linux/fs/internal.h
Linus Torvalds cf619f8919 fs.ovl.setgid.v6.2
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Merge tag 'fs.ovl.setgid.v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping

Pull setgid inheritance updates from Christian Brauner:
 "This contains the work to make setgid inheritance consistent between
  modifying a file and when changing ownership or mode as this has been
  a repeated source of very subtle bugs. The gist is that we perform the
  same permission checks in the write path as we do in the ownership and
  mode changing paths after this series where we're currently doing
  different things.

  We've already made setgid inheritance a lot more consistent and
  reliable in the last releases by moving setgid stripping from the
  individual filesystems up into the vfs. This aims to make the logic
  even more consistent and easier to understand and also to fix
  long-standing overlayfs setgid inheritance bugs. Miklos was nice
  enough to just let me carry the trivial overlayfs patches from Amir
  too.

  Below is a more detailed explanation how the current difference in
  setgid handling lead to very subtle bugs exemplified via overlayfs
  which is a victim of the current rules. I hope this explains why I
  think taking the regression risk here is worth it.

  A long while ago I found a few setgid inheritance bugs in overlayfs in
  the write path in certain conditions. Amir recently picked this back
  up in [1] and I jumped on board to fix this more generally.

  On the surface all that overlayfs would need to fix setgid inheritance
  would be to call file_remove_privs() or file_modified() but actually
  that isn't enough because the setgid inheritance api is wildly
  inconsistent in that area.

  Before this pr setgid stripping in file_remove_privs()'s old
  should_remove_suid() helper was inconsistent with other parts of the
  vfs. Specifically, it only raises ATTR_KILL_SGID if the inode is
  S_ISGID and S_IXGRP but not if the inode isn't in the caller's groups
  and the caller isn't privileged over the inode although we require
  this already in setattr_prepare() and setattr_copy() and so all
  filesystem implement this requirement implicitly because they have to
  use setattr_{prepare,copy}() anyway.

  But the inconsistency shows up in setgid stripping bugs for overlayfs
  in xfstests (e.g., generic/673, generic/683, generic/685, generic/686,
  generic/687). For example, we test whether suid and setgid stripping
  works correctly when performing various write-like operations as an
  unprivileged user (fallocate, reflink, write, etc.):

      echo "Test 1 - qa_user, non-exec file $verb"
      setup_testfile
      chmod a+rws $junk_file
      commit_and_check "$qa_user" "$verb" 64k 64k

  The test basically creates a file with 6666 permissions. While the
  file has the S_ISUID and S_ISGID bits set it does not have the S_IXGRP
  set.

  On a regular filesystem like xfs what will happen is:

      sys_fallocate()
      -> vfs_fallocate()
         -> xfs_file_fallocate()
            -> file_modified()
               -> __file_remove_privs()
                  -> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
                     -> should_remove_suid()
                  -> __remove_privs()
                     newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_FORCE | kill;
                     -> notify_change()
                        -> setattr_copy()

  In should_remove_suid() we can see that ATTR_KILL_SUID is raised
  unconditionally because the file in the test has S_ISUID set.

  But we also see that ATTR_KILL_SGID won't be set because while the
  file is S_ISGID it is not S_IXGRP (see above) which is a condition for
  ATTR_KILL_SGID being raised.

  So by the time we call notify_change() we have attr->ia_valid set to
  ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_FORCE.

  Now notify_change() sees that ATTR_KILL_SUID is set and does:

      ia_valid      = attr->ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE
      attr->ia_mode = (inode->i_mode & ~S_ISUID);

  which means that when we call setattr_copy() later we will definitely
  update inode->i_mode. Note that attr->ia_mode still contains S_ISGID.

  Now we call into the filesystem's ->setattr() inode operation which
  will end up calling setattr_copy(). Since ATTR_MODE is set we will
  hit:

      if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
              umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode;
              vfsgid_t vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode);
              if (!vfsgid_in_group_p(vfsgid) &&
                  !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_FSETID))
                      mode &= ~S_ISGID;
              inode->i_mode = mode;
      }

  and since the caller in the test is neither capable nor in the group
  of the inode the S_ISGID bit is stripped.

  But assume the file isn't suid then ATTR_KILL_SUID won't be raised
  which has the consequence that neither the setgid nor the suid bits
  are stripped even though it should be stripped because the inode isn't
  in the caller's groups and the caller isn't privileged over the inode.

  If overlayfs is in the mix things become a bit more complicated and
  the bug shows up more clearly.

