x12345678;
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p = (u32 *)(data + 1);
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if (*p == 0)
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val = 0x87654321;
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*p = val;
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}
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void lkdtm_SOFTLOCKUP(void)
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{
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preempt_disable();
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for (;;)
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cpu_relax();
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}
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void lkdtm_HARDLOCKUP(void)
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{
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local_irq_disable();
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for (;;)
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cpu_relax();
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}
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void lkdtm_SPINLOCKUP(void)
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{
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/* Must be called twice to trigger. */
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spin_lock(&lock_me_up);
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/* Let sparse know we intended to exit holding the lock. */
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__release(&lock_me_up);
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}
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void lkdtm_HUNG_TASK(void)
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{
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set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
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schedule();
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}
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void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_ADD(void)
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{
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/*
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* Initially, an empty list via LIST_HEAD:
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* test_head.next = &test_head
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* test_head.prev = &test_head
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*/
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LIST_HEAD(test_head);
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struct lkdtm_list good, bad;
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void *target[2] = { };
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void *redirection = ⌖
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pr_info("attempting good list addition\n");
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/*
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* Adding to the list performs these actions:
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* test_head.next->prev = &good.node
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* good.node.next = test_head.next
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* good.node.prev = test_head
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* test_head.next = good.node
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*/
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list_add(&good.node, &test_head);
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pr_info("attempting corrupted list addition\n");
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/*
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* In simulating this "write what where" primitive, the "what" is
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* the address of &bad.node, and the "where" is the address held
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* by "redirection".
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*/
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test_head.next = redirection;
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list_add(&bad.node, &test_head);
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if (target[0] == NULL && target[1] == NULL)
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pr_err("Overwrite did not happen, but no BUG?!\n");
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else
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pr_err("list_add() corruption not detected!\n");
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}
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void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_DEL(void)
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{
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LIST_HEAD(test_head);
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struct lkdtm_list item;
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void *target[2] = { };
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void *redirection = ⌖
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list_add(&item.node, &test_head);
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pr_info("attempting good list removal\n");
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list_del(&item.node);
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pr_info("attempting corrupted list removal\n");
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list_add(&item.node, &test_head);
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/* As with the list_add() test above, this corrupts "next". */
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item.node.next = redirection;
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list_del(&item.node);
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if (target[0] == NULL && target[1] == NULL)
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pr_err("Overwrite did not happen, but no BUG?!\n");
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else
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pr_err("list_del() corruption not detected!\n");
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}
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/* Test if unbalanced set_fs(KERNEL_DS)/set_fs(USER_DS) check exists. */
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void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void)
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{
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pr_info("setting bad task size limit\n");
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set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
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/* Make sure we do not keep running with a KERNEL_DS! */
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force_sig(SIGKILL);
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}
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/* Test that VMAP_STACK is actually allocating with a leading guard page */
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void lkdtm_STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING(void)
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{
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const unsigned char *stack = task_stack_page(current);
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const unsigned char *ptr = stack - 1;
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volatile unsigned char byte;
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pr_info("attempting bad read from page below current stack\n");
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byte = *ptr;
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pr_err("FAIL: accessed page before stack!\n");
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}
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/* Test that VMAP_STACK is actually allocating with a trailing guard page */
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void lkdtm_STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING(void)
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{
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const unsigned char *stack = task_stack_page(current);
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const unsigned char *ptr = stack + THREAD_SIZE;
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volatile unsigned char byte;
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pr_info("attempting bad read from page above current stack\n");
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byte = *ptr;
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pr_err("FAIL: accessed page after stack!\n");
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}
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void lkdtm_UNSET_SMEP(void)
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{
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
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#define MOV_CR4_DEPTH 64
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void (*direct_write_cr4)(unsigned long val);
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unsigned char *insn;
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unsigned long cr4;
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int i;
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cr4 = native_read_cr4();
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if ((cr4 & X86_CR4_SMEP) != X86_CR4_SMEP) {
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pr_err("FAIL: SMEP not in use\n");
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return;
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}
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cr4 &= ~(X86_CR4_SMEP);
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pr_info("trying to clear SMEP normally\n");
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native_write_cr4(cr4);
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if (cr4 == native_read_cr4()) {
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pr_err("FAIL: pinning SMEP failed!\n");
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cr4 |= X86_CR4_SMEP;
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pr_info("restoring SMEP\n");
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native_write_cr4(cr4);
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return;
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}
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pr_info("ok: SMEP did not get cleared\n");
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/*
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* To test the post-write pinning verification we need to call
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* directly into the middle of native_write_cr4() where the
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* cr4 write happens, skipping any pinning. This searches for
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* the cr4 writing instruction.
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*/
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insn = (unsigned char *)native_write_cr4;
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for (i = 0; i < MOV_CR4_DEPTH; i++) {
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/* mov %rdi, %cr4 */
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if (insn[i] == 0x0f && insn[i+1] == 0x22 && insn[i+2] == 0xe7)
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break;
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/* mov %rdi,%rax; mov %rax, %cr4 */
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if (insn[i] == 0x48 && insn[i+1] == 0x89 &&
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insn[i+2] == 0xf8 && insn[i+3] == 0x0f &&
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insn[i+4] == 0x22 && insn[i+5] == 0xe0)
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break;
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}
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if (i >= MOV_CR4_DEPTH) {
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pr_info("ok: cannot locate cr4 writing call gadget\n");
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return;
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}
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direct_write_cr4 = (void *)(insn + i);
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pr_info("trying to clear SMEP with call gadget\n");
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direct_write_cr4(cr4);
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if (native_read_cr4() & X86_CR4_SMEP) {
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pr_info("ok: SMEP removal was reverted\n");
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} else {
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pr_err("FAIL: cleared SMEP not detected!\n");
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cr4 |= X86_CR4_SMEP;
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pr_info("restoring SMEP\n");
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native_write_cr4(cr4);
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}
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#else
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pr_err("FAIL: this test is x86_64-only\n");
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#endif
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}
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