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c269497d24
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJIBAABCAAyFiEES0KozwfymdVUl37v6iDy2pc3iXMFAmI473AUHHBhdWxAcGF1 bC1tb29yZS5jb20ACgkQ6iDy2pc3iXPaMBAAuxb+RBG0Wqlt0ktUYHF0ZxDVJOTK YGGmaDp657YJ349+c0U3mrhm7Wj8Mn7Eoz3tAYUWRQ5xPziJQRX7PfxFzT/qpPUz XYLRppwCWpLSB5NdpNzK3RdGNv+/9BzZ6gmjTj2wfsUCOA8cfpB1pYwyIWm6M9B+ FXMTZ7WOqiuJ3wJa5nD1PPM1z+99nPkYiE6/iKsDidbQgSl8NX6mJY/yUsVxcZ6A c45n0Pf6Fj9w1XKdVDPfiRY4nekmPCwqbrn7QVtiuCYyC54JcZNmuCQnoN8dy5XY s/j2M2DBxT6M9rjOqQznL5jGdNKFCWydCAso06JO/13pfakvPpSS6v95Iltqkbtw 1oHf3j5URIirAhyqcyPGoQz+g5c6krgx/Z2GOpvDs9r/AQ80GlpOBYhN3x61lVT5 MLYq0ylV1Vfosnv7a6+AQZ9lJAkmIqws1WtG28adn7/zMPyD/hWwQ7736k/50CMl oC6zi3G6jCZueWdHZviqf96bjW20ZmNL2DQRy0n8ZSQQGgrsQnFgYMpXtB1Zv8+m XaDOPo20Ne68rzmTsEp2gVgcnXFc5/KQBDvaUta9etrbTEWqQqqTWiP8mA2QiGme JwKMgprV0uVDd6s9TC/O0as02xoKrWuGaL7czhlFxuL45k0nYDmk7ea/gz9MrcWV Y5pzAxs4LVMwVzs= =5E1v -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20220321' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: "We've got a number of SELinux patches queued up, the highlights are: - Fixup the security_fs_context_parse_param() LSM hook so it executes all of the LSM hook implementations unless a serious error occurs. We also correct the SELinux hook implementation so that it returns zero on success. - In addition to a few SELinux mount option parsing fixes, we simplified the parsing by moving it earlier in the process. The logic was that it was unlikely an admin/user would use the new mount API and not have the policy loaded before passing the SELinux options. - Properly fixed the LSM/SELinux/SCTP hooks with the addition of the security_sctp_assoc_established() hook. This work was done in conjunction with the netdev folks and should complete the move of the SCTP labeling from the endpoints to the associations. - Fixed a variety of sparse warnings caused by changes in the "__rcu" markings of some core kernel structures. - Ensure we access the superblock's LSM security blob using the stacking-safe accessors. - Added the ability for the kernel to always allow FIOCLEX and FIONCLEX if the "ioctl_skip_cloexec" policy capability is specified. - Various constifications improvements, type casting improvements, additional return value checks, and dead code/parameter removal. - Documentation fixes" * tag 'selinux-pr-20220321' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: (23 commits) selinux: shorten the policy capability enum names docs: fix 'make htmldocs' warning in SCTP.rst selinux: allow FIOCLEX and FIONCLEX with policy capability selinux: use correct type for context length selinux: drop return statement at end of void functions security: implement sctp_assoc_established hook in selinux security: add sctp_assoc_established hook selinux: parse contexts for mount options early selinux: various sparse fixes selinux: try to use preparsed sid before calling parse_sid() selinux: Fix selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat() LSM: general protection fault in legacy_parse_param selinux: fix a type cast problem in cred_init_security() selinux: drop unused macro selinux: simplify cred_init_security selinux: do not discard const qualifier in cast selinux: drop unused parameter of avtab_insert_node selinux: drop cast to same type selinux: enclose macro arguments in parenthesis selinux: declare name parameter of hash_eval const ...
759 lines
17 KiB
C
759 lines
17 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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/* Authors: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
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* Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com>
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
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*/
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/errno.h>
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#include <linux/string.h>
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#include <linux/spinlock.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include "security.h"
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#include "conditional.h"
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#include "services.h"
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/*
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* cond_evaluate_expr evaluates a conditional expr
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* in reverse polish notation. It returns true (1), false (0),
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* or undefined (-1). Undefined occurs when the expression
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* exceeds the stack depth of COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH.
