mirror of
https://mirrors.bfsu.edu.cn/git/linux.git
synced 2024-12-20 17:44:33 +08:00
a3fe5dbda0
When dirty logging is enabled without initially-all-set, try to split all huge pages in the memslot down to 4KB pages so that vCPUs do not have to take expensive write-protection faults to split huge pages. Eager page splitting is best-effort only. This commit only adds the support for the TDP MMU, and even there splitting may fail due to out of memory conditions. Failures to split a huge page is fine from a correctness standpoint because KVM will always follow up splitting by write-protecting any remaining huge pages. Eager page splitting moves the cost of splitting huge pages off of the vCPU threads and onto the thread enabling dirty logging on the memslot. This is useful because: 1. Splitting on the vCPU thread interrupts vCPUs execution and is disruptive to customers whereas splitting on VM ioctl threads can run in parallel with vCPU execution. 2. Splitting all huge pages at once is more efficient because it does not require performing VM-exit handling or walking the page table for every 4KiB page in the memslot, and greatly reduces the amount of contention on the mmu_lock. For example, when running dirty_log_perf_test with 96 virtual CPUs, 1GiB per vCPU, and 1GiB HugeTLB memory, the time it takes vCPUs to write to all of their memory after dirty logging is enabled decreased by 95% from 2.94s to 0.14s. Eager Page Splitting is over 100x more efficient than the current implementation of splitting on fault under the read lock. For example, taking the same workload as above, Eager Page Splitting reduced the CPU required to split all huge pages from ~270 CPU-seconds ((2.94s - 0.14s) * 96 vCPU threads) to only 1.55 CPU-seconds. Eager page splitting does increase the amount of time it takes to enable dirty logging since it has split all huge pages. For example, the time it took to enable dirty logging in the 96GiB region of the aforementioned test increased from 0.001s to 1.55s. Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Message-Id: <20220119230739.2234394-16-dmatlack@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
440 lines
13 KiB
C
440 lines
13 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
|
|
/*
|
|
* Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux
|
|
*
|
|
* Macros and functions to access KVM PTEs (also known as SPTEs)
|
|
*
|
|
* Copyright (C) 2006 Qumranet, Inc.
|
|
* Copyright 2020 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
|
|
#include "mmu.h"
|
|
#include "mmu_internal.h"
|
|
#include "x86.h"
|
|
#include "spte.h"
|
|
|
|
#include <asm/e820/api.h>
|
|
#include <asm/memtype.h>
|
|
#include <asm/vmx.h>
|
|
|
|
static bool __read_mostly enable_mmio_caching = true;
|
|
module_param_named(mmio_caching, enable_mmio_caching, bool, 0444);
|
|
|
|
u64 __read_mostly shadow_host_writable_mask;
|
|
u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmu_writable_mask;
|
|
u64 __read_mostly shadow_nx_mask;
|
|
u64 __read_mostly shadow_x_mask; /* mutual exclusive with nx_mask */
|
|
u64 __read_mostly shadow_user_mask;
|
|
u64 __read_mostly shadow_accessed_mask;
|
|
u64 __read_mostly shadow_dirty_mask;
|
|
u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_value;
|
|
u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_mask;
|
|
u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_access_mask;
|
|
u64 __read_mostly shadow_present_mask;
|
|
u64 __read_mostly shadow_me_mask;
|
|
u64 __read_mostly shadow_acc_track_mask;
|
|
|
|
u64 __read_mostly shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask;
|
|
u64 __read_mostly shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask;
|
|
|
|
u8 __read_mostly shadow_phys_bits;
|
|
|
|
static u64 generation_mmio_spte_mask(u64 gen)
|
|
{
|
|
u64 mask;
|
|
|
|
WARN_ON(gen & ~MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK);
|
|
|
|
mask = (gen << MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_SHIFT) & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_MASK;
|
|
mask |= (gen << MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_SHIFT) & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_MASK;
|
|
return mask;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
u64 make_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gfn, unsigned int access)
|
|
{
|
|
u64 gen = kvm_vcpu_memslots(vcpu)->generation & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK;
|
|
u64 spte = generation_mmio_spte_mask(gen);
|
|
u64 gpa = gfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
|
|
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(!shadow_mmio_value);
|
|
|
|
access &= shadow_mmio_access_mask;
|
|
spte |= shadow_mmio_value | access;
|
|
spte |= gpa | shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask;
|
|
spte |= (gpa & shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask)
|
|
<< SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN;
|
|
|
|
return spte;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool kvm_is_mmio_pfn(kvm_pfn_t pfn)
|
|
{
|
|
if (pfn_valid(pfn))
|
|
return !is_zero_pfn(pfn) && PageReserved(pfn_to_page(pfn)) &&
|
|
/*
|
|
* Some reserved pages, such as those from NVDIMM
|
|
* DAX devices, are not for MMIO, and can be mapped
|
|
* with cached memory type for better performance.