  When e.g., ovl_setattr() is hit from ovl_fallocate()'s call to
  file_remove_privs() then ATTR_KILL_SUID and ATTR_KILL_SGID might be
  raised but because the check in notify_change() is questioning the
  ATTR_KILL_SGID flag again by requiring S_IXGRP for it to be stripped
  the S_ISGID bit isn't removed even though it should be stripped:

      sys_fallocate()
      -> vfs_fallocate()
         -> ovl_fallocate()
            -> file_remove_privs()
               -> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
                  -> should_remove_suid()
               -> __remove_privs()
                  newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_FORCE | kill;
                  -> notify_change()
                     -> ovl_setattr()
                        /* TAKE ON MOUNTER'S CREDS */
                        -> ovl_do_notify_change()
                           -> notify_change()
                        /* GIVE UP MOUNTER'S CREDS */
           /* TAKE ON MOUNTER'S CREDS */
           -> vfs_fallocate()
              -> xfs_file_fallocate()
                 -> file_modified()
                    -> __file_remove_privs()
                       -> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
                          -> should_remove_suid()
                       -> __remove_privs()
                          newattrs.ia_valid = attr_force | kill;
                          -> notify_change()

  The fix for all of this is to make file_remove_privs()'s
  should_remove_suid() helper perform the same checks as we already
  require in setattr_prepare() and setattr_copy() and have
  notify_change() not pointlessly requiring S_IXGRP again. It doesn't
  make any sense in the first place because the caller must calculate
  the flags via should_remove_suid() anyway which would raise
  ATTR_KILL_SGID

  Note that some xfstests will now fail as these patches will cause the
  setgid bit to be lost in certain conditions for unprivileged users
  modifying a setgid file when they would've been kept otherwise. I
  think this risk is worth taking and I explained and mentioned this
  multiple times on the list [2].

  Enforcing the rules consistently across write operations and
  chmod/chown will lead to losing the setgid bit in cases were it
  might've been retained before.

  While I've mentioned this a few times but it's worth repeating just to
  make sure that this is understood. For the sake of maintainability,
  consistency, and security this is a risk worth taking.

  If we really see regressions for workloads the fix is to have special
  setgid handling in the write path again with different semantics from
  chmod/chown and possibly additional duct tape for overlayfs. I'll
  update the relevant xfstests with if you should decide to merge this
  second setgid cleanup.

  Before that people should be aware that there might be failures for
  fstests where unprivileged users modify a setgid file"

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20221003123040.900827-1-amir73il@gmail.com [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20221122142010.zchf2jz2oymx55qi@wittgenstein [2]

* tag 'fs.ovl.setgid.v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping:
  fs: use consistent setgid checks in is_sxid()
  ovl: remove privs in ovl_fallocate()
  ovl: remove privs in ovl_copyfile()
  attr: use consistent sgid stripping checks
  attr: add setattr_should_drop_sgid()
  fs: move should_remove_suid()
  attr: add in_group_or_capable()
2022-12-12 19:03:10 -08:00