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*/
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static int cond_evaluate_expr(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr *expr)
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{
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u32 i;
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int s[COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH];
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int sp = -1;
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if (expr->len == 0)
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return -1;
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for (i = 0; i < expr->len; i++) {
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struct cond_expr_node *node = &expr->nodes[i];
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switch (node->expr_type) {
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case COND_BOOL:
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if (sp == (COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
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return -1;
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sp++;
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s[sp] = p->bool_val_to_struct[node->bool - 1]->state;
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break;
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case COND_NOT:
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if (sp < 0)
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return -1;
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s[sp] = !s[sp];
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break;
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case COND_OR:
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if (sp < 1)
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return -1;
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sp--;
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s[sp] |= s[sp + 1];
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break;
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case COND_AND:
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if (sp < 1)
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return -1;
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sp--;
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s[sp] &= s[sp + 1];
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break;
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case COND_XOR:
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if (sp < 1)
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return -1;
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sp--;
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s[sp] ^= s[sp + 1];
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break;
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case COND_EQ:
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if (sp < 1)
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return -1;
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sp--;
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s[sp] = (s[sp] == s[sp + 1]);
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break;
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case COND_NEQ:
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if (sp < 1)
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return -1;
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sp--;
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s[sp] = (s[sp] != s[sp + 1]);
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break;
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default:
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return -1;
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}
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}
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return s[0];
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}
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/*
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* evaluate_cond_node evaluates the conditional stored in
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* a struct cond_node and if the result is different than the
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* current state of the node it sets the rules in the true/false
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* list appropriately. If the result of the expression is undefined
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* all of the rules are disabled for safety.
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*/
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static void evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node)
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{
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struct avtab_node *avnode;
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int new_state;
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u32 i;
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new_state = cond_evaluate_expr(p, &node->expr);
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if (new_state != node->cur_state) {
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node->cur_state = new_state;
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if (new_state == -1)
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pr_err("SELinux: expression result was undefined - disabling all rules.\n");
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/* turn the rules on or off */
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for (i = 0; i < node->true_list.len; i++) {
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avnode = node->true_list.nodes[i];
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if (new_state <= 0)
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avnode->key.specified &= ~AVTAB_ENABLED;
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else
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avnode->key.specified |= AVTAB_ENABLED;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < node->false_list.len; i++) {
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avnode = node->false_list.nodes[i];
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/* -1 or 1 */
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if (new_state)
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avnode->key.specified &= ~AVTAB_ENABLED;
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else
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avnode->key.specified |= AVTAB_ENABLED;
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}
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}
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}
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void evaluate_cond_nodes(struct policydb *p)
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{
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u32 i;
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for (i = 0; i < p->cond_list_len; i++)
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evaluate_cond_node(p, &p->cond_list[i]);
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}
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void cond_policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
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{
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p->bool_val_to_struct = NULL;
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p->cond_list = NULL;
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p->cond_list_len = 0;
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avtab_init(&p->te_cond_avtab);
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}
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static void cond_node_destroy(struct cond_node *node)
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{
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kfree(node->expr.nodes);
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/* the avtab_ptr_t nodes are destroyed by the avtab */
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kfree(node->true_list.nodes);
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kfree(node->false_list.nodes);
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}
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static void cond_list_destroy(struct policydb *p)
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{
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u32 i;
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for (i = 0; i < p->cond_list_len; i++)
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cond_node_destroy(&p->cond_list[i]);
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kfree(p->cond_list);
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p->cond_list = NULL;
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p->cond_list_len = 0;
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}
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void cond_policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
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{
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kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
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avtab_destroy(&p->te_cond_avtab);
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cond_list_destroy(p);
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}
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int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb *p)
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{
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kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
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p->bool_val_to_struct = kmalloc_array(p->p_bools.nprim,
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sizeof(*p->bool_val_to_struct),
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GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!p->bool_val_to_struct)
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return -ENOMEM;
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return 0;
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}
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int cond_destroy_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
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{
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kfree(key);
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kfree(datum);
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return 0;