|
|
* However, the above check misconceives those pages
|
|
* as MMIO, and results in KVM mapping them with UC
|
|
* memory type, which would hurt the performance.
|
|
* Therefore, we check the host memory type in addition
|
|
* and only treat UC/UC-/WC pages as MMIO.
|
|
*/
|
|
(!pat_enabled() || pat_pfn_immune_to_uc_mtrr(pfn));
|
|
|
|
return !e820__mapped_raw_any(pfn_to_hpa(pfn),
|
|
pfn_to_hpa(pfn + 1) - 1,
|
|
E820_TYPE_RAM);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool make_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
|
|
const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
|
|
unsigned int pte_access, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
|
|
u64 old_spte, bool prefetch, bool can_unsync,
|
|
bool host_writable, u64 *new_spte)
|
|
{
|
|
int level = sp->role.level;
|
|
u64 spte = SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK;
|
|
bool wrprot = false;
|
|
|
|
if (sp->role.ad_disabled)
|
|
spte |= SPTE_TDP_AD_DISABLED_MASK;
|
|
else if (kvm_mmu_page_ad_need_write_protect(sp))
|
|
spte |= SPTE_TDP_AD_WRPROT_ONLY_MASK;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* For the EPT case, shadow_present_mask is 0 if hardware
|
|
* supports exec-only page table entries. In that case,
|
|
* ACC_USER_MASK and shadow_user_mask are used to represent
|
|
* read access. See FNAME(gpte_access) in paging_tmpl.h.
|
|
*/
|
|
spte |= shadow_present_mask;
|
|
if (!prefetch)
|
|
spte |= spte_shadow_accessed_mask(spte);
|
|
|
|
if (level > PG_LEVEL_4K && (pte_access & ACC_EXEC_MASK) &&
|
|
is_nx_huge_page_enabled()) {
|
|
pte_access &= ~ACC_EXEC_MASK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pte_access & ACC_EXEC_MASK)
|
|
spte |= shadow_x_mask;
|
|
else
|
|
spte |= shadow_nx_mask;
|
|
|
|
if (pte_access & ACC_USER_MASK)
|
|
spte |= shadow_user_mask;
|
|
|
|
if (level > PG_LEVEL_4K)
|
|
spte |= PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK;
|
|
if (tdp_enabled)
|
|
spte |= static_call(kvm_x86_get_mt_mask)(vcpu, gfn,
|
|
kvm_is_mmio_pfn(pfn));
|
|
|
|
if (host_writable)
|
|
spte |= shadow_host_writable_mask;
|
|
else
|
|
pte_access &= ~ACC_WRITE_MASK;
|
|
|
|
if (!kvm_is_mmio_pfn(pfn))
|
|
spte |= shadow_me_mask;
|
|
|
|
spte |= (u64)pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
|
|
|
|
if (pte_access & ACC_WRITE_MASK) {
|
|
spte |= PT_WRITABLE_MASK | shadow_mmu_writable_mask;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Optimization: for pte sync, if spte was writable the hash
|
|
* lookup is unnecessary (and expensive). Write protection
|
|
* is responsibility of kvm_mmu_get_page / kvm_mmu_sync_roots.
|
|
* Same reasoning can be applied to dirty page accounting.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (is_writable_pte(old_spte))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Unsync shadow pages that are reachable by the new, writable
|
|
* SPTE. Write-protect the SPTE if the page can't be unsync'd,
|
|
* e.g. it's write-tracked (upper-level SPs) or has one or more
|
|
* shadow pages and unsync'ing pages is not allowed.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (mmu_try_to_unsync_pages(vcpu->kvm, slot, gfn, can_unsync, prefetch)) {
|
|
pgprintk("%s: found shadow page for %llx, marking ro\n",
|
|
__func__, gfn);
|
|
wrprot = true;
|
|
pte_access &= ~ACC_WRITE_MASK;
|
|
spte &= ~(PT_WRITABLE_MASK | shadow_mmu_writable_mask);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pte_access & ACC_WRITE_MASK)
|
|
spte |= spte_shadow_dirty_mask(spte);
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
if (prefetch)
|
|
spte = mark_spte_for_access_track(spte);
|
|
|
|
WARN_ONCE(is_rsvd_spte(&vcpu->arch.mmu->shadow_zero_check, spte, level),
|
|
"spte = 0x%llx, level = %d, rsvd bits = 0x%llx", spte, level,
|
|
get_rsvd_bits(&vcpu->arch.mmu->shadow_zero_check, spte, level));
|
|
|
|
if ((spte & PT_WRITABLE_MASK) && kvm_slot_dirty_track_enabled(slot)) {
|
|
/* Enforced by kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust. */
|
|
WARN_ON(level > PG_LEVEL_4K);
|
|
mark_page_dirty_in_slot(vcpu->kvm, slot, gfn);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*new_spte = spte;
|
|
return wrprot;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static u64 make_spte_executable(u64 spte)
|
|
{
|
|
bool is_access_track = is_access_track_spte(spte);
|
|
|
|
if (is_access_track)
|
|
spte = restore_acc_track_spte(spte);
|
|
|
|
spte &= ~shadow_nx_mask;
|
|
spte |= shadow_x_mask;
|
|
|
|
if (is_access_track)
|
|
spte = mark_spte_for_access_track(spte);
|
|
|
|
return spte;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Construct an SPTE that maps a sub-page of the given huge page SPTE where
|
|
* `index` identifies which sub-page.
