linux/security/selinux/include
Linus Torvalds 17ae69aba8 Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
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Merge tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris:
 "Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün.

  Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing.

  From Mickaël's cover letter:
    "The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g.
     global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
     is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security
     sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing
     system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to
     help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious
     behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any
     process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict
     themselves.

     Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering
     syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the
     use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the
     kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS
     sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD
     Pledge/Unveil.

     In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features.
     This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This
     series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the
     combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing,
     init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]"

  The cover letter and v34 posting is here:

      https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/

  See also:

      https://landlock.io/

  This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several
  years"

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2]

* tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features
  landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
  samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
  selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
  landlock: Add syscall implementations
  arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
  fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
  landlock: Support filesystem access-control
  LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
  landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
  landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
  landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
  landlock: Add object management
2021-05-01 18:50:44 -07:00
..
audit.h treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 500 2019-06-19 17:09:55 +02:00
avc_ss.h selinux: wrap AVC state 2018-03-20 16:58:17 -04:00
avc.h selinux: fall back to ref-walk if audit is required 2019-12-09 18:37:47 -05:00
classmap.h selinux: add proper NULL termination to the secclass_map permissions 2021-04-21 21:43:25 -04:00
conditional.h selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs 2020-08-17 20:50:22 -04:00
ibpkey.h selinux: move ibpkeys code under CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND. 2020-01-10 11:56:37 -05:00
ima.h selinux: measure state and policy capabilities 2021-03-08 19:39:07 -05:00
initial_sid_to_string.h selinux: remove unused initial SIDs and improve handling 2020-02-27 19:34:24 -05:00
netif.h treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 500 2019-06-19 17:09:55 +02:00
netlabel.h selinux: netlabel: Remove unused inline function 2020-05-12 20:16:33 -04:00
netnode.h treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 295 2019-06-05 17:36:38 +02:00
netport.h treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 295 2019-06-05 17:36:38 +02:00
objsec.h LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock 2021-04-22 12:22:10 -07:00
policycap_names.h scripts/selinux,selinux: update mdp to enable policy capabilities 2020-08-17 20:42:00 -04:00
policycap.h scripts/selinux,selinux: update mdp to enable policy capabilities 2020-08-17 20:42:00 -04:00
security.h selinux/stable-5.13 PR 20210426 2021-04-27 13:42:11 -07:00
xfrm.h lsm,selinux: pass flowi_common instead of flowi to the LSM hooks 2020-11-23 18:36:21 -05:00