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}
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int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
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{
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struct policydb *p;
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struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
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booldatum = datum;
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p = datap;
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if (!booldatum->value || booldatum->value > p->p_bools.nprim)
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return -EINVAL;
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p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_BOOLS][booldatum->value - 1] = key;
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p->bool_val_to_struct[booldatum->value - 1] = booldatum;
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return 0;
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}
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static int bool_isvalid(struct cond_bool_datum *b)
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{
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if (!(b->state == 0 || b->state == 1))
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
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{
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char *key = NULL;
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struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
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__le32 buf[3];
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u32 len;
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int rc;
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booldatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*booldatum), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!booldatum)
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return -ENOMEM;
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rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf));
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if (rc)
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goto err;
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booldatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
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booldatum->state = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
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rc = -EINVAL;
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if (!bool_isvalid(booldatum))
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goto err;
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len = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
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if (((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1)))
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goto err;
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rc = -ENOMEM;
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key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!key)
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goto err;
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rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
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if (rc)
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goto err;
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key[len] = '\0';
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rc = symtab_insert(s, key, booldatum);
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if (rc)
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goto err;
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return 0;
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err:
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cond_destroy_bool(key, booldatum, NULL);
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return rc;
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}
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struct cond_insertf_data {
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struct policydb *p;
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struct avtab_node **dst;
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struct cond_av_list *other;
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};
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static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k,
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const struct avtab_datum *d, void *ptr)
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{
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struct cond_insertf_data *data = ptr;
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struct policydb *p = data->p;
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struct cond_av_list *other = data->other;
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struct avtab_node *node_ptr;
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u32 i;
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bool found;
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/*
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* For type rules we have to make certain there aren't any
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* conflicting rules by searching the te_avtab and the
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* cond_te_avtab.
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*/
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if (k->specified & AVTAB_TYPE) {
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if (avtab_search(&p->te_avtab, k)) {
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pr_err("SELinux: type rule already exists outside of a conditional.\n");
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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/*
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* If we are reading the false list other will be a pointer to
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* the true list. We can have duplicate entries if there is only
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* 1 other entry and it is in our true list.
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*
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* If we are reading the true list (other == NULL) there shouldn't
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* be any other entries.
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*/
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if (other) {
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node_ptr = avtab_search_node(&p->te_cond_avtab, k);
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if (node_ptr) {
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if (avtab_search_node_next(node_ptr, k->specified)) {
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pr_err("SELinux: too many conflicting type rules.\n");
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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found = false;
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for (i = 0; i < other->len; i++) {
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if (other->nodes[i] == node_ptr) {
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found = true;
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break;
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}
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}
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if (!found) {
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pr_err("SELinux: conflicting type rules.\n");
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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}
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} else {
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if (avtab_search(&p->te_cond_avtab, k)) {
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pr_err("SELinux: conflicting type rules when adding type rule for true.\n");
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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}
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}
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node_ptr = avtab_insert_nonunique(&p->te_cond_avtab, k, d);
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if (!node_ptr) {
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pr_err("SELinux: could not insert rule.\n");
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return -ENOMEM;
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}
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*data->dst = node_ptr;
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return 0;
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}
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static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp,
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struct cond_av_list *list,
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struct cond_av_list *other)
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{
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int rc;
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__le32 buf[1];
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u32 i, len;
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struct cond_insertf_data data;
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rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
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if (rc)
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return rc;
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len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
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if (len == 0)
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return 0;
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list->nodes = kcalloc(len, sizeof(*list->nodes), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!list->nodes)
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return -ENOMEM;
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data.p = p;
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data.other = other;
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for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
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data.dst = &list->nodes[i];
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rc = avtab_read_item(&p->te_cond_avtab, fp, p, cond_insertf,
