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ec596aaf9b
None of this code can be enabled any more. Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
238 lines
7.0 KiB
C
238 lines
7.0 KiB
C
/*
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* COPYRIGHT (c) 2008
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* The Regents of the University of Michigan
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* ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
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*
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* Permission is granted to use, copy, create derivative works
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* and redistribute this software and such derivative works
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* for any purpose, so long as the name of The University of
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* Michigan is not used in any advertising or publicity
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* pertaining to the use of distribution of this software
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* without specific, written prior authorization. If the
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* above copyright notice or any other identification of the
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* University of Michigan is included in any copy of any
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* portion of this software, then the disclaimer below must
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* also be included.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED AS IS, WITHOUT REPRESENTATION
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* FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AS TO ITS FITNESS FOR ANY
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* PURPOSE, AND WITHOUT WARRANTY BY THE UNIVERSITY OF
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* MICHIGAN OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
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* WITHOUT LIMITATION THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE
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* REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SHALL NOT BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DAMAGES, INCLUDING SPECIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, OR
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* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, WITH RESPECT TO ANY CLAIM ARISING
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* OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OF THE SOFTWARE, EVEN
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* IF IT HAS BEEN OR IS HEREAFTER ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGES.
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*/
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#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
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#include <linux/types.h>
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#include <linux/jiffies.h>
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#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h>
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#include <linux/pagemap.h>
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#include "gss_krb5_internal.h"
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#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
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# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
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#endif
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/*
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* We can shift data by up to LOCAL_BUF_LEN bytes in a pass. If we need
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* to do more than that, we shift repeatedly. Kevin Coffman reports
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* seeing 28 bytes as the value used by Microsoft clients and servers
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* with AES, so this constant is chosen to allow handling 28 in one pass
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* without using too much stack space.
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*
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* If that proves to a problem perhaps we could use a more clever
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* algorithm.
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*/
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#define LOCAL_BUF_LEN 32u
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static void rotate_buf_a_little(struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int shift)
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{
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char head[LOCAL_BUF_LEN];
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char tmp[LOCAL_BUF_LEN];
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unsigned int this_len, i;
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BUG_ON(shift > LOCAL_BUF_LEN);
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read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, 0, head, shift);
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for (i = 0; i + shift < buf->len; i += LOCAL_BUF_LEN) {
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this_len = min(LOCAL_BUF_LEN, buf->len - (i + shift));
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read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, i+shift, tmp, this_len);
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write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(buf, i, tmp, this_len);
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}
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write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(buf, buf->len - shift, head, shift);
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}
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static void _rotate_left(struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int shift)
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{
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int shifted = 0;
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int this_shift;
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shift %= buf->len;
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while (shifted < shift) {
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this_shift = min(shift - shifted, LOCAL_BUF_LEN);
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rotate_buf_a_little(buf, this_shift);
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shifted += this_shift;
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}
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}
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static void rotate_left(u32 base, struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int shift)
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{
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struct xdr_buf subbuf;
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xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &subbuf, base, buf->len - base);
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_rotate_left(&subbuf, shift);
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}
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u32
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gss_krb5_wrap_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset,
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struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages)
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{
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u8 *ptr;
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time64_t now;
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u8 flags = 0x00;
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__be16 *be16ptr;
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__be64 *be64ptr;
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u32 err;
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dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__);
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/* make room for gss token header */
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if (xdr_extend_head(buf, offset, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN))
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return GSS_S_FAILURE;
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/* construct gss token header */
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ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
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*ptr++ = (unsigned char) ((KG2_TOK_WRAP>>8) & 0xff);
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*ptr++ = (unsigned char) (KG2_TOK_WRAP & 0xff);
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if ((kctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR) == 0)
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flags |= KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR;
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if ((kctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY) != 0)
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flags |= KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_ACCEPTORSUBKEY;
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/* We always do confidentiality in wrap tokens */
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flags |= KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SEALED;
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*ptr++ = flags;
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*ptr++ = 0xff;
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be16ptr = (__be16 *)ptr;
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*be16ptr++ = 0;
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/* "inner" token header always uses 0 for RRC */
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*be16ptr++ = 0;
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be64ptr = (__be64 *)be16ptr;
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*be64ptr = cpu_to_be64(atomic64_fetch_inc(&kctx->seq_send64));
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err = (*kctx->gk5e->encrypt)(kctx, offset, buf, pages);
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if (err)
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return err;
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now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
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return (kctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
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}
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u32
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gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len,
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struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int *slack,
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unsigned int *align)
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{
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time64_t now;
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u8 *ptr;
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u8 flags = 0x00;
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u16 ec, rrc;
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int err;
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u32 headskip, tailskip;
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u8 decrypted_hdr[GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN];
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unsigned int movelen;
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dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__);
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ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
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if (be16_to_cpu(*((__be16 *)ptr)) != KG2_TOK_WRAP)
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return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
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flags = ptr[2];
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if ((!kctx->initiate && (flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR)) ||
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(kctx->initiate && !(flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR)))
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return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
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if ((flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SEALED) == 0) {
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dprintk("%s: token missing expected sealed flag\n", __func__);
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return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
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}
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if (ptr[3] != 0xff)
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return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
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ec = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)(ptr + 4));
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rrc = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)(ptr + 6));
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/*
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* NOTE: the sequence number at ptr + 8 is skipped, rpcsec_gss
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* doesn't want it checked; see page 6 of rfc 2203.
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*/
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if (rrc != 0)
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rotate_left(offset + 16, buf, rrc);
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err = (*kctx->gk5e->decrypt)(kctx, offset, len, buf,
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&headskip, &tailskip);
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if (err)
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return GSS_S_FAILURE;
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/*
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* Retrieve the decrypted gss token header and verify
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* it against the original
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*/
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err = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf,
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len - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN - tailskip,
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decrypted_hdr, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN);
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if (err) {
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dprintk("%s: error %u getting decrypted_hdr\n", __func__, err);
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return GSS_S_FAILURE;
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}
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if (memcmp(ptr, decrypted_hdr, 6)
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|| memcmp(ptr + 8, decrypted_hdr + 8, 8)) {
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dprintk("%s: token hdr, plaintext hdr mismatch!\n", __func__);
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return GSS_S_FAILURE;
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}
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/* do sequencing checks */
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/* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */
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now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
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if (now > kctx->endtime)
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return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
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/*
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* Move the head data back to the right position in xdr_buf.
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* We ignore any "ec" data since it might be in the head or
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* the tail, and we really don't need to deal with it.
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* Note that buf->head[0].iov_len may indicate the available
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* head buffer space rather than that actually occupied.
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*/
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movelen = min_t(unsigned int, buf->head[0].iov_len, len);
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movelen -= offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip;
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BUG_ON(offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip + movelen >
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buf->head[0].iov_len);
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memmove(ptr, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip, movelen);
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buf->head[0].iov_len -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip;
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buf->len = len - (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip);
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/* Trim off the trailing "extra count" and checksum blob */
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xdr_buf_trim(buf, ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip);
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*align = XDR_QUADLEN(GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip);
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*slack = *align + XDR_QUADLEN(ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip);
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return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
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}
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