266 lines
7.1 KiB
C

/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
/* fs/ internal definitions
*
* Copyright (C) 2006 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
*/
struct super_block;
struct file_system_type;
struct iomap;
struct iomap_ops;
struct linux_binprm;
struct path;
struct mount;
struct shrink_control;
struct fs_context;
struct user_namespace;
struct pipe_inode_info;
struct iov_iter;
/*
* block/bdev.c
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
extern void __init bdev_cache_init(void);
void emergency_thaw_bdev(struct super_block *sb);
#else
static inline void bdev_cache_init(void)
{
}
static inline int emergency_thaw_bdev(struct super_block *sb)
{
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_BLOCK */
/*
* buffer.c
*/
int __block_write_begin_int(struct folio *folio, loff_t pos, unsigned len,
get_block_t *get_block, const struct iomap *iomap);
/*
* char_dev.c
*/
extern void __init chrdev_init(void);
/*
* fs_context.c
*/
extern const struct fs_context_operations legacy_fs_context_ops;
extern int parse_monolithic_mount_data(struct fs_context *, void *);
extern void vfs_clean_context(struct fs_context *fc);
extern int finish_clean_context(struct fs_context *fc);
/*
* namei.c
*/
extern int filename_lookup(int dfd, struct filename *name, unsigned flags,
struct path *path, struct path *root);
extern int vfs_path_lookup(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *,
const char *, unsigned int, struct path *);
int do_rmdir(int dfd, struct filename *name);
int do_unlinkat(int dfd, struct filename *name);
int may_linkat(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, const struct path *link);
int do_renameat2(int olddfd, struct filename *oldname, int newdfd,
struct filename *newname, unsigned int flags);
int do_mkdirat(int dfd, struct filename *name, umode_t mode);
int do_symlinkat(struct filename *from, int newdfd, struct filename *to);
int do_linkat(int olddfd, struct filename *old, int newdfd,
struct filename *new, int flags);
/*
* namespace.c
*/
extern struct vfsmount *lookup_mnt(const struct path *);
extern int finish_automount(struct vfsmount *, const struct path *);
extern int sb_prepare_remount_readonly(struct super_block *);
extern void __init mnt_init(void);
extern int __mnt_want_write_file(struct file *);
extern void __mnt_drop_write_file(struct file *);
extern void dissolve_on_fput(struct vfsmount *);
extern bool may_mount(void);
int path_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
const char *type_page, unsigned long flags, void *data_page);
int path_umount(struct path *path, int flags);
/*
* fs_struct.c
*/
extern void chroot_fs_refs(const struct path *, const struct path *);
/*
* file_table.c
*/
extern struct file *alloc_empty_file(int, const struct cred *);
extern struct file *alloc_empty_file_noaccount(int, const struct cred *);
static inline void put_file_access(struct file *file)
{
if ((file->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ) {
i_readcount_dec(file->f_inode);
} else if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITER) {
put_write_access(file->f_inode);
__mnt_drop_write(file->f_path.mnt);
}
}
/*
* super.c
*/
extern int reconfigure_super(struct fs_context *);
extern bool trylock_super(struct super_block *sb);
struct super_block *user_get_super(dev_t, bool excl);
void put_super(struct super_block *sb);
extern bool mount_capable(struct fs_context *);
/*
* open.c
*/
struct open_flags {
int open_flag;
umode_t mode;
int acc_mode;
int intent;
int lookup_flags;
};
extern struct file *do_filp_open(int dfd, struct filename *pathname,
const struct open_flags *op);
extern struct file *do_file_open_root(const struct path *,
const char *, const struct open_flags *);
extern struct open_how build_open_how(int flags, umode_t mode);
extern int build_open_flags(const struct open_how *how, struct open_flags *op);
extern struct file *__close_fd_get_file(unsigned int fd);
long do_sys_ftruncate(unsigned int fd, loff_t length, int small);
int chmod_common(const struct path *path, umode_t mode);
int do_fchownat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, uid_t user, gid_t group,
int flag);
int chown_common(const struct path *path, uid_t user, gid_t group);
extern int vfs_open(const struct path *, struct file *);
/*
* inode.c
*/
extern long prune_icache_sb(struct super_block *sb, struct shrink_control *sc);
int dentry_needs_remove_privs(struct user_namespace *, struct dentry *dentry);
bool in_group_or_capable(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
const struct inode *inode, vfsgid_t vfsgid);
/*
* fs-writeback.c
*/
extern long get_nr_dirty_inodes(void);
extern int invalidate_inodes(struct super_block *, bool);
/*
* dcache.c
*/
extern int d_set_mounted(struct dentry *dentry);
extern long prune_dcache_sb(struct super_block *sb, struct shrink_control *sc);
extern struct dentry *d_alloc_cursor(struct dentry *);
extern struct dentry * d_alloc_pseudo(struct super_block *, const struct qstr *);
extern char *simple_dname(struct dentry *, char *, int);
extern void dput_to_list(struct dentry *, struct list_head *);
extern void shrink_dentry_list(struct list_head *);
/*
* pipe.c
*/
extern const struct file_operations pipefifo_fops;
/*
* fs_pin.c
*/
extern void group_pin_kill(struct hlist_head *p);
extern void mnt_pin_kill(struct mount *m);
/*
* fs/nsfs.c
*/
extern const struct dentry_operations ns_dentry_operations;
/* direct-io.c: */
int sb_init_dio_done_wq(struct super_block *sb);
/*
* fs/stat.c:
*/
int getname_statx_lookup_flags(int flags);
int do_statx(int dfd, struct filename *filename, unsigned int flags,
unsigned int mask, struct statx __user *buffer);
/*
* fs/splice.c:
*/
long splice_file_to_pipe(struct file *in,
struct pipe_inode_info *opipe,
loff_t *offset,
size_t len, unsigned int flags);
/*
* fs/xattr.c:
*/
struct xattr_name {
char name[XATTR_NAME_MAX + 1];
};
struct xattr_ctx {
/* Value of attribute */
union {
const void __user *cvalue;
void __user *value;
};
void *kvalue;
size_t size;
/* Attribute name */
struct xattr_name *kname;
unsigned int flags;
};
ssize_t do_getxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *d,
struct xattr_ctx *ctx);
int setxattr_copy(const char __user *name, struct xattr_ctx *ctx);
int do_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
struct xattr_ctx *ctx);
int may_write_xattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode);
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL
int do_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
const char *acl_name, const void *kvalue, size_t size);
ssize_t do_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
const char *acl_name, void *kvalue, size_t size);
#else
static inline int do_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
const void *kvalue, size_t size)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static inline ssize_t do_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
void *kvalue, size_t size)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
#endif
ssize_t __kernel_write_iter(struct file *file, struct iov_iter *from, loff_t *pos);
/*
* fs/attr.c
*/
int setattr_should_drop_sgid(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
const struct inode *inode);