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&data);
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if (rc) {
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kfree(list->nodes);
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list->nodes = NULL;
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return rc;
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}
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}
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list->len = len;
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return 0;
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}
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static int expr_node_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr_node *expr)
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{
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if (expr->expr_type <= 0 || expr->expr_type > COND_LAST) {
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pr_err("SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown operator.\n");
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return 0;
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}
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if (expr->bool > p->p_bools.nprim) {
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pr_err("SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown bool.\n");
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp)
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{
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__le32 buf[2];
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u32 i, len;
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int rc;
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rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
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if (rc)
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return rc;
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node->cur_state = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
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/* expr */
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len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
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node->expr.nodes = kcalloc(len, sizeof(*node->expr.nodes), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!node->expr.nodes)
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return -ENOMEM;
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node->expr.len = len;
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for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
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struct cond_expr_node *expr = &node->expr.nodes[i];
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rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
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if (rc)
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return rc;
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expr->expr_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
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expr->bool = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
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if (!expr_node_isvalid(p, expr))
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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rc = cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->true_list, NULL);
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if (rc)
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return rc;
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return cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->false_list, &node->true_list);
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}
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int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
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{
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__le32 buf[1];
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u32 i, len;
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int rc;
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rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf));
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if (rc)
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return rc;
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len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
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p->cond_list = kcalloc(len, sizeof(*p->cond_list), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!p->cond_list)
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return -ENOMEM;
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rc = avtab_alloc(&(p->te_cond_avtab), p->te_avtab.nel);
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if (rc)
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goto err;
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p->cond_list_len = len;
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for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
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rc = cond_read_node(p, &p->cond_list[i], fp);
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if (rc)
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goto err;
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}
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return 0;
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err:
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cond_list_destroy(p);
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return rc;
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}
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int cond_write_bool(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
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{
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char *key = vkey;
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struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum = datum;
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struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
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void *fp = pd->fp;
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__le32 buf[3];
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u32 len;
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int rc;
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len = strlen(key);
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buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(booldatum->value);
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buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(booldatum->state);
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buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(len);
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rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
return rc;
|
|
rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
return rc;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* cond_write_cond_av_list doesn't write out the av_list nodes.
|
|
* Instead it writes out the key/value pairs from the avtab. This
|
|
* is necessary because there is no way to uniquely identifying rules
|
|
* in the avtab so it is not possible to associate individual rules
|
|
* in the avtab with a conditional without saving them as part of
|
|
* the conditional. This means that the avtab with the conditional
|
|
* rules will not be saved but will be rebuilt on policy load.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int cond_write_av_list(struct policydb *p,
|
|
struct cond_av_list *list, struct policy_file *fp)
|
|
{
|
|
__le32 buf[1];
|
|
u32 i;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(list->len);
|
|
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < list->len; i++) {
|
|
rc = avtab_write_item(p, list->nodes[i], fp);
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int cond_write_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node,
|
|
struct policy_file *fp)
|
|
{
|
|
__le32 buf[2];
|
|
int rc;
|
|
u32 i;
|
|
|
|
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(node->cur_state);
|
|
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(node->expr.len);
|
|
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < node->expr.len; i++) {
|
|
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(node->expr.nodes[i].expr_type);
|
|
buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(node->expr.nodes[i].bool);
|
|
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rc = cond_write_av_list(p, &node->true_list, fp);
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
return rc;
|
|
rc = cond_write_av_list(p, &node->false_list, fp);
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
|
|
{
|
|
u32 i;
|
|
__le32 buf[1];
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->cond_list_len);
|
|
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < p->cond_list_len; i++) {
|
|
rc = cond_write_node(p, &p->cond_list[i], fp);
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void cond_compute_xperms(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
|
|
struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
|
|
{
|
|
struct avtab_node *node;
|
|
|
|
if (!ctab || !key || !xpermd)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node;
|
|
node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
|
|
if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED)
|
|
services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Determine whether additional permissions are granted by the conditional
|
|
* av table, and if so, add them to the result
|
|
*/
|
|
void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
|
|
struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms)
|
|
{
|
|
struct avtab_node *node;
|
|
|
|
if (!ctab || !key || !avd)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node;
|
|
node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
|
|
if ((u16)(AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
|
|
(node->key.specified & (AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
|
|
avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
|
|
if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
|
|
(node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
|
|
/* Since a '0' in an auditdeny mask represents a
|
|
* permission we do NOT want to audit (dontaudit), we use
|
|
* the '&' operand to ensure that all '0's in the mask
|
|
* are retained (much unlike the allow and auditallow cases).