|
|
*
|
|
* This is used during huge page splitting to build the SPTEs that make up the
|
|
* new page table.
|
|
*/
|
|
u64 make_huge_page_split_spte(u64 huge_spte, int huge_level, int index)
|
|
{
|
|
u64 child_spte;
|
|
int child_level;
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_shadow_present_pte(huge_spte)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_large_pte(huge_spte)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
child_spte = huge_spte;
|
|
child_level = huge_level - 1;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The child_spte already has the base address of the huge page being
|
|
* split. So we just have to OR in the offset to the page at the next
|
|
* lower level for the given index.
|
|
*/
|
|
child_spte |= (index * KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(child_level)) << PAGE_SHIFT;
|
|
|
|
if (child_level == PG_LEVEL_4K) {
|
|
child_spte &= ~PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* When splitting to a 4K page, mark the page executable as the
|
|
* NX hugepage mitigation no longer applies.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (is_nx_huge_page_enabled())
|
|
child_spte = make_spte_executable(child_spte);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return child_spte;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
u64 make_nonleaf_spte(u64 *child_pt, bool ad_disabled)
|
|
{
|
|
u64 spte = SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK;
|
|
|
|
spte |= __pa(child_pt) | shadow_present_mask | PT_WRITABLE_MASK |
|
|
shadow_user_mask | shadow_x_mask | shadow_me_mask;
|
|
|
|
if (ad_disabled)
|
|
spte |= SPTE_TDP_AD_DISABLED_MASK;
|
|
else
|
|
spte |= shadow_accessed_mask;
|
|
|
|
return spte;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
u64 kvm_mmu_changed_pte_notifier_make_spte(u64 old_spte, kvm_pfn_t new_pfn)
|
|
{
|
|
u64 new_spte;
|
|
|
|
new_spte = old_spte & ~PT64_BASE_ADDR_MASK;
|
|
new_spte |= (u64)new_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
|
|
|
|
new_spte &= ~PT_WRITABLE_MASK;
|
|
new_spte &= ~shadow_host_writable_mask;
|
|
new_spte &= ~shadow_mmu_writable_mask;
|
|
|
|
new_spte = mark_spte_for_access_track(new_spte);
|
|
|
|
return new_spte;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static u8 kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits(void)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits is reduced when MKTME or SME are detected
|
|
* in CPU detection code, but the processor treats those reduced bits as
|
|
* 'keyID' thus they are not reserved bits. Therefore KVM needs to look at
|
|
* the physical address bits reported by CPUID.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (likely(boot_cpu_data.extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000008))
|
|
return cpuid_eax(0x80000008) & 0xff;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Quite weird to have VMX or SVM but not MAXPHYADDR; probably a VM with
|
|
* custom CPUID. Proceed with whatever the kernel found since these features
|
|
* aren't virtualizable (SME/SEV also require CPUIDs higher than 0x80000008).
