linux/security
Eric Paris 066746796b Currently SELinux jumps through some ugly hoops to not audit a capbility
check when determining if a process has additional powers to override
memory limits or when trying to read/write illegal file labels.  Use
the new noaudit call instead.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-11 22:02:57 +11:00
..
keys keys: remove unused key_alloc_sem 2008-06-06 11:29:11 -07:00
selinux Currently SELinux jumps through some ugly hoops to not audit a capbility 2008-11-11 22:02:57 +11:00
smack Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/lblnet-2.6_next into next 2008-10-11 09:26:14 +11:00
capability.c security: Fix setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() 2008-08-14 22:59:43 +10:00
commoncap.c Add a new capable interface that will be used by systems that use audit to 2008-11-11 22:02:50 +11:00
device_cgroup.c devcgroup: remove spin_lock() 2008-10-20 08:52:38 -07:00
inode.c integrity: special fs magic 2008-10-13 09:47:43 +11:00
Kconfig securityfs: do not depend on CONFIG_SECURITY 2008-08-28 10:47:42 +10:00
Makefile securityfs: do not depend on CONFIG_SECURITY 2008-08-28 10:47:42 +10:00
root_plug.c security: Fix setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() 2008-08-14 22:59:43 +10:00
security.c Add a new capable interface that will be used by systems that use audit to 2008-11-11 22:02:50 +11:00