|
|
*/
|
|
avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
|
|
if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
|
|
(node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
|
|
avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
|
|
if (xperms && (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) &&
|
|
(node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
|
|
services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int cond_dup_av_list(struct cond_av_list *new,
|
|
struct cond_av_list *orig,
|
|
struct avtab *avtab)
|
|
{
|
|
u32 i;
|
|
|
|
memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new));
|
|
|
|
new->nodes = kcalloc(orig->len, sizeof(*new->nodes), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!new->nodes)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < orig->len; i++) {
|
|
new->nodes[i] = avtab_insert_nonunique(avtab,
|
|
&orig->nodes[i]->key,
|
|
&orig->nodes[i]->datum);
|
|
if (!new->nodes[i])
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
new->len++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int duplicate_policydb_cond_list(struct policydb *newp,
|
|
struct policydb *origp)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc;
|
|
u32 i;
|
|
|
|
rc = avtab_alloc_dup(&newp->te_cond_avtab, &origp->te_cond_avtab);
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
newp->cond_list_len = 0;
|
|
newp->cond_list = kcalloc(origp->cond_list_len,
|
|
sizeof(*newp->cond_list),
|
|
GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!newp->cond_list)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < origp->cond_list_len; i++) {
|
|
struct cond_node *newn = &newp->cond_list[i];
|
|
struct cond_node *orign = &origp->cond_list[i];
|
|
|
|
newp->cond_list_len++;
|
|
|
|
newn->cur_state = orign->cur_state;
|
|
newn->expr.nodes = kmemdup(orign->expr.nodes,
|
|
orign->expr.len * sizeof(*orign->expr.nodes),
|
|
GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!newn->expr.nodes)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
newn->expr.len = orign->expr.len;
|
|
|
|
rc = cond_dup_av_list(&newn->true_list, &orign->true_list,
|
|
&newp->te_cond_avtab);
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
rc = cond_dup_av_list(&newn->false_list, &orign->false_list,
|
|
&newp->te_cond_avtab);
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
avtab_destroy(&newp->te_cond_avtab);
|
|
cond_list_destroy(newp);
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int cond_bools_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *args)
|
|
{
|
|
/* key was not copied so no need to free here */
|
|
kfree(datum);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int cond_bools_copy(struct hashtab_node *new, struct hashtab_node *orig, void *args)
|
|
{
|
|
struct cond_bool_datum *datum;
|
|
|
|
datum = kmemdup(orig->datum, sizeof(struct cond_bool_datum),
|
|
GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!datum)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
new->key = orig->key; /* No need to copy, never modified */
|
|
new->datum = datum;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int cond_bools_index(void *key, void *datum, void *args)
|
|
{
|
|
struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum, **cond_bool_array;
|
|
|
|
booldatum = datum;
|
|
cond_bool_array = args;
|
|
cond_bool_array[booldatum->value - 1] = booldatum;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int duplicate_policydb_bools(struct policydb *newdb,
|
|
struct policydb *orig)
|
|
{
|
|
struct cond_bool_datum **cond_bool_array;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
cond_bool_array = kmalloc_array(orig->p_bools.nprim,
|
|
sizeof(*orig->bool_val_to_struct),
|
|
GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!cond_bool_array)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
rc = hashtab_duplicate(&newdb->p_bools.table, &orig->p_bools.table,
|
|
cond_bools_copy, cond_bools_destroy, NULL);
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
kfree(cond_bool_array);
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hashtab_map(&newdb->p_bools.table, cond_bools_index, cond_bool_array);
|
|
newdb->bool_val_to_struct = cond_bool_array;
|
|
|
|
newdb->p_bools.nprim = orig->p_bools.nprim;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void cond_policydb_destroy_dup(struct policydb *p)
|
|
{
|
|
hashtab_map(&p->p_bools.table, cond_bools_destroy, NULL);
|
|
hashtab_destroy(&p->p_bools.table);
|
|
cond_policydb_destroy(p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int cond_policydb_dup(struct policydb *new, struct policydb *orig)
|
|
{
|
|
cond_policydb_init(new);
|
|
|
|
if (duplicate_policydb_bools(new, orig))
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
if (duplicate_policydb_cond_list(new, orig)) {
|
|
cond_policydb_destroy_dup(new);
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|