|
|
*/
|
|
return boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
u64 mark_spte_for_access_track(u64 spte)
|
|
{
|
|
if (spte_ad_enabled(spte))
|
|
return spte & ~shadow_accessed_mask;
|
|
|
|
if (is_access_track_spte(spte))
|
|
return spte;
|
|
|
|
check_spte_writable_invariants(spte);
|
|
|
|
WARN_ONCE(spte & (SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_MASK <<
|
|
SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_SHIFT),
|
|
"kvm: Access Tracking saved bit locations are not zero\n");
|
|
|
|
spte |= (spte & SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_MASK) <<
|
|
SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_SHIFT;
|
|
spte &= ~shadow_acc_track_mask;
|
|
|
|
return spte;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_value, u64 mmio_mask, u64 access_mask)
|
|
{
|
|
BUG_ON((u64)(unsigned)access_mask != access_mask);
|
|
WARN_ON(mmio_value & shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask);
|
|
|
|
if (!enable_mmio_caching)
|
|
mmio_value = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Disable MMIO caching if the MMIO value collides with the bits that
|
|
* are used to hold the relocated GFN when the L1TF mitigation is
|
|
* enabled. This should never fire as there is no known hardware that
|
|
* can trigger this condition, e.g. SME/SEV CPUs that require a custom
|
|
* MMIO value are not susceptible to L1TF.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (WARN_ON(mmio_value & (shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask <<
|
|
SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN)))
|
|
mmio_value = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The masked MMIO value must obviously match itself and a removed SPTE
|
|
* must not get a false positive. Removed SPTEs and MMIO SPTEs should
|
|
* never collide as MMIO must set some RWX bits, and removed SPTEs must
|
|
* not set any RWX bits.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (WARN_ON((mmio_value & mmio_mask) != mmio_value) ||
|
|
WARN_ON(mmio_value && (REMOVED_SPTE & mmio_mask) == mmio_value))
|
|
mmio_value = 0;
|
|
|
|
shadow_mmio_value = mmio_value;
|
|
shadow_mmio_mask = mmio_mask;
|
|
shadow_mmio_access_mask = access_mask;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask);
|
|
|
|
void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(bool has_ad_bits, bool has_exec_only)
|
|
{
|
|
shadow_user_mask = VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK;
|
|
shadow_accessed_mask = has_ad_bits ? VMX_EPT_ACCESS_BIT : 0ull;
|
|
shadow_dirty_mask = has_ad_bits ? VMX_EPT_DIRTY_BIT : 0ull;
|
|
shadow_nx_mask = 0ull;
|
|
shadow_x_mask = VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK;
|
|
shadow_present_mask = has_exec_only ? 0ull : VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK;
|
|
shadow_acc_track_mask = VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK;
|
|
shadow_me_mask = 0ull;
|
|
|
|
shadow_host_writable_mask = EPT_SPTE_HOST_WRITABLE;
|
|
shadow_mmu_writable_mask = EPT_SPTE_MMU_WRITABLE;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* EPT Misconfigurations are generated if the value of bits 2:0
|
|
* of an EPT paging-structure entry is 110b (write/execute).
|
|
*/
|
|
kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(VMX_EPT_MISCONFIG_WX_VALUE,
|
|
VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks);
|
|
|
|
void kvm_mmu_reset_all_pte_masks(void)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 low_phys_bits;
|
|
u64 mask;
|
|
|
|
shadow_phys_bits = kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits();
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the CPU has 46 or less physical address bits, then set an
|
|
* appropriate mask to guard against L1TF attacks. Otherwise, it is
|
|
* assumed that the CPU is not vulnerable to L1TF.
|
|
*
|
|
* Some Intel CPUs address the L1 cache using more PA bits than are
|
|
* reported by CPUID. Use the PA width of the L1 cache when possible
|
|
* to achieve more effective mitigation, e.g. if system RAM overlaps
|
|
* the most significant bits of legal physical address space.
|
|
*/
|
|
shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask = 0;
|
|
low_phys_bits = boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits;
|
|
if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF) &&
|
|
!WARN_ON_ONCE(boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_bits >=
|
|
52 - SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN)) {
|
|
low_phys_bits = boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_bits
|
|
- SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN;
|
|
shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask =
|
|
rsvd_bits(low_phys_bits, boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_bits - 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask =
|
|
GENMASK_ULL(low_phys_bits - 1, PAGE_SHIFT);
|
|
|
|
shadow_user_mask = PT_USER_MASK;
|
|
shadow_accessed_mask = PT_ACCESSED_MASK;
|
|
shadow_dirty_mask = PT_DIRTY_MASK;
|
|
shadow_nx_mask = PT64_NX_MASK;
|
|
shadow_x_mask = 0;
|
|
shadow_present_mask = PT_PRESENT_MASK;
|
|
shadow_acc_track_mask = 0;
|
|
shadow_me_mask = sme_me_mask;
|
|
|
|
shadow_host_writable_mask = DEFAULT_SPTE_HOST_WRITABLE;
|
|
shadow_mmu_writable_mask = DEFAULT_SPTE_MMU_WRITABLE;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set a reserved PA bit in MMIO SPTEs to generate page faults with
|
|
* PFEC.RSVD=1 on MMIO accesses. 64-bit PTEs (PAE, x86-64, and EPT
|
|
* paging) support a maximum of 52 bits of PA, i.e. if the CPU supports
|
|
* 52-bit physical addresses then there are no reserved PA bits in the
|
|
* PTEs and so the reserved PA approach must be disabled.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (shadow_phys_bits < 52)
|
|
mask = BIT_ULL(51) | PT_PRESENT_MASK;
|
|
else
|
|
mask = 0;
|
|
|
|
kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(mask, mask, ACC_WRITE_MASK | ACC_USER_MASK);
|
|
}
|